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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal challenges an order of the District Judge of Backergunge granting Letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed of Madhab Chandra Mistry to the respondent, Nibaran Chandra Biswas. The will is said to have been executed on 9 December 1898 and, on the testator's own admission as to execution, registered on 14 December 1898. The testator died in Magh 1305 B.S., about two months after the will, leaving three daughters. On 9 July 1929 the respondent (the only son of one daughter who was then dead) applied for Letters of Administration with a copy of the will. The appellant, Nabin Chandra Guha, named as a defendant in that petition, filed an objection in the District Court. The District Judge held that the appellant had no locus standi to oppose the grant, examined the applicant and made an ex parte order granting Letters of Administration. The present appeal was brought from that order. The appellant had purchased one of the properties disposed of by the will at an auction sale in 1918 made in execution of a decree for rent obtained by the landlord; that decree had been obtained in proceedings on the footing that the surviving defendant-daughter was sole heir of the testator. Under the will the properties were to vest in the three daughters and, if any daughter predeceased the testator, her sons and heirs would take her share.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appeal against the District Court's order granting Letters of Administration was competent (i.e., whether a right of appeal lay from the order complained of).
  2. Whether the appellant, having purchased property at auction after the testator's death, possessed locus standi to oppose the grant of Letters of Administration under Section 283 of the Succession Act.
  3. Whether a purchaser from an heir (or assignee from an heir) after the testator's death has locus standi to contest probate/letters or to apply for revocation of probate.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent's Arguments

  • Preliminary objection: the appeal is incompetent. Reliance was placed on Khettra Moni Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu and Radha Raman Chaudhury v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti to support that no appeal lies from the order refusing to add or permit a person to oppose a grant.
  • The validity of the District Judge's order could only be challenged by demonstrating that his decision on locus standi was erroneous; the respondent argued the appellant had no interest within the meaning of Section 283 of the Succession Act and therefore no right to oppose.

Appellant's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The appellant had objected in the District Court and sought to oppose the grant of Letters of Administration; he had purchased property dealt with by the will at an auction sale in 1918 and contended that his purchase might be affected if the will were effective, thus giving him an interest prejudicially affected by the will.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khettra Moni Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu. [1894] 21 Cal. 539. Held that an appeal did not lie from an order refusing to add the name of a person as a party where the Code of Civil Procedure did not allow such an appeal; cited regarding competence of appeals under Probate and Administration Act together with the CPC. Respondent relied on it for the preliminary objection; the Court considered it but found Section 299 of the Succession Act gave a right of appeal in the present case and so overruled the objection.
Radha Raman Chaudhury v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti. A.I.R 1920 Cal. 459. Example of an appeal preferred from an order refusing locus standi and discussion of revision under Section 115 CPC where no appeal lies from such orders. Considered in relation to the preliminary objection; the Court distinguished that situation from the present and relied on Section 299 of the Succession Act to allow an appeal here.
Sri Prosad Narain Singh v. Mt. Dulhin Genda Koer. A.I.R 1914 Cal. 259. Authority that an order refusing a caveator the right to oppose a grant is not appealable. Noted as one of the cases supporting the proposition relied on by respondent; Court nevertheless overruled the preliminary objection on statutory grounds (Section 299).
Indu Bala Debi v. Panchu Mani Dasi. [1915] 28 I.C 578. Another case holding that order refusing a person the right to oppose a grant is not appealable. Referred to among authorities on appealability; Court held Section 299 of the Succession Act supplied a right of appeal in the present matter.
Brindaban Chandra Saha v. Sureswar Saha. [1909] 3 I.C 178. Authority for the English practice that any interest, however slight, and even the possibility of an interest, may suffice to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. Examined as part of the court's analysis of Section 283; the Court considered but favored an interpretation requiring a real interest likely prejudicially affected rather than mere remote possibility.
Crispin v. Doglioni. [1860] 2 Sw. & Tr. 17. Clarifies that "possibility of an interest" means possibility of having an interest in the result of setting aside the will, not mere possibility of filling a character that would give interest. Used to explain the English rule and its limits when considering Section 283.
Satindra Mohan v. Sarala Sundari. [1918] 45 I.C 59. Questioned whether the English rule (any possibility of interest) should apply in entirety in India. Noted by the Court as part of the authorities weighing how to construe Section 283 in this country.
Akhileswari Debi v. Hari Charan. A.I.R 1925 Cal. 223. Interprets Section 283 of the Succession Act as implying a real interest which is or is likely to be prejudicially or adversely affected by the will. The Court adopted this interpretation and applied it to conclude the appellant likely had the requisite interest under Section 283.
Komol Lochan Dutt v. Nilratan Mundle. [1879] 4 Cal. 360. Authority that a purchaser from an heir after the death of the testator has locus standi to oppose probate. Cited to support the proposition that the appellant (a purchaser after death) could have locus standi; the Court relied on this line of authority.
Maddun Mohan Sircar v. Kali Charan Dey. [1893] 20 Cal. 37. Similar authority holding post-death purchasers from heirs can have locus standi. Applied with Komol Lochan as supporting precedent for appellant's locus standi.
Sheikh Azim v. Chandra Nath. [1904] 8 C.W.N 748. Holds an assignee from an heir after the testator's death has locus standi to apply for revocation of a probate already granted. Used to show that transfers from heirs post-death can confer locus standi on the transferee.
Mokshadayini v. Karnadhar. [1915] 31 I.C 702. Another authority in the line that post-death assignees or purchasers may have locus standi. Cited alongside the other cases to support the conclusion that the appellant could contest the grant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal stages.

