Rankin, J.:— In this case the question arises as to the proper principles upon which the damages have to be calculated. The action was tried before me a considerable time ago and I held the second defendant company to be liable to the plaintiffs on the ground of negligence and under the provisions of the Indian Carriers Act. The plaintiff company are incorporated in England and the question arises with regard to 96 packages of tea out of a total consignment of 343. The tea was being carried by the defendant company to Chittagong and the plain purpose of its carrying was that it might be shipped from Chittagong to England and sold there. I am relieved of having to Consider any disputed fact as to whether there is or is not a market for tea at Chittagong. If there was it may well be that the measure of damages would have to be assessed according to the rates prevailing in that market. But Mr. Roy for the defendants has relieved me of much unnecessary trouble by pointing out that upon the facts in this case he has no interest save in establishing that the true way of calculating in rupees the damages which the plaintiff can recover is by taking the rate of exchange to-day, that is to say, prevailing at the date of judgment as distinct from, let us say, the rate prevailing at the date of the breach. The exact berms of the submission made by Mr. Roy I have already read out but I will incorporate them for convenience in this judgment. Mr. Roy's submission was as follows:—
“Without prejudice to any right of appeal neon law or otherwise, I am prepared to accept the figure of Rs. 6,339-3 as damages, should the following contention tail, namely, that the loss caused to the plaintiff being in the first instance measurable in sterling, judgment must be based upon such sterling sum converted into rupees at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the judgment.”
2. Mr. Langford James for the plaintiff company says that the sum of Rs. 6,339-3 will content his clients. I am therefore relieved from considering any question as between the rate of exchange prevailing on 21st December 1915, being the date on which this tea was destroyed by fire and the rate prevailing one or two months afterwards, at the date, namely, on which the tea would normally have arrived in England and been sold in the English market.
3. The question is confined to this—Is the rate of exchange on the date of judgment applicable?—In support of the proposition that the rate of exchange to-day is to be adopted, Mr. Roy has relied upon the fact that the plaintiff company is Incorporated in England. To my mind that is an entirely irrelevant circumstance.
4. The reference to English prices or the English market, arises, if at all, entirely by reason of one or other of two facts, first, that the goods were going to be sold in England and secondly, that there was no market at Chittagong or short of England upon which damages could be fairly assessed. That England is the place where the company was incorporated has no bearing whatsoever. Mr. Roy has also relied upon a decision of my learned brother Mr. Justice Buckland given apparently in November 1919 in a suit No. 693 of 1919 between the Deutsche Asiatiche Bank and D.K Pania and Co.. The decision appears to have been given before the decisions to which I am about to refer and I must draw attention also to the fact that the case there was a case of debt and not of damages. It appears to have been a suit on a Bill of Exchange and I do not understand that there is any written judgment in which the principles of the matter can be found discussed.
5. Now, bearing in mind the question, which is simply whether or not the date of judgment is the date upon which the rate of exchange is for this purpose to be taken, I find that the matter is concluded by recent authority. There is the decision in the first place of Mr. Justice Boche in the case of Di Fernando v. Simon Smits and Co. (1) which was affirmed unanimously on this point by the Court of Anneal whose decision is reported in L.R 1920, 3 K.B, page 409. In addition to this case there is the decision of Mr. Justice Bailhache in Barry v. Van Den Hurk (2) and there is also the decision of Mr. Justice Mc. Cardie in the case of Lebeaugrin v. Crispin (3). At one time American authorities seem be have rendered it doubtful whether the rate of exchange on the date of judgment was not the true rate in the case of an action for debt as distinct from damages; but in my view, as Mr. Justice McCardie has shown, that proposition is not now in accordance with the best opinion. The question before me is whether the rate prevailing on the date of judgment is the rate applicable in a suit for damages and as to that the whole body of recent authority against the contention of the defendant. The reasons given by Mr. Justice Bailhach are very convincing, that the plaintiff my sue immediately a breach bakes place, the damages are then orvstallized, that the law will in general bake no account ??? necessary delay in bringing the suit to hearing. The inconveniences of baking the rate as on the date of judgment are pointed out by Mr. Justice McCardie very forcibly. The decisions seem to be all one way except for the first decision of Mr. Justice Roche in the case of Kirsch and Co. v. Allen Harding and Co. (4). That opinion was subsequently altered. I would only add, for myself, that a Court which can only give judgment in berms of one currency can never undertake to ensure payment of the exact equivalent at the time of payment of a given quantity of another currency. The rate of exchange on the day of payment may be an ideal, but it is an Impossible ideal: the rata at the time of judgment is not the ideal: it is not necessarily nearer to the rate at the time of payment than the rate of any other day. The contention put forward by the defendant company must I think be over-ruled. Judgment must therefore be given for Rs. 6,339-3 in berms of the submission made by Mr. Roy. The plaintiff must have his costs.
6. Suit decreed.