The defendant, respondent, in this Second Appeal has been in possession of the land in dispute for a long time, as usufructuary mortgagee. A suit was instituted by the plaintiffs-appellants, for redemption and that suit was compromised in 1905. By the compromise, the defendant remained in possession for 7 years rent free. Then in April 1912, he was given a kadapa or lease of the land on certain terms and the plaintiffs have instituted this suit in the Revenue Court, under the provisions of Sects 77 and 192 of the Estates Land Act, for the recovery of rent on the basis of that kadapa. It is argued by Mr. Ramesam that the land is seri or home-farm land, that the finding of the District Judge that although it was home-farm land, originally it had been converted into ryoti land is wrong and we ought to set it aside. But we must hold that the plaintiffs by their own conduct debarred themselves, at least so far as this suit is concerned, from contending that the land is home-farm land and not ryoti land, so as to exclude it from the scope of the Estates Land Act. The plaint describes the land as jeroyati and the kadapa relied on describes the land as jeroyati and the defendant as a ryot. We must decide this point against Mr. Ramesam.
The learned District Judge, however, has dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the rent claimed by them, and they are entitled only to a fair and equitable rent, on the basis of a previous mortgage deed and as the amount which he had already paid exceeded the amount claimable on that basis, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The learned District Judge was of opinion that Sect. 25 of the Estates Land Act applied to this case. In our opinion he is wrong. The defendant could not be said in this case to have been ‘admitted to possession’ of ryoti land, at the date of the kadapa and muchilika and he had been in possession previously, as usufructuary mortgagee. The land until the date of the muchilika was home-farm land and the District Judge says that by the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant, as evidenced by the kadapa and muchilika, the character of the land was changed from home-farm into ryoti. It would be straining the language of Sect. 25 too much to say that the defendant in this case was ‘admitted to possession’ of ryoti land. That there is a distinction between admission of a ryot to possession and a ryot being in possession is not only clear from the ordinary meaning of the two phrases but the legislature itself observes the distinction in various sections of the Act. The explanation to Sub-Sect. 2 of Sect. 6 which has been relied on by Mr. Narayanamurthi for the respondents makes a special provision with respect to Sect. 45 by which a ryot occupying old waste and from which rent has been recovered or received or is deemed to be a person admitted thereby to possession. That explanation supports Mr. Narayanamurthi's suggestion that the phrase a person ‘admitted to possession’ does not ordinarily mean a person in possession. If the contention of the respondent was to be adopted it would lead to manifestly inequitable results. He wants to have the benefit of the contract by which he acquired occupancy or permanent rights in the lands, and at the same time he repudiates the other terms which induced the landlord to confer on him occupancy rights. If there is any provision of the Act itself, by which such a result could be sustained, the defendant's position could not be assailed, but since Sect. 25 has no application to his case, we are unable to hold that he is not liable to pay the rent which he contracted to pay when the land was converted from home-farm land into ryoti land. Sect. 181 contemplates such a conversion but the legislature had not made any special provision as regards the terms on which such conversion may be made. In the absence of any such provision the contract of the parties on the basis of which the conversion was made must be enforced.
The result is the decree of the Lower Appellate Court is reversed and that of the Court of 1st instance restored with costs here and in the Lower Appellate Court.
Second Appeal No. 926 of 1919 follows.
C.KAppeal allowed.