Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter
  • Land Reforms Act) and the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter
  • provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of the Land Reforms Act
  • Section 18 of the Land Reforms Act
  • Section 11 of the Land Reforms Act
  • provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16
  • provisions of Land Reforms Act.
  • Section 18. Section 11
  • Section 18(1)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Attorney(S)
Acts
  • provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter
  • Land Reforms Act) and the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter
  • provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.
  • Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • provisions of the Land Reforms Act
  • Section 18 of the Land Reforms Act
  • Section 11 of the Land Reforms Act
  • provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16
  • provisions of Land Reforms Act.
  • Section 18. Section 11
  • Section 18(1)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Sehti, the husband of Smt. Phoola, died in 1911 while the family remained joint. By a family compromise dated 8 February 1932, certain lands were allotted to Smt. Phoola for her maintenance and her name was mutated in the revenue records. On 6 April 1956 she executed sale deeds in favour of the present respondents and subsequently died in 1966.

The appellants instituted a declaratory suit challenging the alienations on the ground that Smt. Phoola held only a limited estate. That suit abated upon commencement of proceedings under the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The same issue was then raised before the Consolidation authorities. The Consolidation Officer and, on appeal, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) upheld the validity of the transfers. In revision, the Deputy Director, Consolidation reversed those findings. A writ petition by the respondents succeeded before the High Court, which held that Smt. Phoola had become an absolute owner (Bhumidhar) under Section 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (“Land Reforms Act”). The present appeal challenges that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether land given to a widow for maintenance under a 1932 family compromise rendered her an asami under Section 11 of the Land Reforms Act or a bhumidhar with full ownership rights under Section 18(1).
  2. Consequently, whether the sale deeds executed by Smt. Phoola in 1956 conveyed valid title to the respondents.
  3. Whether the Deputy Director, Consolidation exceeded the permissible scope of revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating factual findings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Section 11, not Section 18, governed the land because it had been allotted “in lieu of maintenance allowance”; therefore Smt. Phoola was only an asami and lacked power to transfer.
  • Smt. Phoola could not be treated as an “intermediary” for the purpose of Section 18(1).

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramji Dixit & Anr. v. Bhrigunath & Ors. A widow holding only a life estate prior to vesting is deemed a bhumidhar under the Land Reforms Act. The Court held that the ratio applies equally where the widow’s possession arose from a family compromise, thus supporting the High Court’s view that Smt. Phoola became a bhumidhar.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Interpreting Section 18(1), the Court observed that all lands in possession of an “intermediary” as sir or khudkasht on the date immediately preceding vesting stand settled with that intermediary as bhumidhar. The family remained joint, and therefore the joint family itself was an intermediary; Smt. Phoola, still a member in possession of the disputed land, qualified for the benefit of Section 18(1).

The Court rejected application of Section 11, noting that the provision is limited to cases where the holder of sir/khudkasht “allots” land in lieu of maintenance. In contrast, Smt. Phoola’s possession flowed from a 1932 compromise rather than an allotment by an individual holder after vesting.

Relying on Ramji Dixit, the Court held that a widow in possession at the relevant date acquires full bhumidhar rights irrespective of whether the land devolved directly from her husband or through compromise.

Finally, the Court held that the Deputy Director, Consolidation had overstepped revisional limits by re-appraising evidence and making conjectural findings on possession; the High Court was correct to set his order aside.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed; the judgment of the High Court is affirmed.

The immediate effect is that the respondents’ title under the 1956 sale deeds stands validated, and the orders of the Consolidation Officer and Settlement Officer (Consolidation) are effectively restored. The decision reiterates the supremacy of Section 18 over Section 11 when a widow of a joint-family intermediary possessed land on the vesting date, but it does not establish a novel precedent beyond confirming settled interpretation.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Ram Avtar v. Ram Dhani

    N.P.Singh, J.

    (1) ONE Sehti, the husband of Smt. Phoola died in a state of jointness in the year 1911. The said $mt. Phoola continued to be the member of the joint family along with other brothers of her husband. A dispute arose in the family and a compromise was entered into on February 8, 1932 in which it was agreed that Smt. Phoola who was the widow in the family should be given some lands for maintenance. Her name was also mutated in revenue records.

