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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the estate of Mandakini Debi, a Hindu lady who died on 16 September 1918. On 1 October 1918, Barkuntha Nath Chattoraj (the petitioner in the administration proceedings) applied for letters of administration to her estate. On 28 July 1919, Prosannamoyi (the deceased's sister and widow of Rajballav Chattoraj) applied for probate of an unregistered Will allegedly executed by Mandakini on 14 September 1918. By consent, the probate and administration proceedings were tried on the same evidence.

The District Judge concluded that the genuineness of the Will had not been established and accordingly granted letters of administration to the petitioner. Prosannamoyi appealed both decisions to this Court: Appeal No. 81 of 1920 (against refusal of probate) and Appeal No. 35 of 1920 (against grant of letters of administration). The principal issue in the appeals was the genuineness of the Will.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the unregistered instrument purporting to be the Will of Mandakini Debi is genuine.
  2. If genuine, whether the Will should be admitted to probate and the letters of administration previously granted to the petitioner set aside.
  3. Whether Mandakini Debi had testamentary capacity at the time of execution of the Will (as considered in the proceedings).

Arguments of the Parties

Propounder's Arguments (Prosannamoyi)

  • The instrument found in the iron safe is the genuine Will of Mandakini Debi, executed shortly before her death and attested by multiple witnesses.
  • Evidence was led to show preparation of a draft by a retained pleader, dictation and writing of the Will by Natabar Mukherjee (the scribe), attestation by witnesses on the relevant date, and the deposit of the Will and draft in an iron chest.
  • The circumstances surrounding discovery (inventory by a court-appointed Commissioner; listing of the Will and draft in the inventory prepared in presence of several persons) show the Will was in the safe from early October 1918 and therefore could not have been manufactured after the testatrix's death.
  • Testamentary capacity was not contested on the evidence if genuineness were established (concession noted by opposing counsel).

Caveator / Petitioner in Administration Proceedings (Barkuntha Nath Chattoraj)

  • Suggested the Will might have been manufactured after Mandakini's death and smuggled into the iron safe when the room was opened on 2 February 1919 (an allegation the Court treats as unsupported by the record).
  • Imputed absence of the scribe (Natabar Mukherjee) from the village at the relevant date, thereby casting doubt on his testimony and the Will's authenticity.
  • Produced witnesses alleging attempts to procure attesting witnesses for a forged Will for payment (physician Kalipoda Ray and deed-writer Anantalal Ghosh), and relied on other adverse witnesses and challenges to credibility.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jagrani v. Durga Authority referenced in relation to the naturalness or otherwise of testamentary dispositions. Used to support the proposition that the dispositions in the Will were prima facie reasonable and not inofficious or unnatural.
Surendra v. Rani Cited in context of cross-examination being improperly disallowed after a witness turned hostile. Referenced to note that certain procedural irregularities in the trial Judge's handling of cross-examination were problematic.
Jarat Kumari v. Bisseswar Dutt Statement by Jenkins, C.J. that the standard of proof to establish a Will under Indian statutes is that of the prudent man (not absolute certainty). The Court applied this standard (prudential standard) in assessing whether the propounder had proved the Will.
Cooper v. Slade and Devine v. Wilson Authorities cited concerning the effect of presumptions against misconduct and the difference between civil standards of proof and criminal standards when forgery is alleged. Used to explain that while forgery allegations attract a presumption against misconduct, the civil standard (probability/prudent-man) governs admissibility of the Will.
Barry v. Butlin Principle that the onus lies on the party propounding a Will to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument is the last Will of a capable testator. Applied in considering the test for testamentary capacity and whether any suspicion inherent in the transaction remained.
Tyrell v. Painton (Lord Davey) Where a Will is prepared under circumstances raising well-grounded suspicion, the Court ought not to pronounce in favour unless suspicion is removed. Referred to when addressing whether any inherent suspicion remained after considering the evidence of execution and capacity.
Surendra Krishna v. Rani Dasi Authority on the desirability of calling attesting witnesses and the explanation required for witnesses not called. Applied to note that while it is desirable to call all attesting witnesses, the absence of every attesting witness need not be fatal where many attesting witnesses are examined and absence is not specifically suspicious.
Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Matilal Judicial Committee authority on the deference due to a trial Judge's findings of fact when witness demeanour is decisive. Referred to in discussing the scope of appellate review and the circumstances (this case) in which appellate court may reassess findings where surrounding facts and documentary circumstances are central.
Lalji Mohomed v. Guzdar One of the authorities illustrating the balance between appellate review of evidence and deference to trial Judge. Used together with other decisions to justify the appellate court's decision to re-evaluate the District Judge's findings because surrounding facts supported a different inference.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds from a close examination of the chronology and the documentary/physical circumstances surrounding discovery of the Will, and then assesses the credibility and weight of testimonial evidence in light of those circumstances.

