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Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs filed a suit seeking recovery of possession of certain properties and for past and future mesne profits, alleging that those properties were ancestral (belonging to their grandfather), that on family partition they fell to the plaintiffs' father's share, and that their father sold the properties to the defendants without necessity for a low price such that the sale was not binding on the plaintiffs under Hindu law.

The defendants contested the plaintiffs' allegations, asserting (inter alia) that the sale was made to discharge antecedent debts and for family purposes, that consideration was adequate, that the lands were improved by them, and that the suit was not maintainable as framed (for example, a declaration alone without setting aside the sale, and possession claimed without asking for general partition or impleading other co-parceners). They also pleaded limitation and disputed the mesne profits claimed.

The District Munsif framed seven issues and after exhaustive findings held, among other things, that the plaintiff was born at the date of the sale, the alienation was valid and binding on the plaintiffs, plaintiffs were not entitled to mesne profits, the suit was not barred by limitation, the claim for improvements was exaggerated, and only Rs. 40 was due to the defendants for improvements. The District Munsif dismissed the plaintiffs' suit.

On appeal to the Subordinate Judge the principal points were framed as: (1) whether the alienation was binding on the plaintiffs and to what extent; (2) what mesne profits, if any, were due to the plaintiffs; and (3) whether the defendants were entitled to compensation for improvements. The Subordinate Judge held the sale was not binding on the plaintiffs so far as their share was concerned, awarded mesne profits to the plaintiffs (directing inquiry as to amount), confirmed Rs. 40 for improvements, reversed the District Munsif's decree and remanded the suit for ascertainment of mesne profits; the defendants (who had appealed to the Subordinate Judge) then appealed against that decree to the High Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the alienation (sale) of the plaint properties was binding on the plaintiffs and, if not, to what extent it was binding.
  2. What mesne profits, if any, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover.
  3. Whether the defendants were entitled to any compensation for improvements and, if so, in what amount.
  4. Whether the Subordinate Judge's order remanding the case was appealable (i.e., whether the remand was within O. 41, R. 23 or the exercise of inherent jurisdiction), and whether the Subordinate Judge should have drawn a formal preliminary decree rather than remanding the entire suit.
  5. Whether, instead of decreeing possession for the plaintiffs and leaving the defendants to a separate suit for partition, the lower Court should have decreed partition and apportioned possession between plaintiffs and defendants in this suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The properties were ancestral (grandfather's) and fell to the plaintiffs' father on family partition and therefore to the plaintiffs' interest.
  • The sale by their father was without necessity, for a low price, and therefore not binding on the plaintiffs under Hindu law.
  • They sought recovery of possession and mesne profits arising from the defendants' occupation.

