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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Rule 21 of the M.P Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter be referred as Corrupt Practices Rules)
  • Rule 83 of M.P Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred
  • ORDER 6 RULE 17 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • R.S.C Order 25, Rule 4
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 79
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 79,
  • provision in Rule 4
  • Rule 21 (d)(i)
  • :25. Rule 79
  • Rule 7.20.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 21 of the M.P Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter be referred as Corrupt Practices Rules)
  • Rule 83 of M.P Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred
  • ORDER 6 RULE 17 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • R.S.C Order 25, Rule 4
  • sub-rule (3) of Rule 79
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 79,
  • provision in Rule 4
  • Rule 21 (d)(i)
  • :25. Rule 79
  • Rule 7.20.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (J.K. Maheshwari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal challenges the Single Judge's order dated 29-9-2011 in W.P. No. 14591/2010, which upheld the Election Tribunal's order dated 21-12-2010 that declared the election of the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Sakhtali invalid after recount and declared respondent No. 1 as Sarpanch. The appeal is brought under section 2(1) of the M.P. Ucch Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

Substantive facts: The appellant and respondent No. 1, along with 11 other candidates, contested the Sarpanch election. The appellant was initially declared elected by notification dated 3-2-2010 under Rule 83 of the M.P. Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995. A total of 1,364 votes were cast: 1,241 valid, 123 rejected. Appellant received 244 votes; respondent No. 1 received 242 votes.

Respondent No. 1 filed an election petition under section 122 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993, seeking recount. The Election Tribunal directed a recount; that order was the subject of a writ (W.P. No. 3788/2010) which was allowed on 16-4-2010 remanding the matter for framing issues and recording evidence. The Tribunal again directed recount in an order dated 21-12-2010 and recounting took place on 22-10-2010 (chronology in the record indicates recount direction and recount events), after which respondent No. 1 was declared elected by two votes. The Single Judge upheld the Tribunal's recount direction; the appellant filed the present appeal against that upholding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Election Tribunal—and consequently the Single Judge—were correct to direct and uphold a recount/inspection of ballot papers where the election petition did not set out material facts and material particulars sufficient to prima facie justify such an order.
  2. Whether the sacrosanct principle of secrecy of the ballot requires the Tribunal/Court to record prima facie satisfaction on the basis of pleaded material facts and particulars before directing inspection/recount of ballots.
  3. Whether the mere result of a recount (i.e., change in declared winner) can justify an order for recount when the requisite material facts/particulars were not pleaded and proved on the threshold.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Reliance on Rule 21 of the M.P. Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995: grounds to assail election are specified and must be pleaded; the election petition did not plead the necessary material facts/particulars required under Rule 21(d)(i)-(iv).
  • Pleadings alleged improper acceptance of nomination and corrupt practices but these were not proved by cogent evidence before the Election Tribunal.
  • The Election Tribunal's direction to recount was issued without requisite material particulars or prima facie satisfaction; the Single Judge erred in upholding that direction.
  • Relied on various precedents (including P.K.K. Shamsudeen, Satyanarain Dudhani, Birjha Bai, Vidhyawati Lilhare, Kamlesh Bai, Neki Bai) to argue that recount orders must be based on pleaded material facts and cannot be ordered to fish out evidence.

