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Analytical Summary of the Opinion — Writ Petitions Challenging Appointment of Arbitrator under S. 7-B, Indian Telegraph Act

Factual and Procedural Background

Two writ petitions challenged the appointment of the 3rd respondent — the Deputy General Manager (Administration) of Hyderabad Telephones — as arbitrator under Section 7-B of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. The petitioners sought that an alternative arbitrator be appointed (suggesting members of the Telephone Advisory/Consultative Committee, an officer from another Central Government Department, or a Central Government Pleader) in place of the 3rd respondent on the ground of apprehended departmental bias.

The petitioners filed an affidavit alleging that because the 3rd respondent was a departmental officer in charge of administration, he could not be expected to be open-minded and impartial. A representation dated 19-1-1989 was sent to the Union of India (1st respondent) with a copy to the 3rd respondent requesting appointment of someone else. The matter came before the court for adjudication of whether the statutory appointment under S.7-B could be challenged on grounds of bias and whether the specific appointment should be set aside.

The court examined the statutory provision (S.7-B) and relevant authorities, reviewed the files and endorsements relied upon by the petitioners, and ultimately dismissed the writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Central Government may appoint one of its own officials, including a departmental officer of the telephone department, as an arbitrator under Section 7-B of the Telegraph Act, 1885.
  2. Whether principles concerning bias (actual bias or reasonable apprehension of bias) apply to arbitrators appointed under a statutory power (as opposed to appointment under an agreement) and, if so, to what extent.
  3. Whether an appointment of a departmental officer as arbitrator under S.7-B may be set aside or changed by the court under Article 226 of the Constitution on proof of actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.
  4. Whether awards or decisions of an arbitrator appointed under S.7-B, given the statutory provision that "the award ... shall be conclusive ... and shall not be questioned in any Court", are open to challenge and on what grounds or by what remedy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as advanced by Sri J.V. Lakshmana Rao)

  • The appointment under S.7-B is made by statute and not by agreement between parties; therefore, any administrative appointment is subject to principles of natural justice applicable to administrative action.
  • Because the appointment is statutory, the law relating to appointments of arbitrators under the Arbitration Act, 1940 (which arises from agreement), does not apply to appointments under the Telegraph Act.
  • The 3rd respondent, being a Deputy General Manager (Administration) employed by the department, cannot be expected to be impartial; this created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The appointment violated basic principles of natural justice.
  • A representation dated 19-1-1989 requested appointment of an alternative arbitrator (Telephone Advisory Committee member, officer from other department, or Central Government Pleader).

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Sri S. Venkateswara Rao, Additional Standing Counsel for the Central Government)

