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  • provisions of section 423 of the preceding Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898,
  • section 386 of the Code, corresponding to section 423 of the earlier Code
  • provisions of Rule 11 of the Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Code of 1898. Section 386 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 423 of the old Code and section 386 of the new Code,
  • section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 482, the provisions of section 386
  • section 386 of the new Code of 1973,
  • Rule 17(1) of Order 41
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 423 of the preceding Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898,
  • section 386 of the Code, corresponding to section 423 of the earlier Code
  • provisions of Rule 11 of the Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Code of 1898. Section 386 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
  • section 423 of the old Code and section 386 of the new Code,
  • section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • section 482, the provisions of section 386
  • section 386 of the new Code of 1973,
  • Rule 17(1) of Order 41
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.M. Bhattacharjee, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals before the Court were criminal appeals in which no one appeared on behalf of the appellant(s) when the matters were called. The Court posed the question whether these appeals could be dismissed for default of appearance having regard to section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The opinion refers to these matters as "these four appeals" and concentrates on the legal permissibility of dismissal for default in criminal appeals under the present Code (1973) and the earlier Code (1898), and on the effect of the High Court's inherent powers. Ultimately the Court dismissed the appeals for default only and not on the merits.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a criminal appeal can be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellant or his counsel under section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to section 423 of the earlier Code of 1898), or whether the appellate court must, in every such case, peruse the record and dispose of the appeal on the merits.
  2. Whether a High Court, which possesses inherent powers (including those under section 482), may dismiss a criminal appeal for default of appearance and later restore it to file on sufficient grounds, and how that position differs from criminal appellate courts subordinate to the High Court that lack inherent powers.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sankatha Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1208 Held that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellants or their counsel; the Court must adjourn to enable appearance or consider the appeal on merits and pass the final order. Emphasises perusal of the record before disposing of the appeal. The Court treats this three-Judge Bench decision as authoritative and uses it to support the proposition that under section 386 a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default by subordinate criminal appellate courts but must be disposed of on merits after perusal of the record.
Shyam Deo Pandey, (1971) 1 SCC 855 : AIR 1971 SC 1606 Similarly ruled that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance; the Court must adjourn or consider the appeal on its merits and pass final orders. Perusal of the record before disposing of the appeal is mandatory and not a mere formality. The Court cites this decision to reinforce the rule that criminal appeals must be decided on the merits after perusal of the record even if the appellant or his counsel does not appear.
Ram Naresh Yadav, AIR 1987 SC 1500 On its face appears to state that the Court can dismiss an appeal for non-prosecution, enforce discipline or refer the matter to the Bar Council, and that the matter can be disposed of on merits only after hearing the appellant or his counsel; it also suggests the Court might appoint counsel at State cost to argue for appellants. The Court acknowledges the apparent conflict with earlier decisions but reconciles Ram Naresh Yadav by reading it in the context of a High Court exercising inherent powers (section 482). The Court holds that Ram Naresh Yadav is applicable to High Courts with inherent powers and does not displace the rule applicable to subordinate criminal appellate courts under section 386.
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 57 : AIR 1977 SC 2432 Establishes that courts subordinate to the High Court do not possess inherent powers. The Court relies on this to conclude that subordinate criminal appellate courts, lacking inherent powers, cannot dismiss criminal appeals for default of appearance but must peruse the record and dispose of the appeal on merits under section 386.
A.S. Gaurava, (1986) 2 SCC 709 Also holds that courts subordinate to the High Court do not have inherent powers. Used alongside Bindeshwari Prasad Singh to support the conclusion that subordinate criminal appellate courts cannot rely on inherent powers to dismiss appeals for default and instead must follow the mandate of section 386.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds in a series of distinct steps, grounded in statutory text and precedent:

