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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • G.P Mathur, J.
Acts
  • provisions of Section 20(4) of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred
  • 24-10-77. Section 30(1)
  • Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C
  • U.P Act No. 28 of 1976
  • Section 30(1) of Act,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • G.P Mathur, J.
Acts
  • provisions of Section 20(4) of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred
  • 24-10-77. Section 30(1)
  • Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C
  • U.P Act No. 28 of 1976
  • Section 30(1) of Act,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — G.P. Mathur, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a suit filed by the landlord-respondent No. 3 for arrears of rent and ejectment against the tenant-petitioner, Ram Prasad. The Judge, Small Causes Court, decreed the suit (an ex parte decree originally passed on 4-12-1979), and that decree was affirmed by the Additional District Judge in revision. The tenant-petitioner filed the present writ petition challenging the decree. The parties exchanged affidavits and the writ petition was disposed of finally at the admission stage.

Relevant timeline as set out by the Court:

  • 24-10-1977: Notice by the landlord demanding arrears of rent and determining tenancy was served on the tenant.
  • 4-12-1979: Suit decreed ex parte.
  • 15-1-1980: Tenant filed application under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC to set aside the ex parte decree.
  • 5-7-1980: Ex parte decree set aside.
  • 11-8-1980: Suit restored to its original number.
  • 12-11-1980: Date fixed for hearing (the tenant sought an adjournment on this date and the court adjourned to 12-2-1981).
  • 12-2-1981: Tenant deposited Rs. 1,043/- (Rs. 936/- rent for specified period, Rs. 72/- court fee, Rs. 25/- advocate's fee, Rs. 10/- miscellaneous), but did not deposit interest of Rs. 190/- claimed by the landlord.
  • Deposits under Section 30 had been made by the tenant in the City Munsif's court on various dates between 7-2-1978 and 1-5-1980 for earlier periods, after the landlord's notice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the tenant could avoid eviction under Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 by depositing the entire amount of rent together with interest at nine percent and the landlord's costs at the "first hearing" of the suit.
  2. What constitutes the "first hearing" for the purposes of Section 20(4) — whether it is the first date the court actually applies its mind to the matter or the first date mentioned in the summons served on the defendant (per Explanation (a)).
  3. Whether deposits made by the tenant under Section 30(1) after service of the landlord's notice (24-10-1977) could be availed of to avoid eviction under Section 20(4).
  4. Whether a deposit that omits the interest component required by Section 20(4) can nonetheless entitle the tenant to relief under that provision.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Tenant's) Arguments

  • The tenant contended that he deposited the entire amount of rent together with the landlord's costs on the date of the first hearing of the suit and therefore no decree for eviction could be passed against him under Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972.
  • Learned counsel for the petitioner further argued that the "first hearing" should be construed as the date on which the court actually took up the case and applied its mind to the controversy, relying on the decision in Subhash Chandra Jain v. 1st A.D.J.
  • The petitioner also submitted that earlier deposits made under Section 30 of the Act should be taken into account; if those deposits are aggregated with the deposit made on 12-2-1981, the total would suffice to prevent eviction.