Defendants' / Appellants' Arguments

  • They asserted the sale by the plaintiffs' father was to discharge antecedent debts and for legitimate family purposes, and consideration was adequate.
  • They claimed the lands were subsequently improved by them and asked for compensation for improvements.
  • They contended the plaintiffs must prove the plaintiff was born at the date of sale; they also raised procedural/contention points: that a declaration-only suit without seeking to set aside the sale was not maintainable; that a suit for possession without seeking general partition and without impleading co-parceners was improper; that the suit was barred by limitation; and that the mesne profits claimed were excessive.
  • With respect to remand/appealability, respondents (opposing the appellants' preliminary objection) argued the Court has inherent power to remand apart from O. 41, R. 23 and that the Subordinate Judge had properly exercised such power.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamim Debi v. Promotho Nath Omission to embody a decision in formal preliminary-decree form does not negate the right to appeal if the decision in substance amounts to a preliminary decree. The Court relied on this authority to treat the Subordinate Judge's decree, though wrongly framed as a remand, as in substance a preliminary decree and therefore appealable.
Kumud Lal v. Ramani Mohan Authority for treating substantive preliminary adjudication as appealable even if not formally embodied as a preliminary decree. Followed together with Kamim Debi to justify treating the impugned decree as a preliminary decree in substance.
Sidhanath Dhonddev v. Ganesh Govind Where decisions on issues conclusively determine rights so far as the Court is concerned, the Court should draw up a preliminary decree to enable appeal. Cited to support the proposition that the appellate court should have embodied its decision in a preliminary decree; Court chose to treat the decree as preliminary in substance instead of remanding for formal drawing up.
Bai Divali v. Shah Vishnur Manordas It is the duty of the Court, where applied to after passing a preliminary decree, to have the decree drawn up so as to enable appeal. Referred to in support of the duty to draw preliminary decrees; the High Court declined to remand merely for formal drawing up and treated decree as preliminary in substance.
Dorasami Iyar v. Venkatarama Iyar Support for treating substantive adjudications as preliminary decrees for appeal purposes. Followed as part of authorities permitting the High Court to treat the impugned order as a preliminary decree in substance.
Subramania Chettiar v. Padmanabha Chettiar Co-parcener may accept alienation as valid and seek partition with purchaser of properties in which purchaser is interested. Noted as authority that co-parcener may elect to accept alienation and proceed to partition with purchaser, but did not change Court's conclusion that purchaser must pursue partition separately.
Iburamsa Rowthan v. Thiruvenkatasami Naick Similar to Subramania Chettiar on co-parcener accepting alienation and seeking partition. Referred to as consistent authority on co-parcener's remedies; did not alter the Court's position that purchaser must file separate suit for partition.
Venkatarama v. Meera Lubbai Authority that purchaser cannot sue for partition of item sold to him to obtain allotment by metes and bounds; purchaser must file suit for general partition. Used to support the Court's conclusion that a purchaser has only an equity enforceable by a separate partition suit.
Palani Konan v. Masakonam Support for rule that purchaser must seek general partition and cannot claim allotment of vendor's share in sold item by metes and bounds in the suit for possession. Relied upon in concluding defendants were not entitled to partition in the present suit.
Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti (Full Bench) No fluctuation in the share to which an alienee is entitled; alienee's share is the vendor's share at date of alienation subject to equities. Cited to clarify the rights of an alienee and the nature of his entitlement; Court noted the settled principle.
Subba Rao v. Ananthanarayana Ayyar View (not followed in later cases) regarding status of vendee from co-parcener as tenant in common or otherwise. Cited to explain divergent views in earlier decisions; Court noted this view was not followed in subsequent authorities.
Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu Part of line of cases that did not follow Subba Rao and that limit the alienee's rights to an equity enforceable by partition suit. Referred to as part of authority confirming purchaser's limited remedy; used in the Court's survey of precedents.
Manjaya v. Shanmuga Holds alienee only acquires an equity to enforce rights by partition and is not entitled to possession as tenant in common. Followed in the Court's exposition that purchasers in such cases are left to a separate partition suit to work out interests.
Kota Balabhadra Patro v. Khetra Doss Also part of authorities limiting alienee's proprietary status vis-à-vis co-parceners. Referred to in the Court's review of the current of authority restricting the alienee's immediate rights to possession/allotment.
Deendyallal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh (Privy Council) Where co-parceners obtain possession by setting aside sale, the purchaser is declared to have acquired the vendor's share and may proceed to have that share ascertained by partition. Cited to show Privy Council practice of restoring possession to co-parceners while declaring the purchaser's right to have his share ascertained by partition; Court relied on this to support leaving purchaser to separate partition suit.
Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh (Privy Council) Gave possession to co-parceners while declaring purchaser's right to an undivided share and power to obtain partition to enforce that right. Used similarly to Deendyallal to support the view that purchaser's remedy is to obtain declaration and then separate partition proceedings.
Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser Where joint family property sold in execution for satisfaction of claim against a co-parcener personally, purchaser acquires only the judgment-debtor's right to compel partition. Cited as authority that purchaser's rights are limited to proceedings for partition; Court relied on this precedent in affirming the limited remedy of purchasers.
Mangaya v. Shanmuga Where co-parcener alienates his share, alienee acquires only an equity enforceable in partition and is not entitled to sue for allotment of the share in the alienated property or to claim tenant-in-common status. Quoted to reinforce the principle that alienee's interest must be enforced by a separate partition suit.
Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji In suit by a co-parcener to recover possession of property conveyed without necessity, joint possession cannot be given to purchaser; purchaser is entitled only to declaration and left to separate partition suit. Followed by the Court to support the decree awarding possession to co-parceners and restricting the purchaser to a declaration and separate partition remedies.
Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal (Privy Council) Discussed whether a suit for possession by co-parceners can be made conditional on plaintiffs assenting to partition to give effect to defendant's rights; Privy Council remanded for trial and noted potential for conditional relief but expressed no opinion on validity. The Court read the Privy Council's observations narrowly and concluded they did not overrule the principle that purchaser's remedy is to seek partition separately; the Court declined to treat this case as authority allowing partition in the co-parcener's suit.
Subbaya Mudaliar v. Tulasi Mudaliar Commentary by Sadasiva Aiyar J. that the Privy Council in Ramkishore did not decide the partition point and guarded against doing so. Cited to reinforce the Court's interpretation of Ramkishore as not overruling prior authorities restricting partition relief in co-parcener suits.
Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi A view (dissenting, per Krishnaswami Ayyar, J.) that a sale without necessity cannot be ratified by other co-parceners. The Court respectfully dissented from that view and held that such a sale is good until avoided and is capable of ratification by other co-parceners; the Court cited this in limiting mesne profits to the period from the date of suit.
Bhirgu Nath Chambi v. Narsing Tiveri Authority followed by the Court concerning limitation of mesne profits where there was no repudiation prior to suit (supporting mesne profits from date of suit). The Court followed this authority to limit mesne profits to the period from the date of the suit because there was no prior repudiation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Preliminary objection—appealability and remand:

