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Case Number

Writ Petition No. 4598 of 1992

Judges

V.A Mohta
S.M Jhunjhunuwala, JJ.

Acts

provision of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 394 or of S. 394-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation
SECTION 1 BOMBAY RENTS HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE RATES CONTROL ACT 1947
avoided.6. Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act,
Sections 13(1)(1) and 13(1)(c)
1288, Section 14(1)(h)
Section 13(1)(h).

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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Landlord, Lakshminarayan Deo Public Trust, Swaminarayan Mandir, Dhule, had let a shop premises for commercial use to the deceased Bhavarlal Sukhlal Soni (the tenant). The tenant obtained another commercial premises in the town and, on that basis, the landlord filed a suit for recovery of possession relying on Clause 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that Section 13(1)(1) did not apply to tenancies for commercial purposes. On appeal the dismissal was set aside by reference to the Division Bench decision in Madhukar Vishnu Sathe v. Vithoba Ramji Thorat (AIR 1992 Bom 272). The legal heirs of the tenant filed the present petition. The learned Single Judge (Srikrishna, J.) observed conflicting decisions on the interpretation of Section 13(1)(1) and referred the question to a larger Bench. The Chief Justice placed the petition before this Bench for final disposal.

The Bench allowed the petition, set aside the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Dhule, and restored the order for possession passed by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Dhule. The petition was allowed and the rule made absolute; no order as to costs.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether Section 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 applies only to premises let out for residential use or whether it also applies to premises let out for commercial use.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gajanand v. Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, (1982) 1 Bom CR 259	Held that Section 13(1)(1) applies only to premises taken on lease for residential use.	The Bench held this decision correctly laid down the law and followed it.
Dattatraya Pandi Kharote v. Pandurang Maruti Jadhav, 1991 Bom RC 60	Held that Section 13(1)(1) applies only to residential tenancies.	The Bench accepted this decision as correctly stating the law and followed it.
Madhukar Vishnu Sathe v. Vithoba Ramji Thorat, AIR 1992 Bom 272	Held that Section 13(1)(1) also applies to premises taken for commercial use.	The Bench concluded this decision did not correctly lay down the law and declined to follow it.
S. Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal, AIR 1969 SC 1288	Interpreted a provision in the Delhi Rent Control Act (Section 14(1)(h)) similarly, supporting a residential-only reading of a comparable clause.	The Bench relied on this Supreme Court interpretation as supportive of the view that the provision is limited to residential use and approved related observations from Gopal Dass Varma.
Gopal Dass Varma v. Dr. S.K. Bhardwaj, AIR 1963 SC 337	Observed that when premises are used both for residence and profession, acquisition of a suitable residence does not justify termination on that ground alone.	The Bench cited these observations (as approved in S. Kartar Singh) to support a residential-limited reading of Section 13(1)(1).
Anirudhha Ramkrishna Karlekar v. Smt. Jankibai Raghunath Bedekar, 1990 Mah LJ 299; confirmed by the Supreme Court, AIR 1991 SC 503 (1991 (1) SCC 649)	Interpreted Clause 13(1)(c) of the Act broadly to include persons carrying on business with the tenant, indicating that that clause was not restricted to residential purposes.	The Bench held that decisions concerning Clause 13(1)(c) are not in pari materia with Clause 13(1)(1) and that it is unsafe to interpret 13(1)(1) by analogy to 13(1)(c); therefore this precedent could not be read as supporting extension of 13(1)(1) to commercial tenancies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with a plain language approach to Section 13(1)(1). The text of the provision—referring to a tenant who "has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence"—was read as directed to premises let out for residence. The Court observed that the legislative intention, though perhaps awkwardly worded, is to allow landlords to recover residential premises genuinely no longer needed by tenants who have obtained a suitable residence.

