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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • SECTION 16 A PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • Amending Act 34 of 1976, Section 11 of the old Act
  • provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section
  • Section 13 that sub-sections (2) and (2-A)
  • sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 13
  • sub-section (2) of Section 13,
  • Section (2) of Section 13,
  • Rule 9 (j) of the Rules
  • Rule 9(j)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 16 A PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT
  • Amending Act 34 of 1976, Section 11 of the old Act
  • provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section
  • Section 13 that sub-sections (2) and (2-A)
  • sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 13
  • sub-section (2) of Section 13,
  • Section (2) of Section 13,
  • Rule 9 (j) of the Rules
  • Rule 9(j)
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Revision by J.M.L. Sinha, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

On February 8, 1977, T.D. Bhandari, a Food Inspector, collected samples of Bundi Laddoos from the applicant's shop at Railway Bazar, Haldwani. A Public Analyst reported the sample to be adulterated and a complaint was filed prosecuting the applicant under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. At trial the applicant denied the prosecution case; the trial court convicted him and sentenced him to six months' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. The applicant's appeal to the Sessions Judge, Nainital, was dismissed by judgment dated June 20, 1978. The applicant then filed the present revision before J.M.L. Sinha, J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether sub‑sections (2) and (2‑A) of Section 13 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act are mandatory in nature and, if so, whether non‑compliance with those provisions vitiates the conviction.
  2. Whether, on the facts of this case, the statutory notice required by Section 13(2) was in fact sent to or received by the applicant in accordance with the statute and applicable rules.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The learned counsel for the applicant contended that Section 13(2) of the Act had not been complied with and that this non‑compliance vitiated the conviction.
  • The defence at trial was a total denial of the prosecution's case.

Prosecution's Case and Evidence

  • The prosecution relied on the Public Analyst's report that the sample was adulterated, and produced a copy of a notice purporting to have been sent under Section 13(2).
  • The only prosecution witness called was Food Inspector T.D. Bhandari (P.W.1), who stated in chief that a notice under Section 13(2) had been sent and bore the Chief Medical Officer's signature, but admitted in cross‑examination that he did not himself send the notice and that it was sent by the Chief Medical Officer.
  • The prosecution did not call any witness from the Chief Medical Officer's office, did not produce a postal receipt, and did not produce an acknowledgment or any endorsement on the notice indicating dispatch or delivery.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Puttu Lal v. State (Criminal Revision No. 565 of 1978) (Decided July 24, 1979) Held that Rule 9(j) (under the Rules framed under the Act) is mandatory. The court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that statutory rules prescribing dispatch of the Public Analyst's report are mandatory and, by analogy, that sub‑sections (2) and (2‑A) of Section 13 are also mandatory.
Bhola Nath Naik v. The State and another (1977 Cr.L.J. 154) High Court of Calcutta took a view consistent with the mandatory character of the procedural rule concerning dispatch of the report. Cited as supporting authority for treating the relevant procedural provision as mandatory; used to corroborate the mandatory interpretation of Section 13(2).
Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. J. Murhdfior (1977 Cr.L.J. 1634) High Court of Andhra Pradesh similarly held on the mandatory character of the corresponding rule/provision. Relied on as additional precedent supporting the mandatory character of the procedural requirement to inform the accused and permit application for further analysis.
State of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa (1978 Cr.L.J. 427) Bombay High Court adopted a like view regarding mandatory compliance with the rule for sending the Public Analyst's report to the accused. Used to bolster the conclusion that procedural safeguards embodied in the statute/rules must be complied with and that non‑compliance bears on the validity of conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and purposive analysis of Section 13, particularly sub‑sections (2) and (2‑A). The opinion notes that the legislature used the word "shall" in both sub‑sections, which ordinarily imports a mandatory obligation unless a contrary intention appears. The court explained the substantive purpose of these provisions: to give the accused an opportunity, when the Public Analyst reports the article adulterated, to apply to the court within ten days for the sample in the Local (Health) Authority's custody to be forwarded for analysis by the Central Food Laboratory. This procedure was characterized as a provision enacted for the benefit of accused persons to enable an effective defence against prosecution.

The court observed historical context: prior to the Amending Act 34 of 1976, Section 11 required that a collected sample be divided into three parts with one part handed to the person from whom it was taken; the amendment removed that obligation, making the Section 13(2) process — whereby the Local (Health) Authority forwards a copy of the Public Analyst's report and permits application for further analysis — critically important as the accused no longer automatically received a sample part.