Respondent No. 1's Arguments

  • Maintained that the pleadings (paras 6 and 7 of the election petition) together with conduct/statements of election officers showed flouting of legal provisions and mismanagement by returning officers, thereby justifying recount and inspection; the Election Tribunal and Single Judge rightly so held.
  • Relied on Supreme Court authority including T.A. Ahammed Kabeer, Sadhu Singh, and Virender Nath Gautam to support the Tribunal's approach and to argue that the Tribunal's findings did not warrant interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Sevak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai, AIR 1964 SC 1249 Inspection of ballot papers cannot be directed as a matter of course; secrecy of ballot is sacrosanct; Court must be prima facie satisfied on adequate statement of material facts in petition. The court treated this as an authoritative statement that secrecy is sacrosanct and that vague, unsupported pleas cannot justify recount; it formed part of the legal framework the court applied to assess whether the Tribunal had prima facie satisfaction.
Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Shri Krishna Behari, 1969 (2) SCC 433 Challenge on irregularity in counting permitted only when petition contains adequate statement of material facts; reasons for judicial orders must be disclosed; secrecy cannot be ignored without material. Used to support the proposition that the Tribunal must show reasons and prima facie satisfaction based on material facts before directing recount; orders ignoring secrecy without material are impermissible.
Bhabhi v. Sheo Govind, AIR 1975 SC 2117 Six conditions for inspection/recount (including secrecy, clear and specific allegations, prima facie satisfaction, avoidance of fishing inquiries, and possibility of sample inspection only in special facts). The court relied on these conditions to evaluate whether the Election Tribunal met the required threshold for recount—finding the required pleaded particulars lacking for such an intrusion.
Beliram Bhalaik v. Jai Behari Lal Khachi, AIR 1975 SC 283 Mere dissatisfaction with counting without specifics is insufficient for recount; need to specify irregularity/illegality. Supported the conclusion that bare or vague allegations cannot ground an order for recount; the court applied this to the petition's defects.
R. Narayanan v. S. Semmalai, (1980) 2 SCC 537 Possibility of counting error or small margin of victory is not alone sufficient for recounting. Cited to reject the notion that a narrow victory margin by itself justifies recount; court invoked this when considering the two-vote margin arising from recount.
S. Raghubir Singh Gill v. S. Gurucharan Singh Tohra, 1980 Supp SCC 53 Petition for recount must contain adequate statement of material facts; tribunal must be prima facie satisfied that inspection is necessary; sample inspection only in special facts and not for fishing. The court quoted and applied these principles to assess sufficiency of the election petition and the propriety of the Tribunal's order.
P.K.K. Shamsudeen v. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohindeen, AIR 1989 SC 640 Justification for examination/recount must be based on material placed before the tribunal before the order; secrecy of ballot is a salutary rule and should not be lightly broken; recount must be ordered based on prima facie case of high probability. The court relied on this to hold that the result of recount cannot retroactively justify an order; the threshold must be met on the material before the tribunal.
Satyanarayan Dudhani v. Uday Kumar Singh, AIR 1993 SC 367 Cryptic applications for recount without specifics are improper; pleadings/evidence must justify recount and maintain secrecy. Used to underline that bare allegations do not justify recount and that pleadings/evidence must support the order; the court referenced it in rejecting fishing enquiries.
M.R. Gopalkrishnan v. Thachady Prabhakaran, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 101 Allegations of illegal/improper counting that are vague without particulars are insufficient; absence of objections during counting undermines later vague allegations; recount applications made after result with vague allegations are suspect. The court applied these principles to find that the petitioner's allegations were vague and unsupported and that no occasion existed to set aside the election or order recount on that basis.
Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2036 Recounting orders unsupported by cogent and valid reasons are liable to be set aside; Rule 79 context—statutory remedies and the need to disclose basis for recount requests. Cited for the proposition that statutory remedies should ordinarily be availed and that the Tribunal should consider the reasons why statutory remedy was not used in deciding recount requests; court used it to evaluate procedural regularity and sufficiency of basis.
M. Chinnasamy v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2004) 6 SCC 341 Material facts and particulars must be pleaded; evidence at variance with pleadings is inadmissible; prima facie case of magnitude to materially affect election must be pleaded; onus on petitioner. Referenced to emphasize that pleadings must contain material facts and particulars, failure of which precludes allowance of recount—this was a key authority for setting aside the Tribunal's order.
Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh, (2007) 3 SCC 617 Distinction between material facts (facta probanda) and particulars (facta probantia); pleading obligations; particulars amplify material facts and ensure fair trial. The court relied on this distinction to analyze the petitioner's pleadings and to conclude that material particulars were absent though some material facts were asserted.
T.A. Ahammed Kabeer v. A.A. Azeez, AIR 2003 SC 2271 Election Judge's task is delicate; while secrecy is important and onus lies on challenger, the rule of practice should not be stretched to frustrate fair representation; balancing of principles to protect purity of electoral process. Cited by respondent and considered by the court to note the balance between guarding secrecy and ensuring the electoral process's purity; the court applied the observation to reject rigid application that would prevent justice.
Sadhu Singh v. Darshan Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 255 Supports requirement that pleadings/evidence must establish irregularities for prima facie case; secrecy must be maintained; recount cannot be a fishing exercise. Relying party cited it; the court treated it as part of the consistent line of authorities requiring specific pleaded material to direct recount.
Mahender Pratap v. Krishan Pal, (2003) 1 SCC 390 Degree of proof for issuing a direction of recounting must be of a very high standard; onus on election petitioner. Cited in the discussion of standards of proof and onus; the court used it to reinforce that a high standard is required at the threshold.
Phillips v. Phillips, (1874-80) ALL ER Rep Ext 1684 (CA) Pleadings must state such particulars as put defendants on notice; "material" means necessary to formulate a complete cause of action. Used to explain the general pleading principle informing the distinction between material facts and particulars and to underpin the requirement of adequate pleadings in election petitions.
Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd., (1936) 1 All ER 287 (CA) The term "material" in pleadings: necessary facts for formulating a cause of action; omission of a material statement renders pleadings bad. Invoked to support the court's exposition on pleading requirements—material facts must be pleaded to avoid surprise and ensure fair trial.
Birjha Bai v. State of M.P., 2008 (2) MPLJ 591; Vidyawati Lilhare v. SDO-cum-Prescribed Officer, Lanji Balaghat, 2010 (1) MPLJ 115; Kamlesh Bai v. Upper Commissioner Bhopal, 2008 (2) MPLJ 558; Neki Bai v. Mithlesh, 2011 (1) MPLJ 659 State High Court decisions consistent with Apex Court gloss: pleadings and particulars required; recount should not be ordered on vague allegations; evidence beyond pleadings is not admissible. Cited to demonstrate that this Court's prior decisions align with Supreme Court principles and to bolster the court's view that the Tribunal and Single Judge erred in accepting recount without sufficient pleaded particulars.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a structured manner: it first identified the threshold legal principles required before ordering inspection or recount of ballot papers (secrecy of the ballot, need for specific pleaded material facts and material particulars, and the prohibition on fishing inquiries). The court then examined the pleadings and record to see whether that threshold had been satisfied.

