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Judgment Summary — R.S. Narula, C.J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The landlord (petitioner) filed an application for ejectment on 20 October 1973 under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The tenant (respondent) filed a written statement in January 1974. Evidence was closed and the case was fixed for final arguments and subsequent pronouncement of judgment on 6 October 1975. On that same day the respondent applied under Order 6, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure to amend his written statement by substituting paragraph 2 to plead that the notice purportedly served was defective because the premises were a manufacturing concern and, therefore, a six months' notice was required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The petition's paragraph 2 had stated (in the alternative) that a notice under section 106 was sent on 26 September 1973 (Notice No. 284), that it was registered and received and that a reply was dispatched by the respondent on 29 September 1973. The corresponding paragraph in the respondent's written statement had admitted that a notice was sent and that its contents were repudiated on 29 September 1973 by counsel for the respondent.

Despite the absence of a specific challenge to the validity of the notice in the written statement, the Rent Controller framed Issue No. 2: "Whether a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is served." The trial Court (Rent Controller) allowed the respondent's application to amend the written statement by order dated 28 January 1976. The landlord petitioned against that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had been served (as formulated in Issue No. 2 by the Rent Controller).
  2. Whether the respondent's belated application to amend his written statement (under Order 6, rule 17 CPC), made after arguments and on the day of pronouncement, was bona fide and could be allowed.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Landlord's) Arguments — as presented by Mr. M.L. Sarin

  • The application to amend was not bona fide and should have been dismissed on that ground.
  • The petitioner's primary case was that the tenancy was statutory; if established, no question of a notice under section 106 would arise.
  • The reliance on a notice under section 106 was only in the alternative, and that requires a contractual tenancy; termination by notice applies to contractual tenancies, not statutory tenancies.
  • The requirement of six months' notice under section 106 applies to tenancies from year to year (deemed leases) and, where there is a subsisting contract, the parties are governed by the contract terms — the petitioner had pleaded agreed monthly rent and the tenant had not disputed that; the respondent himself admitted the rent and the periodicity (Rs. 200 per munsem).
  • Tenancies for more than a year or from year to year must be in writing and registered; no such document was relied upon in the record.
  • In any event, a recent Supreme Court decision (Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana, 1976 2 SCC 409) had held that, where a Rent Control Act provides special summary proceedings for eviction, it is unnecessary to import the requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the eviction procedure; therefore, no notice under section 106 was necessary for an eviction application under section 13 of the East Punjab Act.

Respondent's (Tenant's) Pleaded Basis for Amendment

  • The proposed substituted paragraph 2 asserted that the notice was defective because the premises were a manufacturing concern and therefore a six months' notice was required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; on this ground the ejectment petition ought to be dismissed.
  • In the written statement as originally filed the respondent admitted that a notice was sent but stated that its contents were repudiated by the respondent's counsel on 29 September 1973; the amendment sought to expand that factual/legal position to challenge validity under section 106.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana, 1976 2 SCC 409 Held that where a Rent Control Act provides special summary proceedings for eviction, there is no room to import the requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; the Rent Act is a complete code on eviction procedure. The court treated this Supreme Court decision as decisive: after this pronouncement, Issue No. 2 (validity/necessity of notice under s.106) had become redundant and could not justify a late amendment of the written statement.
Ulligappa v. S. Mohan Rao (Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court) — cited in the Supreme Court judgment Held that the Andhra Pradesh Act provided a self-contained procedure for eviction so no recourse to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. Referred to by the Supreme Court and noted by the court in the present opinion as an example of an earlier High Court view which the Supreme Court considered and addressed in Puwada.
Raval and Co. v. K.C. Rumchandran, 1974 1 SCC 424 Contained observations that in certain cases the provisions of specific Rent Acts were in addition to, and not in derogation of, the Transfer of Property Act; general observations should be confined to the facts of those cases. The opinion cites the Raval judgment as part of the chain of authorities the Supreme Court examined and distinguished when deciding that Rent Acts with self-contained eviction procedures need not import s.106.
Manujandra v. Purandu Prosad (1967) 1 S.C.R 476 : A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1419 Dealt with eviction; included observations that the Acts considered were in addition to and not in derogation of the Transfer of Property Act (general observations to be confined to facts). Referred to in the Supreme Court's discussion as authority containing general observations; the court in the present opinion relied on the Supreme Court's analysis that such observations must be confined to the facts before applying them to Rent Acts with self-contained schemes.
Brij Rai Krishna v. S.K. Shawant Bros., 1951 S.C.R 145 — (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 115) Held that certain Rent Act provisions (here Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings Act) were self-contained and it was unnecessary to look to the Transfer of Property Act to determine eviction; the Rent Act provided its own eviction procedure. Quoted by the Supreme Court and relied upon in the opinion to support the proposition that Rent Acts with comprehensive eviction provisions are self-contained and do not require importation of section 106.
Shri Hem Chand v. Smt. Sham Devi, AIR (1955) Punj. 36 (ILR 1955 Punj. 36) Held that when a Rent Control Act provides a procedure for eviction, provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act have no relevance to applications under the Rent Control Act. The present court approved the Punjab High Court's reasoning (as adopted by the Supreme Court) and treated it as supportive of the conclusion that s.106 is not relevant to eviction applications under a Rent Act providing summary proceedings.
R. Krishanamurthy v. Parthasarathy, AIR 1949 Mad. 780 (1949) 1 Mad LJ 412 Held that section 7 of the Madras Buildings Act had its own scheme so an application for eviction could be made before contractual tenancy was terminated by notice to quit; no need to reconcile with Transfer of Property Act. Cited by the Supreme Court to show that certain Rent Acts operate as self-contained codes; the present court invoked this line of authority to support the conclusion that s.106 need not be applied.
Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi, AIR 1965 SC 101 Example of a case where a regular suit for eviction (rather than summary proceedings under a Rent Act) had to be filed; distinguished from Acts providing summary eviction provisions. The opinion contrasts this line of authority with Rent Acts that provide summary procedures, using the distinction to justify not importing s.106 into the special Rent Act procedure before the Rent Controller.
Abbasbhai's case, (1964) 5 S.C.R 157 — (A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1341) Referenced among earlier decisions dealing with interaction between Rent Acts and the Transfer of Property Act; mentioned in the context of whether Rent Acts are in addition to or in derogation of the Transfer of Property Act. Noted by the Supreme Court in its analysis; the present court relied on the Supreme Court's sorting and distinguishing of these authorities when concluding Puwada settled the legal position.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, relying strictly on the material and authorities cited in the opinion:

  1. The court considered the factual sequence: the respondent's late application to amend his written statement was made on the day of pronouncement after arguments and after evidence was closed. The amendment sought to introduce a legal contention that a six months' notice under section 106 was required because the premises were used for manufacturing.
  2. The court noted that the trial Court had framed an issue (Issue No. 2) on whether a valid notice under section 106 was served, despite the written statement not having specifically challenged the validity of the notice.
  3. The court reviewed the legal position as settled by the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana (1976 2 SCC 409). That decision addressed whether an eviction application under a Rent Control Act (which provided special summary proceedings) required prior termination of tenancy by serving notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the Supreme Court held it did not. The Rent Act was held to be a complete code on eviction in such circumstances.
  4. The opinion recounted the Supreme Court's analysis and its treatment of earlier authorities (including Raval and Co., Manujandra, Brij Rai Krishna, Shri Hem Chand, R. Krishanamurthy and others). The Supreme Court distinguished cases where the Act was not a self-contained code from those where it was, and underscored that general observations in earlier decisions must be confined to the facts of those cases.
  5. Applying the Supreme Court's conclusion to the present matter, the court found that once Puwada had settled the law that a Rent Control Act containing a self-contained, special summary eviction procedure renders section 106 inapplicable to eviction proceedings under the Act, Issue No. 2 had become redundant for the purposes of the eviction proceeding under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act.
  6. Given that the amendment sought by the respondent would enlarge the scope of the (now redundant) issue and would embark upon a fresh enquiry on a point irrelevant to the Rent Act eviction procedure, and given the extremely late stage at which the amendment was sought (after arguments and on the day of pronouncement), the court concluded that the trial Court's allowance of the amendment could not be sustained.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed: the trial Court's order dated 28 January 1976 is set aside and the tenant-respondent's application to amend his written statement is dismissed.

Direct consequences and procedure ordered by the court:

  • The trial Court, which had already heard arguments on the merits, is directed to dispose of the eviction petition in accordance with law (i.e., proceed on merits without permitting the late amendment on the s.106 point).
  • The parties were ordered to appear before the trial Court on 24 November 1976.
  • Costs of the proceedings in this Court are to abide the result of the eviction application before the Rent Controller (i.e., costs to be decided depending on final outcome of the eviction matter).

Broader implications (as stated in the opinion): the court treated the Supreme Court's decision in Puwada as settling the legal position that where a Rent Control Act provides special summary eviction proceedings and is a complete code on eviction, the procedural requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act need not be imported into the eviction procedure. Consequently, reliance on section 106 at a late stage in such proceedings was irrelevant and could not justify reopening or enlarging the scope of the issues before the Rent Controller.

Order accordingly.

    Mool Raj Jain v. M/S. Jayna Engineering Works .

