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  • S. 66(1) of the Income Tax Act
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  • S. 66(1) of the Income Tax Act
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Factual and Procedural Background

This reference was made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (Calcutta Bench) under S.66(1) of the Income Tax Act at the request of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras. The assessees filed a return for the year 1938-39 on 15 August 1938. On 11 March 1939 the Income Tax Officer (ITO) served a notice under Ss.22(4) and 23(2) to produce accounts for the money-lending business for the year 1937-38, with compliance required by 20 March 1939. The assessees produced certain books, but the ITO believed that a separate set of books had been suppressed.

At the time of the first notice S.28 had not yet been amended; the amendment took effect from 1 April 1939 and Sub‑section (1)(b) then provided for a penalty (up to one and a half times the income tax and super‑tax avoided) where a person without reasonable cause fails to comply with notices under S.22(4) or S.23(2).

On 9 December 1939 the ITO wrote asserting that a separate set of books existed and had not been produced. On 4 January 1940 a fresh notice under Ss.22(4) and 23(2) was issued requiring production of books for 1937-38, 1936-37 and 1935-36. The assessees did not comply. On 31 January 1940 the ITO assessed the assessees for 1938-39 at an income of Rs.16,100 under S.23(4). Two days before the assessment the ITO had served a show‑cause notice seeking reasons why a penalty should not be imposed under S.28(1)(b). The ITO held a hearing and by an order dated 21 December 1940 found default and imposed a penalty of Rs.1,200 in addition to tax payable under the assessment.

The assessees appealed both orders to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner. The Assistant Appellate Commissioner agreed with the ITO. The assessees accepted the assessment under S.23(4) but appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal against the penalty. The Tribunal allowed the appeal: it held that (1) to impose a penalty for non-production of books the existence of the books should be shown by more tangible material than is ordinarily necessary for an assessment under S.23(4), and (2) S.28 could not be applied because the assessment related to a period prior to 1 April 1939 (when the amendment came into force). The Tribunal then referred three questions to the Court for decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings for imposition of penalty in respect of the assessment for the year 1938-39 are governed by the Income Tax Act as it stood in 1938-39 (the year of assessment) or by the Income Tax Act as amended from 1 April 1939, given that the proceedings were completed in 1940.
  2. If the amended Act of 1939 is applicable, whether the default was committed on 20 March 1939 (in response to the first notice, prior to commencement of the amendment) or in January 1940 when there was a second default in failing to comply with another notice under S.22(4) for production of the same books.
  3. If the amended Act applied, whether the Tribunal's view that the existence of the books should be shown by more tangible material than would ordinarily be necessary for an order under S.23(4) was correct in concluding that the case was not fit for imposition of a penalty under S.28.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Income Tax Commissioner v. Badridas Ramrai Shop, Akola Describes how an Income Tax Officer should proceed when making an assessment under S.23(4): the assessment must be a fair estimate made honestly to the best of the officer's judgment; the officer may consider local knowledge, repute, previous returns and other relevant matters; though some guesswork is inevitable it must be honest and not vindictive, capricious or dishonest. The Court used this precedent to explain the nature of an assessment under S.23(4) (best‑judgment/estimate), and to contrast that with imposition of penalties under S.28 which cannot rest on guesswork. The precedent thereby informed the Court's distinction between evidentiary standards for assessment and for penalty imposition.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by noting that the Tribunal's questions were imperfectly framed (the second and third were not fully intelligible) but that the Court could infer the Tribunal's intended meaning from the Tribunal's order.

With respect to the first question, the Court identified the real issue as whether S.28(1)(b) could be applied to the failure to comply with the notice issued on 4 January 1940. The Court observed that the earlier notice (served 11 March 1939 with compliance by 20 March 1939) predated the amendment to S.28 and therefore S.28(1)(b) could not be applied to that earlier notice. By contrast, when the fresh notice was issued on 4 January 1940 the amendment was in force (effective 1 April 1939) and S.28(1)(b) was applicable to failures occurring after that date.

The Court addressed a submission (not attributed to a specific party in the opinion) that applying S.28(1)(b) to the second notice would render the amendment retrospective. The Court rejected that argument, explaining that the ITO had full power to issue the second notice on 4 January 1940 and that a failure to comply with that notice after the amendment was in force rendered the assessee liable under S.28(1)(b). The Court therefore answered the first question by holding that the ITO had the right to act under S.28(1)(b) for failure to comply with the notice issued on 4 January 1940; this conclusion also resolved the second question.