  • Even if the appointment is not by agreement but by statutory power, the same principles regarding disqualification for bias are generally attracted.
  • The Court should not set aside an appointment or direct appointment of another arbitrator unless the petitioner proves that the appointee was disqualified in some manner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Registrar, Co-operative Societies v. Dharamchand, AIR 1961 SC 1743 Consideration of alleged bias of a Registrar appointed under statutory rule; raised but left open the general question whether natural justice principles apply to such statutory arbitrators. Cited as a case where Supreme Court rejected bias allegation on facts and did not decide the broader question of applicability of natural justice to statutory arbitrators.
Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P., AIR 1959 SC 1376 Referenced in relation to applicability of natural justice principles to statutory appointments. Mentioned as part of the jurisprudential background; the Court noted earlier references but did not use it to alter the outcome of the present petitions.
U.P. Co-operative Federation v. Sunder Brothers, AIR 1967 SC 249 Held that reasonable apprehension of bias can justify refusal to compel arbitration when arbitrator occupies roles that create likelihood of bias (following Bristol Corporation v. John Aird & Co.). Used to show that statutory appointments could be subject to the same bias principles as appointments by agreement; supports that a reasonable prospect of bias can release parties from arbitration.
Bristol Corporation v. John Aird & Co. (1913) AC 241 Authority for the proposition that an arbitrator who is also a witness or is in a position of conflict cannot fairly act as arbitrator; reasonable prospect of bias is sufficient to avoid arbitration. Quoted and relied upon in discussing when arbitration can be refused on grounds of likely bias.
Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577 Illustrative of the test of bias where reasonable suspicion/likelihood of bias led to quashing of a decision. Cited in discussing the tests ('reasonable suspicion' vs 'real likelihood') and their practical impact.
S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P., AIR 1973 SC 2701 Supreme Court observations distinguishing tests of 'reasonable suspicion' and 'real likelihood' of bias. Referenced to show previous Supreme Court commentary on appropriate tests for bias.
G. Sarana v. Lucknow University, AIR 1976 SC 2428 Commentary that relevant question is whether there was reasonable ground to believe a member was likely to be biased; introduces substantial possibility language. Used to illustrate the development of tests for reasonable apprehension of bias.
International Airport Authority of India v. K.D. Bali, AIR 1988 SC 1099 Clarified that there must be 'a real likelihood' of bias and that apprehension must be reasonable as judged by an average, honest person fully cognisant of the facts. Relied upon heavily to articulate that mere suspicion is insufficient; the Court invoked this standard in reasoning about statutory arbitrators under S.7-B.
King (De Vesci) v. Justices of Queen's County, (1908) 2 LR 285 Definition (Lord O'Brien) of bias as "a real likelihood of an operative prejudice" and requirement of reasonable evidence for such likelihood. Quoted in International Airport Authority to reinforce the standard that 'real likelihood' and reasonable evidence are required.
Mineral Development Limited v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 468 Referenced as part of the jurisprudence on bias and related tests. Cited in support of discussion on standards applied by the Supreme Court in bias cases.
Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2386 Observation that the relevant perspective is the reasonableness of the apprehension in the mind of the affected party, not the judge's own assessment of bias. Quoted to support the proposition that the court should view the apprehension from the party's standpoint and measure its reasonableness.
Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak, (1951) 343 US 451 Referenced as part of authorities considered along with Metropolitan Properties and Ranjit Thakur in the context of assessing bias tests. Listed among comparative authorities informing the Court's approach to bias tests.
Regina v. Liverpool City Justices, Ex parte Topping, (1983) 1 WLR 119 Referenced among cases concerning tests for reasonable apprehension and bias. Included as part of the jurisprudential background; used to inform the Court's articulation of applicable tests.
R. v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256 Famous statement that justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. Reiterated as a guiding principle balancing the need for apparent impartiality with the necessity of avoiding elevation of mere suspicion into disqualification.
R. v. Camborne Justices, Ex parte Pearce, (1954) 2 All ER 850 Quoted for the caution that the principle of apparent justice should not be permitted to outweigh the reality of justice. Used to emphasize that the court must avoid decisions driven solely by mere appearance without substance.
Smt. Makhani Devi Banka v. Union of India, AIR 1981 Ori 11 Authority indicating that decisions under S.7-B may be questioned under Article 226 despite the statutory bar on judicial questioning under the Arbitration Act. Cited to support the proposition that awards under S.7-B are open to challenge by certiorari under Article 226.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began with a plain reading of Section 7-B, observing that the Central Government has wide discretion to appoint an arbitrator either specially for a particular dispute or generally for disputes under the section. The court confined itself to the limited question whether the Central Government could appoint one of its own subordinates (a departmental officer) as arbitrator.

The court noted parallels between powers to appoint arbitrators arising out of contracts (where parties may consent to appointment of an officer of one party) and statutory appointment under S.7-B. It reasoned that the effect achieved by party agreement in contract-based arbitration (permitting an appointing party to choose its own arbitrator subject to judicial removal for bias) is in the present context achieved by the statutory provision in S.7-B. Therefore, the opposite party's power (here, the Central Government's power) to appoint an arbitrator of its choice cannot be lightly questioned; however, it remains subject to judicial control on established grounds including bias under Article 226.

The court reviewed relevant authorities where the Supreme Court and other courts have dealt with bias and appointments under statutory powers. From those precedents the court distilled the applicable legal principles: an arbitrator appointed under S.7-B may be a government official (including of the telephone department), but must act judicially and free from departmental bias; the court may remove such an arbitrator under Article 226 if actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias is established; and the relevant apprehension is that of the aggrieved party judged by the standard of a reasonable, honest, average person fully cognisant of the facts.

