1. The first question argued is whether the application of 27th June 1910 was a step-in-aid of execution. Appellant (defendant 2) contends that it was not, because it was presented to the Mayavaram Court to which jurisdiction over the suit property had lately been transferred, not to the Kumbakonam Court which passed the decree. Appellant relies on Panduranga Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Reddi(1) and Gomatham Alamelu v. Komandur Krishnamacharlu(2). The latter case turned on acquiescence in the Court's jurisdiction and is not in point. The correctness of the former has been doubted in Allagappa Mudaliyar v. Thiyagaraja Mudaliyar(3) and it was not followed in Subbiah Naicker…(Second Counter-Petitioner) v. Ramanathan Chettiar…(Petitioner) .*(4). In the last-mentioned case the whole question was considered fully, though the Court was not obliged to act on its conclusion, since it could deal with the matter by means, of a transfer. That conclusion which we adopt is that the Court which passed a decree for sale cannot, after a transfer of jurisdiction, even entertain an application for the sale of the suit properties. We have not been shown that for the present purpose any distinction, can be drawn between execution of a decree of that nature and the decree before us, one for possession. We therefore hold that the application of 27th June 1910 was not made to the wrong Court.
2. It is next urged that the applications of 27th April 1907 and 27th June 1910 were not steps-in-aid of execution, because they were not properly presented.
3. They were in fact filed in Court, but were returned for correction of defects and eventually were not re-presented corrected. No doubt in Raghunatha Thatha Chariar v. Venkatesa Tawker(5) and Gopal Sah v. Janki Koer(6) it was held that an application returned for correction must be treated as having been presented, when the Court has accepted it, corrected. But in the former case the defect was fundamental and the application should have been rejected in the first instance: and the latter decision expressly dissented from a series of Madras cases begining with Ramanadan Chetti v. Periatambai(7), in which it was held that the validity of the original presentation was not affected by a subsequent order of return, unless the defects to be corrected were such as to prejudice the judgment-debtor substantially: see also Ramayyan v. Kadir Bacha Sahib(8). The defects in the applications now in question were not of that character. Only one of them calls for notice, the fact that the application of 1910 was not accompanied by a petition under O. 32, R. 12 of the CPC. The explanation that rule applies only to pending proceedings is however sufficient. In these circumstances the fact that these applications were returned does not deprive them of their character as steps-in-aid of execution.
4. Appellant however contends that this conclusion is affected by the decree-holder's failure ever to re-present these applications properly corrected to the satisfaction of the Court. This is material also to his argument regarding the application of 6th December 1912. It was returned as they were for similar defects and had not been corrected and accepted by 31st December 1912. It is true that in the present Code, which was in force at the date of the two applications in question, there is a special provision for the calculation of limitation from the date of first presentation “where an application has been amended” O. 21, R. 17. But that we think assumes what is not here the case: that the amendment required was essential to the validity of the application. If the application was valid without amendment with reference to the authorities already cited, it must be held to be a step in aid and to be valid for the purpose of Section 48 of the CPC.
5. Appellant's remaining argument based on that section must therefore fail, because there had been a valid presentation of the application now before us within 12 years from the date of the decree, that is, before 6th December 1912. It is urged that application is not the one before us, because after it had been returned by the Mayavaram Court for amendment in non-essential respects, it was re-presented on 15th January 1913, after jurisdiction had been transferred to the Kumbakonam Court by notification with effect from 1st January 1913, with a prayer for its return for presentation to the latter Court as the proper one. It was returned and presented accordingly, and we are asked to consider this prayer as a withdrawal of the application by respondent, to which the Court gave effect by its order. We cannot do so, since the Mayavaram Court, on losing its jurisdiction lost also its power to deal with the application in any way, and respondent's prayer and the Court's order on it could have no legal effect. In these circumstances it is not necessary for us to consider whether respondent's delay in applying to the Kumbakonam Court can be excused under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The application must be treated as having been on the file of the Mayavaram Court, until it was transferred with the other business of that Court to the Kumbakonam Court; and it is immaterial whether it was taken to the latter by respondent or sent there with the Mayavaram Court's other records.
6. The appeal must therefore be dismissed with costs.
S.N/R.K
7. Appeal dismissed.