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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking recovery of Rs. 84,17,996.80 along with Rs. 17,00,754/- claimed for non-supply of Central Sales Tax Form C. The suit arose from a super stockist agreement dated 20th April 1999, whereby defendant No. 1, a sole proprietorship of defendant No. 2, was appointed as a non-exclusive super stockist for Uttar Pradesh. Under the agreement, the plaintiff supplied goods to the defendants who were to sell them and make payments accordingly. The plaintiff alleged that despite regular supplies and payments, a large outstanding amount of Rs. 99,93,663.80 was due as of 1st April 2005. The plaintiff sent reminders and letters demanding payment, but the defendants delayed and made partial payments in May to July 2005. Subsequently, disputes arose, including a suit filed by the defendants in the Senior Civil Judge Court, Kanpur, seeking injunction against termination of the stockist agreement. The plaintiff then filed the present recovery suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaint discloses a cause of action for the suit filed by the plaintiff.
  2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation.
  3. Whether the suit is maintainable in view of the arbitration clause contained in the agreement and invoices between the parties.
  4. Whether the matter should be referred to arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The suit is barred under the Arbitration Act due to an arbitration clause in the invoices requiring disputes to be referred to an arbitrator before court proceedings.
  • The plaint does not disclose any cause of action, arguing that the cause of action stated as receipt of summons in the defendants' suit is irrelevant to recovery of money.
  • The suit is time barred; the defendants contend that the account is not a running account under the Limitation Act and payments made are not on account payments.
  • The suit is not maintainable as the arbitration clause mandates arbitration, and the defendants assert that referral to arbitration should only occur upon an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which they claim cannot be filed after the written statement.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaint discloses a cause of action supported by averments of supply, payments, running account maintenance, outstanding balance, and demand for payment.
  • The suit is not barred by limitation as payments were made as late as July 2005, and the issue of limitation requires evidence and cannot be decided at the preliminary stage.
  • The plaintiff agrees to refer the matter to arbitration in view of the arbitration agreement and opposes the defendants' attempt to avoid arbitration by procedural technicalities.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action. It found that despite the defendants' focus on the summons in the Kanpur suit, the plaint as a whole clearly showed supply of goods, payments, a running account, outstanding dues, and demand for payment, establishing cause of action. Regarding limitation, the court noted the plaintiff's specific averment of a running account and undisputed payments in mid-2005, concluding that limitation could not be decided at this stage without evidence and would be for the arbitrator to determine.

The court then addressed the arbitration clause issue. The defendants initially pleaded arbitration in their written statement but later resisted referral to arbitration on procedural grounds. The court held that the defendants' first objection in the written statement effectively constituted an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since the plaintiff consented to arbitration, the defendants could not retract this position. The court emphasized the legislative intent behind Section 89 of the CPC to encourage alternate dispute resolution, especially where parties have an arbitration agreement. Consequently, the court appointed an arbitrator and referred the disputes for adjudication, allowing both parties to raise claims and counterclaims.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF

The court disposed of the suit and related interlocutory application by referring the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement between the parties. The defendants were not permitted to avoid arbitration after initially pleading it. The arbitrator appointed was Mr. Justice S.K Aggarwal (Retd.), with a fixed fee to be shared equally. The direct effect is that the recovery suit will not proceed in the civil court but will be resolved through arbitration. No new precedent was established as the decision applied existing statutory provisions and procedural principles.