The court also addressed the effect of sub-section (2) of S.7-B (that the arbitrator's award "shall be conclusive" and "shall not be questioned in any Court") and concluded that despite this statutory language, decisions under S.7-B are subject to scrutiny under Article 226 (certiorari). Thus, unlike certain unreasoned awards under the Arbitration Act, decisions under S.7-B must be reasoned and remain open to judicial review under constitutional writ jurisdiction.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court examined the petitioners' affidavits and the files relied upon. An additional affidavit alleged endorsements by the 3rd respondent prior to appointment which would disqualify him. The petitioners' counsel was permitted to peruse the files but could not identify any endorsements by the 3rd respondent. The court concluded that the endorsements were not by the 3rd respondent and that no other material was placed before the court to establish actual bias or a reasonable likelihood of bias.

The court emphasized the safeguard that the arbitrator's decisions must be reasoned and are open to correction via certiorari under Article 226, which ameliorates concerns about departmental appointments. Given the lack of proof of actual bias or of a reasonable apprehension of bias in these petitions, the court declined to direct a replacement arbitrator.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were DISMISSED.

Immediate consequences for the parties: the appointment of the 3rd respondent as arbitrator was not set aside by this court; the arbitrator may proceed unless and until a proper Article 226 petition establishing actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias is made out.

Broader implications deduced in the opinion (as explicitly stated):

  • An arbitrator appointed under S.7-B may legitimately be a government official, even one belonging to the telephone department; the statute does not prohibit such appointments.
  • Such arbitrators must act judicially and without departmental bias; they are removable by the Court under Article 226 on proof of actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.
  • The relevant test for apprehension is that of the aggrieved party judged by the standard of a reasonable, honest, average person; mere whim or fanciful suspicion will not suffice.
  • Decisions under S.7-B, despite the statutory bar to court questioning of the award, are amenable to judicial review under Article 226 and therefore must be reasoned decisions; they cannot enjoy the same protection as certain unreasoned awards under the Arbitration Act.

No new legal rule was announced beyond application and clarification of existing principles: the Court applied established standards on bias to statutory appointments and affirmed the availability of Article 226 as the proper remedy to challenge disqualifying bias in S.7-B arbitrations.

Petitions dismissed. No costs.

    S. Kanyalal v. Union Of India And Others

    1. In these two writ petitions a question of apprehension of bias of an arbitrator appointed under the provisions of S. 7-B of the Indian Telegraph Act has been raised.

    2. In these two writ petitions the petitioner prays for the appointment of any member of the Telephone Advisory Committee or Consultative Committee or any officer from any other Central Government Department or any Central Government Pleader as an arbitrator under S. 7-B in cancellation of the appointment of the 3rd respondent who is the Deputy General Manager (Administration) and who has been appointed for conducting arbitration proceedings in these two cases.

    3. Section 7-B of the Telegraph Act 1885 deals with arbitration of disputes including those arising between a person having a telephone and the department in connection with alleged excess billing of telephones. The said section reads as follows:

    “Section 7-B.— (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, if any dispute concerning any telegraph line, appliance or apparatus arises between the telegraph authority and the person for whose benefit the line, appliance or apparatus is, or has been, provided, the dispute shall be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the Central Government either specially for determination of that dispute or generally for the determination of disputes under this section.

    (2) The award of the arbitrator appointed under sub-sec. (1) shall be conclusive between the parties to the dispute and shall not be questioned in any Court.”

    4. In the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition the petitioner alleged that the 3rd respondent being a departmental officer in charge of the administration and working in the office of the General Manager, Hyderabad Telephones, he cannot be expected to have the required open-mindedness and impartiality to render justice to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted a representation dt. 19-1-1989 to the Union of India (1st respondent) with a copy to the 3rd respondent requesting that anybody else as is now referred to in the writ petition, be appointed as arbitrator. It is contended that the 3rd respondent being a Deputy General Manager, Administration, cannot act as an arbitrator over a dispute raised by the petitioner inasmuch as the 3rd respondent is employed by the department. This, it is stated, has created a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that he will not get justice at the hands of the 3rd respondent. The appointment, it is said, is in violation of basic principles of natural justice.