  1. Framework: The court reviewed binding precedents (Supreme Court and this Court) establishing that:
    • The secrecy of ballot papers is sacrosanct and cannot be lightly violated.
    • An order for inspection/recount requires clear, specific allegations supported by adequate statements of material facts and, where necessary, material particulars; the tribunal must be prima facie satisfied on these materials.
    • Sample inspection may be permitted only in special facts to lend assurance to prima facie satisfaction, not to fish for evidence; a narrow margin alone is not sufficient.
  2. Meaning of "material facts" and "material particulars": The court analysed authorities (including Phillips, Bruce and Virender Nath Gautam) to explain that material facts are the primary facts a party must plead (facta probanda) and particulars are supporting details (facta probantia). Both are required to enable a fair defense and to avoid surprises; evidence divergent from pleadings is inadmissible.
  3. Examination of the petition's pleadings: The court inspected the election petition's paragraphs (notably paras 6, 7 and 9). It found that:
    • The petition alleged mismanagement at polling booths Nos. 124 and 126 and claimed improper conduct by returning officers, and alleged denial of recount at the time; these allegations constituted some material facts.
    • However, the petition did not describe the specific irregularities at polling booth No. 125, yet the recount result showed a two-vote change arising from that booth.
    • The petition lacked particulars specifying the nature and number of invalid votes counted or valid votes rejected, names of tables/rounds/polling stations with detailed irregularities, or other supporting particulars required by authorities like M. Chinnasamy, M.R. Gopalkrishnan and Chandrika Prasad Yadav.
  4. Assessment of evidentiary materials and officer statements: The Tribunal relied on statements by Returning Officers who gave inconsistent accounts (e.g., applications for recount allegedly taken home, or possibly in an envelope). The court noted contradictory statements and conduct suggesting mismanagement at booths 124 and 126 (Tehsildar's presence, possibility of breach of peace). But the court emphasized that such findings, without the necessary pleaded particulars as to the specific irregularities—particularly regarding booth 125 where the decisive change occurred—were insufficient to discharge the high onus on the petitioner.
  5. Application of authorities to facts: The court applied the precedents' rules that secrecy must be preserved and that recounts cannot be ordered on vague allegations or to fish out evidence. The court held that merely asserting invalid votes counted for one candidate and invalid rejection for another without particulars does not meet the threshold. The result of recount (change of declared winner) cannot retroactively justify an order for recount; the justification must exist on the material before the tribunal when the order was made.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Given the absence of adequate pleaded material facts and supporting particulars—especially with respect to the polling booth which produced the decisive difference—the Tribunal erred in directing recount and in setting aside the election. The Single Judge erred in affirming the Tribunal without independently considering whether the pleadings and evidence established prima facie satisfaction to permit recount.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The orders of the Election Tribunal dated 21-12-2010 and of the learned Single Judge dated 29-9-2011 are set aside, and the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 is dismissed.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Election Tribunal's order invalidating the appellant's election and declaring respondent No. 1 elected is set aside; the election petition by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed. The court directed that parties bear their own costs.
  • Legal implication: The court reaffirmed the settled principle that recount/inspection of ballot papers requires specific pleaded material facts and supporting particulars and a prima facie satisfaction on the record before the tribunal; secrecy of ballot is not to be lightly infringed. The opinion applies established precedents rather than creating new law—no novel principle was announced beyond the consistent application of cited authorities.

Order: "Appeal allowed." C.C. as per rules. Parties to bear their own costs.

    Ganesh Ram Gayari v. Bagdiram And Others

    J.K Maheshwari, J.:— Challenging the order dated 29-9-2011, passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P No. 14591/2010 upholding the order dated 21-12-2010 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer (Election Tribunal), Sitamau, district Mandsaur declaring the election of the Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sakhtali as invalid after recount, and to declare the respondent No. 1, as Sarpanch this appeal has been preferred under section 2(1) of the M.P Ucch Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaypeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005.

    2. The facts giving rise to the filing of the present writ appeal are that appellant and respondent No. 1 along with 11 other candidates have contested the election of Sarpanch, Gram Panchayat Sakhtali, Sitamau, district Mandsaur, wherein the appellant was declared elected by issuance of notification on 3-2- 2010, as per Rule 83 of M.P Panchayat Nirvachan Niyam, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as, Nirvachan Niyam). It is stated that total 1364 votes were casted, out of which set of 1241 votes were valid and 123 votes were rejected as not valid. The appellant received 244 votes and respondent No. 1 received 242 votes. After becoming unsuccessful, respondent No. 1 has filed an election petition under section 122 of the M.P Panchayat Raj and Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as Adhiniyam, 1993) which was decided on 5-4-2010 directing recount of the votes. The said order was challenged by filing a W. P. No. 3788/2010 which was allowed on 16-4-2010 and while remitting the matter back to the Election Tribunal, it was directed that after framing of the issues and recording the evidence the election petition be decided on merit. Thereafter, the Election Tribunal vide order dated 21-12-2010 decided the same and directed for recount of votes and subsequently on 22-10-2010 recounting took place, wherein respondent No. 1 has been declared elected as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sakhtali, as he has received two more votes than the appellant. The said order was challenged before the writ Court, inter alia contending that the material facts and particulars have not been pleaded before the Election Tribunal. However, the findings to direct for recount is not in conformity to the principle of law laid down by various judgments. Learned Single Judge while passing the order impugned, has referred the earlier order of remand passed by this Court on 16-4-2010 and thereafter quoting some paras of the order dated 21-12-2010 passed by the Election Tribunal, recorded the finding that in the facts of the case, recounting as directed by Election Tribunal, is just and proper. However, interference was declined. Being aggrieved by the said order, this appeal has been preferred.

