Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.:— This Revision Petition was preferred by the petitioner against an order dated 17th November, 1999 of ARC allowing an Eviction Petition of landlord. At the time of filing of the petition on 24th April, 2000, the petitioner had contended that there was no record to show that respondent was owner of the premises. He was only attorney of the owner and had no right in the suit premises. The notice was issued to the respondent limited to the question of ownership of the suit premises.

2. The petition for eviction in respect of property No. C-3/2, Janak Puri under Section 14 (1)(e) DRC Act was filed by Sh. Mahesh Prasad Srivastava, respondent, on the ground of his bona fide requirement. The relationship of landlord and tenant was not disputed. Undisputedly, the premises was also let out for residential purpose. The bona fide requirement of the landlord was established through cogent evidence. However, the tenant had taken an objection that Sh. Mahesh Prasad Srivastava was not the owner of the premises. He was only an attorney of the owner and the petition under Section 14(1)(e) was not maintainable. Whereas, the contention of the landlord was that this property was initially purchased by his elder brother Sh. J.P Srivastava as karta of the family and Sh. J.P Srivastava had duly authorized him to let it out at that time. Later on, by way of a family settlement, the property fell in his share. He proved the record of family settlement deed as exhibit AW-1/1 and affidavit of his elder brother Sh. J.P Srivastava executed in his favour, as AW-1/2.

3. Sh. J.P Srivastava had also executed GPA and an affidavit in favour of his younger brother Sh. Mahesh Prasad Srivastava. The learned ARC observed that the landlord had sufficiently proved his ownership for the purpose of Delhi Rent Control Act and the tenant was estopped from challenging ownership from the landlord.

4. The petitioner assailed the order of the learned ARC on the ground that the learned ARC erred in holding that the property was purchased by Sh.J.P Srivastava as karta and a family settlement was made. The respondent No. 1 had failed to prove that there was an HUF or Sh. J.P Srivastava was karta of HUF. It is further argued that there were contradictory findings given by the learned ARC. On one hand, ARC observed that Sh.J.P Srivastava had executed a GPA and an affidavit by virtue of which the ownership rights were transferred and on the other hand, it was stated that there was a family settlement. It is argued by the tenant that there was an effort on part of Sh. Mahesh Prasad Srivastava to grab the property of his brother. The family settlement relied upon by the landlord was not registered document. The rent receipt executed by the landlord shows that he had signed the rent receipt as attorney of Sh. J.P Srivastava. The plea taken by the landlord that he was owner was a baseless plea.

5. It is argued by counsel for the petitioner that Mahavir Prasad respondent had been holding himself to be the owner of property even in 1981. He had constructed the property after this plot came to his share in family settlement. Moreover in view of affidavit of his brother Sh. J.P Srivastava given in the Court no doubt can be raised about ownership of respondent.

6. It is settled law that under Delhi Rent Control Act, a landlord seeking eviction of premises for his bona fide requirement is not required to show his absolute ownership over the property. The word ‘owner’ has not been defined in the Act and concept of ownership for the purpose of Delhi Rent Control Act has to be understood in proper context. If a person has let out the premises as an Attorney of some other person for the benefit of some other person and he is only collecting rents and passing it on to the person for whose benefit the premises is let out, then such a person cannot be considered as owner unless he is able to show that the person for whom he is acting has relinquished his rights in his favour and after letting it out as Attorney he subsequently became the owner. This Court on a number of occasions, held that the concept of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act is different from the concept of ownership under Transfer of Property Act and ownership under DRC Act it is not the absolute ownership. The properties in Delhi have been changing hands on the basis of various kinds of documents. There was a time in Delhi when sale and purchase of properties was not easily registered and in order to overcome this, the persons living in Delhi devised different modes of transferring the interest and started preparing a set of documents like General Power of Attorney, affidavits, money receipts, ‘Will’, etc. This Court had recognized that these kind of documents by which interest in the property is transferred is sufficient to consider the ownership for the purpose of Delhi Rent Control Act and the landlord is not required to show absolute ownership. In Sushil Kanta Chakravarty v. Rajeshwar Kumar.., 79(99) 1999 DLT 210 : 1999 (49) DRJ 723 this Court has held that in case of a petition under Section 14 (1)(e) in order to show the ownership it was not necessary to show absolute ownership and the legislature used the word ‘owner’ in Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act not in the sense of absolute owner but it was used in contradistinction with a landlord as defined in the act who is not an owner but who holds the property for the benefit of another person and merely collects the rent. If the person collected the rents for himself and for his own benefit and the property is his own even in the loose sense and no one is claiming rights over the property then he is considered an owner for the purpose of Section 14 (1)(e). Even possessory rights over the property of a person have been given recognition as ownership vis-a-vis tenant under Delhi Rent Control Act. In Shanti Sharma v. Ved Prabha, (1987) 4 SCC 193, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the import of word ‘owner’ in context of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act and observed as under:

14. The word ‘owner’ has not been defined in this Act and the word ‘owner’ has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be is that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Govt. or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the Legislature when it used the term ‘owner’ in the provision of Section’ 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term ‘owner’ has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase ‘owner’ thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term ‘owner’ is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term ‘owner’ as is contemplated under this Section.

