Dr. Bharat Bhushan Parsoon, J.
1. There is a shop located in Subhash Mandi, Kurukshetra details of which had given in the impugned judgment of 25.7.2013 of the Appellate Authority whereby ejectment of the petitioner - tenant, interalia, on the ground of personal bonafide necessity of the landlord, had been ordered.
2. Vide rent petition filed under Section 13 of Haryana Urban(Control of Rent & Eviction) Act 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) ejectment of the tenant from the shop in dispute had been sought on the following grounds:-
(i) Non-payment of arrears of rent;
(ii) Change of user of the tenanted premises;
(iii) Materially impairment in value of the tenanted premises;
(iv) The premises were unfit for human habitation being in dilapidated condition; and,
(v) Personal bonafide necessity of sons of the landlord and his family members.
3. Tough resistance was made by the tenant. After evaluating oral as well as documentary evidence produced by the parties, the Rent Controller vide its judgment of 21.1.2011 had dismissed the petition of the landlord. In appeal by the landlord where cross-objections had also been preferred by the tenant, the Appellate Authority reversing the findings of the Rent Controller only on the issue of personal bonafide necessity had ruled that the premises were required by the landlord and thus ejectment was ordered while cross-objections of the tenant were rejected.
4. Challenging the impugned order, the petitioner - tenant had assailed the findings of the Appellate Authority on the issue of personal necessity on the following grounds:-
(i) Pleadings regarding bonafide personal necessity were required in compliance with statutory provisions. Findings of the Appellate Authority that omission in this behalf was only procedural irregularity and should not come in the way of the landlord to get his premises vacated if otherwise his need is found to be genuine are wrong; and,
(ii) There is no evidence to prove that the demised premises are required for running the business by the son of the respondent-landlord. Puneet Garg son of the respondent-landlord whose personal necessity has also been claimed by the landlord was not even brought in the witness-box.
5. It is claimed that the finding of the Appellate Authority on the issue of personal necessity is casual and non-clinching and was not sufficient to dislodge the findings recorded by the Rent Controller.
6. Hearing has been provided to counsel for the parties while going through the grounds of Revision Petition and the impugned order.
7. Landlord Jiwan Ram has two sons namely Amit Garg and Puneet Garg. They are grown up and the landlord seeks eviction of the tenanted shop, pleading necessity even of his sons claiming that they have to start business of sale and storage of pesticides. The stand of the petitioner - tenant right from the very beginning is that the landlord along with his both sons is running the business of commission agency in the New Grain Market, Kurukshetra and all of them are well settled, without any necessity of getting the premises vacated.
8. No doubt the expression that landlord requires the premises for “his own use”, is not confind in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally but personal necessity and requirement of user would also in clude the same to be of his sons. It would be construed that the landlord requires the premises “for his own use”.
9. If we go through the pleadings of the landlord, these are highly deficient. In this case, personal necessity of sons of the landlord has been claimed for eviction of the premises. It was thus mandatory for the landlord father especially when such sons are not parties in the litigation to plead and prove that even his sons were not occupying any other such building and had not vacated any such building without sufficient cause after coming into force of the Act.
10. Clearly enough the pleadings in terms of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter mentioned as The Haryana Rent Act) East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 are deficient as the landlord pleading personal necessity of the sons has no where mentioned that neither the sons are occupying any other building nor had they vacated any such building without sufficient cause.
11. In Ajit Singh v. Jit Ram, 2008 (4) R.C.R (Civil) 390 (SC), it was held that provision of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 which are pari materia with provision of the Haryana Act are mandatory. Thus pleadings of the landlord regarding bonafide requirement of the landlord and his sons were clearly not in conformity with the requirement of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Haryana Rent Act. At this stage reference may be made to para No. 22 of the impugned judgment of the Appellate Authority which is reproduced, as below:-
“As far as the plea of the respondent that the essential ingredients of the bonafide requirement were neither pleaded nor proved by the landlord is concerned, it is not tenable as it has been proved on record that the shop is required by the landlord for his personal necessity. The mere procedural irregularity/omission should not come in the way of the landlord to get his premises vacated if otherwise his need is found to be genuine.”
12. This finding of the Appellate Authority is clearly against the verdict of the Hon'ble Supreme Court(supra) where compliance with the stated provisions of the Rent Act in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) has been held to be mandatory. When these findings of the Appellate Authority are viewed in the context of findings of the Rent Controller on this count these certainly speak of arbitrariness and perversity. At this stage finding of the Rent Controller on this count contained in para No. 18 are reproduced as below:-
“Also, it is further relevant to mention that it was imperative for the landlord to specifically plead the ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(b) and (c) i.e not occupying another residential building and that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause; but from the perusal of the record, neither these statutory conditions have been complied with nor any evidence to state and prove these facts has been led. The absence of any pleading and proof in this regard, certainly has caused prejudice to the respondent also. In this regard, this Court takes its support from the observations in the case titled as Banka Ram v. Shrimati Sarasvati Devi 2003 HRR 595(P&H).”
13. Thus the finding of the Appellate Authority as referred to in para No. 22 of the impugned judgment is clearly perverse as also arbitrary. Even when matter of personal necessity is viewed and evaluated as a fact, the Appellate Authority without discussing the evidence and evaluation of the same made by Rent Controller resulting in finding against the landlord, had sweepingly given finding in favour of the landlord. Finding of the Appellate Authority in the impugned judgment is to the effect as given on the next page:-
“In Mohammad Ayub v. Mukesh Chand 2012 (1) HJ.L.R 103, it was held that it is settled law that landlord is best judge of his requirement. The tenant can not dictate his term. In the case in hand it is the case of the landlord that he requires the shop for the business of his sons. The courts or the tenant cannot sit in judgment over the decision of the landlord to use his shop in a particular manner. Other authorities on the point are Dhanraj v. Legal Representatives of Nemi Chand, 2012 (2) H.L.R 315; Lajwanti (Smt.) v. Avtar Singh 2012 (1) H.L.R 43; Gurdial v. Kabul Singh Nagla 2010 (2) H.LO.R 361 and Ravi Sethi (S) v. Smt. Kamla Madan (S) 2012 (1) H.L.R 449.
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From the evidence on record, it is proved that the premises are required by the landlord for his personal necessity. Therefore, the tenant is liable to be ejected from the demise premises. The finding of the learned trial Court on this issue is accordingly reversed.”
14. No doubt a tenant cannot guide a landlord who is the only judge of his requirement but the landlord is to clearly establish his personal necessity as a fact from the evidence and material brought before the Rent Controller. There are multiple circumstances recorded by the Rent Controller which are militating against genuineness of ground of personal necessity put forth by the landlord.
15. Finding of the Rent Controller rendered after evaluation and appraisal of evidence and attending facts and circumstances holding nonexistence of personal necessity for eviction of the premises has been sweepingly bye-passed by the Appellate Authority. In addition, serious flaws in the case of the landlord in non-examination of son Puneet Garg interalia, for whose necessity he claims eviction of the premises, deposition of landlord and of his son Amit Garg being highly sweeping and very general have been ignored by the Appellate Authority. From the examination of landlord, it has rather been established that they are engaged in the business of commission agency in the premises in their possession and thus do not require the tenanted premises. On this count finding of the Appellate Authority reversing the judgment of the Rent Controller, that premises are required for personal use of the landlord, without any evidence to back such findings, are capricious, perverse and arbitrary and thus are reversed restoring the findings returned by the Rent Controller.
16. Accepting the revision petition, the judgment of the Appellate Authority, is set aside while judgment of the Rent Controller is restored. Sequelly petition is held to have been rightly dismissed by the Rent Controller.