    5. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri J.V Lakshmana Rao, that the appointment of the arbitrator under S. 7-B is made under the statute itself and not by way of any agreement between the parties and that therefore any action taken administratively for appointment of an arbitrator is subject to the principles of natural justice known to administrative law. It is argued that in that context the law relating to applicability of principles of bias of appointment of arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940 cannot be applied to appointments of arbitrator under the Telegraph Act. On the other hand, it is contended by Sri S. Venkateswara Rao, the Additional Standing Counsel for the Central Government that even assuming that the appointment of the arbitrator is not by way of an agreement between the parties governed by the Arbitration Act, still the same principles are, by and large, attracted and unless it is shown by the petitioner that the appointee was disqualified in some manner the Court cannot set aside the appointment and direct somebody else to be appointed.

    6. A plain reading of S. 7-B shows that the Central Government has a wide discretion in appointing a person as an arbitrator generally for the determination of disputes under S. 7-B or specially for determination of a particular dispute. We are not here concerned with the validity of the abovesaid provision but we are concerned with the limited question as to whether the Central Government could appoint one of its own subordinates as an arbitrator.

    7. We are all familiar with clauses in arbitration contracts governed by the Arbitration Act which confer wide power on a government or authority to appoint one of its subordinates as an arbitrator. Of course there the aggrieved party consents to such a power being given to the opposite party subject no doubt to the power of the Court to remove the arbitrator on the ground of bias or for other good reason under S. 5 of the said Act. Further, in certain other cases, a party to a contract can even file a suit in a civil court ignoring the arbitration clause and plead bias and successfully oppose an application filed under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act for stay of the suit.

    8. What the agreement of the party achieves in the above cases in permitting an arbitrator of the choice of one of the parties to the dispute, to be appointed is achieved, in the present case, by the statutory provision in S. 7-B of the Telegraph Act. Thus under the Telegraph Act also, the opposite party's power to appoint an arbitrator of its own choice cannot be questioned except for good reason and inclusive of the ground of bias, under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

    9. I shall first refer to two cases of an arbitrator appointed under a statutory power wherein the Supreme Court applied the principle of bias or likelihood of bias.

    10. In Registrar, Co-operative Societies v. Dharamchand, AIR 1961 SC 1743 under R. 18 made under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, the Registrar could either conduct the arbitration himself or appoint another person as an arbitrator. That was a case of misappropriation by a paid manager and the managing committee was initially suspended by the Registrar. The Registrar himself issued notice for taking action against the Managing Committee as an arbitrator. It was argued that the Registrar was disqualified on account of his bias. The Supreme Court rejected the contention of the petitioners and held that the Registrar did not suffer from any actual bias nor could it be said that he would not be impartial merely because he had earlier given a notice for suspension of the committee or was the administrative head over the societies. The question whether general principles of natural justice could be applied in the case of such an arbitrator appointed under a statutory rule was raised but not decided. After referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1959 SC 1376 their Lordships left open the question of applicability of principles of natural justice enunciated in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao's case. They observed (at p. 1746 of AIR):—

    “We do not wish, however, to be understood as having made any pronouncement that if it had been proved that the Registrar was suffering from any bias, then the present would have been a fit case for the issue of a writ of prohibition as asked by the respondent. Before the writ could be issued a further question would have to be decided whether in view of the statute, that is, R. 18 of the Rules framed under S. 43 of the Act, there was any scope for applying the rule of natural justice on which the contesting respondent relied. A question of this kind was mentioned in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P In the view that we have taken it is unnecessary to go into that question and we do not do so.”

    Further, from the judgment in Dharamchand's case, (AIR 1961 SC 1743) above referred to it is not clear whether their Lordships were considering an allegation of actual bias or an allegation regarding a reasonable apprehension of bias. On facts, the Supreme Court allowed the Registrar to go ahead with the arbitration and did not accept the plea of bias.

    11. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the case of another arbitrator appointed under the provisions of the Co-operative Societies Act 1912 in U.P Co-operative Federation v. Sunder Brothers, Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249. In this case their Lordships allowed the civil suit to proceed and did not grant any stay under S. 34 of the Arbitration Act on the ground that the allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias was substantiated by the aggrieved party. They held, following the decision of the Bristol Corporation v. John Aird & Co., (1913) AC 241 that an arbitrator who is placed in the position of a witness as well as a Judge could not be allowed to take up arbitration. A reasonable prospect of bias, it was held, was sufficient to release the parties from arbitration. The Supreme Court quoted the following observations of Lord Atkinson in the above case, which read as follows (at P. 252 of AIR):—