The Court rejected the proposition that the clause could be used to evict tenants of commercial premises who had obtained other suitable residence, reasoning that such a construction would produce an absurd result inconsistent with legislative purpose. The Court noted that residential and non-residential premises are treated differently by rent control legislation, and that excluding commercial leases from this ground is a matter of legislative policy rather than judicial construction.

The Bench considered the decision in Madhukar Vishnu Sathe, which expanded the clause to commercial use by relying on an interpretation of a different clause (13(1)(c)) in Anirudhha Karlekar. The Court explained that Sections 13(1)(1) and 13(1)(c) serve different purposes and are not in pari materia; therefore, it is unsafe to interpret one provision by applying the reasoning used for the other. While acknowledging the general rule that the same word appearing in different parts of a statute should normally receive the same meaning, the Court emphasized that context and legislative purpose are predominant considerations.

On this basis the Court concluded that Madhukar Sathe was wrongly decided, and that the earlier decisions in Gajanand and Dattatraya correctly interpreted Section 13(1)(1).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Section 13(1)(1) applies only to premises let out for residential use and does not extend to premises let for commercial purposes.

Direct consequences:

The reference was answered in favour of the view that Section 13(1)(1) is confined to residential tenancies.
The petition was allowed; the order of the Additional District Judge, Dhule was quashed and set aside; the order for possession passed by the 2nd Joint Civil Judge, Junior Division, Dhule was restored.
No order as to costs was made.

Broader implication noted by the Court: commercial leases are left outside the ambit of this eviction ground, which the Court described as a matter of legislative policy rather than judicial construction. The Court did not purport to establish any further novel principle beyond this interpretative conclusion.

Disposition: Petition allowed.

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Bhavarlal Sukhlal Soni, Since Deceased By His Heirs And Legal Representatives Narmadabai Etc. v. Lakshminarayan Deo Public Trust Swaminarayan Mandir .

V.A Mohta, J.:— This is a reference by the learned single Judge (Srikrishna, J.) to resolve the conflict of opinion as to interpretation of Section 13(1)(1) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (the Act).

2. In Gajanand v. Rashtriya Girni Kamgar Sangh, (1982) 1 Bom CR 259 (R.A Jahagirdar, J.) and in Dattatraya Pandi Kharote v. Pandurang Maruti Jadhav, 1991 Bom RC 60 (Ashok Agarwal, J.) have held that the provision applies only to the premises taken on lease for residential use. In Madhukar Vishnu Sathe v. Vithoba Ramji Thorat, AIR 1992 Bom 272 (V.V Kamat, J.) has taken a view that the provision would apply also to premises taken for commercial use.

3. Factual matrix lies in a narrow compass and it is this: Lakshminarayan Deo Public Trust, Swaminarayan Mandir, Dhule (the Landlord) had let out for commercial use the shop premises to deceased Bhavarlal Sukhlal Soni (tenant). The tenant secured another commercial premises in the town and on that basis a suit for recovery of possession of the premises under Clause 13(1)(1) was filed by the landlord. The trial Court dismissed the suit taking a view that Section 13(1)(1) is not attracted in cases of tenancy for commercial porposes. The said order of dismissal was set aside in appeal on the basis of the case of Madhukar Vishnu Sathe (AIR 1992 Bom 272) (supra). Aggrieved thereby, this petition was filed by the legal heirs of the tenant. During the course of hearing, the learned single Judge noticed the above conflict of opinions and hence referred the question to a larger Bench. The Hon'ble Chief Justice has been pleased to place the petition itself before us for final disposal.

4. We reproduce for ready reference the relevant portion of Section 13(1)(1):

“13. When landlord may recover possession:—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of sections 15 and 15a, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied—

(a) to (k) …. ….. ….. …..

(1) that the tenant after coming into operation of this Act has built, acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a suitable residence.”