    3. Shri A.K Sethi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant referring to Rule 21 of the M.P Panchayats (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1995 (hereinafter be referred as Corrupt Practices Rules) contended that the grounds to assail the election has been specified in Rule 21 (d)(i) to (iv). In the pleadings of the election petition, the ground of improper acceptance of nomination and corrupt practices were also pleaded, but both of the grounds were not found proved by Election Tribunal in absence of the material and cogent evidence to establish the same. In the present case, the Court has directed for recounting, to which material facts and the particulars have neither been pleaded nor produced therefore, the direction issued for recount by the Election Tribunal, upheld by the learned Single Judge is not in conformity to law. Learned senior counsel has placed reliance on the judgments of P.K.K. Shamsudeen v. A.M Mappillai Mohindeen, AIR 1989 SC 640, Satyanarain Dudhani v. Uday Kumar Singh, AIR 1993 SC 367 and the division Bench judgments of this Court in the case of Birjha Bai v. State of M.P, 2008(2) MPLJ 591, Vidhyawati Lilhare v. SDO-cum- Prescribed Officer, Lanji Balaghat, 2010(1) MPLJ 115 : 2010(2) JLJ 29 and a Single Bench judgment in the case of Kamlesh Bai v. Upper Commissioner Bhopal and Hoshangabad Division, 2008(2) MPLJ 558 : 2008(2) MPHT 466 Neki Bai v. Mithlesh, 2011(1) MPLJ 659. In view of the aforesaid it is submitted that the direction issued for recount by the Election Tribunal as well as by learned Single Judge was without considering the pleadings and without having any material particulars to record prima facie satisfaction. It is further submitted that the grounds for recounting has not been pleaded and proved therefore also the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge may be ordered to be set aside.

    4. Per contra Shri Abhishek Tugnawat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent referring the pleadings in paras 6 and 7 of the election petition has strenuously argued in support of the findings recorded by the Election Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge and contended that looking to the conduct of the election officers and their statements it reveals that they have flouted the provisions of the law, therefore, the recount has rightly been directed by the Election Tribunal and upheld by the learned Single Judge. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court in the Case of T.A Ahammed Kabeer v. A.A Azeez, AIR 2003 SC 2271, Sadhu Singh v. Darshan Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 255 and Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh, (2007) 3 SCC 617. In view of the foregoing it is urged that upholding the order passed by the Election Tribunal and learned Single Judge, writ appeal filed by the appellant may be dismissed.

    5. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and also perused the record of the writ Court and the documents so filed by the parties carefully. However, looking to the facts of the present case, it is required to be seen that as per the material facts and the particulars brought before the Election Tribunal and also before learned Single Judge, whether satisfaction has rightly recorded directing for recount of votes, bringing necessary ingredients in the petition filed by him. It is to be seen that the relevant fact to prove prima facie case as required to plead supported by the documents is made out by respondent No. 1. But before examining the contentions of the parties first of all, the position set out to direct recount by various judgments of Hon'ble the Apex Court as well as of this Court may be looked into, and on such basis, it is to be further seen that whether the order passed by the Election Tribunal and by learned Single Judge is in departure of maintaining the secrecy of the ballot papers.

    6. In the said context, first of all in the judgment of Ram Sevak Yadav v. Hussain Kamil Kidwai, AIR 1964 SC 1249, the Hon'ble Apex Court has set out the circumstances when an order of inspection of ballot papers can be directed. Wherein it has been held that the order of inspection cannot be directed as a matter of course merely on the insistence upon by one of the party. The secrecy of the ballot papers is sacrosanct which ought to be maintained while passing the order of recount. The Court must look into and satisfy that the petition for setting aside the election contains an adequate statement of material facts on which the appellant relies in support of his case. It is to be further seen that on the basis of material so produced, the Tribunal is prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete justice between the parties, inspection of the ballot papers is necessary. It has been observed that on the basis of vague pleas made in the petition, not supported by material or to fish out evidence to support such pleas, the order of recount should not be passed.

    7. In the case of Jitendra Bahadur Singh v. Shri Kirshna Behari, 1969(2) SCC 433, it is held that challenge on the ground of irregularity in scrutinizing and counting of votes can be permitted when the petition for setting aside the election contains the adequate statement of the material facts, and the Tribunal must prima facie satisfy on it. It has further been held that when judicial order is based on reasons, those reasons must be disclosed in the order itself. However, the order if any passed, ignoring the secrecy of the ballot papers without having material facts is not permissible under the law.

