These Writ Appeals and Writ Petitions raise common questions of law and, therefore, they have been directed to be heard together.

2. The facts giving rise to the writ appeals and petitions may be stated: It would suffice if we state the facts leading to the filing of Writ Appeal No. 367 of 1976. The appellant is a tenant of a building in Hashmat Gunj, Sultan Bazar, Hyderabad. The 2nd respondent (landlord) had filed an application before the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellant on several grounds. The landlord and purchased the premises in question on 25-9-1970 and informed the appellant on 20-10-1970 of the same and asked him to vacate the premises. The tenant relied pon and agreement of tease for a period of 20 years in his favour by the previous landlord and contended that he is not liable to vacate the premises. The tenant also had filed a suit. C.S No. 256 of 1971 in the court of the IV Assistant Judge City Civil Court, Hyderabad, and prayed for specific performance of the agreement of release in bis favour. The eviction petition was filed on 17-2-1971 and the suit by the tenant was filed on 4-5-1971. The tenant filed an application under section 10 C.P.C for stay of the proceedings before the Rent Controller until the final disposal of the suit filed by him. Following decision of this court in M. Subbaramayya v. B.N Swamy. . A.I.R 1972 A.P 186. the Rent Controller dismissed that application. That led to the tenant unsuccessfully filing an appeal before the Chief Judge agreed with the Rent Controller that the proceedings in the court of the rent controller cannot be stayed on the ground that a suit is pen- ding in a civil court. The tenant therefore filed the petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order of the Chief Judge, court of small causes, confirming the order of the Rent Controller. Our learned brother, Raghuvir, J., following a decision of the Division Bench of this High Court in Harikishan Singh v. B Narayana. . 1971 1 A.L.T 29. held that the proceedings before the Rem Controller are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. However relying upon the view expressed by a single Judge, Sriramulu J., in Subbaramayya v. B.N Swamy. the learned judge held that section 10 C.P.C cannot be invoked by the tenant seeking stay of the proceedings before the Rent Controller. He also negatived the contention that the Rent Controller could exercise inherent jurisdiction under Sec. 151 CPC. Hence the writ appeals.

3. The petitioners in both the writ petitions are tenants. They also resisted the applications filed for their eviction by the landlord on the ground that the landlord is not entitled to seek their eviction when there was permanent tenancy in their favour. The petitioner in W.P No. 2764 of 1976 has filed a suit earlier in the court of the Third Additional Judge City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for enforcement of the agreement regarding tenancy in his favour.

4. Mr. M.L Ganu appearing for the appellants and the petitioners contended that, though section 10 C.P.C may not in terms apply to a court of rent controller, as the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable to the court of Rent Controller, the Rent Controller would be acting within the limits of law if he exercisesthe inherent power of the court under Section 151 CPC.

5. It may be stated at the outset that the Rent Control Act is a special enactment prescribing its own procedure for eviction of a tenant or for determination of fair rent or increase of rent. Section 10 of the Act provides the grounds on which an eviction petition could be rested by a landlord. The Act also provides for appeals and revisions. An order made under the Act is binding not only on tenants bat also on sub tenants. There is a provision for instituting proceedings by or against legal representatives. The Rent Controller is also empowered to issue summons to the witnesses requiring them to attend in person to give evidence or produce documents in their custody in connection with any proceedings before him. The Government is empowered to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act Rule 22 of the Rent Control Rules provides for service of summons. The proviso to that rule says;

“Provided that in the matter of summoning witnesses and compelling production of documents in dispute, the Controller, shall, so far as may be follow the procedure laid down in that bihalf in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, with such modifications as the circumstances may require.”

6. This is the only provision which empowers the Rent Controller to follow the procedure in the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of summoning witnesses and compelling production of documents.

