The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
Greaves, J.:— This is an appeal by the Defendants. The suit was one for declaration of title to and for possession of a certain plot of land. Both the lower Courts have decreed the suit in the Plaintiffs favour. The judgments of both the Courts are attacked on the ground that it is said that a document between third parties, namely, a kabuliyat, Ex. 4, was admitted and wrongly admitted as evidence in the suit. This document Ex. 4 purported to show that the land with which it is concerned was bounded by some of the lands in suit which were therein described as brahmattar lands, another plot being described as Ishan's brahmattar. There is no doubt that if this document Ex. 4 is admissible in evidence it supports the Plaintiffs' contention and the judgments of both the lower Courts are correct. But in our opinion, this document Ex. 4 which was between third parties was not admissible in evidence either as regards the question of the boundary or as to the nature of the land, namely, that it was brahmattar and Ishan's brahmattar. We agree with the decision in Saroj Kumar Acharji Choudhuri v. Umed Ali Howladar , where it was decided that a document of this nature was not admissible in evidence under the provisions of either sec. 11 or sec. 13 of the Indian Evidence Act. The authorities, some of which are conflicting, are discussed at p. 22 of that judgment. Mr. Justice Mookerjee who, in the case of Bisheswar Dayal v. Harbans Sahay (2) had apparently held that a document of this nature was admissible in evidence under the provisions of secs. 11 and 13 of the Indian Evidence Act, altered his view in the decision in Abdullah v. Kunj Behari Lal , where he held that a document of this nature was not admissible in evidence under the provisions of secs. 11 and 13 of the Indian Evidence Act, thus differing from the view which he had previously expressed. Both the cases in Saroj Kumar Acharji Choudhuri v. Umed Ali Howladar and Abdullah v. Kunj Behari Lal must be taken to overrule the decision in Dwarka Nath Bakshi v. Mukunda Lal Choudhuri (4), where it was held that a document of this nature was admissible under the provisions of secs. 11 and 13 of the Indian Evidence Act.
It only remains to refer to a passage in Abdullah v. Kunja Behary Lal where Mr. Justice Mookerjee seems to think that although such a document is not admissible under the provisions of secs. 11 and 13 of the Indian Evidence Act, it may be admissible under the provisions of sec. 32 of that Act. But, with great respect to that learned Judge, the reasoning by which he arrives at this view does not seem to me at all conclusive and I find great difficulty in seeing how a mere description of boundaries in a document between third parties can be said to be a statement against the proprietary interest of the person making it. It may well be that, for some ulterior purpose boundaries may not be correctly described in a document, and, if this is so, how a statement of that nature can be said to be against the proprietary interest of the person making it, it is somewhat difficult to ascertain.
I think that the law is correctly stated, if I may say so, in the decision in Saroj Kumar Acharji Choudhuri v. Umed Ali Howladar to which I have already referred and I am not prepared to say that the document Ex. 4 is admissible in evidence under the provisions of sec. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
I wish to say in passing that it does not appear in the case of Saroj Kumar Acharji Choudhuri v. Umed Ali Howladar , whether the executant of the document was dead or not.
In the present case the executant of the document is dead; but even so, for the reasons which I have already stated I do not think that the document is admissible in evidence under the provisions of sec. 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
This disposes of the matter. The appeal is accordingly allowed, the decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and the case is sent back to that Court in order that the learned Judge may deal with the appeal upon the evidence on the record excluding Ex. 4 from consideration. Costs will abide the result.
I may add that it seems to us that the law was correctly laid down many years ago in Brajeswari Peshakar v. Budhanudhi , where the learned Chief Justice Sir Richard Garth in deciding a difference of opinion between two other learned Judges stated:—“A recital in a deed or other instruments is in some cases conclusive, and in all cases evidence as against the parties who make it … But it is no more evidence as against third persons than any other statement would be.”
Chakravarti, J.:— I agree
S.C.C