    Eastern Medikit Ltd. v. R.S. Sales Corporation

    A.K Sikri, J.— The plaintiff has filed this suit for recovery of Rs. 84,17,996.80. Further, a sum of Rs. 17,00,754/- is claimed on account of non-supply of Central Sales Tax Form C. The suit is founded on the allegations that the defendant No. 1 which is the sole proprietorship concern of the defendant No. 2 was appointed as stockist of the plaintiff and a super stockist agreement dated 20th April, 1999 was entered into between the parties. The defendant No. 1 was appointed as the super stockist for the territory of Uttar Pradesh on non-exclusive basis, Under the said agreement, the goods were to be supplied by the plaintiff to the defendants and the defendants were to sell those goods. It is averred that the plaintiff used to regularly supply material to the defendants and the defendants were sending payments on regular intervals. The plaintiff and the defendants were maintaining a running account, There are other allegations made in the plaint stating the reasons because of which disputes arose between the parties as according to the plaintiff there were huge outstanding and the plaintiff had to write various letters to the defendants for making the payments. As on 1st April, 2005 a sum of Rs. 99,93,663.80 became due and payable. The plaintiff addressed letter dated 25th May, 2005 bringing to the attention of the defendants the aforesaid outstanding and asking the defendants to liquidate the same. After various reminders, the defendants made some payments, the details whereof are given in para 13 of the plaint and which are as under:

    Date of cheque Amount Cheque details Date of credit 23.5.2005 Rs. 5,00,000/- 767284 Standard Chartered 4.6.2005 7.6.2005 Rs. 5,00,000/- 767285 Standard Chartered 13.6.2005 16.6.2005 Rs. 5,00,000/- 767286 Standard Chartered 22.6.2005 24.6.2005 Rs. 5,00,000/- 767287 Standard Chartered 29.6.2005 30.6.2005 Rs. 5,00,000/- 767288 Standard Chartered 8.7.2005

    2. It is further alleged that some differences between the defendant No. 2 and his father arose in respect of some family properties and on this pretext and to win the sympathy of the plaintiff, the defendants got huge credits from the plaintiff company. The plaintiff was expecting that the defendants would make payment. However, the defendants filed a suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kanpur for permanent injunction restraining the plaintiff herein from terminating the stockist agreement. On receiving the summons from the said Court in the aforesaid suit filed by the defendants, the plaintiff came to know of the intentions of the defendants that they were not willing to make further payment and wanted to entangle the plaintiff in some or the other litigation. Thus on coming to know of this intention, the plaintiff filed the instant suit for recovery.

    3. The defendants filed their written statement, inter alia, stating that the suit is barred under the provisions of the arbitration act as, admittedly the invoices issued by the plaintiff itself contained an arbitration clause which is in the following terms:

    “Disputes before referring to the Court would be referred to an Arbitrator.”

    4. Thereafter, present application has been filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking rejection/dismissal of the plaint/suit on the basis of same plea, namely, existence of an arbitration agreement between the parties, Apart from this ground, two other grounds are pressed by the learned Counsel for the defendants for dismissal of the suit and I shall deal with those submissions first. These are:

    (a) The suit does not disclose any cause of action. In this behalf, reference is made to para 27 of the plaint dealing with the cause of action and opening sentence of this para states that “cause of action arose on 1st August, 2005 when the plaintiff received summons of the suit filed by the defendants in Kanpur”. On the basis of this averment in the opening part of the said para, learned Counsel for the defendants submitted that receipt of summons in th suit filed by the defendants herein would not give cause of action as the cause of action should be relatable to the recovery of the money for which the suit is filed.

    While making this submission, learned Counsel has not taken other averments made in the same para into account wherein it is mentioned that cause of action arose when some correspondence was addressed by the plaintiff which was received back unserved and also when the letter dated 23rd August, 2005 was sent to the defendants informing the defendants of termination of tenancy. It is thus clear that the plaintiff had demanded the amount and entered into the correspondence in this behalf. The averments regarding receipt of summons in the suit filed by the defendant are made in the context that from receipt of this summons intention of the defendants not to pay the amount became clear. Therefore, when this para is read in its entirety and along with other averments made elsewhere in the plaint, it is clear that the plaintiff has in no uncertain terms stated that the plaintiff has supplied the material, received certain payments against the said material, was maintaining running account of transactions between the parties, balance due as per the said running account and demand made for payment of the said balance and the intention of the defendants in not making the payment which according to the plaintiff is clear from the fact that the defendants filed the suit for injunction in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Kanpur. Therefore, I am of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action and cannot be rejected on this ground.

