P.R Sundara Ayyar and T.V Vaidyanaiha Ayyar for appellant.
S. Subrahmania Ayyar and S. Venkataramana Ayyar for first respondent.
Their Lordships expressed the following opinion:—
Benson, J.:— The facts of the case referred for our decision are stated in the Order of Reference in the following terms [This has been set out above]:—
I understand that the plaintiff's natural father agreed to give his son in adoption and the first defendant made the adoption on the condition that the disposition of the property in exhibit I should be binding on the plaintiff.
The question for determination is “whether the provision in exhibit I in favour of the first defendant in regard to the property described in schedule II thereto will bind the plaintiff.”
This question is one of no small difficulty. Notwithstanding the view expressed in the Order of Reference to which I was a party, further argument and consideration has now led me to the conclusion that the answer must be in the affirmative.
It is argued for the plaintiff that the matter is decided by the authority of the Privy Council and that was the view taken by this Court in the Court of Jagannadha v. Papamma, where the facts were on all fours with those in the present case. In that case the learned Judges relied on the observation of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bhaiya Rabidat Singh v. Maharani Indar Kunwar that it was difficult to understand how an agreement by the natural father “could prejudice or affect the rights of his son which could only rise when his paternal control and authority determined.” In that case, however, the question was whether the adoption itself was invalid, and the decision was that it was not. Their Lordships expressly point out that no trace of any reservation or condition is to be found is the deed of adoption and that no condition were attached to the adoption.
The case, therefore, can hardly be regarded as deciding that a condition made at the time of adoption and entered in the instrument evidencing the adoption, as in this case, is void. On the contrary, it is clear from the decision of the Privy Council, in the case of Ramasamayyen v. Venkataramaiyen that such an agreement by the natural father is, at all events, not void.
Their Lordships there say (at p. 101):—“How far the natural father can by agreement before the adoption renounce all or part of his son's rights so as to bind that son when he becomes of age, is also a question not altogether unattended with difficulty; although the case of Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki, certainly decides that an agreement on the part of the father that his son's interest shall be postponed to the life interest of the widow is valid and binding. In this case their Lordships think it enough to decide that the agreement of the natural father which has been set out was not void, but was, at the least, capable of ratification when his son became of age.”
The concluding words seem to indicate that in their Lordships' opinion the natural father was not legally incapable of acting as guardian of his son, and of making an agreement on his behalf with regard to the property to be acquired by the adoption. If that is the true position, then the question in each case would he whether the agreement so made by the natural father should or should not be upheld, and this, I take it, would depend on whether the agreement in regard to the property was in itself a fair and reasonable one, and one which, taken as part of the contract for the adoption, was for the minor's benefit, as being a condition on which alone the adoption would be made. This is the principle that was adopted in the case of Ravji Vinayakrav Jaggannath Shankar Sett v. Lakshmi Bai and I think that it accords with the general practice of the people in this Presidency and their consciousness of what their law allows.
No doubt in the case of Lakshmi v. Subramanya, this Court went further and held that when the disposition of property was one which the person adopting could make immediately prior to the adoption the agreement as to the property must be taken to he part of the contract for the adoption and be valid apparently in all cases, Shephard, J., put the case in these words:—
“In the present case the adoption was made not by a widow, as in the case of Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal(4) but by the plaintiff's husband who, before the adoption took place, was unquestionably at liberty to alienate his property as he pleased, subject only to the plaintiff's right of maintenance. If being thus full owner he might before the adoption have disposed of his property in part or in whole in favour of the plaintiff, I fail to see why he should not, when making the adoption, stipulate with the other party to the adoption that a certain part of his property should be set apart for the maintenance of his wife and to that extent taken out of the category of property in which his intended son should have the full right of a co-parcener. It seems to me a mistake to say that the infant adopted son on whose behalf the natural father consents to such a stipulation can only be bound by that consent on the principle on which he might be bound by other agreements made on his behalf, viz., on the principle that the agreement is made for a necessary purpose (Lakshmam Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal for the supposition is that, but for the consent of the natural father, the adoption would never have taken place. To object to the agreement is therefore tantamount to objecting to the adoption. The adoption and the disposition of his property by the father being part of one transaction, the son never acquired any interest in the property disposed of and therefore no question can arise as to his guardian's competency to deal with it.”
We may add that a reservation made by a widow in regard to her life interest, which she had the right to alienate before the adoption, would stand on the same footing.
The above case was followed in Narayanasami v. Ramasam and Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal and the decision is in accordance with the decision in Vinak Narayan Jog v. Govindrav Chintaman Jog, Chitko Raghunath Rajadiksh v. Janaki(5) and Basava v. Lingan Gauda(6). Among the Judges who decided these cases were such distinguished Hindu lawyers as Sir T. Muthusami Ayyar, Nanabhai Haridas and Ranade, JJ. I think that great weight must be attached to the decisions of such men on a question like the present which I regard as one of Hindu Law modified by Hindu customs and usage developed in accordance with the conceptions of the present time. It is to be observed that there is no text of Hindu law which either recognizes or prohibits such an agreement as the present being entered into, and it is certain, as remarked by West and Bühler, ‘Hindu Law,’ 3rd edition, page 1106, that in actual practice “fair arrangements for the protection of the widow's interest during her life, are commonly made, and are always supported by the authority of the caste.”
This is the principle on which Farran, J., proposed to decide cases like the present. He says “By Hindu law to infant will be bound by the act of his guardian when bonâ fide and for his interest, and when it is such as the infant might reasonably and prudently have done for himself if he had been of full age, but not where the act appears not to have been for his benefit unless he has ratified it on reaching majority. I cannot but think that this principle ought to guide the Courts in considering whether agreements like the one under consideration can be upheld or not. If the stipulations are unreasonable such as giving to the widow an absolute power of disposition over the property, they should be rejected as ultra vires of the father; if reasonable, such as only to define and limit the son's enjoyment of the property, they should be upheld” (Ravji Vinayakrav Jagganath Shankar Sett v. Lakshmi Bai). The validity of the adoption, if legally made, is quite independent of the validity of any agreement as to the property. If the agreement is such as to be inconsistent with the fundamental idea underlying adoption and the purpose for which it is sanctioned by Hindu law, as, for instance, if it deprived the adopted son of all right to the property of the adoptive father and so left him without any means of performing the necessary religious offices towards the manes of his adoptive father and his ancestors, it may well be that the Courts would regard the condition as essentially repugnant to Hindu law and would refuse to uphold it. But it would seem that a fair and reasonable disposition of the property is but essentially repugnant to Hindu law, or the purposes for which adoption is allowed, and is nowhere forbidden by that law. Such dispositions are commonly made, and are upheld by the authority of the caste and the consciousness of the people. In these circumstances, I think that the Courts ought no to refuse to recognize them as binding on the minor, for whose benefit the adoption, coupled with the agreement as to the disposition of the property, was really made. It maybe assumed that the natural father would not have agreed to the adoption, coupled with the disposition of the property, unless it was for the benefit of his son to do so: nor would the adoptive father have taken the son in adoption except on the condition agreed to. The adoption, of course, cannot he set aside, and to set aside the condition which was coupled with the adoption, while maintaining the adoption, would require the justification of strong grounds of legal necessity or public policy.
In the present case the condition as to the property is a reasonable one, and such as the Courts should uphold. I would therefore, answer the question referred to us in the affirmative.
Davies, J.:— I concur.
Russell, J.:— I concur.