1. Chronology and physical discovery:

  • A Commissioner was appointed on 1 October 1918 to inventory the deceased's moveables. The Commissioner visited and encountered objections from Prosannamoyi, who said the key of the iron chest was with Kali Bhusan Mukherjee and that she would not open the chest until he came.
  • On 3 October 1918 the District Judge ordered that the boxes and safe be kept by the Commissioner in a separate room under seal. The Commissioner, on 4 October, collected moveables and locked them in a sealed room.
  • After further procedural events, the Commissioner opened the room on 2 February (the Court's narrative), prepared an inventory on 3 February listing explicitly “Unregistered Will … and Draft … tied in a piece of cloth” among the contents of the iron chest. This inventory was prepared in the presence of Kali Bhusan, Baikuntha Nath Chottoraj and the pleader for Prosannamoyi.
  • The Will and draft were then brought and filed in Court under the Commissioner’s orders in February.
  • From these facts the Court concludes the Will and draft were inside the iron safe as early as 4 October 1918.

2. Rejection of the smuggling/manufacture-after-death hypothesis:

  • The Court rejects the suggestion that the Will was manufactured later and smuggled into the safe when opened, because that suggestion lacks evidentiary support; the inventory prepared on 3 February explicitly recorded the Will and draft as found, and the inventory was created in the presence of persons who could have objected then if the record were false.
  • The Court notes that the party making the allegation should have examined the Commissioner if intending to charge carelessness or complicity; the absence of such evidence and the contemporaneous listing in the inventory weigh strongly against the smuggling hypothesis.

3. Testimony of key witnesses supporting genuineness:

  • Natabar Mukherjee, the scribe and god-son of the testatrix, described a chain of events in September (visiting the ill Mandakini, discovery of a draft in a wall-almira, calling in a pleader who dictated the Will, Natabar writing it, and attestation by witnesses). He states he signed Mandakini's name as executant at her request and that the Will and draft were placed in the iron chest.
  • The Court finds attempts to undermine Natabar's presence or reliability unsuccessful: the party attacking him did not secure available corroborative documentary evidence (an attendance register) or the attendance of a superior officer who could contradict him; warrants or process to produce that officer were not effectively pursued.
  • The Court treats the postcard evidence (dated 7 November 1918) as consistent with Natabar having returned to the colliery after the date of execution, and therefore corroborating his account that he did not return to the village until after early November.

4. Corroborative evidence and credibility assessment:

  • Babu Upendra Nath Dass (pleader) testified that he prepared the draft found in the iron safe. The trial Judge had discounted his evidence for inability to recall the exact date and for not producing accounts; the appellate Court found no sufficient basis to reject him and accepted his testimony as honest and straightforward.
  • Trailokyanath Karak, formerly in the service of Mandakini, placed the drafting of the Will within a period of not less than ten and not more than thirty days before her death and gave evidence as to execution and attestation.
  • Some witnesses for the caveator (e.g., Kalipoda Ray and Anantalal Ghosh) alleged attempts to procure witnesses or to forge a Will for payment; the Court held these accounts unreliable and inconsistent with the contemporaneous fact that the Will was in the sealed iron safe at the relevant dates.