  1. Distinction from civil procedure: The Court first contrasts the civil appeal procedure (Order 41 Civil Procedure and Rule 17(1) with its 1976 Explanation) with criminal procedure. While civil appeals may be dismissed for default of appearance in certain circumstances, the Civil Rules were amended to clarify that dismissal on the merits is not authorized by the absence of the appellant alone.
  2. Statutory mandate in criminal appeals: The Court focuses on the language of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (corresponding to section 423 of the old Code). Section 386 directs that after perusing the record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if available, the appellate Court "may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering dismiss the appeal" or may pass appropriate orders. The Court treats the "after perusing the record" requirement as a categorical mandate.
  3. Precedent requiring perusal and merit disposal: The Court relies on a line of Supreme Court authority (notably Sankatha Singh and Shyam Deo Pandey) holding that criminal appeals cannot be dismissed for default of appearance and must be either adjourned to permit appearance or disposed of on the merits after perusal of record; perusal must be indicated when the order is passed.
  4. Apparent conflict with Ram Naresh Yadav: The Court acknowledges that Ram Naresh Yadav might, at first blush, appear to permit dismissal for non-prosecution and disciplinary measures. However, the Court undertakes to reconcile that decision with the earlier line by considering context and differing circumstances of the cases rather than assuming a direct contradiction.
  5. Role of inherent powers and distinction between courts: The Court explains that the High Court possesses inherent powers (including under section 482) and, in the exercise of those powers, may dismiss an appeal for default and later restore it on sufficient grounds. In contrast, courts subordinate to the High Court lack inherent powers (as held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh and A.S. Gaurava) and therefore cannot dismiss appeals for default; they are bound to follow section 386 and dispose of appeals on merits after perusing the record.
  6. Application to the present appeals: Because the appeals are before "this Court," which the opinion states has the full amplitude of inherent powers, the Court concludes it may, consistently with Ram Naresh Yadav, dismiss the appeals for default of appearance. However, the dismissal is expressly pronounced as being for default only and not on the merits.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismissed the appeals for default of appearance but not on the merits. The opinion states: "The above appeals are accordingly dismissed but for default only and not on merits." The concluding line in the opinion is "Appeals dismissed."

Implications

  • Direct effect on the parties: The four appeals before the Court are dismissed for default of appearance; the dismissal is expressly not on the merits.
  • Scope of appellate authority:
    • High Courts: May, in the exercise of inherent powers (including under section 482), dismiss criminal appeals for default of appearance and may restore such appeals to file on sufficient grounds. The Court reads Ram Naresh Yadav as addressing such exercises of inherent power by High Courts.
    • Subordinate criminal appellate courts: Being without inherent powers, they cannot dismiss criminal appeals for default of appearance under section 386; instead they must peruse the record and dispose of the appeal on the merits even if the appellant or his counsel does not appear.
  • Precedential position: The opinion relies on established Supreme Court authority (Sankatha Singh, Shyam Deo Pandey) to affirm the mandatory perusal-and-merits rule for subordinate courts under section 386, and reconciles Ram Naresh Yadav by situating it in the context of High Court inherent powers. The Court thus clarifies the extent and limits of dismissal for default in criminal appeals depending on the forum; it does not purport to overturn the earlier three-Judge Bench authority it cites.

Source: Opinion excerpt attributed to A.M. Bhattacharjee, C.J., as provided in the materials supplied for this summary.

    Mahendrakumar Shantilal Shah v. State Of Maharashtra .

    A.M Bhattacharjee, C.J:— No one is present on behalf of the appellant in any of these appeals. Can these appeals be dismissed for default with section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure staring at the face?

    2. A civil appeal, if not dismissed summarily under the provisions of Rule 11 of the Order 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is to be listed for hearing with notice to the respondent and if the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. The cleavage of opinion as to whether such dismissal can be for default of appearance only, or on the merits also, has now been sealed by the Explanation added to Rule 17(1) of Order 41 by the Amendment of 1976, providing categorically that “nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the Court to dismiss the appeal on the merits”.

    3. The law in the Criminal Jurisdiction is however different, as would appear from the provisions of section 423 of the preceding Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898, now replaced by section 386 of the new Code of 1973, which is in pari materia with its predecessor in the old Code of 1898. Section 386 of the present Code of Criminal Procedure provides that if a criminal appeal is not dismissed summarily under section 384, the same is to be heard under section 385, with notice to the parties and after sending for the record of the case, unless the same is already there and then the appellate Court “after perusing such record, and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears …may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering dismiss the appeal” or may allow the same by passing appropriate orders.