7. A Division Bench of this court, in Hari Kishan Singh v. B. Narayan. considered the scope of Rule 22 of the Rent Control Rules. In that case, the question arose whether the successor Rent Controller could continue the proceedings from the stage left by bis predecessor-in-office or whether he should hold a de nove enquiry. The learned Judges held that practice of the court is the law of the court and that it is open to the successor Rent Controller to continue the enquiry from the stage left by his predecessor. The rules that a de nove enquiry cannot be insisted upon. They also observed that, even if the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code can be applied to the proceedings under the Rent Control Act wherever possible. Or. 18 rule 15 can have no application and that the respondents in that case were not entitled to rely on this provision to justify their contention that the succeeding officer could proceed upon the evidence recorded by the predecessor. There is no rule which requires that the transferee Rent Controller Should conduct a de novo enquiry and cannot continue the enquiry from the place left by the previous Controller. They based their decision solely on the ground that the practice should beon strong grounds before the parctice could be deviated from. They however observed : “We are however not unmindful of the fact that even though there has been a long and established practice, if such practice contravenes the Constitution or the law it ought not to be permitted to continue. But very strong grounds must exist before such practice is deviated from and we are not satisfied in this case that such grounds exist”. In that view, the. revision petitions filed asking for a de novo enquiry were dismissed.

8. To show that the Court of Rent Controller is a Court, the learned counsel invited our attention to a judgement of Ramachandra Rao, J, in C.R.P No, 868 of 1973 decided on 9-4-74 (reported in 1974 A.P, High court Notes at page 151, where the learned judge held that the provisions of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked before the Rent Controller for condonation of delay in filing an application for setting aside an exparte order of eviction. All that the Learned Judge said was that, having regard to the several provisions of the Rent Control Act and the rules made thereunder the Rent Controller possesses all the attributes of a “Court”. In so holding, the learned Judge relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarahi Central Co-op. Bank, and that of the Puniab High Court in vidya Devi v. Firm Madan Lal.

9. A Division Bench of this court in C.R.P No. 1360 of 1976 (decided on 1-10-1977) (1977 A.P.H No. 275) on a consideration of the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Tekangana Area). Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, held that section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under that Act and that the authorities under the Act have no power to extend the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal or revision before the authorities under that Act. The learned Judges however expressed the opinion:—

“Bound as we are by the aforesaid decision, we must hold that even though the authorities under the Hyderabad Tenancy Act are “Courts” within the meaning of the said expression employed in section 5 of the Limitation Act, yet it has no application, for the reason that they are not civil courts, and hence the Limitation Act itself has no authorities, except, of course, insofar as they are expressly made applicable by the special enactment”.

10. The Supreme Court, in Jugal Kishore v. Sitamarahi Central Co op. Bank. held that.

“The Registrar of Co-op. Societies has not merely the trappings of a court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issue, to review his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in S. 51 of Code of Civil Procedure.In adjudication upon is dispute referred under S. 48 of the Act, the Registrar to all intents and purposes, is a Court discharging the same functions and duites in the same manner as a court of law is expected to do.”

11. It is significant that, so far as the Act with which we are now concerned, apart from the proviso to Rule 22 referred to above empowering the Rent Controller, as for as may be, to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of summoning witnesses and compelling production of documents in dispute with such modifications as the circumstances may require, the other provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are not made applicable. In the Supreme Court case referred to above, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies was empowered to even exercise inherent jurisdiction of courts mentioned in Sec. 151 C.P.C No such inherent power, as mentioned in section 151 C.P.C, is conferred by the Rent Control Act upon the Rent Controller. Therefore, the appellants cannot call in aid that decision in support of their contention the Rent Controller has inherent power.

12. All that this court said in Sita Devi v. Anna Rao. was that, having regard to the rules framed under section 67 of the Estates Abolition Act, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code can be applied to the proceedings as far as practicable The learned Judges while holding that the Tribunal would be entitled to direct under Sec. 151 C.P.C apart to redeposit the amount drawn by him however, ruled that the Tribunals adjudicating disputes under the Act are not “Courts” within the meaning of Article 192 of the Limitation act, ‘The learned Judges observed that, having regard to the fact that only certain provisions of the Limitation Act were made applicable to the proceedings under that Act or the rules made thereunder before the tribunal, the application of other provisions of the Limitation Act had been deliberately excluded. They did not say that authorities named under the Estates abolition Act are courts’.

13. A full Bench of the Punjab High Court, in Manohar Lal v. Mohanlal. while holding that the Rent Controller cannot be regarded as a Civil Court, however, held that he has inherent power to set aside an exparte order passed by himself.

