K. Madhava Reddy, J.:— These petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India raise a common question of law as to the interpretation of the expression “continuous service for not less than one year” occurring in S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act in the context of the termination of the petitioners' services without complying with the requirements of S. 25F of the Act.
2. The petitioners who are either members of the clerical or subordinate staff of the Central Bank of India, the respondent herein, were appointed for varying periods from time to time and on the expiry of one such period of service, they were not reappointed. Of these, petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 2547, 2551 and 2556 of 1976, are clerks belonging to the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. The petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 2548, 2549, 2550, 2552, 2559, 2561, 2563, 2564, 2636, 2638 and 3122 of 1976, also are all members of the clerical staff but belong to the non-scheduled castes and non-scheduled tribes. The petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 2554, 2557, 2558, 2560, 2562 and 2633 of 1976, are members of the subordinate staff.
3. As the question of law that is raised is common to all the writ petitions, suffice to mention the facts set out in Writ Petition No. 2547 of 1976. The petitioner was initially appointed as a clerk on a temporary basis on 27 November 1974, and he worked for a period of one month and three days. On the expiry of the said period of appointment he was reappointed for varying periods but with some interruptions. He was last appointed on 1 June 1976, and he worked till 26 June 1976. On the expiry of the said period he was not reappointed. The petitioner claims that he has actually worked for a period of more than 240 days during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of the termination of his service and was, therefore, entitled to one month's notice or one month's wages in lieu of such notice and also retrenchment compensation as envisaged by S. 25F of the Act. He contends that inasmuch as the requirements of the section have not been complied with, the termination of his services is illegal and ineffective. He, therefore, seeks a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to reinstate him in service with full back-wages and all attendant benefits.
4. The particulars of the petitioners' period of service though not averred in the writ petitions, are fairly conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent with reference to the records as being borne out by the records of the respondent-bank. We, therefore, proceed to consider the contentions of the parties on that footing. It may be noticed even at this stage, that all the petitioners in these writ petitions, except the petitioners in Writ Petitions Nos. 2551, 2554 and 2636 of 1976, have put in not less then 240 days of actual work in the twelve calendar months immediately preceding the date of termination; only they were not in service for a continuous period of twelve months, there were interruptions.
5. Before considering the petitioners' contention that the termination of their services is illegal and without jurisdiction as it is in contravention of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, we must refer to and dispose of the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that these writ petitions are not maintainable —
firstly, for the reason that the Central Bank of India is not a “State” or “any other authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India; and
secondly, because of the alternative remedy available to the petitioners under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, the High Court is precluded under Art. 226(3) of the Constitution from issuing any writ.
6. Article 12 of the Constitution of India declares that the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India which are under the control of the Government of India. The question as to which person or authority is included in the expression “other authorities” came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366]. The Supreme Court laid down therein that the expression “other authorities” in Art. 12 is wide enough to include within it every authority created by a statute and functioning within the territory of India, or under the control of Government of India. The expression “other authorities” will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. In the light of that enunciation the Supreme Court held that the Life Insurance Corporation, the Industrial Finance Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Commission constituted respectively under the Life Insurance Corporation Act. The Industrial Finance Corporation and the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959, were other authorities included within the meaning of a “State” under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The tests laid down for determining whether a body or corporation was an authority within the meaning of Art. 12 were stated to be:
“(1) Whether the company or corporation was constituted under any statute; and
(2) whether powers are conferred on it by law, that is, are the statutory bodies free in framing the terms and conditions of service of their employees or whether they are bound to apply the terms and conditions as laid down in the regulations framed under the said statute.”
7. Applying the said tests, we may examine the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, by and under which certain banks, including the Central Bank of India stood transferred and vested in the corresponding Indian Bank mentioned in the schedule appended to the said Act is “any authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. The Central Bank of India was a banking company incorporated under the Banking Companies Regulation Act and functioning as such on the date of the commencement of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970; it was an existing bank as contemplated by this Act. By virtue of S. 3 of the Act, the new banks specified in Sch. I to the enactment were constituted. Every existing bank mentioned in the schedule stood transferred to and vested in the corresponding new bank as laid down under S. 4 of the Act. The result of such vesting is as declared under S. 5 of the Act. The new banks so constituted are, in the discharge of the functions, required to be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving “public interest” as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank, issue. This is enjoined by S. 8 of the Act. Section 9 vests the Central Government with the power to prepare a scheme for carrying out the provisions of the said Act. With effect from the date of the commencement of the Act, the Central Bank of India, Ltd., which was an existing bank, stood transferred to and vested in the new bank, viz., Central Bank of India as amended in Sch. II to the said Act. From these provisions, it is clear that the Central Bank which is a new bank is created by statute; whatever functions it discharges and whatever powers it exercises, are those required of it conferred on it by the statute. It is a statutory authority constituted under a statute and governed by statutory schemes, regulations or rules framed in conformity with the statute. It is an authority which satisfied the tests laid down by Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366] (vide supra), to qualify for being included in the definition of State under Art. 12 of the Constitution.