  1. The Court analysed whether the Subordinate Judge's order remanding the case was appealable. It observed that orders of remand under O. 41, R. 23 are appealable under O. 43, but a simple remand made under inherent powers and not under O. 41, R. 23 would not fall within the appeal provision. The Court examined whether the Subordinate Judge had simply remanded under inherent power or had in effect made a preliminary decree.
  2. The Court considered the District Munsif's proceedings and found that the lower Court had tried and decided all issues; the only matter left undone was an ascertainment of mesne profits. The Court reviewed O. 20, R. 12 (rules for suits for recovery of possession and for mesne profits) and the definition of "decree" (Sect. 2(2) C.P.C.), concluding that an Appellate Court which finds a party entitled to possession should pass a preliminary decree for possession and direct inquiries as to mesne profits where required, instead of remanding the whole suit.
  3. The Court acknowledged that inherent powers (Sect. 151) exist to do justice where express code provisions do not suffice but stressed that such powers are to be used only to make orders necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse. It highlighted that a remand implies there is something for the lower Court to do; here, as the Appellate Court could pass a decree for possession, remanding that matter was idle and would produce anomalous and costly procedures.
  4. Noting authorities (Kamim Debi, Kumud Lal, Sidhanath Dhonddev, Bai Divali, Dorasami Iyar etc.), the Court held it could treat an incorrectly drawn remand order as a preliminary decree in substance and permit appeal. Thus the Court overruled the preliminary objection of the respondents and proceeded to hear the merits.

Merits — substantive points:

  1. On whether the alienation was binding: The Court regarded the Subordinate Judge's factual finding (that there was no necessity for the alienation and no bona fide enquiries by the defendants) as conclusive and not open to reexamination in the second appeal. Thus the Court accepted the Subordinate Judge's finding that the alienation was not binding on the plaintiffs to the extent of their share.
  2. On whether the lower Court should have decreed partition in this suit: The Court reviewed the current of authority and concluded that when a co-parcener sues to recover possession on ground of invalid alienation, the established practice is to decree possession to the co-parcener and to declare the purchaser's right to seek partition separately. The Court observed procedural difficulties and limitations on counter-claims under the Code that make it inappropriate to convert such a possessory suit into a general partition suit at the purchaser's instance. Consequently, the Court held that defendants are not entitled in this suit to a partition of the specific item conveyed or of the joint family properties generally.
  3. On mesne profits and improvements: The Court held that mesne profits should not be allowed prior to the suit because the alienation by the father to the extent of his share would be good until avoided. Following the authority in Bhirgu Nath Chambi, the Court limited mesne profits to the period from the date of the suit, since there was no repudiation before the suit. The Court accepted the lower finding as to improvements that only Rs. 40 was due to the defendants.
  4. Overall disposition as to form of decree: The Court concluded the Subordinate Judge's order should be treated as in substance a preliminary decree for possession (even though formally drawn as a remand) and modified it to declare defendants' entitlement to the vendor's half share as a right to be enforced by separate partition proceedings; the Court declined to remand merely to have the lower Court draw a formal preliminary decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court made the following core rulings (emphasised as required):