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of any affirmative arguments by the respondents in the writ petition; the Court's narrative records facts and legal positions relevant to the respondents' successful prosecution of the suit but does not set out a separate respondent-argument section.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subhash Chandra Jain v. 1st A.D.J. (1989 15 ALR 300 SC) Advanced by petitioner to define "first hearing" as the date the court applies its mind (pre-amendment authority). The Court observed this case dealt with the law before the amendment (U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976) and therefore its ratio was not applicable to the post-amendment statutory meaning of "first hearing".
Sita Ram v. District Judge (1984 1 ARC 410) — Full Bench Interprets "first hearing" under Section 20(4): where the court, on the date mentioned in the summons, adjourns the case without transacting business, the date in the summons remains the first hearing. The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to hold that the statutory Explanation (a) fixes the first hearing as the date in the summons even if the court later adjourns without transacting business.
Sheo Kumar Sharma v. IV A.D.J. (1985 2 ARC 344) Holds that the date of first hearing is not altered where, after service of summons, the suit is decreed ex parte and later the ex parte decree is set aside. Used to support the proposition that restoration of a suit after an ex parte decree does not change the operative "first hearing" date for Section 20(4) purposes.
Baburam Gupta v. Daya Shanker (1982 1 ARC 161) Similar holding: first hearing date is not altered by an ex parte decree later set aside. Applied to reinforce that the earlier procedural events do not alter the statutory first-hearing date.
Mohd. Alim v. Mohd Abrar (1989 1 ARC 329) Holds that the date of first hearing is not altered if the suit is dismissed for default after service of summons and later restored. Invoked to underline the consistency of the rule that restoration after default does not change the statutory first-hearing date.
Kanchan Singh v. Additional District Judge Holds that if the landlord, after serving notice showing willingness to accept rent, is not tendered rent but the tenant deposits rent under Section 30(1), no benefit accrues to the tenant and the tenant will be deemed a defaulter. Relied on to conclude that deposits made after the landlord's written notice cannot be treated as valid Section 30 deposits for the purpose of avoiding eviction.
Vijai Kumar v. 1st A.D.J. (1988 14 ALR 680) Reinforces the view that a deposit under Section 30(1) made after the landlord's notice will not benefit the tenant. Applied to support the Court's conclusion that the petitioner could not claim benefit from Section 30 deposits made after service of notice (24-10-1977).
Pyare Lal v. 1st A.D.J. (1989 15 ALR 62) Holds that if the deposit has been made more than one month after service of notice, no benefit can be given to the tenant. Used to demonstrate that the petitioner’s Section 30 deposit made more than one month after service (deposit on 7-2-1978; notice 24-10-1977) did not entitle him to protection.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by closely examining statutory text, the procedural timeline, and relevant precedents. The principal elements of the Court's reasoning were:

  1. Interpretation of "first hearing": Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 permits a court, in lieu of passing an eviction decree, to relieve a tenant from liability of eviction if at the "first hearing" the tenant deposits the entire amount of rent together with interest at nine percent and the landlord's costs. Explanation (a) defines "first hearing" as "the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant." The Court emphasized that this statutory explanation (added by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976) fixes a concrete date (the date mentioned in the summons) as the "first hearing" rather than an abstract moment when the court applies its mind.
  2. Service of summons and knowledge of the suit: The material did not specify the exact date mentioned in the summons as served on the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the ex parte decree indicated non-service of summons. The Court rejected any inference that service did not occur merely because an ex parte decree was originally passed and later set aside. The Court further noted that the petitioner had filed an application under Order 9, Rule 13 CPC on 15-1-1980, demonstrating knowledge of the suit by that date.
  3. Requirement to deposit at the first hearing date: Given that the suit was restored and a date of hearing (12-11-1980) was fixed, the Court held that the petitioner needed to deposit the full statutory amount by that date to claim relief under Section 20(4). Instead, the petitioner sought an adjournment on 12-11-1980 and made the deposit only on 12-2-1981; therefore, the Court concluded the petitioner failed to comply with Section 20(4) time-wise.
  4. Completeness of deposit — interest component: The Court observed that the deposit made on 12-2-1981 omitted the interest of Rs. 190/-, which was required under Section 20(4). While a trivial shortfall might be condoned on facts, the court found the shortfall here was not negligible (Rs. 936 rent vs. Rs. 190 interest), so Section 20(4) was not satisfied.
  5. Section 30(1) deposits: The Court analyzed Section 30(1) which permits a tenant to deposit rent in court if the alleged landlord refuses to accept it, but only until the landlord signifies in writing a willingness to accept it. Because the landlord's notice demanding arrears and indicating willingness to accept rent was served on 24-10-1977, subsequent deposits in court (first such deposit noted on 7-2-1978) could not be treated as valid Section 30 deposits for the tenant's benefit. The Court relied on precedents (Kanchan Singh, Vijai Kumar, Pyare Lal) establishing that deposits after service of a landlord's notice (and particularly more than one month after) do not protect the tenant.
  6. Application of precedents: The Court distinguished the Subhash Chandra Jain authority because it dealt with pre-amendment law, and instead relied on Full Bench and other decisions upholding that the date in the summons is determinative of "first hearing" and that restoration or setting aside of ex parte decrees does not alter that date for Section 20(4) purposes.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed. The decree passed by the Judge, Small Causes (as affirmed by the Additional District Judge) does not suffer from any illegality, and the stay order is vacated. Petition dismissed.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The tenant-petitioner Ram Prasad remains subject to the eviction decree and the decree for arrears as previously entered and affirmed; the writ petition fails.
  • Statutory practice reinforced: The decision reaffirms that for the purpose of Section 20(4) the "first hearing" is the date specified in the summons (Explanation (a)), and the tenant must make the full statutory deposit (including interest at nine percent and landlord's costs) by that date. A deposit made after that date, or a deposit that omits the interest component, does not entitle a tenant to relief under Section 20(4).
  • On Section 30 deposits: The ruling confirms that deposits made under Section 30(1) after the landlord has served a notice signifying willingness to accept rent will not benefit the tenant; deposits made more than one month after service of notice will not protect the tenant.
  • No broader new precedent: The Court's decision applies and reconciles existing statutory language and earlier authorities; the opinion does not announce a new legal principle beyond the application of existing statutory interpretation and precedents.