5. Standard of proof and legal synthesis:

  • The Court reiterates the applicable standard for proving a Will under Indian law: the prudent-man standard (not absolute or criminal standard), and that while forgery allegations attract a presumption against misconduct, the civil standard requires assessment of probability. Authorities cited are used to frame this standard.
  • Applying this standard to the record — the early secure deposit of the Will, consistent witness testimony and the absence of any plausible hypothesis explaining how the Will could have been manufactured and placed in the safe after the relevant dates — the Court finds the propounder's case established.

6. Testamentary capacity:

  • Opposing counsel conceded that if the Will was shown to have been executed by Mandakini, there would be no contention as to her having a sound disposing mind. The Court found the evidence to afford overwhelming proof that the testatrix had the requisite capacity.

7. Appellate review and deference to trial Judge:

  • The Court acknowledges the general rule of deference to trial Judges who have seen and heard witnesses, but explains that where a case turns importantly on surrounding facts and documentary circumstances (as here), the appellate Court must review the evidence and draw its own inferences. On that basis the Court concluded that the District Judge's adverse findings were vitiated by unfounded suspicions and inadequate analysis.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling:

Appeal Allowed. The Will propounded by Mandakini Debi is admitted to probate; the application for probate is granted and the application for letters of administration is dismissed.

Consequences and immediate implications:

  • Prosannamoyi (the propounder/appellant) succeeds: probate of the Will is granted.
  • The previously granted letters of administration to the petitioner (Barkuntha Nath Chattoraj) are set aside (application for letters of administration dismissed).
  • The appellant is awarded costs in both Courts in the two proceedings.
  • The opinion does not announce that it establishes a new legal precedent; it applies existing principles (standards of proof for Wills, assessment of evidence, and appellate review) to the facts and concludes the District Judge erred in his factual appraisal. No broader novel legal rule is stated in the opinion.

Judge Buckland concurred with the judgment of Mookerjee, J. (noted in the opinion).

    Prasannamayi Debya, Proponent v. Baikuntha Nath Chattoraj And Anr., Caveators

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Mookerjee, J.:— The subject-matter of the litigations which have culminated in these two appeals is the estate left by one Mandakini Debi, a Hindu lady, who died on the 16th September 1918. On the 1st October 1918, Barkuntha Nath Chattoraj, the surviving brother of her deceased husband Brahmananda Chattoraj, made an application for letters of administration to the estate left by her. On the 28th July 1919, her sister Prosannomoyi, the widow of Rajballav Chattoraj, another brother of her husband, applied for probate of an unregistered Will alleged to have been executed by her on the 14the September 1918 two days before her death. The relationship of the members of the family is set out in the annexed genealogical table:—

    By consent of parties, the administration and probate proceedings were tried on the same evidence. In the probate proceedings, the District Judge came, to the conclusion that the genuineness of the Will had not been established; accordingly, he granted letters of administration to the Petitioner in the other proceedings. Two appeals have, consequently, been presented to this Court by Prosannamoyi: Appeal No. 81 of 1920 is directed against the refusal of probate: Appeal No. 35 of 1920 is directed against the grant of letters of administration. The substantial point in controversy is the question of genuineness of the Will.