    R.S Narula, C.J:— The Landlord-petitioner filed an application for ejectment of the tenant-respondent on October 20, 1973, under section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter called the Act). The written statement was filed by the tenant in January 1974 and evidence of the parties having been closed, the case was fixed for final arguments on October 6, 1975. After the arguments, the case was adjourned for pronouncement of judgment, to October 6, 1975. On that very day, i.e, October, 6, 1975, the respondent made an application under, Order 6, rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to amend his written statement, by substituting for the existing paragraph 2 there in the following paragraph:

    “Para No. 2 of the application is admitted correct to this extent only that a notice was sent as the notice was defective as the premises in a question is a manufacturing concert and six months' notice is required under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. On this ground the ejectment petition is liable to be dismissed.”

    2. Paragraph 2 of the original petition for eviction stated as below:

    “That the tenancy of the respondent was statutory. However, without prejudice to this plea and to avoid any further complication a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent by the petitioner through Shri Sukhpat Rai ??? Advocate to the respondent. This notice was notice No. 284 dated 26th September, 1973 and was sent under registered cover acknowledgement due and under certificate of posting. That this notice was duly received by the respondent and a reply to the same was also sent by the respondent through Shri S.S Oberoi Advocate on 29th September, 1973.”

    3. In the corresponding paragraph of his written statement, the respondent bed replied to the above averments by merely saying:—

    “Para No. 2 of the application is admitted correct to this extent only that a notice was sent to the answering defendant and the contents of which were repudiated on 29th September, 1973 by the counsel for the respondent.”

    4. In spite of the fact that no particular objection to the validity of the notice as such had been taken in the written statement, one of the issues framed by the Rent Controller in the case related to this matter.

    5. That was issue No. 2 which was in the following terms:—

    “Whether a valid notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, is served.”

    6. The trial Court by its order dated January 28, 1976, which is sought to be impugned, allowed the application of the respondent and permitted the amendment of his written statement.

    7. Mr. M.L Sarin, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that the application for amendment was in the circumstances of this case, not bona fide and should therefore, have been dismissed on that short ground. He submits that his client's case in the first alternative was and is that the tenancy was statutory. If he is able to prove that, no question of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act would arise. It is only in the alternative that the petitioner had prayed that even if the tenancy is not found to be statutory it stood terminated by a notice. The question of terminating by notice can arise only in the case of a contractual tenancy. The requirement of a six months' notice in the case of manufacturing concern is only for a tenancy from year to year and as such all that section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act provides is that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year. In the instance case, it is the respondent's own case that the tenancy was contractual. Whether the contract was oral or in writing makes no difference. If there is a contract then no question to go into the deeming provision would arise and the parties would be governed by the terms of the contract. The landlord had pleaded that the agreed rent was on monthly basis and that was not disputed by the tenant. In his own statement as a witness, the respondent had admitted that the rate of rent was Rs. 200/- per munsem. From the record of the case, as it is, it cannot be said that the tenancy was from year to year. This is independent of the fact that a tenancy for more than a year or from year to year has to be in writing and registered. It is nobody's case that any such document exists. Even if all this is not take into account. It is now clear that no notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary in order to bring an application for eviction under section 13 of the Act in view of the latest authoritative pronouncement by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Puwada Venkateswara Rao v. Chidamana Venkata Ramana . 1976 2 SCC 409. That was a case of a petitioner for eviction under section 10 of the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (15 of 1960). One of the questions that arose for decision before the Supreme Court was whether in order to file an application for eviction under the Rent Control Act it was or was not necessary to terminate a tenancy by a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held on that point in favour of the landlord relying on its earlier Division Bench judgment in Ulligappa v. S. Mohan Rao . 1979-2 Andh. LT 268. wherein a Division Bench of that Court had held that the Andhra Pradesh Act provided a procedure for eviction of tenants which was self contained so that no recourse to the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was necessary. After mentioning the Division Bench judgment of the Andhra Pradesh, High Court, their Lordships of the Supreme Court referred to their own earlier judgment in Raval and Co. v. K.C Rumchandran . 1974 1 SCC 424, wherein they had held as follows:—

    “On behalf of the appellants reliance is placed upon two decisions of this Court, (1963) 3 S.C.R 312 : (A.I.R 1963 S.C 120) and Manujandra v. Purandu Prosad, (1967) 1 S.C.R 476 : (A.I.R 1967 S.C 1419). They are cases dealing with eviction. In those two cases it was held broadly speaking, that the provisions of the Acts there under consideration were in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. There are certain general observations in those two decisions upon which reliance was placed to contend that they apply to cases of fixation of rent also. The argument was that as it was held in those cases that the Acts did not provide the landlord with additional rights which he did not possess under his contract of tenancy, similarly where there was a subsisting contract of tenancy it is not open to the landlord to take advantage of the provisions of the Act to apply for fixation of a fair rent at a figure higher than the contract rent. We are not called upon in this case to consider whether those two cases were correctly decided. But we must point out that the general observations therein should be confined to the facts of those cases. Any general observation cannot apply in interpreting the provisions of an Act unless this Court has applied its mind to and analysed the provisions of that particular Act. We may also point out that in both those cases the contract of tenancy was not subsisting. In a sense, therefore, the observations therein were not really necessary for deciding those cases. We may also point out that in Brij Rai Krishna v. S.K Shawant Bros., 1951 S.C.R 145—(A.I.R 1951 S.C 115) dealing with the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 and interpreting Section 11 of that Act this Court observed as follows:—

