The only question for consideration is whether when a melcharthdar grants a renewal to the tenant, the shackles put on him by S. 40(2) of the Malabar Tenancy Act drop down.
The respondent obtained a melcharth in respect of the plaint mentioned properties. He filed a suit for eviction and in that suit, the tenants applied for renewal and the renewal was granted. He subsequently filed the suit out of which this appeal arises in which he sought to evict the tenants on the ground that he wanted the land for his own personal use. The tenants applied for renewal but their application was resisted on the ground that the landlord wanted the land for his own personal use under S. 20(5). The first Court allowed the contentions of the tenants and ordered a renewal. On appeal, the learned Judge held that the plaintiff was entitled to evict under S. 20(5) even though he was a melcharthdar because he had granted a renewal in the prior suit and has thus become the landlord. Hence the appeal by the tenants whose petition for obtaining renewal was dismissed.
That the respondent obtained a right to the property by a melcharth from the original jenmi is not disputed. As a matter of fact, as melcharthdar he filed the suit for eviction and in that suit the renewal was granted. He now seeks to evict the tenants again and opposes the application for subsequent renewal. The learned District Judge observes that the view taken by the learned District Munsif amounted to this, namely, that a melcharthdar can only be a melcharthdar and nothing else, and that just as a lessee can himself become a landlord by sub-leasing the tenancy, a melcharthdar also, by entering into a direct contract of tenancy with another, might become his landlord within the meaning of the Act. He therefore considered that by the previous renewal the plaintiff has become a landlord and therefore can file a suit under S. 20 of the Act. Evidently the learned District Judge has not noticed that a melcharth has been defined in S. 3(p) as being a “transfer by the landlord of a part of his interest in any land held by his tenant by which the transferee is entitled to evict such tenant.” So by the very melcharth, the melcharthdar becomes entitled to evict and S. 40(2) contemplates a suit by the melcharthdar under S. 14 or 20 of the Act. The section runs thus:
“No holder of a melcharth can when suing for eviction claim possession on grounds (5) and (6) of S. 14 or on grounds (5) and (6) of S. 20 as the case may be.”
The only two provisions made in the Act for eviction are Ss. 14 and 20 and in both these sections what is stated is that no suit for eviction of a cultivating verumpattamdar, or a customary verumpattamdar, kuzhikanamdar, or kanamdar shall lie at the instance of his landlord except on the grounds stated thereunder. Unless the melcharthdar was conceived of being a landlord of that particular tenant, it is not possible to understand how a suit could be filed under those two sections by the melcharthdar with no other rights except under the melcharth. If therefore a melcharthdar was conceived by the legislature to be a landlord for the purpose of those two sections, the fact that either by attornment or grant of a renewal he gets the character of a landlord cannot give him much higher or different rights than what he has as a melcharthdar. In this view, on the fact that he granted a renewal and thus became a landlord or that the tenant attorned to him and therefore the relationship of landlord and tenant was created as between the two, it cannot be said that he would be exempt from the restrictions under S. 40(2) of the Act.
In these circumstances, I set aside the order of the District Judge and restore the order of the District Munsif on the petition with costs throughout.
No leave.
N.R.R