8. It is contended by Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, that notwithstanding the constitution of the new bank under the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1970, in the place of the existing bank, the new bank constituted under the provisions of the said Act is not “any authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution for, it still carries on banking business and is required to conform to the directions that may be issued by the Reserve Bank of India and is also liable so pay incometax as laid down under S. 11 of the Act. According to him, the mere fact that the banking business of the existing bank is now taken over by the new bank constituted under the Act, its activity does not become a Governmental activity, so as to bring it within the ambit of “any other authority” envisaged by Art. 12 of the Constitution and constitute it as a “State.” It still continues to be a bank and its business a banking business.
9. In this context, Sri Subrahmanya Reddy relies upon a decision of the Bombay High Court in Ramesh Krishna Rao v. The State Bank Of India* [1974 — II L.L.N 177]. That was a case dealing with taking over of the State Bank of India under the State Bank of India Act (23 of 1955) in which there are provisions corresponding to Ss. 2 to 4 of the Banking Companies Act. A Bench of the Bombay High Court, referring to Ss. 3, 17, 43, 49 and 50 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955, postulated that in order to succeed, the petitioner must establish that the bank is “State” as defined under Art. 12 of the Constitution and proceeded to hold that it was not any other authority for “such authority” must have within its power some functions which partake the nature of the Governmental or quasi-Governmental functions. This judgment was rendered before the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi [1975 — I L.L.N 366] (vide supra). Having regard to the above decision of the Supreme Court, the view of the Bombay High Court, that in addition to an authority being constituted under a statute, the powers exercised by and the functions performed by such authority should also partake of a Governmental or quasi-Governmental activity which was one of the essential attributes for deeming such authority to be a “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, no longer holds good. For determining whether an authority is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, what all has to be seen is whether it is constituted under a statute. That requirement is amply satisfied in the constitution of the new Central Bank under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1970. The other decision relied upon by Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent is Jailal Kapur v. Union of India [(1977) 2 S.L.R 798]. That was a case in which the Court held that the Hindusthan Zinc, Ltd., which was constituted by virtue of the powers conferred under the provisions of Metal Corporation (Nationalization and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976, was not an “authority” which could be deemed to be a “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. It would be seen that though the Hindustan Zinc, Ltd., was a company constituted in accordance with the provisions of the said enactment, the company itself was not constituted by the statute. In exercise of the powers conferred under the Metal Corporation (Nationalization and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1976, on the Government, the Government issued a notification under S. 4 and constituted the Hindusthan Zinc, Ltd., as a Government company and incorporated the same under the provisions of the Companies Act. There is a clear distinction between the company being constituted by the statute itself and a company being constituted by the Government in exercise of the powers conferred by a statute and incorporated under the Companies Act. A company, though constituted in exercise of a statutory power vested in the Government but incorporated under the Companies Act, was by the very nature of its constitution a “corporate body” and not a “statutory authority.” The Judges of the Rajasthan High Court specifically referred to this distinction in Para. 6 of the judgment. That decision, therefore, does not in any way help the respondent's contention. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the decision of the Supreme Court in Executive Committee, Vaish Degree College, Shamli v. Lakshmi Narain [1976 — I L.L.N 474], in which the Supreme Court dealt with the question whether an Executive Committee of a Degree College registered under the Registration of the Co-operative Societies Act and affiliated to the Agra University was “any authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and declared that
“before an institution can be a statutory body it must be created by or under the statute and owe its existence to a statute. This must be the primary thing which has got to be established.”
Their Lordships also pointed out that
“a distinction must be made between an institution which is not created by or under a statute but is governed by certain statutory provisions for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution.”