The court further relied on the statutory prescription that the copy of the Public Analyst's report must be sent "in such manner as may be prescribed." The applicable rule (Rule 9‑A) required the local authority to send the copy immediately after institution of prosecution by registered post or by hand, which the court read as reinforcing the mandatory nature of Section 13(2). The court also noted earlier Rule 9(j), which was held mandatory by this Court and other High Courts (see the cited precedents).

Turning to the facts, the prosecution produced a notice purporting to have been sent on April 12, 1977 (while the prosecution was instituted on June 1, 1977). The court stated that the date of dispatch before institution was not decisive; rather, the decisive issue was proof of actual dispatch and/or receipt in conformity with the statutory requirement. The only witness, P.W.1 (the Food Inspector), testified that the notice was sent and bore the Chief Medical Officer's signature but admitted he did not dispatch it himself. The prosecution did not call any official from the Chief Medical Officer's office, did not produce any postal receipt, and the notice itself carried no endorsement or acknowledgment of delivery. Given this lack of evidence, the court found there was no proof that the notice required by Section 13(2) was sent to or received by the applicant.

Because the court concluded that sub‑sections (2) and (2‑A) are mandatory and the statutory procedure had not been established on the record, the court held that the conviction could not be maintained.

Holding and Implications

Revision allowed; the conviction and sentence recorded against the applicant are set aside.

Direct consequences ordered by the court:

  • The applicant, who was on bail, need not surrender.
  • The bonds furnished by the applicant stand discharged.
  • Any fine paid shall be refunded.

The court's holding expressly declares that sub‑sections (2) and (2‑A) of Section 13 are mandatory and that non‑compliance with the statutory procedure entitles the accused to relief by way of quashing the conviction. The opinion did not proceed to decide other contentions raised by the applicant because the revision succeeded on the Section 13(2) point.

    Kesar Singh v. State Of U.P.

    J.M.L. Sinha, J.-

    This revision arises out of the judgment dated June 20, 1978 passed by the Sessions Judge, Nainital, 'dismissing the appeal that was filed by the present applicant against his con­viction and sentence under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

    On February 8, 1977, Sri T.D. Bhandari, Food Inspector, collected sample of Bundi Laddoos from the shop of the applicant situate in Railway Bazar, Haldwani. One part of the sample was sent to the Public Analyst who reported it to be adulterated. A complaint was, therefore, filed for the prosecution of the applicant. The defence set up by the applicant was a total denial of the prosecution case. The trial court held the applicant guilty under Section 7 read with Section 16 of the Act and, convicting him there under, sentenced him to six months' R.I. and a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. Aggrieved against it ap­plicant filed an appeal in the court of sessions which resulted in dismissal and hence this revision.

    One of the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the applicant before me was that Section 13(2) of the Act has not been complied with and hence the conviction recorded against the ap­plicant stands vitiated.

    For appreciation of the contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant it is necessary to read sub­sections 2 and (2-A) of Section 13. They are as follows:

    "(2) On receipt of the report of the result of the analysis under sub­section (1) to the effect that the arti­cle of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the per­son, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under Section 14-A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sam­ple of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.

    (2-A) When an application is made to the court under Sub-section (2) the court shall require the Local (Health) Authority to forward the part or parts of the sample kept by the said Authority and upon such requi­sition being made, the said authority shall forward the part or parts of the sample to the court within a period of five days from the date of the receipt of such requisition."

    It is pertinent to note that both in sub­section (2) and sub-section 2(a), the legislature used the word 'shall'. When .the legislature uses the word 'shall' the inference, unless a contrary is shown by context or otherwise, is that the rule is mandatory. In the instant case, it is apparent on a perusal of Section 13 that sub-sections (2) and (2-A) thereof were enacted by the legislature to provide an opportunity to the accused to ask for the other sample phial in the possession of the local authority being produced in court for its being sent to the Director of Central Food Laboratory, if he dis­putes the report of the Public Analyst. The provision was thus enacted for the benefit of those who are proceeded aga­inst under the Act in order to provide an effective defence to them against un­called for prosecution. In this connec­tion it is also worthy of notice that pre­viously there was a provision in Section 11 of the Act that when any sample was collected by the Food Inspector, it was divided in three parts and one part thereof was handed over to the person from whom the sample was collected. By the Amending Act 34 of 1976, Section 11 of the old Act has been am­ended and the Food Inspector is no more required to hand over any part of the sample to the person from whom it is collected. The result is that the per­son from whom the sample is collected can by no means take any action by himself for any part of it being sent the Director of Central Laboratory.