This summary is strictly confined to the facts, arguments, authorities, and conclusions explicitly contained in the provided opinion text and does not add or infer any material beyond the opinion itself.

Show full summary ...

    Ram Prasad v. Viith Additional District Judge, Meerut

    G.P Mathur, J.:— A suit for arrears of rent and ejectmeut filed by the landlord-respondent No. 3 against the petitioner Ram Prasad has been decreed by the Judge, Small Cause Court, and the decree was affirmed by the Additional District Judge in revision. Aggrieved the tenant-petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Parties have exchanged affidavits and, therefore, the writ petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage.

    2. The first submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the tenant had deposited the entire amount of rent together with landlord's costs of the suit on the date of first hearing of the suit and, therefore, no decree for eviction could be passed against him in view of the provisions of Section 20(4) of U.P Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

    3. In order to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel, it will be necessary to mention certain dates. The landlord sent a notice demanding arrears of rent and determining the tenancy of the petitioner which was served upon him on 24-10-1977. Thereafter the landlord filed the suit for arrears of rent and ejectment which was decreed ex-parte on 4-12-1979. The tenant moved an application under Order 9, Rule 13 C.P.C for setting aside the ex-parte decree on 15-1-1980 and the decree was set aside on 5-7-1980 and the suit was restored to its original number on 11-8-1980. The parties were informed of the date of hearing as 12-11-1980. However on 12-11-1980 the tenant moved an application 27-C praying for adjournment of the case and the said application was allowed and 12-2-1981 was fixed for the hearing of the suit. On 12-2-1981 tenant deposited Rs. 1043/- which included Rs. 936/- as rent from 27-10-1976 to 26-2-1981, Rs. 72/- as the court fee, Rs. 25/- as advocate's fee and Rs. 10/- as miscellaneous expenses.

    4. Section 20(4) of the Act provides that if at the “first hearing” of the suit the tenant deposits the entire amount of rent together with interest at the rate of nine per cent and the landlord's costs of the suit the court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability of eviction. Explanation (a) to this sub-section provides that the expression “first hearing” means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant. The material on record does not show as to when the summons were actually served upon the petitioner tenant and what was the date mentioned therein. Shri Mandhyan has submitted that the fact that the suit was decreed ex-parte itself shows that the summons were not served upon the petitioner. In my opinion from the mere fact that the suit was decreed ex-parte and the said decree was later on set aside no inference can be drawn that the summons were not duly served upon the petitioner. There is no averment in the writ petition that the summons were not served upon the petitioner or that he got no knowledge of the suit. Even assuming that the summons were not duly served the fact that the petitioner filed a restoration application on 15-1-1980 for setting aside the decree would lead to the conclusion that at least on 15-1-1980 the petitioner got knowledge of the suit. The ex-parte decree was set astde on 5-7-1980 and the suit was restored to its original number on 11-8-1980 and was fixed for hearing on 12-11-1980. Even if the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted he should have deposited the entire amount on the said date, i.e, on 12-11-1980, in order, to get benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. Since the petitioner did not deposit the amount on the said date but sought adjournment and deposited the same on 12-2-81 he cannot get any benefit of the deposit made by him and the suit was rightly decreed.