    “Whether it be wise or unwise, prudent or the contrary, he has stipulated that a person who is a servant of the person with whom he contracts shall be the Judge to decide upon matters upon which necessarily that arbitrator has himself formed opinions. But though the contractor is bound by that contract, still he has a right to demand that notwithstanding those pre-formed views of the engineer, that gentleman shall listen, to argument and determine the matter submitted to him as fairly as he can as an honest man; and if it be shown in fact that there is any reasonable prospect that he will be so biased as to be likely not to decide fairly upon those matters, then the contractor is allowed to escape from his bargain and to have the matters in dispute tried by one of the ordinary tribunals of the land. But I think he has more than that right. If, without any fault of his own, the engineer has put himself in such a position that it is not fitting or decorous or proper that he should act as arbitrator in any one or more of those disputes, the contractor has the right to appeal to a Court of law and they are entitled to say, in answer to an application to the Court to exercise the discretion which the 4th section of the Arbitration Act vests in them. ‘We are not satisfied that there is not some reason for not submitting these questions to the arbitrator’. In the present case the question is, has that taken place?”

    Their Lordships also referred to the following observations of Lord Moulton (at Pp. 252-253 of AIR):—

    “But, My Lords, it must be remembered that these arbitration clauses must be taken to have been inserted with due regard to the existing law of the land, and the law of the land applicable to them is, as I have said, that it does not prevent the parties coming to the Court, but only gives to the Court the power to refuse its assistance in proper cases. Therefore to say that if we refuse to stay an action we are not carrying out the bargain between the parties does not fairly describe the position. We are carrying out the bargain between the parties, because that bargain to substitute for the Courts of the land a domestic tribunal was a bargain into which was written, by reason of the existing legislation, the condition that it should only be enforced if the Court thought it a proper case for its being so enforced.”

    Applying the said principles, the Supreme Court allowed the suit to go on in the civil Court rather than compelling the parties to go for arbitration. Their Lordships observed (at p. 253 of AIR):

    “It is obvious that a party may be released from the bargain if he can show that the selected arbitrator is likely to show bias or by sufficient reasons to suspect that he will act unfairly or that he has been guilty of continued unreasonable conduct.”

    They held that inasmuch as the Registrar had approved the termination of the contract of managing agency with the plaintiff and the Registrar was the Chairman of the defendant society, the case was not a fit one for allowing arbitration, and permitted the suit to go on. Thus in the above case the arbitrator appointed under the powers arising in a statute viz., the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 was held governed by the same principles of bias or reasonable likelihood of bias.

    12. In recent times, the question has been raised whether the dominant test is ‘reasonable suspicion’ or ‘real likelihood’ of bias. In Metropolitan Properties Co. v. Lannon, (1969) 1 QB 577 the Court of Appeal quashed the Kensington determination in regard to fair rent of a flat because it was thought that the Chairman's position might have led to a prejudice against landlords since he was living in a flat elsewhere of which his father was the tenant and of which the landlord was a company associated with the Kinsington landlords.

    13. Jain, in his ‘Principles of Administrative Law’ (4th Ed. 1986 at p. 224) says that some confusion has arisen because of the concurrent use of the two phrases ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘real likelihood’ of bias in several cases. According to Wade also, some confusion has been introduced into the English law by the simultaneous use of the above words. But he says that “in the great majority of cases either test will lead to the same result. This might be so in all cases if ‘likelihood’ is given the meaning of ‘possibility’ rather than probability. For if there is no real possibility of bias, no reasonable person would suspect it.” (Wade, Administrative Law (5th Ed. 1985) Pp. 430-431). Professor De Smith explains that the ‘reasonable suspicion’ test looks mainly to outward appearances while ‘real likelihood’ test focusses on one's own evaluation of the probabilities. (Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 1980, p. 264). Jackson thinks that there is no antithesis between the two tests of ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘real likelihood’ (Natural Justice, 1977, p. 50). Jain points out that the Supreme Court has observed in S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P, AIR 1973 SC 2701 that these two tests are inconsistent with each other. There the Supreme Court applied the tests of ‘real likelihood’ of bias but this was to be based on the ‘reasonable apprehension of a reasonable man fully cognisant of the facts’. Later, he says, that in G. Sarana v. Lucknow University, AIR 1976 SC 2428 the Supreme Court observed that the real question was not whether a member of the Administrative Board while exercising quasi-judicial powers was biased for it was difficult to prove the state of the mind of the person. What had to be seen was whether there was reasonable ground for believing that he was likely to have been biased. At another place the court observed that the question was whether there was a substantial possibility of bias animating the mind of the member in the Board against the aggrieved person. (See Jain, Principles of Administrative Law (4th Ed. 1986) at p. 224).