    8. Thereafter, in the case of Bhabhi v. Sheo Govind, AIR 1975 SC 2117, the Apex Court has laid down six conditions those are (i) it is important to maintain the secrecy of the ballot which is sacrosanct and should not be allowed to be violated on frivolous, vague and indefinite allegations (ii) before inspection is allowed, the allegations made against the elected candidate must be clear and specific and must be supported by adequate statements of material facts; (iii) the Court must be prima facie satisfied on the materials produced before the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount; (iv) the Court must come to the conclusion that in order to grant prayer for inspection it is necessary and imperative to do full justice between the parties: (v) the discretion conferred on the Court should not be exercised in such a way so as to enable the applicant to indulge in a roving inquiry with a view to fish out materials for declaring the election to be void; and (vi) on the special facts of a given case sample inspection may be ordered to lend further assurance to the prima facie satisfaction of the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount, and not for the purpose of fishing out materials. In the case of Beliram Bhalaik v. Jai Behari Lal Khachi, AIR 1975 SC 283 it is held that mere submitting an application stating that the candidate is not satisfied with the counting without specifying any irregularity and illegality, the order of recount should not be directed.

    9. In the case of the R. Narayanan v. S. Semmalai, reported in (1980) 2 SCC 537, it was held that merely on the basis of the possibility of error in counting, cannot be a ground to direct recounting. Simultaneously it has further held that small margin of victory is not a sufficient ground for Court to direct recounting. Then, in the case of S. Raghubir Singh Gill v. S. Gurucharan Singh Tohra, 1980 Supp SCC 53, the Hon'ble the Apex Court has held as under :—

    “A petition for recount after inspection of some ballot papers must contain an adequate statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies in support of his case. The Tribunal must be prima facie satisfied that in order to decide the dispute and to do complete justice between the parties an inspection of the ballot papers is necessary. Only on the special facts of a given case sample inspection may be ordered to lend further assurance to the prima facie satisfaction of the Court regarding the truth of the allegations made for a recount and not for the purpose of fishing out materials.”

    10. In the case of P.K.K. Shamsudeen v. K.A.M. Mappillai Mohindeen, AIR 1989 SC 640, it was held that justification for an order for examination of ballot papers and recounting of the votes is not to be derived from Hind-sight and by the result of recount of votes. On the contrary justification for an order to recount for votes should be passed as per the material placed by an election officer, on the threshold before an order for recount of votes is actually made. The reason of the said salutary rule is that the preservation of the secrecy of ballot papers is a sacrosanct principle which cannot be lightly or hastily broken unless there is a prima facie genuine need for it. The right of a defeated candidate to assail the validity of the election result seeking recounting of votes has to be subject to basic principles that the secrecy of the ballot is sacrosanct and mandatory. However, unless the affected party is able to allege and substantiate any acceptable measure by means of evidence that a prima facie case of a higher degree of probability existed, recount of votes may be ordered by the Election Tribunal or by the Court.

    11. In the case of Satyanarayan (supra) it was held that on submitting a cryptic application claiming recount without specifying the details for it or showing irregularity or illegality would not be proper to direct for recount on the basis of the bare allegations in the petition. The pleadings and evidence brought before the Election Tribunal do not justify grounds for recount allowing inspection and secrecy of the ballot papers ought to be maintained and it cannot be permitted to be tinkered with lightly.

    12. In the case of M.R Gopalkrishnan v. Thachady Prabhakaran, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 101, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that if on the basis of allegations that counting has been conducted illegally and improperly not in congenial atmosphere, it is held that such allegations are vague without specifying any particular irregularity in counting. No complaint oral or in writing to the Returning Officer or any official concerned during the course of counting was substituted merely stating the fact that invalid votes in favour of the returned candidate and rejection of valid votes in favour of the election appellant has materially affected the result of election as alleged without raising any objection, merely on such vague allegations, recount cannot be directed. In paras 20 and 21 it has held as under :—

    “20. We now come to the third ground advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that invalid votes were counted in favour of the returned candidate respondent No. 1 and that out of the total rejected votes of 1375, quite a large number of valid votes in favour of the appellant were rejected, which materially affected the result of the election. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant has not set forth the concise statement of material fact with regard to the allegation of counting invalid votes in favour of the respondent No. 1 nor has given any particulars of such invalid votes which are alleged to have been counted in favour of respondent No. 1. He also submitted that similarly there are no particulars with regard to the rejection of valid votes in favour of the appellant nor number of such votes in order to support the allegation that such rejection of valid votes in favour of the appellant materially affected the result of the election. In our opinion there is no substance in these submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. In fact the appellant has neither pleaded the details and the number of such invalid votes which were counted in favour of respondent No. 1 nor has given the particulars of the number of such valid votes in favour of the, appellant which were wrongfully rejected during the course of counting. This apart, the Returning Officer, Supervisors and other officials were also present in the counting hall throughout the process of counting and the observers also visited the counting hall, but neither the appellant nor any of his counting agents pointed out or objected either orally or in writing that invalid votes were counted in favour of the respondent No. 1 or valid votes in favour of the appellant were rejected. The evidence of the Returning Officer, PW 16 clearly goes to show that no such complaint was made by any one during the course of counting. In these facts and circumstances it is difficult to accept the allegations made by the appellant which seem to be only an after thought and without any evidence or material to support the same.