This term came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court and it was also in reference to Section 14(1)(e) and it was held by the Delhi High Court in T.C Rekhi v. Smt. Usha Gujral [1971] Rent Control Journal Page 322 at 326 as under:

The word “owner” as used in this clause, has to be construed in the background of the purpose and object of enacting it. The use of the word ‘owner’ in this clause seems to me to have been inspired by the definition of the word ‘landlord’ as contained in Section 2(e) of the Act which is wide enough to include a person receiving or entitled to receive the rent of any premises on account of or on behalf of or for the benefit of any other person. Construed in the context in which the word “owner” is used in Clause (e), it seems to me to include all persons in the position of Smt. Usha Gujaral who have taken a long lease of sites from the Government for the purpose of building houses thereon. The concept of ownership seems now to be eclipsed by its social and political significance and the idea of ownership, in case like the present is one of the better right to be in possession and to obtain it. To accede to the contention raised by Shri Kapur would virtually nullify the effect of Clause (e) and would render all such landlords remedyless against tenants however badly they may need the premises for their own personal residence. I do not think such a result was intended by the Legislature and I repel the appellant's contention. I consider it proper before passing on to the next challenge to point out that the word “owner” as used in Clause (e) in Section 14(1) does not postulate absolute ownership in the sense that he has an absolutely unrestricted right to deal with the property as he likes. To describe some one as owner, and perhaps even as an absolute owner, of property is to say two things: it is to assert that his title to the property is indisputable and that he has all the rights of ownership allowed by the legal system in question. Rights of ownership may, therefore, be limited by special provisions of law and include in those provisions such as are in force in New Delhi according to which citizens are granted long leases of sites for constructing buildings thereon. Now, the words of a statute, though normally construed in their ordinary meaning, may contain inherent restrictions due to their subject matter and object and the occasion on which and the circumstances with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning part from the context (See Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition Vol. 36 Paragraph 843 P. 394). The meaning of the word “owner” in Clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellant's construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision.”

7. It is therefore evident that the landlord herein was not supposed to prove absolute ownership. He was only to prove that he was something more than tenant and he was collecting rents not for his brother but for himself. It was not for the tenant to challenge the family settlement arrived at between landlord and his elder brother. Only Sh. J.P Srivastava, the elder brother of the landlord could have challenged the family settlement and plea of ownership taken by the landlord. It is not the case of the tenant/petitioner herein that at any point of time, Sh.J.P Srivastava staked his claim over the property and asks the tenant to pay rent to him directly or not to vacate the property. An affidavit by Sh.J.P Srivastava filed in the Court is exhibit AW-1/2 and by this affidavit Sh.J.P Srivastava had deposed that he has authorized the petitioner/landlord to recover the possession of the premises. The family settlement arrived at between Sh. J.P Srivastava and the landlord, his younger brother was also proved on record as AW-1/1. In family settlement it has been specifically stated that ownership rights of the premises in question shall vest completely and absolutely in favour of the petitioner.

8. Counsel for the petitioner contended that a family settlement is required to be registered and if it is not registered it cannot be looked into. As already stated this Court has not to look into the ownership of respondent for the purpose of the Transfer of Property Act. If Sh. J. P. Srivastava or other family member had challenged the family settlement, the Court could look it from the angle of the Transfer of Property Act. But a tenant cannot challenge the family settlement nor can ask the Court to ignore the document on the ground of its not having been registered. Even other wise, in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1976 (3) SCC 119, Supreme Court observed as under:

“10. In other words to put the binding effect and the essentials of a family settlement in a concretised form, the matter may be reduced into the form of the following propositions:

(1) The family settlement must be a bona fide one so as to resolve family disputes and rival claims by a fair and equitable division or allotment or properties, between the various members of the family;

(2) The said settlement must be voluntary and should not be induced by fraud, coercion or undue influence;

(3) The family arrangement may be even oral in which case no registration is necessary;

(4) It is well-settled that registration would be necessary only if the terms of the family arrangement are reduced into writing. Here also, a distinction should be made between a document containing the terms and recitals of a family arrangement made under the document and a mere memorandum prepared after the family arrangement had already been made either for the purpose of the record or for information of the Court for making necessary mutation. In such a case the memorandum itself does not create or extinguish any rights in immovable properties and therefore does not fall within the mischief of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act and is, therefore, not compulsorily registrable;

(5) The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claims or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same;

(6) Even if bona fide disputes, present or possible, which may not involve legal claims are settled by a bona fide family arrangement which is fair and equitable the family arrangement is final and binding on the parties to the settlement.”

9. The landlord was cross examined at length by the petitioner/tenant and in his cross examination he had categorically stated that though the property stood in name of his elder brother in L&DO but he had applied for mutation as the property belongs to him in terms of family settlement. It is he who constructed the property. He stated that he got the electricity connection installed in the premises in his own name. Water connection was in his own name.

10. It is apparent from the evidence recorded by the Trial Court and from the documents that the respondent was owner of premises and the plea raised by the tenant regarding ownership was a bogus plea and raised just to deprive the landlord of his property at the time when he needed it bona fidely. The respondent/landlord who needed the property had retired from the service and had to surrender the accommodation provided to him by the office and wanted the premises for his own residence but because of this bogus plea taken by the tenant the landlord has been deprived of the possession of his own premises for last about 9 years when this petition remained pending.

11. I consider that the petition is liable to be dismissed with heavy costs and is hereby dismissed with costs of Rs. 50,000/-.