    (b) Other plea raised by the defendants is that the suit filed by the plaintiff is time barred. It is sought to argue that the details when the material was supplied, are not given and the account maintained is not a running account which would fall into the ambit of Article 1 of the Schedule attached to the Limitation Act. It is further stated that certain payments which are made by the defendants to the plaintiff and reflected in para 13 cannot be treated as ‘on account payment’.

    5. As already pointed out above, the plaintiff has made a specific averment that it was maintaining a running account. Further, copy of the stock statement as maintained by the defendants itself on its letterhead is filed Annexure-A. Copy of the statement of account is also filed Annexure-B. The payments which are made by the defendants and particulars whereof are given in para 13 have not been disputed by the defendants. Thus payments are made in June and July, 2005. Therefore, issue of limitation cannot be decided at this stage. If the averments of the plaintiff are taken as correct (it is to be borne in mind while considering the application of the defendants under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC the Court is to look into the averments made in the plaint only), the suit prima facie does not appear to be time barred. It is, of course, an issue which is to be ultimately decided on evidence. In the present case, as would be noted in the latter part of the order, as I am relegating the parties to the arbitration, it would be for the Arbitrator to decide this issue after recording the evidence of the parties.

    6. The only other ground which remains is that the suit is not maintainable in view of the arbitration clause. This very plea, as already recorded above, is taken by the defendants in the written statement itself on the basis of which present application is filed. Curiously, when the plaintiff agreed that in view of the arbitration agreement between the parties the matter be referred to the Arbitrator, the defendants took somersault and the statement is made that the defendants do not want the matter to be referred to the arbitration. This attitude of the defendants is not at all understandable. The ingenuous plea taken at this stage is that the present application is filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC and the matter be referred to arbitration only when appropriate application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is filed. It is also submitted that after filing of the written statement, application under Section 8 could not have been filed by the defendants.

    7. No doubt, written statement has been filed. However, in the written statement the very first objection taken by the defendants is that the suit is barred under the provisions of the arbitration act and the arbitration clause contained in the invoices is reproduced by the defendants. Thus even when the written statement is filed strings are attached by challenging the maintainability of the suit in view of the said arbitration clause. Therefore, in such circumstances the first preliminary objection of the defendants contained in the written statement can be treated as an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It is more so when the plaintiff who has filed this suit has no objection for matter to be referred for the arbitration. The defendants after taking such a plea cannot now be allowed to wriggle out of it. Therefore, this plea in the application can be treated as an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation, 1996. At this stage, one may even refer to the provisions of section 89 of the cpc which empower a Court to refer the matter for arbitration, conciliation, mediation or Lok Adalat if the Court is of the opinion if it appears to the Court that there exists element of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties. There cannot be a better case where such element exists than a case where the parties themselves agree for referring the matter to the arbitration at the time of entering into the contract itself. The Legislature, by amending incorporation section 89 of the cpc in the year 2002, has intended that endeavour should be made by the Courts to encourage settlement of disputes by alternate dispute resolution mechanism. Keeping in view such a legislative intent and when ADR is to be encourage in a case like the present one where the parties had entered into an arbitration agreement, it would be in the interest of both the parties that the matter is referred for arbitration. Mr. Justice S.K Aggarwal, retired Judge of this Court, is appointed as the Arbitrator and the disputes raised by the plaintiff in this suit are referred to him for adjudication. The defendants shall also be entitled to raise its counter claims, if any, Fee is fixed at Rs. 1,10,000/- in lump sum to be shared equally by the parties.

    8. The suit and IA are disposed of in the aforesaid term.

    Suit and IA disposed of.
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    Comments

    Eastern Medikit Ltd. v. R.S. Sales Corporation
    (May 22, 2006)