On the third question the Court considered whether the evidentiary standard for imposing a penalty under S.28 is higher than for making a "best judgment" assessment under S.23(4). The Court reasoned that the two sections are distinct and have nothing in common that would allow a direct equivalence of standards. It summarized the nature of an assessment under S.23(4) (drawing on the cited Privy Council authority) as necessarily an estimate in the face of missing information, which may permissibly involve honest guesswork informed by local knowledge, prior returns and other factors.

By contrast, the imposition of a penalty under S.28 is not a matter of guesswork. The Court held that before imposing a penalty in circumstances like this the Income Tax Officer must possess such evidence as would convince a reasonably minded person that a second set of books exists. The Court also emphasized that it was not possible to prescribe a universal, hard‑and‑fast rule about the precise quantum or type of evidence required; each case must be judged on its own circumstances. The Court thus answered the third question by setting out this evidentiary standard and rejecting the notion that the S.23(4) standard suffices for S.28 penalty imposition.

Finally, the Court ordered that the Commissioner is entitled to costs fixed at Rs.250.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Income Tax Officer was entitled to act under S.28(1)(b) in respect of the failure to comply with the notice issued on 4 January 1940.

Additional holdings and directions:

  • The amendment to S.28 (effective 1 April 1939) applied to the second notice issued on 4 January 1940; application of S.28 to that notice is not retrospective.
  • The standards for assessment under S.23(4) (best‑judgment estimate) and for imposition of a penalty under S.28 are distinct: while S.23(4) permits honest guesswork in forming an estimate, S.28 requires evidence sufficient to convince a reasonably minded person that a suppressed second set of books exists.
  • The Court declined to prescribe a rigid evidentiary formula for all cases; the sufficiency of evidence for imposing a penalty under S.28 must be assessed on the facts of each case.
  • The Commissioner was awarded costs of Rs.250.

Implications: The direct effects of the decision are (1) that the ITO had jurisdiction under the amended S.28 to proceed against the assessees for non‑compliance with the 4 January 1940 notice, and (2) that a higher, non‑speculative evidentiary standard is required before a penalty under S.28 may be imposed. The opinion does not elaborate broader precedent beyond these points; it does not set an exact evidentiary checklist but establishes the governing standard and leaves factual application to individual cases.

    The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah And Another

    (Delivered by The Chief Justice.)

    This reference has been made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Calcutta Bench, under S. 66(1) of the Income Tax Act at the request of the Commissioner of Income Tax Madras. On the 15th August 1938 the assessees filed a return of their income for the year 1938-39. On the 11th March 1939 the Income Tax Officer served a notice upon them under Ss. 22(4) and 23(2) to produce the accounts of their money-lending business for the year 1937-38 and connected documents. The notice was to be complied with by the 20th of that month. The assessees produced for the inspection of the Income Tax Officer certain books of account but when he examined them he considered that the assessees possessed another set of books which they had suppressed. When the notice under Ss. 22(4) and 23(2) was served on the assessees, S. 28 had not been amended. It was amended with effect from the 1st April 1939. Sub-S. (1)(b) of S. 28 now provides that if the Income Tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or the Appellate Tribunal in the course of proceedings under the Act is satisfied that a person has without reasonable cause failed to comply with a notice under Sub-S. (4) of S. 22, or Sub-S. (2) of S. 23, he or it may direct him to pay by way of penalty, in addition to the tax payable by him, a sum not exceeding one and a half times the income tax and super tax, if any, which would have been avoided if the income as returned by the person had been accepted as the correct income.

    On 9th December 1939 the Income Tax Officer wrote to the assessees stating that a separate set of account books had been kept and that these had not been produced. On the 4th January 1940 he caused to be issued a fresh notice under Ss. 22(4) and 23(2) requiring the assessees to produce the books of account for the years 1937-38, 1936-37 and 1935-36. The assessees did not comply with this notice. On the 31st January 1940 the Income Tax Officer assessed the assessee for the year 1938-39 on an income of Rs. 16,100. This assessment was under S. 23(4). Two days before this assessment was made the Income Tax Officer served a notice upon the assessees requiring them to show cause why a penalty should not be inflicted under S. 28(1)(b). The respondents appeared before the Income Tax Officer in compliance with this notice and he gave his decision in an order dated the 21st December 1940. He held that there had been default in compliance with the notice to produce the books of account and consequently he imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,200 in addition to the amount of tax payable under the order of assessment.