Applying that test, their Lordships held that the Executive Committee of the College which merely adopted certain regulations and statutes governing the Agra University for the management of the institution under its control was not an “authority” against which a writ could be issued. In that very decision to clearly emphasize the distinction the Supreme Court referred to its earlier decision in Prabhaka Rama Krishna Jodh v. A.L Pande [(1965) 2 S.C.R 713], wherein it was held that the governing body of the college which was constituted under an Ordinance was an “authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. This decision, far from supporting the contention of the respondent, pointed out that an authority constituted under a statute would be a “State” within the meaning of Art. 12. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Lachhman Dass Aggarwal v. Punjab National Bank [1978 — I L.L.N 190], specifically dealing with the provisions of the Banking Companies Act, considered the question whether the Punjab National Bank was “any other authority” against which a writ could be issued and held that the Punjab National Bank as distinguished from Punjab National Bank, Ltd., is not a company incorporated pursuant to the provisions of the Companies Act, but a body created by a statute, namely, the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. After referring to the various provisions of the Banking Companies Act and also specifically to S. 11 upon which reliance was placed by the bank herein for contending that it was not “any other authority” within the meaning of Art. 12 the Court held:
“We have no doubt that the new corresponding banks are authorities within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and that a writ could be issued against that authority.”
In Sukhdev Ratilal v. Chairman [(1976) 2 S.L.R 144], the Gujarat High Court came to a similar conclusion with reference to the Bank of Baroda. In Satyanarayana Murthy (K.) v. Syndicate Bank (by Chairman and Managing Director) [1976 — I L.L.N 328], my learned brother, A.V Krishna Rao, J., dealing with a petition seeking a writ against the Syndicate Bank, held that the Syndicate Bank may be said to be a “State” within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution and issued a writ of mandamus. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the Central Bank of India constituted as a new bank under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Regulation) Act is “any other authority” included within the meaning of a “State” under Art. 12 of the Constitution against which a writ of mandamus could be issued if a proper case is made out.
10. According to Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, Sub-sec. (6) of S. 5 also clearly shows that the new bank was not a State. Sub-section (6) of S. 5 declares as follows:
“Nothing in this Act shall be construed as applying to the assets, rights, powers authorities and privileges and property, movable and immovable, cash balances and investments in any country outside India (and other rights and interests in, or arising out of, such property) and borrowings, liabilities and obligations of whatever kind subsisting at the commencement of this Act, of any existing bank operating in that country if, under the laws in force in that country, it is not permissible for a banking company, owned or controlled by Government, to carry on the business of banking there.”
The effect of that provision merely is if an existing bank owned or controlled by the Government was not permitted to carry on business in any particular country, the provisions of the said Act were not to apply to the assets, rights, powers, authorities, privileges, property, cash balances and investments as well as borrowings, liabilities, obligations subsisting on the date of the commencement of the Act. In other words, S. 5(6) only seeks to make the new banks conform to the laws that are in force in any country outside India by prohibiting the existing banks which were hitherto carrying on business outside the territory of India from doing so in view of the transfer to and vesting of the said business in the corresponding new bank, wholly owned and controlled by the Government. But for this provision, the new banks would be within their rights in carrying on banking business outside the territory of India but that would infringe with the laws in force in those countries. In order to avoid any such conflict, provision is made in Sub-sec. (6) of S. 5 that they would not be entitled to carry on business outside the territory of India. That provision does not render the new bank a bank constituted otherwise than under a statute. The fact that it is still carrying on banking business in accordance with the laws in force in the other country, does not render it an authority other than a statutory authority.
11. Sri Subrahmanya Reddy next contended that S. 11 of the Act also points out to the new bank not being an “authority” but a mere banking company like any other banking company. Section 11 declares that for the purpose of Incometax Act, 1961, every corresponding bank shall be deemed to be an Indian company and hence it cannot be deemed to be an authority included in the definition of “State” under Art. 12 of the Constitution. But to our mind, this provision does not give any such indication. If as contended by Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, the learned counsel for the respondent, the new bank constituted under the Act were to be like any other banking company, such a provision would not at all have been necessary. These new banks by virtue of the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1970, being wholly owned by the Government under the provisions of the Incometax Act, would be wholly exempt from the liability to pay incometax. Evidently because the entire banking business in the country was not transferred to and stand vested in the new banks wholly owned by the Government and only the business of some of the banks stood transferred, the Government in its anxiety to run the new banks on a par with the other banks, declared under S. 11 that for the purpose of the Incometax Act, these new banks would be deemed to be “Indian companies.” This provision was necessitated only because but for this provision these new banks being wholly owned by the Government would be exempt from the Incometax Act. That only shows that as they are wholly owned by the Government they were not liable to incometax but were brought within the ambit of the Incometax Act by declaring them to be an “Indian company” which they ceased to be as a result of the provisions of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 1970.