14. The proviso to rule 22 also enables the Rent Controller to follow the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code in the matters specified therein with such modifications as the circumstances may require. The power to make modifications in the matter of procedure relating to witnesses makes it clear that the Rent Controller is not strictly bound by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code even in the matter of summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents. Deviation from the provisions of the Code with such modifications as the circumstances may require is permissible in the enquiries before him but that cannot make the Court of Rent Controller a “Court” so as to exercise jurisdiction under section 10 C.P.C section 10 C.P.C is enacted in order to prevent courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simaltaneously entertaining and adjudicating upon in respect of the same cause of action, the same subject matter and same relief. It is to see that there are no parallel litigations going on in courts of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of the same subject matter or relief so as to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions by two or more Courts. Firstly the court of Rent Controller is not a court of concurrent jurisdiction. The subject matter and the relief sought by the appellants and the petitioners in the Civil Courts are different from the subject matter and relief sought before the Rent Controller Therefore, Section 10 cannot be availed by the Rent controller, to stay the proceedings pending before him. The question then is whether.It would be open to him to stay the suit invoking section 151 C.P.C The court of Rent Controller may have the trappings of a court. It has also the judicial power to examine witnesses on oath, to decide disputes between the contending parties and its decision is final subject to an appeal and revision. But the Rent Control Act is a self-contained Act and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable only for a limited purpose. The Rent Controller, therefore, is not a civil court though he performs functions similar to a civil court and belongs to the judicial cadre. It is not open to him to follow the procedure laid down in the code of Civil Procedure by—passing the procedure laid down in the Rent Control Act or the rules made thereunder except to the extent indicated in the proviso to rule 22. He is bound by the procedure prescribed by the Act and the rules made thereunder.

15. The Madras High Court, in The South India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lakshmi. held that, though section 151 C.P.C may not apply to the proceedings before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, the court or Tribunal is not devoid of an inherent power to permit such procedures as are rendered imperative by the principles of natural justice, even though there may be no explicit reference to such a procedure in the reference to such a procedure in the rules. There, the Insurance company sought to file an additional written statement to the affect that it bad no legal liability in respect of the claims or damages where there has been transfer of ownership of the vehicle. It is in this connection that the learned Chief Justice said that the Tribunal is not devoid of inherent power, In no case cited before us has it been held that a Rent Controller has inherent power to invoke section 10 C P C.

16. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in Zakeria Soleman v. Collector, Yeotmal held that inherent powers can only be implied in the Civil Courts having general jurisdiction, but where specifical authorities are constituted under a special status and for special object, it is not possible to imply inherent powers in them. In that case, a question arose whether a Rent Controller had the power under Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order to dismiss for default an application of landlord for eviction of a tenant and whether be had the power to restore that application to file. The learned Judges were of the view that the rent controller had that power, by implication, to restore the application for eviction dismissed for default. Therefore they observed:—

“In the discharge of his functions to decide an application for permission to determine a tenancy, the Rent Controller would in conceivable cases, find himself absolutely helpless if a recalcitrant party decides at his will to remain absent or, not to carry out any particular direction of the Rent Controller in spite of repeated orders It seems to us that in such circumstances, we must hold that a power to dismiss the application for default or for non-compliance of orders is absolutely essential. Without implying such a power we think that, the function of the Rent Controller would be rendered largely ineffective, if not. impossible, in conceivable cases”.

17. It is on the ground that the power to dismiss for default also implies the power to restore that application to file that the learned Judges made that observation. They did not say that the Rent Controller had inherent power on the implied power of conferred upon by Sec. 151 C.P.C They decided that case on the implied power of the Rent Controller under Clause 13 of the Rent Control Order.