    (2) THE said Phoola executed sale deeds in favour of the respondents on April 6, 1956 in respect of the lands in question. She died in the year 1966. Thereafter, the appellants filed a suit for declaration that Smt. Phoola having only a limited interest in the said property could not have transferred the same in favour of the respondents. That suit abated in view of issuance of the notification under the provisions of U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. Thereafter, the same question as to whether the transfer could have been made or not by Smt, Phoola in favour of the respondents was raised before the Consolidation Officer. The Consolidation Officer upheld the right of Smt. Phoola to transfer the lands in question. The appeal filed on behalf of the appellants before the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was also dismissed with the same finding. However, on revision application being filed on behalf of the appellants, the Deputy Director, Consolidation set aside the orders passed by the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). Thereafter, a writ petition was filed on behalf of the respondents before the High Court. A learned Judge of the High Court after taking into consideration the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Land Reforms Act) and the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Succession Act) came to the conclusion that even before coming into force of the provisions of the succession act Smt. Phoola had acquired absolute right under Section 18 of the Land Reforms Act on the basis of which she could have conveyed valid title to the respondents. The High Court also proceeded to consider the effect of the provisions of the succession act in connection with the arguments raised before the High Court that the lands which had been given to Smt. Phoola for maintenance, were in lieu of a pre-existing right.

    (3) LEARNED counsel appearing for the appellants took the stand that in the present case, Section 11 of the Land Reforms Act shall be attracted and not Section 18. Section 11 and relevant part of Section 18 of the Land Reforms Act are as follows :

    "SECTION 11. Sir or khudkasht allotted in lieu of maintenance allowance -Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, where sir or khudkasht has been allotted by the sir or khudkasht holder thereof to a person in lieu of maintenance allowance, such person shall be deemed to be the asami thereof entitled to hold the land for so long as the right of maintenance allowance subsists. Section 18. Settlement of certain lands with intermediaries of cultivators as Bhumidhar(1) Subject to the provisions of Sections 10, 15, 16 and 17 all lands (a) in possession of or held or deemed to be held by an intermediary as sir, khudkasht or an intermediary's grove, (b) held as a grove by, or in the personal cultivation of a permanent lessee in Avadh, (c) held by a fixed-rate tenant or a rent-free grantee as such, or (d) held as such by (i) an occupancy tenant, (ii) a hereditary tenant, (iii) a tenant or Patta Dawami or Istamrari referred to in Section 17, possessing the right to transfer the holding by sale, (e) held by a grove holder, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary, lessee, tenant, grantee or grove-holder, as the case may be, who shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be entitled to take or retain possession as a bhumidhar thereof.

    (4) ON a plain reading of Section 18(1) it appears that all lands in possession of an intermediary as sir or khudkasht on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall be deemed to be settled by the State Government with such intermediary. The High Court was of opinion that as Smt. Phoola was in possession of the lands in question on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, it shall be deemed to have been settled by the State Government with her in view of Section 18(1) and she had right to retain the same as Bhumidhar thereof.

    (5) ON behalf of the appellants it was pointed out that Smt. Phoola shall not be deemed to be an intermediary so as to avail the benefit of Section 18(1). The Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the High Court have proceeded on the assumption that after the compromise in the year 1932 Smt. Phoola came in possession of the lands which are the subject matter in dispute, in lieu of maintenance on the basis of compromise in the family. The family was joint. There is no finding that there was any partition at any stage later. As such, it shall be deemed that Smt. Phoola continued to be a member of the joint family which was admittedly an intermediary within the meaning of provisions of Land Reforms Act. In this background, according to us Section 18(1) was fully attracted and on the basis thereof it shall be deemed that the land which she was holding as'sir or khudkasht was settled by the State Government with her and she was entitled to retain possession as Bhumidhar thereof.

    (6) THIS Court in the case of Ramji Dixit & Anr. v. Bhrigunath & Ors.1 has considered the scope of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act in connection with a widow holding a life estate and has held that in view of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act she will be deemed to be Bhumidhar. Learned counsel tried to distinguish the judgment by saying that in that case, the land had devolved on the widow from her husband directly and not on the basis of any compromise. According to us, the ratio . of that judgment cannot be distinguished on this ground.

    (7) THE High Court has rightly rejected the stand of the appellants that as Smt. Phoola got the lands by way of maintenance it will be .covered by Section 11 of the Act and after vesting she will be deemed to be the asami and not Bhumidhar. It appears Section 11 shall be applicable where the holder of sir or khudkasht lands allots such lands to a person in lieu of maintenance allowance. In the present case, Smt. Phoola got the lands on the basis of a compromise entered into in the year 1932 and she was in possession thereof.

    (8) WE are surprised as to how the Deputy Director while exercising the revisional power entered into all questions of fact and came to the conclusion on pure conjecture that the appellants before this Court shall be deemed to be in possession of the lands since 1932. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that howsoever wide the power under statutory revision may be in contract to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, still while exercising that power the authority concerned cannot act as court of appeal so as to reappreciate the evidence on record for recording findings on questions of fact. According to us, the High Court should have set aside the order of the Deputy Director, on this ground alone and should have restored the order of the Consolidation Officer and the Settlement Officer (Consolidation). We are in agreement with the conclusions arrived at by the High Court. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.

    --- *** ---

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Ram Avtar v. Ram Dhani
    (Sep 26, 1996)