    21. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, submitted that having regard to the size of counting hall which was packed and uncongenial atmosphere prevailing therein as stated earlier it was not possible for the petitioner/appellant or his agents to watch, over-see and check the ballot papers so that they could take note of the particulars of ballot papers which were not correctly placed in the respective bundles of the candidates in whose favour the votes were cast or the particulars of those votes which were rejected as invalid though the same were otherwise valid and, therefore, it was not possible for the, petitioner/appellant to make a mention or plead any more facts and particulars beyond those already stated in paras 4 and 7 of the petition. After giving our anxious consideration to the submissions made above, we are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the same. In the earlier part of this judgment, we have already discussed the evidence and material on record and found that there is absolutely no basis to show that there prevailed any kind of confusion or irregularity in the counting which could have disabled the appellant or his agents from watching the process of counting. As said above no such grievance was ever advanced by the appellant or his agents at the time of counting either orally or in written to the Returning Officer or to the observers or to any member of the counting staff deputed for the purpose. The applications for recount were made only after the counting was over and the result was declared and that too with vague allegations. This submission has no merit and the same is accordingly rejected.”

    13. In the case of Chandrika Prasad Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 2036, by three Judges Bench of Hon'ble the Apex Court, it was held that if the recounting order is not supported by cogent and valid reasons, it is liable to be set aside. The Court in paras 25 and 26 has held as under :—

    “25. Rule 79 as noticed hereinbefore enables a candidate to file an appropriate application for recounting of votes. Rule 79 unlike rules framed by other States does hot say that such an application would not be maintainable after declarations of the votes polled by the parties or prior thereto. Such an application, therefore, can be filed at any point of time. The very fact that sub-rule (3) of Rule 79 provides for amendment of the result relating to the votes polled by the respective candidates and as, such amended result is required to be announced in the prescribed form under sub-rule (2) of Rule 79, the same itself is a pointer to the fact that even after announcement of result for recounting an application would be maintainable. It may be true that only because such an application had not been filed before the returning officer by itself may not preclude the Election Tribunal to go into the question of requirement of issuing a direction for recounting but there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that Rule 79 serves a salutary purpose. Counting of ballot papers in terms of the rules takes place in presence of the candidate or his counting agent. When an agent or a counting agent or the candidate himself notices improper acceptance or rejection of the ballot papers, he may bring the same to the notice of the prescribed authority. As noticed hereinbefore, in a given case, an application for recounting either before announcement of the result or thereafter, would be maintainable. Once an application is filed by an agent or a counting agent or the candidate himself pointing out the irregularities committed by the officers appointed for the counting the ballot papers, immediate redressal of grievances would be possible. As indicated hereinbefore, while filing such an application the basis for making a request for recounting of votes is required to be disclosed. The returning officer is statutorily enjoined with a duty to entertain such an application, make an inquiry and pass an appropriate order in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 79 either accepting in whole or in part such requests or rejecting the same wherefor he is required to assign sufficient or cogent reasons. In the event, such an application is allowed either in whole or in part, he is statutorily empowered to amend the results also.

    26. Ordinarily, thus, it is expected that the statutory remedies provided for shall be availed of. If such an opportunity is availed of by the Election Petitioner; he has to state the reasons therefor. If no sufficient explanation is furnished by the Election Petitioner as to why such statutory remedy was not availed of, the Election Tribunal my consider the same as one of the factors for accepting or rejecting the prayer for recounting. An order of the prescribed authority passed in such application would render great assistance to the Election Tribunal in arriving at a decision as to whether a prima facie case for issuance of direction for recounting has been made out.”

    14. In the case of M. Chinnasamy v. K.C Palanisamy, reported in (2004) 6 SCC 341, the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court held that the material facts and material particulars must be pleaded. Evidence at variance with pleadings is neither admissible nor permissible. Prima facie case that at such magnitude as to materially affect the election, must be pleaded. Onus to prove the said allegations is on the returned candidate. Merely making such allegations because of the margin of the votes between the returned candidate and the elected candidate is narrow, recount cannot be directed. It has further been held that where irregularities in counting of votes were alleged in the election petition, but in detail the names of polling stations, counting centers, tables round of counting of votes in relation to which alleged irregularities have taken place without disclosing the material facts, the appellant has not proved prima facie case of scrutiny of ballot papers. However, rejection has rightly been directed. In the case of Vidyawati Lilhare (supra) and Birjha Bai (supra) the Court has held similar preposition of law as thus:-

    “42. With respect we are not in a position to endorse the views taken therein in its entirety. Unfortunately, the decision of a larger Bench of this Court in Jagjit Singh (supra) had not been noticed therein. Apart from the clear legal position as laid down in several decisions, as noticed hereinbefore, there cannot be any doubt or dispute that only because a recounting has been directed, it would be held to be sacrosanct to the effect that although in a given case the Court may find such evidence to be at variance with the pleadings, the same must be taken into consideration. It is now well-settled principle of law that evidence adduced beyond the pleadings would not be admissible nor any evidence can be permitted to be adduced which is at variance with the pleadings. The Court at a later stage of the trial as also the appellate Court having regard to the rule of pleadings would be entitled to reject the evidence wherefor there does not exist any pleading.

    43. Furthermore, the High Court has not arrived at a positive finding as to how a prima facie case has been made out for issuing a direction for recounting. It is well-settled that prima facie case must be made out for scrutiny and recounting of ballot papers where it is of the opinion that the errors are of such magnitude as to materially affect the election. [See M.R Gopalakrishan v. Thachady Prabhakaran, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 101].

    44. The requirement of laying foundation in the pleadings must also be considered having regard to the fact that the onus to prove the allegations was on the election petitioner. The degree of proof for issuing a direction of recounting of votes must be of a very high standard and is required to be discharged. [See Mahender Pratap v. Krishan Pal, (2003) 1 SCC 390].”