  1. Competency of the appeal: The respondent's preliminary objection argued that authorities (including Khettra Moni Dasi and Radha Raman Chaudhury) showed no appeal lay from orders refusing persons the right to oppose a grant. The Court examined the statutory framework and concluded that Section 299 of the Succession Act clearly gives a right of appeal from the order complained of in this case. On that basis the Court overruled the preliminary objection and allowed the appeal to proceed.
  2. Locus standi under Section 283 of the Succession Act: The respondent contended the appellant lacked the interest required by Section 283. The Court reviewed judicial authorities on the meaning of "any interest" in S.283. It noted that while English authorities (e.g., Brindaban Chandra Saha and Crispin v. Doglioni) sometimes treated any possibility of interest as sufficient, Indian decisions have questioned that breadth (e.g., Satindra Mohan). Relying on Akhileswari Debi v. Hari Charan, the Court interpreted S.283 to require a real interest which is or is likely to be prejudicially or adversely affected by the will. Applying that standard to the facts, the Court observed that the appellant's 1918 purchase of property disposed of by the will "stands the chance of being affected" if the will were effective at the date of the suit (in particular, the purchase might be held to be of only the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest rather than the holding itself). The Court further relied on authorities establishing that purchasers or assignees from an heir after the testator's death may have locus standi (Komol Lochan Dutt; Maddun Mohan Sircar; Sheikh Azim; Mokshadayini). On this analysis the Court held the appellant met the requirement of having a real interest likely prejudicially affected and therefore had locus standi to oppose the grant.

Holding and Implications

Appeal allowed; the order of the Court below granting Letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed is set aside.

Consequences for the parties:

  • The respondent's application for Letters of Administration is to be dealt with afresh in the Court below, giving the appellant an opportunity to contest the proceedings.
  • The costs of this appeal (hearing fee assessed at two gold mohurs) were ordered to abide the result of the case in the Court below.

Broader implications: The opinion applies existing authorities to interpret Section 283 as requiring a real interest likely prejudicially affected and confirms that purchasers or assignees from heirs after the testator's death can have locus standi to challenge probate/letters. The opinion does not purport to create a new rule of law beyond the application and reconciliation of cited precedents and statutory provisions.

    Nabin Chandra Guha v. Nibaran Chandra Biswas

    1. This is an appeal from a decision of the District Judge of Backergunge by which he has granted Letters of Administration with a copy of the will annexed of one Madhab Chandra Mistry to the respondent Nibaran Chandra Biswas. The will is alleged to have been executed by the testator Madhab Chandra Mistry on 9th December 1898 and appears to have been registered on his own admission as to execution on the 14th of that month. The testator is said to have died in Magh 1305 B.S, that is to say about two months after the will, and to have left three daughters. On 9th July 1929 the respondent, Nibaran Chandra Biswas, the only son of one of those daughters, who is dead, applied for Letters of Administration with a copy of the said will. The appellant Nabin Chandra Guha who was named as a defendant in the said petition filed an objection but the District Judge held that be had no locus standi to oppose the grant. Immediately thereafter he examined the applicant and made an order ex parte for grant of Letters of Administration. Prom this order the present appeal has been taken.

    2. The appellant happens to have purchased one of the properties disposed of by the will at an auction sale held in 1918 in execution of a decree for rent thereof which was obtained by the landlord.

    3. This decree had been obtained by the landlord in a suit laid against one of the daughters of the testator, the other two daughters having died long before, on the footing that she was the sole heir of the said testator. It should be pointed out here that under the will all the properties were to vest in the three daughters after the testator's death and in case any of the daughters predeceased him her sons and heirs would get her share. The District Judge observed in his order:

    “He is not a legatee. He is not an heir and he has derived no interest in the estate from the deceased himself. To permit him to contest the grant merely on the ground of a subsequent derivation of title to some of the deceased's property would be to Introduce an issue which a probate Court has no jurisdiction to determine. It is a bare issue on a question of title raised by a stranger on a transaction subsequent to the testator's death and this is not within the scope of a Court sitting in probate.”

