In this case the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore in the Chingleput District has made what purports to be an order under Sect. 145 (6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is objected for the petitioners here that order was made without jurisdiction. It appears that the respondent here presented a petition to the District Magistrate of Chingleput alleging that there was likely to be breach of the peace in connection with certain land and praying for action to be taken under Sect. 145 of the Code. The District Magistrate, as he says, decided “to take the petition on file” and then transferred it to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore for disposal. The Sub Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore proceeded to make what purported to be an order under Sect. 145 (1). But it happened that the land concerned was not within the local limits of the jurisdiction of that Sub Divisional Magistrate. The petitioners here therefore contend that he had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sect. 145 (1).
For the respondent it is contended that the District Magistrate had under Sect. 192 of the Code power to transfer the enquiry at any stage and that the District Magistrate having once transferred this matter to the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore that Sub Divisional Magistrate had jurisdiction to proceed with an enquiry under Sect. 145. In re Arumuga Tegundan and Satish Chandra Panday v. Rajendra Narain Bagchi have been quoted for the respondent to show that enquiries under Sect. 145 of the Code may be transferred by the proper authorities from one Court to another. But it must be noticed that in each of these cases the order under Sect. 145 (1), which is the initiatory step in proceeding under Sect. 145 had been made by a Magistrate who had local jurisdiction over the land concerned.
In view of the decision in In re Arumuga Tegundan I must take it that, if the District Magistrate had himself made an order under Sect. 145 (1) in this case—as he had undoubtedly jurisdiction to do—and had then transferred the matter to the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore, the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore would have had jurisdiction to proceed with the enquiry though I may perhaps venture to say that, if I had not that decision before me, I should have regarded that question as open to doubt. But I have no doubt that the order under Sect. 145 (1) in such a case must be made by a Magistrate having local jurisdiction over the land or water concerned. That I think is made clear both by the object and wording of the Section. The object of Sect. 145 is not to provide parties with an opportunity of bringing their civil disputes before a Criminal Court or of manoeuvring for position for the purpose of subsequent civil litigation, though that is often the effect of such proceedings, but to arm the Magistrate concerned with an additional weapon for maintaining peace within the area for which he is responsible. And the wording of Sect. 145 (1) requires the Magistrate to state in his initial order that he is satisfied that there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace concerning some land or water or its boundaries within the local limits of his jurisdiction. It is not the business of any Magistrate as such to maintain order or peace outside the limits of his local jurisdiction. What the Tiruvellore Sub Divisional Magistrate has in effect done in this case is to say:
“I am satisfied that there is a dispute likely to cause a breach of the Peace concerning some land within someone else's jurisdiction and I propose to use my powers to prevent it”
which is almost an absurdity. The learned Sub Divisional Magistrate has, I think felt the difficulty of his position as in his order purporting to be made under Sect. 145 (1) he has said that the land is within his jurisdiction “as per the proceedings of the District Magistrate”. Now in this presidency a District Magistrate may post one Sub Divisional Magistrate in charge of another Sub Division, but he has no power to alter the boundaries of any Sub Division of his district permanently temporarily or for the purpose of a particular case. No order of the District Magistrate could have brought the land with which we are concerned within the local jurisdiction of the Sub Divisional Magistrate of Tiruvellore. That being so, I think it is clear that the Sub Divisional Magistrate's order under Sect. 145 (1) in this case was without jurisdiction, and it follows that his whole proceedings were without jurisdiction. There does not appear to be any direct authority on this point; but Konda Reddy v. King Emperor which deals with a somewhat similar provision in Sect. 107 of the Code, takes in effect the same view of the matter as I have done. I may add that in this case, even if the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate's order had not been without jurisdiction, it would have been necessary to send the proceedings back to him in order that he might write a proper judgment in the case. What he has done, is when he came to the end of his enquiry, to fill up form 22 in Schedule V of the Code, which is in the nature of a decree and leave the matter there without any explanation of his reasons or his view of the evidence put before him. It would be very convenient to Magistrates if they could be allowed to dispose of such cases in that way; but there can be no doubt that it is their duty to write an order or judgment which shows that they have considered the contentions of the parties and the evidence put before them and which gives the reasons for their decision. There is nothing in Sect. 145 to absolve a Magistrate from that ordinary duty.
The whole proceedings of the Sub Divisional Magistrate in this case are set aside.
N. R. R.Order set aside.