    ‘Section 11 begins with words ‘Notwithstanding anything contained in any agreement or law to the contrary’ and hence any attempt to import the provisions relating to the law of transfer of property for the interpretation of the section would seem to be out of place. Section 11 is a self-contained section and it is wholly unnecessary to go outside the Act for determining whether a tenant is liable to be evicted or not, and under what conditions he can be evicted. It clearly provides that a tenant is not liable to be evicted except on certain conditions and one of the conditions, laid down for the evictions of a month to month tenant is non-payment of rent.’

    Similarly in Shri Hem Chand v. Smt. Sham Devi, AIR (1955) Punj. 36 which dealt with the Delhi and ??? Merwara Rent Control Act, Section 13(1) of which provided that no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any court favour of the landlord against tenant nitwit standing anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, it was held that the Act provided the procedure for obtaining the relief of ejectment and that being so the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had no relevance. Both these cases were referred to the decision in (1963) 3 SCR 312 : (AIR 1963 SC 120). Therefore, the following observations in (1967) SCR 475—(AIR 1967 SC 1419) that ‘Rent Act are not ordinarily intended to interfere with contractual leases and are Acts for the protection of tenants and are consequently restrictive and not enabling, conferring as new right of action but restricting the existing rights either under the contracts or under the general law’ should not be held to apply to all Rent Acts irrespective of the scheme of those ??? and their provisions, the decisions of the Madras High Court in R. Krishanamurthy v. Parthasarathy, AIR 1949 Mad. 780 (1949) 1 Mad LJ 412 where it was held that section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946 had its own scheme of procedure and therefore there was no question of an attempt to reconcile that Act with the transfer of Property Act and that in application for eviction could be made to the Rent Controller even before the contractual tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit, should not have been summarily dismissed on the grounds that it was contrary to the decisions of this Court in Abbasbhai's case, (1964) 5 S.C.R 157—(A.I.R 1964 S.C 1341) and Mangilal's case, (1964) 5 S.C.R 239, (A.I.R 1965 S.C 101) and therefore was not a correct law, without examining the provisions of that Act.”

    8. Their Lordships drew a clear distinction between the law laid down by them in the cases covered by the Rent Control Act, such as the case of Raval and Co. and of Rai Brij Rai Krishna v. S.R Shaw and Brothers . AIR 1951 SC 115. on the one hand, and cases like Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi, AIR 1965 SC 101, where regular suit for eviction had to be filed, on the other hand. Their Lordships approved the judgment of the Punjab High Court in Shri Hem Chand v. Shrimati Sham Devi . ILR 1955 Punj. 36. in which a Division Bench of this Court had clearly held that the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act requiring the serving of a notice, upon the tenant have no relevance when considering an application for ejectment made under the Rent Control Act and that, therefore, no such notice was necessary to be served.

    9. After the settlement of the law by the Supreme Court in their Lordships's latest judgment in Puwada Venkateswara Rao's case, no doubt at all is left in the legal position. The words in the relevant provision relating to applications for eviction in almost all the Rent Control Acts providing for special summary proceedings for eviction of tenants are practically the same. The Supreme Court has held that in all such cases where a special provision for summary proceedings for eviction of tenants under an Act containing all the requirements for those proceedings is given, there is no room for importing the requirements of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Act is also a complete Code on the subject of eviction. That being so, it is clear that after the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the above mentioned latest judgment of their Lordships, issue No. 2 had become redundant and no application for amending the written statement with a view to enlarge the scope of the issue or to embark upon a fresh enquiry in connection therewith can be allowed. In this view of the matter, the order of the trial Court allowing the amendment at an extremely late stage on a point which is not relevant to the enquiry cannot be sustained.

    10. For the aforementioned reasons I allow this petition, set aside and reverse the order of the trial Court dated January 28, 1976, and dismiss the application of the tenant-respondent for amendment of his written statement. The trial Court, which has already heard arguments of the parties on merits, will now dispose of the petition for eviction in accordance with law. The parties will appear before the trial Court on November 24, 1976. Costs of the proceedings in this Court shall abide the result of the eviction application before the Rent Controller.

    11. Order accordingly.

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    Comments

    Mool Raj Jain v. M/S. Jayna Engineering Works .
    (Nov 3, 1976)