  • The preliminary objection was overruled: the impugned order of the Subordinate Judge, although formally a remand, could be treated in substance as a preliminary decree and thus was amenable to appeal.
  • The Subordinate Judge's factual finding that the alienation was not binding on the plaintiffs (to the extent of their share) was accepted as conclusive and was not disturbed in second appeal.
  • The defendants are not entitled, in this suit, to a partition (neither of the specific item conveyed nor of the joint family properties generally); they have a declaration of entitlement to the vendor's share which they may enforce by a separate suit for partition.
  • Mesne profits are limited to the period from the date of the suit (because the sale by the father to the extent of his share is good until avoided and there was no repudiation before suit).
  • The award for improvements of Rs. 40 to the defendants as found by the lower Court was confirmed.
  • Final disposition: The decree of the Subordinate Judge is modified in the respects stated; the memorandum of objection (and the appeal) is dismissed with costs, and the appellants were directed to pay the respondents' costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effects on the parties: Plaintiffs will obtain possession of the properties (as declared by the appellate court in substance). Defendants retain an equitable right to the vendor's share (half the vendor's share as declared) which they must pursue by a separate partition suit to work out their interest. Defendants' claim for improvements is limited to Rs. 40 as previously found. Mesne profits recoverable by the plaintiffs are confined to the period from the date the suit was instituted.
  • Procedural implication: Appellate Courts should, where they are able to, pass a preliminary decree for possession (and direct enquiries as to mesne profits as per O. 20, R. 12) rather than remanding matters which the Appellate Court itself can determine; where an appellate decision in substance amounts to a preliminary decree but is not formally drawn as such, the decision may be treated as a preliminary decree for purposes of appeal.
  • Precedential note: The Court adjusted the Subordinate Judge's formal approach by treating the order as preliminary in substance and relied on cited authorities in doing so; the Court did not purport to create a broader precedent beyond applying and following the authorities and principles expressly discussed in the opinion.
S. S. Appeal and memorandum of objections dismissed. (Memorandum of Objection is dismissed with costs.)

    Subbe Goundan v. Krishnamachari

    JUDGMENT

    Defendants are the appellants. This appel arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs to recover possession of the properties claimed in the plaint on the ground that the sale of the properties by their father to the defendants is not valid and binding on the plaintiffs and for the recovery of past and future mesne porfits. The case for the plaintiffs was that the land specified in the plaint and other properties belonged to their grandfather, that on a family partition the plaint properties fell to the share of their father, that he without any necessity sold the plaint properties to the defendants for a low price, that the sale was not binding on them and that they are under Hindu law entitled to recover possession of the properties from the purchasers. The defendants put the plaintiff to the proof that he was born at the date of the sale and contended that the sale by the plaintiff's father was to discharge antecedent debts and for other family purposes, that the consideration was adequate that the lands were subsequently improved by them and that the suit filed for a declaration alone without asking for setting aside the sale was not maintainable, nor was the suit claiming possession without requiring a general partition and without impleading the other co-parceners. It was pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation, that the plintiffs were not entitled to mesne profits and that the mesne profits claimed were excessive. Various issues, seven in number, were settled on these pleadings and the District Munsif in an exhaustive judgment has dealt with the several issues. He found that the plaintiff was born at the date of the alienation, that the alienation was for valid purposes and was binding on the plaintiffs, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any mesne profits, that the suit was not barred by limitation, that the claim for improvements was exaggerated, that the only amount which the defendants would be entitled to was Rs. 40 that the suit as framed was maintainable as the plaintiffs were not bound to set aside the sale-deed and that as regards possession they were entitled to recover possession of the properties sold leaving it to the purchasars to file a suit for partition in respect of the plaintiffs' father's share if so minded. In the result the District Munsiff dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge stated that the only points for decision were:—

    (1) Was the plaint mentioned alienation binding on the plaintiffs and to what extent?