    4. The words “after perusing the record” etc. in section 386 have all the weight of a categorical mandate and while construing those words in the corresponding section 423 in the preceding Code, the Supreme Court was never in doubt that, to quote from the three Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1208 at 1209, “a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for the default of appearance of the appellants their Counsel” and “the Court has either to adjourn the hearing of the appear to enable them to appear, or should consider the appeal on merits and pas the final order”. To the same effect is the decision of a later two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shyam Deo Pandey, (1971) 1 SCC 855 : AIR 1971 SC 1606 at 1610, where it has been similarly ruled that “a reading of section 423 makes it clear that a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for default of appearance of the appellants or their counsel”, and “the Court has either to adjourn the appeal in order to enable them to appear or it should consider the appeal on merits and pass final orders”. The requirement regarding the perusal of record before disposing of the appeal, even where the appellant does not appear, cannot be treated as an empty formality. Perusal of the record of the particular case and giving indication of such perusal in the order is a must before dismissing the appeal, even though the appellant or his counsel does not appear to press the appeal.

    5. The position in law is so well-settled because of the clear letters of the law in section 423 of the old Code and section 386 of the new Code, and also the gloss put on the former by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that any further citation would be a mere useless idle parade. But a rather recent decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Naresh Yadav, AIR 1987 SC 1500, may ex facie appear to strike a different note and to have ruled that “the Court can dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution and enforce discipline or refer the matter to the Bar Council with this end in view,” “but the matter can be disposed of on merits only after hearing the appellant or his Counsel” and “the Court might as well appoint a Counsel at State cost to argue on behalf of the appellants”.

    6. The reason behind the law providing for different courses to be adopted in appeals by the Civil Courts and the Criminal Courts is not far to seek. Criminal appeals are, more often than not, preferred by convicted persons, whose lives or personal liberties have been put in peril by the sentence of imprisonment or even of fine, if not paid. And what is more, the society as a whole is, as it ought to be, vitally interested in the prevention of improper convictions as also unmerited acquittals. The legislature, therefore, in enacting the provisions relating to disposal of criminal appeals, has taken care to provide that once a criminal appeal is admitted for hearing, implying thereby that the order of, say, conviction and sentence, warrants reconsideration, the Court cannot and shall not dispose of the same except on the merits and after examining the record on its own, whether or not the appellant appears to prosecute the appeal. As already noted, the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh (supra) and in Shyam Deo Pandey (supra) and in various other earlier and later decisions, has ruled out dismissal of criminal appeals for default and mandated disposal, including dismissal, on the merits only after examination of the records. The dictum in Ram Naresh Yadav (supra) therefore, to the effect that “the Court can dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution” may appear at the first blush to be contrary to the long catena of decisions on the Supreme Court, referred to hereinabove.

    7. The wave of consistent earlier decisions, even if emanating from co-equal Benches, would have been good enough to relieve us from the obligation to follow a solitary contrary decision if Ram Naresh Yadav (supra) is such a one, particularly when the latter has not, even remotely, taken note of the earlier decision. But since one such earlier decision in Sankatha Singh, AIR 1962 SC 1208, has emanated from a larger three-Judge Bench, we, as already noted, cannot but govern ourselves by the same and hold that under section 386 of the Code, corresponding to section 423 of the earlier Code which contained the law at the relevant time, a criminal appeal cannot be dismissed for the default of appearance of the appellant, but has got to be disposed of on the merits on perusal of the record, whether or not the appellant or his Counsel appears to pursue the appeal.