5. The task of interpretation of the above provision uninfluenced by any judgment appears to be easy on applying the plain language formula. It is apparent that the clause applies only to the premises let out for residence. The object being to make available to landlords all residential premises really not needed by the tenants due to building, acquiring or being allotted a “suitable residence”. Though unhappily worded the above legislative intention is clearly discernible. It could not have been the legislative intention to evict the tenant of commercial premises because he secured other suitable residence. In a search of legislative intent, absurdities have always to be avoided.

6. Section 14(1)(h) of the Delhi Rent Control Act is almost similar to Section 13(1)(1) of the Act. In the case of S. Kartar Singh v. Chaman Lal, : AIR 1969 SC 1288, Section 14(1)(h) has been interpreted on the lines indicated above. In the said decision, following observations in the case of Dr. Gopal Dass Varma v. Dr. S.K Bhardwaj, AIR 1963 SC 337 have received approval (page 340):

“If the premises from which ejectment is sought are used not only for residence but also for profession how could S. 13(1)(h) come into operation? One of the purposes for which the tenancy is acquired is professional use, and that cannot be satisfied by the acquisition of premises which are suitable for residence alone, and it is the suitability for residence alone which is postulated by Section 13(1)(h). Therefore, in our opinion, it would be unreasonable to hold that tenancy which has been created or used both for residence and profession can be successfully terminated by merely by showing that the tenant has acquired a suitable residence.”

7. It is true that the above interpretation leaves the commercial leases completely out of the ambit of these provisions but it is a matter of legislative policy. Residential premises and non-residential premises have been made to stand on different pedestals in many Rent Control Legislations and there is nothing unusual about it.

8. Even in Madhukar Vishnu Sathe (AIR 1992 Bom 272) (supra), the learned single Judge has observed that in the first blush the impression can be carried that the provisions are meant only for premises let out for residential purposes. But the learned single Judge has based his view on the interpretation given to the word “residence” in Clause 13(1)(c) of the Act by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Anirudhha Ramkrishna Karlekar… v. Smt. Jankibai Raghunath Bedekar…., 1990 Mah LJ 299 which has been confirmed by the Supreme Court (1991 (1) SCC 649) : (AIR 1991 SC 503 at p. 505).

Clause 13(1)(c) reads thus:

“that the tenant or any person residing with the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, or has been convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes; or that the tenant has in respect of the premises been convicted of an offence of contravention of any provision of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of S. 394 or of S. 394-A of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act.”

The Division Bench has held that having regard to the language employed in the provision and its object, it could not have been the legislative intention to exclude the commercial leases from the clause pertaining to eviction on the ground of nuisance or annoyance or use for immoral or illegal purposes. Keeping that object in view the words “any person residing with the tenant” have been widely construed so as to include also a person carrying on business with the tenant. The later part of the provision pertaining to the contravention of the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act, though restricted to the City of Bombay, indicates that the clause as a whole was not meant only for residential purposes. Sections 13(1)(1) and 13(1)(c) are not in pari materia and it is quite unsafe to interpret one with reference to decisions dealing with the other. Section 13(1) enumerates several independent grounds of eviction and each has a different purpose. Arguments by analogy in matters like this can be — as in the instant case — misleading. It is true, as submitted by Shri Dalvi, learned Counsel for the respondents, that normally the same word appearing in different part of one statute should be given the same meaning, but all depends upon the context, legislative purpose being the predominent consideration.

9. Under the circumstances, in our view, Madhukar Sathe (AIR 1992 Bom 272) (supra) does not lay down law correctly and Dattatraya Pandit (1991 Bom RC 60) and Gajanand ((1982) Bom CR 259) (supra) have correctly laid down the law. Reference answered accordingly.

10. The whole petition has been transferred to us for final disposal. The inevitable consequence of the above answer to the reference is to allow the petition and to quash and set aside the order passed by the Additional District Judge, Dhule and to restore the order/for possession passed by the 2nd Jt. Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Dhule.

11. The petition is allowed and rule made absolute in the above terms. No order as to costs.

Petition allowed.

Bhavarlal Sukhlal So... v. Lakshminarayan Deo P...