Sulaiman and Banerji, JJ.:— After stating the facts as above thus continued:—
In appeal it has not been pressed before us that the entry made at the time of the settlement, when there was single proprietors in both the mahals, could in any sen be the record of a custom of pre-emption, or a bindin contract between co-sharers. The only point alleged that the case is governed by the new Ac The learned vakil for the appellant argues that, inasmuch as under article 10 of the Limitation Act the period fixed for suits for pre-emption is one year from the date of the registration of the document, the cause of action to institute a suit arises, only when the registration has been effected. He, therefore, argues that it must be supposed that the present transaction was complete only when the registration was effected.
It is not disputed that the new Act came into force on the 17th of February, 1923. In fact this has been clearly so held in the case of Sarju Prasad v. Bhagwati Prasad.
Section 2 of the Agra Pre-emption Act provides that nothing in the Act shall affect any right in respect of any transfer made before the commencement of the Act. We have nothing to do, therefore, with the period of limitation prescribed for suits for pre-emption. The only point to consider is when the transfer which is sought to be pre-empted actually came into effect. The argument on behalf of the appellant ignores the provisions of section 47 of the Registration Act under which a registered document operates from the time it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the date of its registration. Although the sale-deed was incomplete till the formality of registration had been gone through, once that requirement was fulfilled the sale took effect from the date of its execution. This is quite clear on the wording of section 47. As pointed out by their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case of Kalyanasundaram Pillai v. Karuppa Mooppanar, registration is a necessary solemnity in order to the enforcement of a gift of immovable property, but it does not suspend the transfer of the gift until registration actually takes place. This is a necessary consequence of the provision that registration does not depend upon the consent of the executant, but is the act of an officer appointed by law for the purpose, who must register the document. If duly executed and presented as required, neither death nor revocation by the executant being a ground for refusing registration. In our opinion, therefore, the transfer in this case was, in the eye of the law, made on the 16th of February, 1923, and not on the 17th. Section 2 of the Act, therefore, makes the new Act inapplicable to this transfer.
The result, therefore, is that this appeal is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.