    14. In recent times, however, in cases arising under the law of arbitration, the Supreme Court has made more significant observations and explained the words ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘real likelihood’ very clearly in International Airport Authority of India v. K.D Bali, AIR 1988 SC 1099. While rejecting the plea of bias the Supreme Court quoted the observations of Lord O'Brien L.C.J in King (De Vesci) v. Justices of Queen's County, (1908) 2 LR 285 as follows (at p. 1103 of AIR):—

    “By bias I understand a real likelihood of an operative prejudice, whether conscious or unconscious. There must in my opinion be reasonable evidence to satisfy us that there was a real likelihood of bias. I do not think that the vague suspicions of whimsical capricious and unreasonable people should be made a standard to regulate our action here. It might be a different matter if suspicion rested on reasonable grounds, was reasonably generated and but certainly mere flimsy ground elusively generated and morbid suspicions should not be permitted to form ground of decision.”

    15. Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. speaking for the Court observed that in the words of Lord O'Brien, LCJ there must be ‘a real likelihood’ of bias. It is well settled, he observed that there must be a real likelihood of bias and not mere suspicion of bias before the proceedings can be quashed on the ground that the person conducting the proceeding is disqualified by interest. The learned Judge referred to Gullapalli Nageswara Rao v. State of A.P, (AIR 1959 SC 1376) and to Mineral Development Limited v. State of Bihar, AIR 1968 SC 468. Having so observed, the learned Judge referred to an earlier decision in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (AIR 1987 SC 2386) wherein Venkatachaliah, J. had observed as follows (at Pp. 2390-91 of AIR):—

    “As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the party. The proper approach for the Judge is not to look at his own mind and ask himself, however, honestly, ‘am I biased?’, but to look at the mind of the party before him.”

    In that context Venkatachaliah, J. had referred to the decisions in Metropolitan Properties Co. (FGC) Ltd. v. Lannon, (1969-1 QB 577), Public Utilities Commission of the District of Colambia v. Pollak, (1951) 343 US 451 and to Regina v. Liverpool City Justices, Ex parte Topping, (1983) 1 WLR 119. After quoting the above observations of Venkatachaliah, J. Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. clarified, in the International Airport Authority case, (AIR 1988 SC 1099) referred to above, as follows (at Pp. 1103-04 of AIR):

    “But there must be reasonableness of the apprehension of bias in the mind of the party. The purity of administration requires that the party to the proceedings should not have apprehension that the authority is biased and is likely to decide against the party. But we agree with the learned Judge of the High Court that it is equally true that it is not every suspicion felt by a party which must lead to the conclusion that the authority hearing the proceedings is biased. The apprehension must be judged from a healthy, reasonable and average point of view and not on mere apprehension of any whimsical person………. Vague suspicions of whimsical, capricious and unreasonable belief are not our standard to regulate our vision. It is the reasonableness and the apprehension of an average, honest man that must be taken note of.”

    Sabyasachi Mukherji, J. reiterated (at p. 1105) that the Supreme Court had no difficulty in endorsing and maintaining the integrity of the principle ‘justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done’ (a quotation of Lord Hewart in R. v. Sussex Justices, (1924) 1 KB 256, but that it is equally important to remember that the principle should not lead to the erroneous impression that ‘justice should merely appear to be done than it should in fact be done’ as stated by Slade, J. in R. v. Camborne Justices Ex-parte Pearce, (1954) 2 All ER 850 at 855.