    There is yet another circumstance which points to the conclusion that the provision contained in sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 13 is mandatory. According to sub-Section (2) of Section 13, a copy of the report of the Public Analyst has to be sent to the person concerned 'in such manner as may be prescribed'. The expression 'Prescrib­ed' means prescribed by rules. According to Rule 9-A a copy of the report of the Public Analyst should be sent by the local authority to the person concerned im­mediately after the institution of the pro­secution by registered post or by hand,, as may be appropriate. The fact that the rule required the local authority to send the copy of the report of the Public Analyst immediately after the institu­tion of the prosecution clearly indicates that the provision contained in sub-sec­tions (2) and (2-A) of Section 13 was enacted to be complied with and not for being ignored.

    It may also be not out of place to mention that previously there was a corresponding provision contained in Rule 9 (j) of the Rules framed under the Act. It read as follows:

    "It shall be the duty of the Food Inspector to send by hand or re­gistered post a copy of the report re­ceived in Form III from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken, in case it is found to be not conforming to the Act or the Rules made there under, as soon as the case is filed in the Court."

    It has been held by this Court in the case of Puttu Lal v. State (Criminal Revision No. 565 of 1978 Decided on july 24, 1979) that the pro­vision contained in Rule 9(j) is manda­tory. Similar view was taken by the High Court of Calcutta in the case of Bhola Nath Naik v. The State and an­other (1977 Cr.L.J. 154) by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Public Prosecutor, Hydera­bad v. J. Murhdfior (1977 Cr.L.J. 1634) and by the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa (1978 Cr.L.J. 427). If the provision contained in Rule 9(j) was of a mandatory character, there is no reason why the rule contained in sub-sections (2) and (2-A) of Section 13 be not held mandatory and I hold accordingly.

    Coming to the facts of the present case, the prosecution no doubt placed on record a copy of the notice purporting to have been sent to the applicant under Section 13 (2) of the Act. Learned counsel for the applicant however pointad out that the prosecution in. this case was instituted on June 1, 1977, while the notice purports to have been sent on April 12, 1977, i.e. much before the institution of the complaint. Learned counsel urged that the notice claimed to have been sent on April 12, 1977 could not be in fulfillment of the provi­sions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 13.

    The mere fact that the notice was sent to the applicant before the institu­tion of the complaint and not thereafter does not appear to be of much consequ­ence. The fact, however, remains that there is no evidence worth the name to show that the notice was at all despatched, much less of the fact that it was ever received by the applicant. The only witness examined by the prosecu­tion in this case was Sri T.D. Bhandari, Food Inspector (P.W. 1). In his emanation in-chief, he no doubt, said that a notice under Section 130(2) had been sent to the applicant and that the notice carried the signatures of the Chief Me­dical Officer. In cross-examination, however, he admitted that the notice was not sent by him but was sent by the Chief Medical" Officer. The prosecution did not put into the witness box any per­son of the office of the Chief Medical Officer to depose that the notice was ac­tually despatched to the applicant or was handed over to him by hand. The prosecution did not even place on re­cord any postal receipt to show that the notice was sent by registered post. The notice does not carry any endorsement to indicate whether it was sent by post or by hand nor does that carry any ac­knowledgment of the applicant. That being the state of evidence, it cannot be held that any notice as required by Sec­tion 13 (2) was at all sent to the appli­cant.

    Since the provisions contained in Section 13(2) of the Act are of manda­tory nature and since they were not complied with, the conviction recorded against the applicant cannot be main­tained.

    Learned counsel far the applicant also raised a couple of other conten­tions, but since the revision succeeds on the point of non-compliance of Section (2) of Section 13, it is not necessary to enter into any discussion on those points.

    This revision is, accordingly, allow­ed. The conviction and sentence re­corded against the applicant are set aside. The applicant is on bail. He need not surrender. The bonds fur­nished by him stand discharged. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded.

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    Comments

    Kesar Singh v. State Of U.P.
    (Aug 3, 1979)