    The Will purports, on the face of it, to have been executed by Mandakini whose name was signed by Natabar Mukherjee, who also signed his own name as the scribe, and there were in addition seven attesting witnesses. The scribe and tour of the attesting witnesses have been examined on behalf of the propounder. The Will recites that Brahmananda, the husband of the testatrix, had a brother, Rajballav, who had taken her sister Prosannomoyi as his second wife. Brahmananda and Rajballav used to live in joint mess and estate as members of a Hindu family, and since their death, Mandakini and Prosannamoyi had likewise lived in joint mess and estate. Rajballav had bequeathed his property to his widow, that is, to her sister Prosannamoyi, and in his Will had appointed her husband as executor. Her husband had taken out probate of the Will of his brother and had, out of the income, and profits of his own property and of the estate left by his brother, acquired properties in his own name. All these properties he had beqeathed to her and had appointed her cousin (mother's sister's son) Kali Bhusan Mukherjee as executor. After these recitals, the testatrix proceeded to give directions for the disposal of her estate in five paragraphs. In the first clause she dedicated a property to Goddess Durga and appointed Baikunthanath (her husband's younger brother), and Asutosh (son of her husband's elder brother) as managers of the property so dedicated. In the second clause, she directed her brother-in-law and nephew-in-law to feed Brahmins annually on the occasion of the Durga Puja, for the spiritual benefit of her husband, out of the income, of two other properties. In the third clause she directed Rs. 1,500 to be spent in the performance, of her Srddh ceremony. In the fourth clause she directed the residue of her estate to vest absolutely in her sister Prosonnamoyi. In the fifth clause, she directed the expenses of, the annual Sradh ceremony of herself and of her husband to be met out of the income of the estate vested in her sister. These directions do not seem unnatural: on the other hand, they constitute the kind of disposition which might well have been made by an elderly Hindu lady in the position of the testatrix. She had no children; her sister had married in the same family as herself: their husbands were brothers who had lived joint in mess and estate and separate from their other brothers. Her nearest relations by marriage were her husband's younger brother and elder brother's son. In a family so constituted it was not surprising that a pious Hindu lady would dedicate some property for the worship of the deity, appoint her brother-in-law and nephew-in-law as managers thereof, make provision for her own Sradh ceremony and the annul Sradh ceremonies of herself and of her husband and leave the residue of the estate to the sister whom she dearly loved. These provisions of the Will can, in no sense, be deemed inofficious or unnatural: On the other hand, they are primâ facie reasonable, as they do not disregard the moral claims of the relatives of the testatrix which the ties of kinship suggest; they are consequently not calculated to excite suspicion as to the genuineness of the disposition. Jagrani v. Durga . We now proceed to consider the evidence as to the actual execution and due attestation of the Will by the testatrix; but before we do so, it is necessary to state the circumstances which led up to the discovery of the Will, for, as will presently appear, their true bearing upon the question of genuineness of the Will has not been tally appreciated by the trial Judge.

    As previously stated, the applicant for letters of administration presented his petition to the District Judge on the 1st October 1918. On the same date, the District Judge made an order for the appointment of Babu Lalitmohan Bannerji, a Pleader, as Commissioner to make an inventory of the articles and cash to be found in the iron safe and boxes belonging to the deceased. The Commissioner went to the residence of the deceased on the following day. Thereupon, Prosannamoyi objected to the interference of the Commissioner on the ground that her sister Mandakini had bequeathed all her properties to her by means of a Will. She further stated that the key of the iron chest in which the moveable properties left by the deceased were kept was not with her, but was with Kali Bhusan Mookerjee, the son of mother's sister, who lived in Pakhanna 14 miles off. She added that she trusted no body else and would not open the iron chest or box till he came. She further declined to show anything as she had got everything in pursuance of the Will. What she stated was reduced to writing by the Commissioner, and, later on in the day, she asserted again that her sister Mandakini had bequeathed her property to her by means of a Will. The Commissioner submitted a report to the Court on the following day, in which he explained his inability to make an inventory. On the 3rd October, the District Judge recorded that Prasannamoyi claimed the property under a Will, directed her to show cause on the 6th November 1918, why she should not be criminally prosecuted for disobedience of the orders of the Court, and issued instructions that in the meantime the boxes and the safe containing the property of which an inventory was sought to be made, be kept by the Commissioner in a separate room under seal, the key of the room to remain in the custody of the Commissioner. On the 4th October the Commissioner again went to the residence of the deceased, collected the moveables left by her, made a list thereof and placed them in a separate room which was locked up and sealed by him. The contempt proceedings against Prasannomoyi dragged on for some time, but were subsequently abandoned. On the 21st December 1918, a reference to arbitration was made at the instance of the parties, but this also, as might have been anticipated, proved infructuous in the end, as the question of the genuineness of a testamentary instrument cannot be settled by compromise. Ultimately, the Commissioner again went to the residence of the deceased under the orders of the Court, dated the 31st January 1919. He reached the place on Saturday, the 1st February, opened the room on the following day, and made a list of the safes, boxes and other articles as also of their contents. This list was filed in Court on the 3rd February 1919 and contained the following entry.