12. The next question, however, is whether the bank was in the circumstances obliged to comply with the requirements of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act before terminating the services of the petitioners and whether they have not complied with the same so as to entitle the petitioners to a writ of mandamus directing their reinstatement with full back-wages and consequent benefits.
13. The fact that all the petitioners except the petitioner in Writ Petitions Nos. 2551, 2554 and 2636 of 1976, referred to above, have put in more than twelve months of service and have also worked for not less than 240 days within a period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of termination is not disputed. What is, however, contended by Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, is that as none of the petitioners were in service for a continuous period of twelve months, they cannot be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year as laid down in S. 25F of the Act. According to him, even if they had rendered service for more than twelve months, even though they had put in 240 days' service within those twelve months since it was interrupted by periodical terminations and reappointments, it was not obligatory upon the management to give one month's notice or wages in lieu of the notice and pay compensatory allowances envisaged by S. 25F.
14. In order to appreciate this contention, it is necessary to read the definition of “continuous service” in S. 25B which applies to the provisions of Chap. V-A dealing with law of retrenchment in which S. 25F occurs, S. 25B reads as follows:
“25B. Definition of continuous service. — For the purpose of this chapter —
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorized leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lockout or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of Cl. (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer —
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than —
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than —
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.— For the purpose of Cl. (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employee shall include the days on which —
(i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;
(ii) he had been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave;
so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.”
It is common ground that none of the petitioners have been in service for a period of one year under a single order of appointment. They were appointed for a few months at a time, on the expiry of which they were reappointed under fresh orders. The total length of service of all the petitioners except those mentioned above, no doubt exceeds twelve months and also exceeds 240 days of actual work within twelve months immediately preceding the date of termination and as such according to them they satisfy the requirements of S. 25B (2)(a)(ii). It is not disputed that for the application of S. 25 F the petitioners should have been in “continuous service” for not less than one year. If there was no special definition of the expression “continuous service,” then admittedly the petitioners would not be entitled to the benefit of S. 25F. But as per the definition of “continuous service” occurring in S. 25B which takes within its ambit not only uninterrupted service of twelve months but also service for a period of 240 days within a period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of termination, it is necessary to examine to what extent interrupted service could be taken to be “continuous service” so as to entitle a workman to the benefits of S. 25F. Sub-section (1) of S. 25B refers to continuous service which is uninterrupted except for sickness, authorized leave, or accident or strike which is not illegal or lockout which is not due to any fault of workman. Under Sub-sec. (2) of S. 25B workmen who have not been in continuous service within the meaning of Cl. (1) are also deemed to be in continuous service if certain requirements laid therein are satisfied. For the purpose of our present case, we are not concerned with the workmen who have been in uninterrupted service for a period of twelve months. We are concerned with those whose service has been interrupted but who claim that they should be deemed to be in continuous service in view of Sub-sec. (2)(a)(ii) of S. 25B. Under Sub-sec. (2)(a)(ii), S. 25B a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year would also be deemed to be in continuous service for the purpose of S. 25F, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days.