    5. Learned counsel has submitted that the date of first hearing should be deemed to be the date on which the court took up the case and applied its mind to the controversy between the parties and relied upon Subhash Chandra Jain v. 1st A.D.J . 1989 15 ALR 300 SC. in support of his submission. In my opinion the contention raised by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted for an H artificial meaning has been given to the expression “first hearing” by Explanation (a) to Section 20(4) of the Act which means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant. This explanation has been added by U.P Act No. 28 of 1976 with effect from 5-7-1976. In the case of Subhash Chandra Jain (supra) the court was considering the situation as it existed prior to the amendment. In Sita Ram v. District Judge . 1984 1 ARC 410. a Full Bench of our Court has held that where the court, on the date mentioned in the summons, adjourns the case to some other date without transacting any business or without applying its judicial mind to the list, the date of first hearing for purposes of Section 20(4) would still be the date mentioned in the summons. In Sheo Kumar Sharma v. IV A.D.J . 1985 2 ARC 344. and Baburam Gupta v. Daya Shanker . 1982 1 ARC 161. it has been held that the date of the first hearing will not be altered where after service of summons the suit is decreed ex-parte and the ex-parte decree is later on set aside. In Mohd. Alim v. Mohd Abrar . 1989 1 ARC 329. it has been held that the date of first hearing will not be altered if from service of summons the suit is dismissed for default and later on it is restoted. Therefore, in order to get the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act the petitioner should have deposited the entire amount latest by 12-11-1980. Since he moved an adjournment application on the said date and deposited the amount on 12-2-1981 it is obvious that he cannot get any benefit of the deposit made by him and the decree for eviction was rightly passed against him.

    6. There is another reason due to which the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act. It is not disputed that the petitioner did not deposit the interest amount which came to Rs. 190/- when he deposited the money on 12-2-1981. Under Section 20(4) of the Act the tenant has to deposit the entire amount of rent together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum. If the deposit falls short by a very small amount the same may be ignored or the shortage may be condoned on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. However, in the present case the amount of rent deposited by the petitioner is Rs. 936/- and the interest amount is Rs. 190/-. The Shortage in deposit is not a very small or negligible amount which may be ignored. The shortage being considerable the only conclusion which can be drawn is that the petitioner has not complied with Section 20(4) of the Act and he cannot get the benefit of the said provision.

    7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next submitted that respondents 1 and 2 have erred in not giving the benefit of the deposit made by him under Section 30 of the Act and if the said deposits are taken into consideration the deposit made by him on 12-2-1981 would be sufficient and no decree for eviction could be passed against him. The record shows that the petitioner deposited rent for the periods 1-11-1976 to 31-3-1977 on 4-4-1977 and then for 1-4-1977 to 31-8-1980 between 7-2-1978 and 1-5-80. The deposits under Section 30 have been made in the court of the City Munsif, Meerut, on various dates between 7-2-1978 and 1-5-1980. It is not disputed that the landlord gave a notice of demand to the petitioner which was served upon him on 24-10-77. Section 30(1) provides that if any person claiming to be a tenant of a building tenders any amount as rent in respect of the building to its alleged landlord and the alleged landlord refused to accept the same then the former may deposit such amount in the prescribed manner and continue to deposit any rent for any subsequent period until the landlord in the meantime signifies by notice in writing to the tenant his willingness to accept it. It is, therefore, clear that the deposit under Section 30(1) can be made only till the landlord has signified his willingness to accept it by notice in writing. Once the notice has been given by the landlord it is not open to the tenant to deposit the rent in Court. If the tenant deposits the rent in Court after service of notice upon him he cannot get the benefit of the said deposit. In the present case the notice was served upon the petitioner on 24-10-1977 whereby the landlord asked him to pay him the arrears of rent. On the said date the petitioner had neither paid any rent with effect from 1-4-1977 nor had deposited the same in the court. However even after receipt of the notice he did not pay the rent to the landlord but deposited the same in court on 7-2-1978. In this view of the matter the petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit of the deposit made by him under Section 30(1) of the Act. In Kanchan Singh v. Additional District Judge,6 it has been held that if after service of notice by the land lord upon the tenant showing his willingness and readyness to accept the rent and asking the tenant to tender rent to him, the rent is deposited under Section 30(1) of Act, no benefit of the deposit can be given to the tenant and he would be deemed to be a defaulter. The same view has been taken in Vijai Kumar v. 1st A.D.J . 1988 14 ALR 680.. In Pyare Lal v. 1st A.D.J . 1989 15 ALR 62. it has been held that if the deposit has been made more than one month after the service of notice no benefit can be given to the tenant. In the case in hand the notice was served on 24-10-1977 but the deposit was made more than one month after on 7-2-1978. In this view of the matter the petitioner was not entitled to the benefit of the deposit made under Section 30(1) of the Act.

    8. In view of the discussions made above it is clear that the decree apssed by the Judge, Small Causes, as affirmed by the Additional District Judge in revision does not suffer from any illegality. The writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Stay order is vacated.

    9. Petition Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Ram Prasad v. Viith Additional District Judge, Meerut
    (May 1, 1992)