    Iron chest.

    Contents.

    “(1) Unregistered Will of Srimati Mandakini Debi by the pen of Natabar Mookerjee of Pratrassayar, dated 28th Bhadra 1325 B.S

    (2) Draft of a Will by Srimati Mandakini Debi. These two are tied in a piece of cloth.”

    The list, as expressly stated in the report of the Commissioner, dated 3rd February 1919, was prepared by him in the presence of Kali Bhusan Mukherjee, Baikuntha Nath Chottoraj (the Petitioner) and Babu Upendra Nath Das, Pleader for Prasannamoyi. The articles found in the room were after the preparation of the lit, left there, and the room itself was again locked up and sealed. On the 3rd February 1919 (that is, the day after discovery of the Will in the iron safe), Prosannamoyi made a petition to the arbitrators in which she recited the previous incidents and prayed that they might send for the Will. On the requisition of the arbitrators the District Judge directed the Commissioner on the 10th February to bring the documents and file them in Court. On the 16th February, the Commissioner went to the house again, “brought the unregistered Will and a draft of a Will found in an iron safe” and filed them in Court on the following day, “wrapped in a piece of cloth.” It is thus clear that the Will was inside an iron safe which was locked up and placed inside a room, the doors where of were locked up and sealed by the Commissioner and remained so sealed from 4th October-1918 up till 2nd February 1919; consequently, the Will must have been in existence as early as the 4th October 1918. It has been boldly suggested, however, that the Will might have been manufactured later and smuggled into the iron safe when the room was opened and the safe was unlocked on the 2nd February 1919. But there is manifestly no foundation whatever for this ingenious suggestion which is not based on any evidence in the record. As already stated, the Commissioner reported to the Court on the 3rd February 1919, that he had prepared the list of the contents of the room and of the safes and boxes in the presence, of Baikunthanath Chottoraj, and the list specified in explicit terms “the Will and draft tied in a piece of cloth,” as found among the contents of the iron chest. Baikunthanath might have forthwith objected that this was an incorrect statement, and that the Will was smuggled in when the safe was opened by the Commissioner, his omission to take exception at the time is significant, and no weight can be attached to the much belated afterthought that the Will might have been surreptitiously introduced into the safe when it was opened by the Commissioner. Such, a suggestion plainly involves a serious charge of carelessness against the Commissioner and he should in all fairness have been examined before the charge could be entertained. On the other hand, such evidence as there is on the record including the statement of the caveator as to what took place when the Commissioner opened the room and unlocked the safe, indicates that the work was done in the presence of many people anxiously watching the proceedings, in such circumstances it is improbable in the highest degree that a desperate attempt would be made to smuggle in the two documents, or, that if made, it should escape detection. We must consequently hold that the Will and the draft were inside the iron safe on the 4th October 1918, when it was placed inside the room which was locked up and sealed by the Commissioner. This conclusion as we shall presently see is supported by reliable evidence on the record.