    15. The similar preposition of law has been laid down by this Court in the cases of Birjha Bai v. State of M.P, 2008(2) MPLJ 591, Vidhyawati Lilhare v. SDO-cum-Prescribed Officer, Lanji Balaghat, 2010(1) MPLJ 115 : 2010(2) JLJ 29 and Kamlesh Bai v. Upper Commissioner Bhopal and Hoshangabad Division, 2008(2) MPLJ 558 : 2008(2) MPHT 466.

    16. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on a judgment of Sadu Singh (supra) wherein it was held that on the basis of the material facts and pleadings irregularities in counting of votes for prima facie case must be established, roving and fishing enquiry cannot be directed by an order of recount and the secrecy of the ballot papers should be maintained. Relying upon the case of Virender Nath Gautam (supra), it is contended, that there is a distinction in the material facts as well as material particulars. However, the Court after considering the pleadings and on considering of the material particulars available on record rightly recorded a finding which do not warrant any interference. Relying upon the observations of Hon'ble the Apex Court in the case of T.A Ahammed Kabeer (supra) in para 26 reads as under :—

    “26. The task before an Election Judge is ticklish. It is often urged and also held that the success of a winning candidate should not be lightly set aside and the secrecy of ballot must be zealously guarded. On account of a rigid following of these principles the election Courts are inclined to lean in favour of the returned candidates and place the onus of proof on the person challenging the result of election, insisting on strict compliance with the rules of pleadings and excluding such evidence from consideration as is in divergence with the pleadings. However, what has so developed as a rule of practice should not be unduly stretched; for the purity of the election process needs to be preserved unpolluted so as to achieve the predominant goal of democracy that only be should represent the constituency who has been chosen by the majority of the electors. This is the purpose and object of the election law.”

    17. In view of the aforesaid, it is submitted that on account of rigidly following the principles, the election Courts are inclined to lean in favour of the returned candidates placing the onus of proof on the person challenging the result of election, but it is the duty of the Court to see that the period of election process needs to be ascertained unpolluted so as to achieve the predominant goal of democracy that only he should represent the constituency who has been chosen by the majority of the electors and this is the purpose and object of the election law. It is further said that the order of recount has rightly been passed and pursuance to the said order, after recounting, appellant has been declared elected by two votes, therefore at this stage, interference is not warranted.

    18. Thus, it is to be seen that what is the meaning of material facts and how it is distinguishable from material particulars. To find out the said meaning, first of all the meaning of the word material is relevant. Thereafter the meaning of material facts and material particulars may be understand.

    If we see the dictionary meaning of the word “material” it means ‘fundamental’, ‘vital’, ‘basic’, ‘cardinal’, ‘central’, ‘crucial’, ‘decisive’, ‘essential’, ‘pivotal’, indispensable’, ‘elementary’ or ‘primary’. The material facts can be said to be those facts upon which a party relies and his claim rests upon.

    19. In the leading case of Phillips v. Phillips.*, reported in (1874-80) ALL ER Rep Ext 1684 (CA), Cotton, L.J Stated :—

    “What particulars are to be stated must depend on the facts of each case. But in my opinion it is absolutely essential that the pleading, not to be embarrassing to the defendants, should state those facts which will put the defendants on their guard and tell them what they have to meet when the case comes on for trial.” Relying upon the aforesaid judgment in the case of Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd., reported in (1936) 1 All ER 287 (CA), Scott L.J observed as under :—

    “The cardinal provision in Rule 4 is that the statement of claim must state the material facts. The word ‘material’ means necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action; and if any one ‘material’ statement is omitted, the statement of claim is bad; it is ‘demurrable’ in the old phraseology, and in the new is liable to be ‘struck out’ under R.S.C Order 25, Rule 4 (see Phillips v. Phillips.*); or ‘a further and better statement of claim’ may be ordered under Rule 7.”

    20. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that the material facts in each of the case remains different. However, those material facts must be set out in the pleadings which may be proved on the basis of the material particulars brought on record during trial. The pleadings are necessary to plead, otherwise, the defendant may be embarrassed stating that if the facts have been brought in their notice, then they may be in a position to meet those averments by filing a reply and particulars in defence. However, Scott L.J has rightly explained that the claim must be stated in the material facts indicating the complete cause of action. By omission of the statement of material facts the claim so made is bad. The aforesaid judgments have been accepted in India. In the judgment of Virender Nath Gautam (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 34 and 35 observed as under :—

    “34. A distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘particulars’, however, must not be overlooked. ‘Material facts’ are primary or basic facts which must be pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in support of the case set up by him either to prove his cause of action or defence. ‘Particulars’, on the other hand, are details in support of material facts pleaded by the party. They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by giving distinctive touch to the basic contours of a picture already drawn so as to make it full, more clear and more informative. ‘Particulars’ thus ensure conduct of fair trial and would not take the opposite party by surprise.

    35. All ‘material facts’ must be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is to enable the opposite party to know the case he has to meet with, in the absence of pleading, a party cannot be allowed to lead evidence. Failure to state even a single material fact, hence, will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on the other hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature of evidence a party would be leading at the time of trial.”