    The assessees challenged the correctness of both the orders of the Income Tax Officer in appeals to the Assistant Appellate Commissioner, who agreed with the Income Tax Officer. The assessees accepted the decision of the Assistant Appellant Commissioner so far as it concerned the assessment to income tax under S. 23(4) but they appealed to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal against the penalty which had been inflicted on them. The Tribunal allowed the appeal on the ground that in connection with the imposition of a penalty for the non-production of books “the existence of the books should be shown in some more tangible material than it may ordinarily be necessary for purposes of an assessment under S. 23(4).” The Tribunal also held that S. 28 could not be applied in a case where the assessment was for a period prior to the 1st April 1939 when the amendment came into force.

    The Tribunal has referred three questions to the Court for decision. They read as follows:

    “(1) Whether the proceedings in this case for the imposition of penalty in respect of the assessment for the year 1938-39 are governed by the Income Tax Act as it stood in 1938-39, the year of assessment, or whether they are governed by the Income Tax Act as amended from the 1st April 1939, as the proceedings were completed in 1940.

    (2) If it is held that the Income Tax Act as amended in 1939 should be applicable, the next question will arise: When the default was committed, whether on the 20th March 1939 in answer to the first notice prior to the commencement of the amended Act of 1939 or in January 1940 when there was again a second default to comply with another notice under S. 22(4) for the production of the same books.

    (3) If it is held that the Amended Act applied whether the view of law taken by the Tribunal that the existence of the books should be shown in some more tangible material than the one in the case of an order under S. 23(4) was right in arriving at the conclusion that the case was not a fit one for imposition of penalty.”

    It is regrettable that the Tribunal did not take greater care in framing these questions. The second and third questions as they stand are not intelligible; but we gather what is meant from the order which the Tribunal passed on the assessees' appeal.

    The first question is, whether S. 28(1)(b) can be applied in respect of the failure to comply with the notice issued on the 4th January 1940. It obviously could not be applied to the earlier notice because when that notice was issued the amendment had not been made. When the second notice was issued the amendment had been made, and we consider that the section was applicable. When the amendment came into force the Income Tax Officer had not made an assessment for the year 1938-39 and he was entitled to make it when he did, namely, on the 31st January 1940. It has been suggested that to hold that S. 28(1)(b) applies to the second notice is making the section retrospective, but this is not so. The Income Tax Officer had full power to issue the notice on the 4th January 1940 and failure to comply with it meant liability under S. 28(1)(b). The answer to the first question is that the Income Tax Officer had the right to act under S. 28(1)(b) for failure to comply with the notice issued to the assessees on the 4th January 1940. This answer also covers the second question.

    The third question is really whether more evidence is required for the imposition of a penalty under S. 28 than would be required for a “best judgment” assessment under S. 23(4). The two sections have nothing in common and it is not possible to give a direct answer to the question. When the Income Tax Officer makes an assessment under S. 23(4) it must be in the nature of an estimate, because the assessee has failed to place before him material for making an accurate assessment. In Income Tax Commissioner v. Badridas Ramrai Shop, Akola (1), the Privy Council pointed out how an Income Tax Officer should proceed when assessing under that section. Their Lordships said:

    “The officer is to make an assessment to the best of his judgment against a person who is in default as regards supplying information. He must not act dishonestly, or vindictively or capriciously, because he must exercise judgment in the matter. He must make what he honestly believes to be a fair estimate of the proper figure of assessment and for this purpose he must, their Lordships think, be able to take into consideration local knowledge and repute in regard to the assessee's circumstances and his own knowledge of previous returns by and assessments of the assessee, and all other matters which he thinks will assist him in arriving at a fair and proper estimate; and though there must necessarily be guess work in the matter, it must be honest guess work. In that sense, too, the assessment must be to some extent arbitrary.”

    The imposition of a penalty under S. 28 is not a matter of guess work. Before imposing a penalty in such a case as this the Income Tax Officer must have in his possession such evidence as would convince a reasonably minded man that there exists a second set of books. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule as to what is actually required. Each case must depend upon its own circumstances. We answer the third question in this sense.

    The Commissioner is entitled to his costs which we fix at Rs. 250.

    N.R.R

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    The Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madras v. Vedlapatla Veera Venkataramiah And Another
    (Mar 15, 1943)