    Natabar Mukherjee, the god-son of the testatrix and the writer of the Will, has deposed that he used to serve in the Nakarka Colliery (Post Kotwalgat, District Manbhum) 300 or 400 miles distant from his house which was about 6 miles off from the residence of Mandakini and that he came home in September 1919, to see his wife who was ill and also to negotiate for the marriage of his daughter. On or about the 13th September, he went to see Mandakini as usual as she was his godmother and found her ill. Prosannamoyi also was ill, and according to the witness, both of them probably had an attach of influenza. He was told that Mandakini would execute a Will. On his stating that he had no experience in Will drafting she said that she had a draft prepared by Upendra Babu of Bankura who was her retained pleader from before. The draft was in a wall-almira, wrapped up in a rag. The draft showed that Mandakini was willing away in favour of Prosannomoyi and Prosannomoyi was in her turn willing away in favour of Mandakini. The draft in fact was for a mutual Will. Natabar did not approve of the draft, and on the suggestion of Rajendra Narayan Biswas, Babu Bhuth Nath Mondal, a Pleader of the Burdwan Bar, who had come to the village on business was called in. The Pleader examined the draft and dictated the Will to Natabar who wrote it out. After the Will had been written out; it was read over and explained to Mandakini by the witness. At her request, he signed her name as executant. Bhuthnath Mandal also became a witness and he was followed by other attesting witnesses. The Will was then taken to Prosannomoyi who was lying bedridden in another room. As she was not able to get up she asked the witness to take it back to Mandakini. After she had been helped to get up, she went into another room and kept the Will and draft tied up in a rag inside an iron chest. It was in this safe that the two documents were found on the 2nd February 1920. On this evidence, it is difficult to realise how a doubt, could be seriously raised as to the genuineness of the Will. The Court below, however, has not taken a comprehensive view of the case and has looked at every incident with suspicion which appears to us to be groundless. The attempt to break down Natabar Mookerjee in cross-examination was by no means successful. The suggestion was made that he was not present in the village and in the house of Mandakini on the date of execution of the Will. He emphatically repudiated the imputation. If his statement was untrue, he could have been completely contradicted by Janakiballav Hazra, his superior officer in the colliery where an attendance register was kept; but it is significant that though his name was included in the list of witnesses effective steps were not taken to serve the writ on him and to place him in the witness box. The warrant issued against Janaki was not served for want of an identifier, and the application for reissue of process was renewed at so late a stage of the case, that the District Judge rightly refused to grant it. It is further clear from the evidence of Natabar Mookerjee that subsequent to his return to the colliery after the execution of the Will, he did not go back to the village for many Weeks. A post card written by him on the 7th November 1918 to Prosannomoyi is alleged to have been found on or about the 2nd December 1918 in a window in the house though it is not mentioned by Baikuntha in his examination-in-chief. The contents of this Communication, which the witness was never called upon to explain, have been supposed to militate against the theory that Natabar was present when the Will was executed. The letter, however, is capable of a very different interpretation, and is consistent with the view that when Natabar left Mandakini, her illness had not taken a serious turn (as, indeed, is shown by other evidence on the record) and also that Natabar was not informed of her death for some considerable time. The letter was evidently written on receipt of intimation of news of her death from Prasannamoyi who communicated with him while the proceedings for contempt were pending against her. The letter brings out the very important fact that even on the 7th November 1918 Natabar was at the colliery and thus corroborates his assertion that he did not return to the village till after its date. This also could have been verified or contradicted if the Petitioner had secured the attendance of the colliery officer Janakiballav Hazra and secured the production of the attendance register. It is not enough to suggest doubts as to the veracity of a witness it the means of contradiction are available to the party who challenges his truthfulness these should be produced before the Court. We must consequently take it as established, beyond reasonable doubt that Natabar was present at the house of Mandakini on or about the 14th September 1918, took part in the preparation of the Will and did not again return to the village till after the 7th November 1918. This conclusion completely demolishes the theory that the Will, was manufactured after the death of Mandakini on the 16th September 1918, for, as has already been shown, the Will was inside the iron safe as early as the 4th October 1918. If Natabar, the scribe of the Will, was 300 or 400 miles away at the colliery, from the 15th September 1918 to the 7th November 1918, the question inevitably arises when and where did he manufacture the Will to be placed inside the iron safe not later than the 4th October 1918. No hypothesis, probable or improbable, has even been suggested as a satisfactory solution of this crucial difficulty in the path of the Respondent.