15. If the contention of Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, were to be accepted, that a person should be in service immediately before the date termination and also for a period of twelve months immediately preceding that date, then such a workman would be satisfying the requirements of S. 25B (i) and question of such a workman being deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year would not arise. Sub-section (2) applies to cases which do not fail within Sub-sec. (1) of S. 25B and expressly deals with cases of workmen who are not in continuous service. In that context, the period of twelve months is actually preceding the date with reference to which it has to be determined whether a workman has put in 240 days, could only mean the actual period of twelve months, even though during that period, the workman was in service with intermittent breaks. No doubt, the workman should have been in continuous service for a period of one year but that one year need not have been during a period of twelve months immediately preceding the date of determination. The workman should have on the whole put in service for a period of one year though not in a continuous period of twelve months and should have worked for a period of not less than 240 days within twelve months immediately preceding the date of termination with reference to which calculation is to be made. So calculated all the petitioners who have been in service for more than twelve months before the impugned date of termination and who have put in 240 days would be deemed to be in “continuous service” for a period of one year within the meaning of S. 25F. It is common ground that although there is no specific order of termination of service in the case of each of the petitioners, inasmuch as their appointment itself was for a specific period, as laid down in Digwadhi Colliery v. Ramji Singh [(1964) 8 F.L.R 456] and in State Bank Of India, Kuzhithurai Branch v. Sundaramony (N.) [1976 — II L.L.N 5] (vide supra), that amounts to an order of termination requiring compliance of S. 25F. Though Sri Subrahmanya Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that the Supreme Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works, Ltd. v. Workmen [A.I.R 1963 S.C 1914], laid down that only if the appointment of the workmen were for a minimum period of one year and within that period of one year they had worked for 240 days, they would be entitled to the benefits of S. 25F, we do not find anything in the aforesaid decision which points out to that conclusion. That was a case in which though the workman had worked for more than 240 days, the total period of his service was less than eleven calendar months. The observations made therein do not lead to an inference that the interrupted periods of service should not be taken into account for ascertaining whether a workman was in service for a period of one year or not. Any doubt in this regard is dispelled by what is stated by the Supreme Court in Digwadhi Colliery v. Ramji Singh (vide supra). That was a case in which the workman concerned was a badli workman appointed to work in the post of a permanent employee or a probationer who was temporarily absent. He worked as a badli workman in the calendar years 1959 and 1960 in different capacities. His employment was not continuous; there were in fact six breaks in service of one day to a week in 1959 and eight breaks of one day to a week in 1960. He, however, worked for more than 240 days in each calendar year though with interruptions. Dealing with the question whether he was entitled to the benefits of S. 25F, the Supreme Court laid down that
“Section 25B says that for the purpose of S. 25F a workman who in a period of twelve calendar months has actually worked for not less than 240 days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service. Service for 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months is equal not only to service for a year but is to be deemed continuous service even if interrupted. Therefore, though S. 25F speaks of continuous service for not less than one year under the employer, both conditions are fulfilled if the workman has actually worked for 240 days during a period of twelve calendar months.”
This view is reiterated and emphasized by Krishna Iyer, J., in State Bank Of India, Kuzhithurai Branch v. Sundaramony (N.) (vide supra), in the following words:
“This nine days employment, tacked on to what has gone before, has ripened to a continuous service for a year on the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days of broken bits of service.”
It is on that assumption the Supreme Court proceeded to consider the question of law arising as to whether he was entitled to the benefits of S. 25F and declared that workman was entitled to its benefit. Hence so long as the total period of service of the petitioners-workmen was twelve calendar months or more, irrespective of whether that was continuous or interrupted and they had actually worked for a period of not less than 240 days within twelve months immediately preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, the workmen would be deemed to be in “continuous service” for the purpose of S. 25F of the Act.
16. Applying this test, it is seen that all the petitioners, except those in Writ Petitions Nos. 2551, 2554 and 2636 of 1976, were in continuous service for not less than one year and hence without satisfying the conditions precedent to retrenchment laid down in S. 25F their services could not be terminated. They are, therefore, entitled to the issue of a writ of mandamus directing their reinstatement with full back-wages and all attendant benefits. The petitioners referred to in the above three writ petitions, however, admittedly have either not been in service for a period of twelve months or have not put in 240 days of actual work and hence do not satisfy the requirements of S. 25B so as to be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year even as envisaged by S. 25B(2)(a)(ii). Consequently they would not be entitled to any relief on the ground that in terminating their services the respondent-bank did not comply with the requirements of S. 25F.
17. The learned standing counsel, Sri Subrahmanya Reddy next contended that having regard to the alternative remedy available to the petitioners, this Court, in exercise of the jurisdiction vested in it under Art. 226 of the Constitution, is precluded from granting any relief and the petitioners can only seek the alternative remedy provided to them under the Industrial Disputes Act. Sri Narasimham, the learned counsel for the petitioners, however, seeks to meet this contention by asserting that the action of the respondent-bank is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution and also on the ground that the so-called alternative remedy provided under the Industrial Disputes Act is a remedy which the petitioners cannot seek by directly approaching the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court. They cannot approach the Tribunal unless the Government refers the dispute for adjudication under S. 10 of the Act. Hence the said remedy cannot be deemed to be such a remedy within the meaning of Art. 226(3) of the Constitution as to debar them from invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.