    16. In my opinion, the abovesaid principles applied by the Supreme Court to cases of an arbitrator appointed under an agreement of arbitration are equally applicable to arbitration by an arbitrator appointed under a statutory power exercised by one of the parties such as S. 7-B of the Telegraph Act. These principles can be summarised as follows:

    An arbitrator appointed under S. 7-B of the Telegraph Act, 1885 by the Central Government could be an official belonging to the Government and indeed an official belonging to the telephone department itself. The arbitrator so appointed has to act in a judicial and fair manner and free from departmental bias. He can be removed by the Court in exercise of powers under Art. 226 of the Constitution if a case of actual bias is established. He can also be removed if a case of a reasonable apprehension of bias is made out by the aggrieved party. The reasonable apprehension here is that of the aggrieved party and not that of the Court but the court has to see whether the apprehension is merely whimsical and imaginary or real. The court has necessarily to be satisfied that the apprehension of the aggrieved party is comparable to that of an average, honest, reasonable person.

    17. In fact, the amended English law of arbitration by contract, contains beneficent provisions. These provisions were introduced in 1934 and have been continued by S. 24 of the 1950 Act. Sub-clause (1) of that section provides that where a party to an arbitration agreement applies to the court for removal of the arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator ‘is not or may not be impartial’, it shall not be a defence to contend that the party to the agreement ‘knew or ought to have known’ that the arbitrator by reason of his relation towards any other party to the agreement or of his connection with the subject referred, might not be capable of impartiality. The Arbitration Act, 1940 has unfortunately not been brought in line with the above English amendment.

    18. But one thing is clear. So far as the arbitrator appointed under S. 7-B of the Telegraph Act, 1885 is concerned, his decision is not liable, because of sub-cl. (2) of that section, to be questioned in any Court of law and therefore not liable to be questioned under S. 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 but is liable to be questioned, as already stated, under Art. 226 of the Constitution (see Smt. Makhani Devi Banka… v. Union Of India…Opposite Party.), AIR 1981 Ori 11. For that reason, the decision must necessarily be a reasoned decision. It cannot enjoy the same protection which an award without reasons enjoys under the Arbitration Act, 1940. It is neither possible nor desirable to extend to the decision of the arbitrator under S. 7-B of the Telegraph Act, 1885 the same protection as an unreasoned award under the Arbitration Act enjoys, particularly when the matter, even so far as arbitrations under the Arbitration Act are concerned, is under review by the Supreme Court and also when the amended English law in this behalf permits the affected party to ask the arbitrator to state a special case for the opinion of the court on a question of law.

    19. Bearing the above principles of law and safeguards in mind, could it be stated that no departmental officer of the telephone department could be appointed as an arbitrator under S. 7-B? In my opinion, not. The section does not prohibit a departmental official being appointed. However, if it is established that such an official has actual bias in fact or that the aggrieved party has a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the official, such person can be prevented from acting as an arbitrator by resort to Art. 226 of the Constitution. The apprehension that is material is that of the aggrieved party and not of the Court. The apprehension must be reasonable and not fanciful or whimsical. Whether it is reasonable or not is for the Court to decide under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The Court has to apply the test whether a reasonable, honest and average man could have such an apprehension on those facts. If the Court thinks these tests are satisfied it could, under Art. 226, direct change of the arbitrator. The decision of the arbitrator has to be a reasoned one open for correction in a court of Certiorari.

    20. Let us now examine the facts of these two cases. The allegation in the original affidavit was that the Central Government could not appoint a departmental officer as an arbitrator u/s. 7-B. This submission does not satisfy the legal requirements above mentioned. But then an additional affidavit was filed later to say that on account of certain endorsements made by the 3rd respondent, prior to his appointment, on these files, he is disqualified to decide these cases. The relevant files have been produced and the petitioner's counsel was allowed to peruse the same and he could not state that there were any endorsements by the 3rd respondent. I am satisfied that these endorsements are not those of the 3rd respondent. No other material is placed before me either in proof of actual bias or of a reasonable likelihood of bias. In any event, the need to give adequate grounds while giving the decision is, as already stated, an ample safeguard to the rights of the petitioners. The arbitrator cannot obviously adopt a standardised or stereotyped form of decisions in all cases. His decisions are liable to be scrutinised under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

    21. I have dealt with this matter at some length because of the large number of writ petitions that are coming before me every week wherein telephone bills running to huge amounts, several of them exceeding Rs. 20,000/-, are under attack.

    21. The writ petitions are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

    Petitions dismissed.

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    Comments

    S. Kanyalal v. Union Of India And Others
    (Mar 23, 1989)