    Apart from this, there is other weighty evidence besides that of Natabar Mukherjee, to support the genuineness of the Will. The testimony of Babu Upendra Nath Dass, a Pleader of long standing of the Bankura bar, is unimpeachable. He asserts that he prepared the draft which was subsequently found inside the, iron safe along with the Will. There is no inherent improbability in the terms of the draft which could be used either for a mutual Will or for a Will by one of the sisters in favour of the other. The trial Judge has summarily discarded the evidence of the Pleader, because he could not remember the date when he made the draft the suggestion apparently was that he might have prepared it after the death of the testatrix. This is a mere hypothesis not supported by evidence. The Judge has further commented adversely upon the circumstance that the witness did not produce his accounts; the obvious answer is that he was never called upon to do so, even though he offered, when asked in cross-examination about his accounts to produce them on the flowing day. The objection that the accounts of Mandakini were not produced is equally futile her papers, if any, were in the custody of the Commissioner and no attempt was made to examine them. In our opinion there is no reason why the evidence of Babu Upendra Nath Dass, so far as it goes, should not be accepted as a perfectly honest and straightforward statement. But if the Pleader is unable to recall the exact time when he prepared the draft, the date is fixed with some approach to accuracy by Trailokyanath Karak who was formerly in the service of Mandakini. He swears that he was sent by Mandakini to Babu Upendranath Dass to get the draft prepared and that this took place not less than ten nor more than 30 days before her death. The witness also describes the incidents connected with the actual execution and attestation of the Will. There is no reason why he should be disbelieved, except the fact that he had been in the service of Mandakini. We need not refer in detail to the evidence of Nagendra Nath Ghose whose statements do not seem probable, and whose cross-examination was improperly disallowed even after he had turned hostile [Surendra v. Rani ], nor is it necessary to rely upon Surendranath Mondal whose manner is described by the Judge as suspicious. But we do not see adequate reasons for rejecting the testimony of Babu Bhutnath Mondal, a Pleader of the Burdwan Bar. The District Judge, was evidently annoyed when it was found difficult to secure his attendance, but the explanation offered by him for his failure to attend punctually has the ring of truth. Apart from this, his evidence in support of the Will was trustworthy and remained unaffected by cross-examination. It may be noted that the Judge considered him unworthy of credit because his professional income as a lawyer is small, but clearly it cannot be affirmed as a general rule that a person is not trustworthy because he is not wealthy, and the Judge himself does not hesitate to believe Kalipoda Ray, a witness for the caveator, though his income as a medical man is equally limited. The position, then, is that there is a large body of respectable evidence in support of the case made by the propounder, and that evidence fits in with the two cardinal points that the Will must have, been in evidence as early as the 4th October 1918, and that no hypothesis has been propounded to show that the Will could have teen manufactured after the 15th September and before the 4th October 1918: As against this evidence the caveator produced a physician, Kalir poda Ray, who asserted that he was approached in January or February 1919, with a request that he should for a consideration of Rs. 400 become witness to a Will executed by Mandakini, and a deed writer, Anantalal Ghosh, who alleged that he had been invited in the middle of November 1918, to forge a Will by Mandakini for a bribe of Rs. 200. These witnesses are obviously unreliable and their statements must be deemed untrue when it is remembered that at the dates spoken to by them the Will was inside the iron safe. The other, witnesses give evidence of, a negative character which does not neutralise that adduced by the Petitioner. The adverse comments made upon the evidence of Prasannomoyi are really not justified, there is nothing to show that she knew that the Will which had been taken to her and returned was deposited in the iron safe, if is further not shown that she obtained the key of the safe after the death of her sister or that if she had the key she ever opened it and examined the contents; she may have heard of the matter during her illness, but it is not improbable that as stated by her in her petition to the arbitrators on the 3rd February 1919, it may have escaped her memory. In these circumstances we are clearly of opinion that the District Judge has arrived at an erroneous conclusion on the question of genuineness of the Will. His judgment shows that his opinion is not based upon a careful analysis, of the evidence and has been influenced by unfounded suspicion. As was pointed out by Jenkins, C.J, in Jarat Kumari v. Bisseswar Dutt , the standard of proof to establish a Will, required by the Indian Statutes is that of the prudent man and not an absolute or conclusive one. The Indian Evidence Act, while thus adopting the requirements of the prudent mail as an appropriate concrete standard by which to measure proof, is at the same time expressed in teems or conditions of probability or improbability so that where, as in this case, forgery comes in question in a civil suit, the presumption against misconduct is not without its due weight as a circumstance of improbability though the standard of proof to the exclusion of all reasonable, doubt required in a criminal case may not be applicable, Cooper v. Slade and Devine v. Wilson . If the evidence is tested from the point of view just indicated, it leaves no room for escape from the conclusion that the Will was in fact executed by Mandakini.