    21. In view of the foregoing preposition of law, it is clear that the material facts are the contents which ought to be pleaded in the election petition, while material particulars is the material in support thereto explaining those facts in detail. Thus, it is clear that material facts ought to be pleaded in the pleadings and it may be supported by material particulars thereby the other side may have a right to put his defence rebutting those facts by pleading and by producing the particulars in support of his defence. Therefore the material facts are known to be facta probanda and material particulars are known as facta probantia. However, to make out a case seeking direction for recount, the facts must be pleaded and it should be supported by material particulars, there upon the Court should record satisfaction for directing recount.

    22. In the context of the legal position discussed above the facts of the present case is required to be examined. In this regard, if the pleadings of the election petition is seen, thereby as per para 6 of the election petition, it is pleaded that on the basis of the datas received from three polling centers, respondent No. 1 was declared as ejected candidate. While he was busy in preparing for rally of his victory, at that time, appellant by joining hands with the Returning Officers, polling booth No. 124 and 126, got cancelled the vote received by respondent No. 1, and some of the votes of the appellant which were cancelled has been counted as valid votes to him. However, by two votes, the appellant before this Court was declared elected. In para 7 of the election petition, it is pleaded that when respondent No. 1 has reached on relevant polling stations and submitted the application for recount, then it was told that he may go to Sitamau, where the recounting may be ordered, however, denied for recounting. In para 9 it is stated that on the said two polling booth, the respondent No. 1 has not received the votes as indicated in Form No. 17.

    23. The Election Tribunal while passing the order impugned has observed that as per the statements of the Returning Officer of polling booth No. 124 and 125, it was admitted that respondent No. 1-Bagdiram has submitted the application for recount, where upon the recount was done. However, the denial of respondent No. 1 from recount is incorrect. The Returning Officer of the polling booth No. 125 has stated that the application for recounting has been taken with him to home and not specified in the diary of the Returning officer. The Returning Officer of the polling booth No. 124 has stated that the application for recount may be in the envelope of ballot papers, but in their return they have stated that none of the person have submitted the application for recounting. The Returning Officer were unaware regarding the provisions of Order 6, Rule 17 of Civil Procedure Code. It has further been observed that Tehsildar has reached to village Sakhtali, where there was a possibility of breach of peace and law and order, where it was heard that recounting is going on, but nothing is submitted on record. In view of the foregoing it appears that in the polling booth No. 124 and 126 there was a mismanagement thereby Tehsildar had reached on the spot. The conduct of the Returning Officer indicates that they have not acted as per law and their statements are contradictory to their reply therefore, recount was directed.

    24. In view of the findings as well as the pleadings set forth in the election petition, it is clear that the description of the irregularities in counting of the votes has not been specified. While describing the illegality and irregularity of polling booths Nos. 124 and 126, the pleadings is only of two booth, but no irregularity of polling booth No. 125 has been pleaded. After recount, two votes were found in excess in polling booth No. 125, thereby the respondent No. 1 was declared elected. Thus, it is clear that the irregularities of polling booth No. 125 has not been stated in the election petition. It has not been stated that while counting the ballot papers, what type of irregularities were seen by the election petitioner or his agent and on which polling booth. Thus description thereof is missing in pleadings, and in absence of bringing the material facts in pleadings of election petition and without explaining it by material particulars recount has been ordered. Merely making an allegation of counting of the invalid votes of the appellant and not counting the valid votes of the returned candidate and vis-a-vis allegation is not sufficient to direct the recount. Thus, findings recorded on the basis of the conduct of the Returning Officer is not sufficient to set aside the election of the appellant or to direct for recount. In this regard, the guidance can safely be taken from the judgments of M. Chinnasamy (supra), Chandrika Prasad Yadav (supra), and M. Gopalakrishnan (supra) as discussed above. Whereby it is clear that if the election petitioner has not set forth sufficient statement of material facts on record with regard to allegations of counting of invalid votes, nor has given any particulars of such invalid votes which has been alleged to be counted, recount cannot be directed. No material particulars with regard to rejection of valid votes nor the number of such votes in support of the allegations have been brought on record. In absence thereto the Election Tribunal is having no occasion to set at knought the election of the appellant declaring it invalid, and to direct the recount of votes.

    25. In the light of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of P.K.K. Shamsudeen (supra) it is clear that the result of recount would not be sufficient to justify the order. In view of the foregoing discussion it is apparent that in absence of the pleadings of the material facts supported by material particulars, learned Election Tribunal committed error to direct the recount which is not in conformity to the law laid down by the Apex Court and also by this Court. The learned Single Judge while passing the order impugned has relied upon the findings recorded by the Election Tribunal without considering the fact that the pleadings and the evidence brought on record are sufficient to prima facie satisfy the Court directing recount or not. In this regard, it can be safely observed that until and unless prima facie satisfaction of the Court is recorded, secrecy of the ballot papers are sacrosanct, and it ought to be maintained. The learned Single Judge has also not considered the aforesaid proposition of law, therefore, the order passed by the learned Single Judge affirming the order of the Election Tribunal stands set aside. In consequence thereto the Election petition filed by respondent No. 1 stands dismissed.

    26. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant stands allowed, dismissing the Election petition filed by respondent No. 1, by setting aside the order of the Election Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.

    C.C as per rules.

    Appeal allowed.

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