    4. A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondent to the competency of the appeal and two decisions of this Court have been relied upon in support, viz., Khettra Moni Dasi v. Shyama Churn Kundu . [1894] 21 Cal. 539. and Radha Raman Chaudhury v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti . A.I.R 1920 Cal. 459. In the former case the appeal was preferred by a person whose application to be made a party to the proceeding and to intervene was refused by an order passed on a certain date, and on a subsequent date the case was heard and order was made for grant of probate, and it was from the former order that the appeal was preferred. This Court, in that appeal, held that no appeal lay as, regarding Sections 86 and 53 of the Probate and Administration Act (5 of 1881) together, it appeared that an appeal was permissible only in a case in which such an appeal would lie under the Code of Civil Procedure. The learned Judges pointed out that the Code did not allow an appeal from an order refusing to add the name of a person as plaintiff or defendant and so no appeal would lie from the order refusing the application which the appellant had made in the Court below to be made a party. There was no appeal in that case, as there is in the case before us, from the order which was made for the grant. In the case of Radha Raman Chaudhury v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti the appeal had been preferred by certain persons who wanted to oppose the grant but were refused on the ground that they had no locus standi and the appeal, as far as may be made out was from the said order of refusal, in which it was also stated that

    “probate would be granted to the respondent on proof of the will in common form.”

    5. The appellants had, it appears, filed an application for revision under S. 115 of the Code in the alternative. The learned Judges said:

    “It has been held in several cases that no appeal lies against such an order. The order however can be revised upon the application under Section 115 of the CPC,

    and proceeded to revise the order complained of. That also therefore was not a case where, as here the appeal was preferred from the order granting the probate. That an order refusing a caveator to oppose a grant is not appealable has been held in other cases as well, e.g, Sri Prosad Narain Singh v. Mt. Dulhin Genda Koer . A.I.R 1914 Cal. 259 and Indu Bala Debi v. Panchu Mani Dasi . [1915] 28 I.C 578.. These apparently were the class of cases which Chatterjea, J., had in mind when he made the observations in the case of Radha, Raman Chaudhury v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti which have been quoted above. We are of opinion that Section 299 of the Succession Act, clearly gives a right of appeal from the order complained of in the present case and we must accordingly overrule the prelimimary objection.

    6. It was next urged on behalf of the respondent that inasmuch as there is nothing illegal or wrong on the face of the order complained of its validity can only be challenged on behalf of the appellant by showing that the decision of the District Judge on the question of his locus standi is erroneous. This must be so. To show that decision is correct it has been urged that the appellant has no interest within the meaning of Section 283 of the Succession Act. The words in that section are:

    “all persons claiming to have any into the estate of the deceased.”

    7. These words have from time to time been explained by judicial decisions. Brindaban Chandra Saha v. Sureswar Saha . [1909] 3 I.C 178. may be taken as an authority for the proposition that any interest, however slight, and even the possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. That apparently is the rule of English practice and possibility of an interest does not apply to possibility of a party filling a character which would give him an interest but to the possibility of his having an interest in the result of setting aside the will: Crispin v. Doglioni . [1860] 2 Sw. & Tr. 17. Whether this rule should be taken to be applicable in its entirety in this country seems to have been questioned in the case of Satindra Mohan v. Sarala Sundari . [1918] 45 I.C 59.. Taking the words of S. 283 in their natural meaning it is in our opinion sufficient to interpret them as implying a real interest which is or is likely to be prejudicially or adversely affected by the will: see Akhileswari Debi v. Hari Charan . A.I.R 1925 Cal. 223. It is difficult to say that the appellant does not fulfil this requirement. The purchase that he has made stands the chance of being affected if the terms of the will were effective at the date of the suit; for then in certain events and circumstances what he purchased might be held to be only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor and not the holding itself.

    8. A purchaser from an heir after the death of the testator has a locus standi; and to have it is not necessary for the objector to show that he had an interest in the estate at the time of the testator's death: Komol Lochan Dutt v. Nilratan Mundle . [1879] 4 Cal. 360, Maddun Mohan Sircar v. Kali Charan Dey . [1893] 20 Cal. 37.. So also it has been held that an assignee from an heir of the testator after the latter's death has locus standi to apply for revocation of a probate already granted: Sheikh Azim v. Chandra Nath . [1904] 8 C.W.N 748. Mokshadayini v. Karnadhar . [1915] 31 I.C 702.. For these reasons we hold that the second contention of the respondent as also the view on which the learned Judge has proceeded must be overruled. The result; is that this appeal will succeed. The order of the Court below is set aside and the application of the respondent for Letters of Administration should be dealt with on giving the appellant an opportunity to contest the proceedings. Costs of this appeal—hearing fee being assessed at two gold mohurs—will abide the result of the case in the Court below.

    K.N/R.K

    9. Appeal allowed.

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    Nabin Chandra Guha v. Nibaran Chandra Biswas
    (Mar 2, 1932)