    The only other question that could possibly arise would be that of her testamentary capacity. On this part of the case, however, Sir Asutosh Chaudhuri conceded that if it was found that the Will had been in fact executed by Mandakini, he could not contend that she had not at the time a sound disposing mind. No doubt, as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Barry v. Butlin , the onus probandi lies in every case upon the party propounding a Will to satisfy the conscience of the Court that the instrument propounded is the last Wilt of a free and capable testator, in other words, as stated by Lord Davey in Tyrell v. Painton , wherever a Will is prepared under circumstances which raise a well-grounded suspicion that it does not express the mind of the testator, the Court ought not to pronounce in favour of it unless the suspicion is removed. The suspicion to which allusion is thus made must be one inherent in the transaction itself and not the doubt, that may arise from a conflict of testimony which becomes apparent on an investigation, of the transaction. Considered in the light of these principles, the question of testamentary capacity is free from difficulty. The evidence adduced by the propounder affords overwhelming proof that the testatrix, was in full possession of her mental faculties when she executed the Will, and this is borne out even by the evidence of Bijoy Chandra Ghose, Jamini Bhusan Chattoraj and Bipin Behari Mondal called by the caveator. We have further the important fact that the Will was executed according to a draft prepared at the instance of Mandakini some time before her illness and there is nothing to indicate that Erosonnathoyi influenced the disposition in her favour. Some stress was laid, not unnaturally on the circumstance that all the attesting witnesses were not Called, but though it is desirable that all the attesting witnesses capable of being called should be examined to remove all suspicion of fraud, it is, notath solutely, nedessary that where, as here there are many, attesting, witnesses the absence of every one not called should, be specifically explained, Surendra Krishna v. Rani Dasi .

    It has been finally Urged that the Court should be slow to interfere with the findings of fact of the trial. Judge who saw and head the witnesses and had an opportunity, of noting their demeanour. This is a salutary rule and it may be conceded that as pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Bombay Cotton Manufacturing Co. v. Matilal the verdict of a Judge trying the case should not be lightly disregarded where the issue is simple and straightforward and the only question is which set of witnesses is to be believed. The case before us is of a different description. Here the determination of the question of genuineness depends not merely upon assertions of witnesses but upon surrounding facts and circumstances whose existence is either admitted or indisputably proved, and the judgment of the District Judge is, in our opinion, vitiated by his failure to test the veracity of the witnesses by reference thereto. The decisions reviewed in Lalji Mohomed v. Guzdar and Surendra Krishna v. Rani Dasi show that two conflicting view points have to be reconciled, namely, on the one hand the undoubted duty of the Court of Appeal to review the recorded evidence and to draw its own inferences and conclusions, and on the other hand the unquestionable weight which must be attached to the opinion of the Judge of the Primary Court who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and noticing their look and manner. We have kept in view these considerations and have arrived at the conclusion that the opinion of the District Judge on the question of genuineness of the Will cannot be supported on a right appreciation of the evidence.

    The result is that the appeal must be allowed and the Will admitted to probate. The application for probate is granted while the application for letters of administration is dismissed. The Appellant will have costs in both Courts in the two proceedings.

    Buckland, J.:— I agree.

    J.N.R
    Appeal Allowed.

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    Prasannamayi Debya, Proponent v. Baikuntha Nath Chattoraj And Anr., Caveators
    (Apr 14, 1921)