18. The contention that the action of the respondent violates the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners under Arts. 14 and 16 was not raised in the writ petitions. However, they have filed petitions Writ Petition Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 5861 to 5878 of 1977, to permit them to raise this contention. Though this ground was not raised in the writ petitions, this contention is sought to be raised in view of the events that have happened subsequent to the filing of the writ petitions. As this contention cannot be raised before the Industrial Tribunal even if the matter goes before it, we deem it just to allow the same to be raised in these writ petitions and these petitions are accordingly allowed.
19. In these petitions, the petitioners have averred that subsequent to the filing of the writ petitions, the respondent-bank has ordered reinstatement of three of the retrenched employees in September 1977, and that they have also joined duty. They state that although the above employees and the petitioners are similarly placed while they have been reinstated, the petitioners are denied the benefit of reinstatement. This, according to them, violates the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. In the counter-affidavit filed in answer to these petitions, the respondents have admitted the reinstatement of the three of the employees referred to in the above petitions. But it is contended that those persons were reinstated in view of the discretion vested in the respondent-bank under Circular No. 4 of 1968, dated 6 May 1968, issued in regard to the recruitment of staff. That circular vests a discretion in the matter of recruitment in regard to the appointment of clerical cadre from special categories like sportsmen. For the purpose of disposing of this contention, we deem it unnecessary to go into the questions as to how far the appointment of the above-mentioned three members of the retrenched staff is in accordance with the said circular. The writ petitions challenge the validity of the order of the retrenchment in the case of the petitioners herein on the ground that it violates S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act. While the violation of Arts. 14 and 16 that is alleged in these writ petitions miscellaneous petitions is with regard to the reappointment or reinstatement of some of the retrenched employees, there is no allegation in the said petitions about any discrimination or any violation of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution in the matter of retrenchment itself. Thus the order of retrenchment itself does not suffer from the infringement of any fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Arts. 14 and 16. Even if the petitioners' contention is accepted, the infringement, if any, is only in the matter of reinstatement of some of the retrenched workmen, with which question we are not concerned in these writ petitions. Although the petitioners are allowed to raise the additional ground that there is a violation of Arts. 14 and 16, on the facts of the present case, we do not think that there has been any violation of Arts. 14 and 16 in the matter of retrenchment and, therefore, no writ could be issued under Art. 226(1)(a). Of course, if there were to be a violation of fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioners, a writ would be issued even if an alternative remedy was available to them under the Industrial Disputes Act. However, in view of the conclusion we have reached on this question we must hold that they are not entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other order in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226.
20. It cannot be disputed that if there is any retrenchment in violation of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the workmen have a right to apply for the reference of the said industrial dispute to the Government for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal. Of course, unless there is a reference by the Government, an Industrial Tribunal of its own accord cannot entertain the claim of the petitioners and grant relief to the workmen. But that by itself, as held by this Court in Government of India (represented by its Secretary) Ministry of Finance, Central Secretariat, New Delhi v. National Tobacco Company, Ltd. [(1977) 2 A.P.L.J 1], is not a ground to hold that the workmen have no alternative remedy provided under law for the time being in force as contemplated under Art. 226(3) of Constitution. The Full Bench repelled this very contention in the following words:
“It was argued that under S. 10, the Government had discretion whether to refer a dispute or not to the Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, the possibility of a dispute being raised before the Industrial Tribunal cannot be considered to be “other remedy” within the meaning of Cl. (3) of Art. 226. We cannot accede to this contention. The Industrial Disputes Act has provided a clear remedy for adjudication of the disputes by Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, once a dispute is raised and the same has been referred to them. If in any particular case, the Government acts arbitrarily or contrary to law in refusing to refer a dispute to the Tribunal or Labour Court, then such a refusal may be a ground for filing a writ petition. One cannot postulate that the Government may not refer a dispute to the appropriate forum created by the statute and then entertain a writ petition.”
In that view of the matter, the Full Bench dismissed the writ petition holding that the Industrial Disputes Act provided an alternative remedy for the redressal of the grievance of the workmen therein. Bound as we are by the aforesaid Full Bench decision of our Court, although the petitioners succeed in regard to their main contentions, we have, no option but to dismiss these writ petitions.
21. In the result, all the writ petitions are dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs.