Raj Singh v. State Of Haryana .

Order

1. The appellant before us has been convicted for the offence under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 for possession of charas. The prosecution case is that on 22-5-1990, on suspicion the appellant and one Tulsa Bai were apprehended when opium from Tulsa Bai and charas from the appellant were recovered. The trial court acquitted both the accused in separate trials. However, on appeal by the State the judgment of the Sessions Judge was reversed in the case of the appellant by setting aside the acquittal and he had been convicted for the said offence and sentenced to undergo imprisonment. Hence this appeal.

2. In this appeal it is urged that the appellant was born on 9-12-1974 and as the date of alleged committal of offence was 22-5-1990, and on that day, he was a juvenile being less than 16 years of age, he could not have been tried by the Sessions Court but by the Juvenile Court and hence his conviction is bad. Unfortunately this contention has not been raised at any stage earlier. Section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) defines a juvenile to be a person of less than 16 years of age. Section 2(e) of the Act defines that a juvenile who has been found to have committed an offence is a delinquent juvenile. Section 22 of the Act provides that in no case a delinquent juvenile is liable to imprisonment but has to be tried by the Juvenile Court and cannot be tried by the Court of Session. We are fortified in this view by a decision of this Court in Raghbir v. State Of Haryana . (1981) 4 SCC 210, AIR 1981 SC 2037.

3. It is on record that the appellant's date of birth is 9-12-1974 as per the certificate issued by the Board of School Education, Haryana. This certificate stands reaffirmed by another certificate produced today before the Court verifying the said fact. In the circumstances, there cannot be any serious dispute about the date of birth of the appellant i.e 9-12-1974. If that is so, the trial should have been held only as provided under Section 22 of the Act so a different procedure followed leading to conviction of the appellant is vitiated.

4. We allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant. We direct that the entire trial shall stand quashed and the appellant should be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

5. It will be open to the appellant to move an appropriate application for grant of bail in the trial court.