18. The scope of Section 10 and section 151 C.P.C came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Mitnohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal. that was a case where the applicant and the respondent had entered into a partnership at Indore for working coal mines at Kajeram (District Burdwan). The Head office of the partnership was at Indore. The partnership came to be dissolved subsequently on August 22, 1945. On Account of the disputes that arose between them on August 18, 1948, the appellant filed a suit in the court of the subordinate Judge at Asansol against the respondent for recovery of a sum Rs. 1,00,000/- on account of his share in the capital and assets of the partnership firm. The respondent filed an application under Sec. 34 of the Arbitration Act in the Asansol court seeking stay of the suit in view of terms of the arbitration agreement and that application was rejected on August 20, 1949. Meanwhile on January 3, 1949. the respondent had filed a suit in the court of the District Judge, Indore against the appellant asking for a decree or Rs. 1,90, 519,06, and interest thereon. In December 1951 the respondent applied in the court at Asansol for the stay of the suit in the exercise of its inherent powers. That application was rejected by the Subordinate Judge on the ground that there could be no scope for acting under Sec. 151 C.P.C as section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code had no application to the suit, it having been instituted earlier than the suit at Indore. That order was confirmed by the High Court of Calcutta on 7th May 1953, The High Court however directed that the two suits pending before the Asansol Court should be taken up by the Subordinate Judge and dispossed of as expeditiously as possible. Meanwhile, the appellant on April 28, 1950 applied to the Indore Court for staying that suit under sections 10 and 151. That application was opposed by the respondent. Among the grounds raised were that, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in force in Madhya Bharat the court at Asansol was not an internal court and that the suit filed in Asansol Court could not have the effect of staying the proceedings of that as it and that the two suits were of different nature, their subject matter and relief claimed being different. The application for stay was rejected on July 1951. The High Court of Madhya Bharat confirmed that order on August 20, 1953. The result was that the proceedings in both the suits were to continue and that the Asansol court had been directed to hear the issue of jurisdiction at an early date. It was in those circumstances that the respondent applied under section 151 C.P.C on September 14, 1953 to the Indore court for restraining the appellant from continuing the proceedings in the suit filed by him in the court at Asansol. The Indore court issued an interim injunction under Or. Rule 1 C.P.C to the appellant restraining him from proceeding with his Asansol suit pending decision of the Indore suit. The Bharat contending that the lower court was in error in holding that it was competent to issue an interim injunction against him under Or. 39 Rule 1 C.P.C The High Court dsimissed the appeal by observing that, though Order 39 Rule 1 did not apply to the facts of the case, that order could be issued in the exercise of the inherent powers of the court under Sec, 151 C.P.C ft appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave. The Supreme Court observed at page 526 of the report:

“When there is 8 special provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for dealing with the contingencies of two such suits being instituted, recourse to the inherent powers under S. 151 is not justified. The provisions of S. 10 do not become inapplicable on a court holding that the previously instituted suit is a vexatious suit or has been instituted in violation of the terms of the contract, xxxxxxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

It is clear therefore that the Legislature had contemplated the contingency of two suits with respect to similar reliefs being instituted and of the institution of a suit in one court when it could also be instituted in another court and it be preferable, for certain reasons, that the suit be tried in that other court.”

19. In view of the various considerations stated above, we are of opinion 1 hat the order under appeal cannot be sustained and cannot be said to be an order necessary in the interests of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.

20. The Supreme Court also relied upon its earlier decision in Padam Sen v. State of Uttar Pradesh. dealing with the powers of the court under section 151 C.P.C, where it observed:

“The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to these powers and therefore, it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in S. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressely provided by the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature”.

21. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court made it clear that the powers under Section 5t C.P.C are not to be exercised when their exercise may be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. section 10 C.P.C cannot therefore be invoiced by resort to section 151 C.P.C by a Rent Conrtoller. It is not enough if the parties before the Rent Controller or the Civil Court are one and the same. It is further mandatory that the subject matter in issue in both the cases must be substantially the same and the previously instituted suit must be pending either in the same court or in a different court having jurisdiction to grant the relief ‘Court’ having concurrent jurisdiction of the Civil Court nor the reliefs prayed for are substantially the same. It, therefore follows that any exercise of the power under section 10 C.P.C by the Rent Controller by resort to section 151 C.P.C would be in conflict with the specific requirements of section 10 and the intention of the Legislature.

22. For the reasons recorded we confirm the judgement of the learned single Judge and dismiss the writ appeals and writ petitions, but in the circumstances, without costs.

23. Mr. M.L Ganu has made an oral application for leave to appeal to the supreme court. We are unable to certify that any substantial question of law of general importance, which in our opinion, needs to be decided by the Supreme Court, arises in these cases. The oral application is, therefore, rejected.

W.A Dismissed