    8. But even though Ram Naresh Yadav (supra) may appear at the first blush to lay down some thing contrary to the earlier decisions and even contrary to the clear provisions of section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has nevertheless a special message which will be apparent on a closer scrutiny. We think that as a matter of judicial propriety, decency and decorum, the decisions of the apex tribunal of the land, even though appearing to be contrary to or inconsistent with each other or one another, must be sought to be reconciled and explained by assuming, wherever possible, that they applied to different seats of circumstances. This is the course which was recommended by our ancient Jurists — “SRUTIRDWAIDHE SMRITIRDWAIDHE STHALAVEDA PRAKALPATE” — i.e in case there be two contrary precepts of the Sruties of the Smrities, different cases or sets or circumstances are to be assumed for their application. As Jurist Jaimini said, contradictions or inconsistencies are not to be readily assumed, as they very often be not real, but only apparent, resulting from the application of the same or similar principle to different sets of facts — “PRAYOGE HI VIROTHA SYAT”. We would proceed accordingly.

    9. If a criminal appeal is dismissed, though for, default of appearance only, the order of dismissal cannot be set aside and the appeal restored to file by any appellate Court subordinate to the High Court, even on proof of sufficient and satisfactory grounds for non-appearance. The reason is that the Code of Criminal Procedure, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure, does not expressly provide for such a course and, as now ruled by the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh, (1977) 1 SCC 57 : AIR 1977 SC 2432, and in A.S Gaurava ((1986) 2 SCC 709) the Courts subordinate to the High Court have no inherent powers. Since the appellant in such a case would be without any remedy against the ex parte dismissal by way of restoration and may thus have to submit to an order of conviction without any opportunity of having the same re-examined by the appellate Court, such appellate Court must not and cannot be allowed to go outside the provisions of section 386 and to dismiss an appeal for default of appearance, but must examine the correctness, propriety or legality of the impugned order on perusal of the records on its own, even though none has appeared to press the appeal. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh, (supra) AIR 1962 SC 1208, and in Shyam Deo Pandey supra (1971) 1 SCC 855 : AIR 1971 SC 1606 and other decisions holding the same view would govern such appeal, which cannot be dismissed for default of appearance, but must be disposed of on he merits on examination of the record under the mandate of section 386.

    10. But when a criminal appeal is pending before the High Court, which notwithstanding section 386, has all the inherent powers to make any order or the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of process or other indiscipline, ??? expressly provided in section 482, the provisions of section 386 do not and cannot have any exclusive application to the exclusion of those inherent towers. The appeal in Ram Naresh Yadav (supra) was pending before the High Court having the entire gamut of inherent powers available to it. The Supreme Court has expressly demonstrated its awareness of the enormity of he problem resulting in dislocation and hampering of the working of the High Court, “if Counsel do not appear when criminal appeals are called out” and has then observed in that context that “the Court can dismiss the appeal ??? non-prosecution and enforce discipline or refer the matter to the Bar council with this end in view”. The reaction of the Supreme Court to the unfortunate state of affair resulting from the Advocates not appearing when criminal appeals are called out generated the above-quoted observations and with section 482 staring at the face, no one would doubt the powers of the High Court to pass such orders of dismissal for default. And such dismissal for default under the inherent powers, instead of dismissal on merits on perusal the records only without hearing the appellant, would also secure to the appellant the opportunity to have the ex parte dismissal set aside by the High Court, obviously in the exercise of inherent powers, on proof of a sufficient grounds for non-appearance. But, to repeat, the right to dismiss criminal appeal ??? default for appearance and then to restore the same, are not at all available the criminal appellate courts subordinate to the High Court, which are ??? governed by section 386 and are devoid of all inherent powers.

    11. We are thus inclined to hold that while a High Court may dismiss a criminal appeal for default of appearance, as held in Ram Naresh Yadav (Supra) and may also restore the same to file on sufficient grounds, the criminal appellate courts subordinate to the High Court, exclusively governed ??? section 386 and having no inherent powers, cannot, in view of the mandate the section, do so, but must dispose of the appeal on the merits on perusal the records, even when the appellant or his Counsel does not appear to ??? or prosecute the appeal.

    12. Since these four appeals are before us in this Court, which has all ??? inherent powers in all its amplitude, plentitude and magnitude, we can obviously dismiss these appeals, as pointed out in Ram Naresh Yadav (supra).

    13. The above appeals are accordingly dismissed but for default only and not on merits.

    Appeals dismissed.
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    Mahendrakumar Shantilal Shah v. State Of Maharashtra .
    (Jun 9, 1994)