    (2) What mesne profits if any were the plaintiffs entitled to, and

    (3) Were the defendants entitled to any and what compensation for improvements?

    No objection seems to have been taken before him as regards the legal questions, as to the maintainability of the suit or to the bar of limitation; and he held that the sale was not binding on the plaintiffs so far as their share of the plaint properties was concerned and that the defendants would have to bring a separate suit for partition, the plaintiffs being on the authorities entitled to recover possession of the entire property. As regards mesne profits he held that the plaintiffs were entitled to mesne profits and that the suit would have to go back to the District Munsif for ascertaining the amount due to them. As regards improvements be confirmed the finding of the District Munsif, that only a sum of Rs. 40 was due to the defendants for improvements. He allowed the appeal with costs, reversed the decree of the District Munsif and remanded the suit to the District Munsif's Court for ascertaining the amount of mesne profits due to the plaintiffs and directed the District Munsif to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs in the light of the above findings. Against this decree the defendants appeal.

    A preliminry objection is taken that no appeal lies as the order of remand was not passed under O. 41, R. 23, but was passed by virtue of the inherent power of the Court to order a remand apart from the provisions of that rule. There can be little doubt that if the order was simply an order of remand not falling within O. 41, R. 23, it is not appealable under O. 43 as Sub-Cl. (u) only refers to an order and R. 23 of O. 41 remanding a case. It is contended for the appellants that the decree of the Subordinate Judge is in effect a preliminary decree and that consequently although it is inform a decree remanding the suit it is appelable as a preliminary decree. We think that as the Subordinate Judge has decided that the alienation is not binding on the palintiffs there was nothing for the District Munsif to do on remand and the decree is the effect a preliminary decree which has been wrongly drawn up as a decree remanding the whole suit. We think that the Subordinate Judge was worng in reversing the decree of the District Munsif and remanding the entire suit for disposal. It is clear that the present case does not fall within O. 41, R. 23 of the Civil Procedure Code, which provides for the remand of cases by the Appellate Court. This rule provides that “were the Court from whose decree an appeal is preferred has disposed of the suit on a preliminary point and the decree is reversed in appeal, the Appellate Court may, if it thinks fit, by order remand the case and may further direct what issue or issues shall be tried in the case so remanded. * * * “In the present case the District Munsif did not dispose of the suit on a preliminary point but tried all the issues and has given findings on all of them. The only thing he did not do was to ascertain the amount of mesne profits which would be due to the plaintiffs. In cases of suits to recover possession of immoveable property, R.12 of O. 20 provides that where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immoveable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree (a) for the possession of the property (b) for the rent or mesne profits, which have accrued on the property during a period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an enquiry as to such rent or mesne profits (c) directing an enquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until (i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder, (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or (iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree whichever event first occurs. It provides that where an enquiry is directed under Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the resulc of such enquiry. This rule therefore clearly contemplates the passing of a final decree as regards possession of the property and the amount which is payable as mesne profits or the passing of a preliminary decree for possession of the property and directing an account to be taken of the mesne profits and the passing of a final decree as regards mesne profits after the ascertainment. Turning to the definition of decree in the Civil Procedure Code Sect. 2 Cl. (2) defines a decree as the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. The explanation to that section is to the effect that a decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely dispossed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposes of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final. Having regard to the definition of decree and to the provisions of O. 20 R. 12, it seems to us that the proper course which ought to have been adopted by the Subordinate Judge when he found that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the properties was to have passed a prelimiary decree directing the defendants to deliver possession to the plaintiffs and to have directed the District Munif to make the necessary enquiries as regards mesne profits provided for by O. 20, R. 12.

    It has been argued by the respondents that the powers of remand conferred by the Code are not confined to the provisions of O. 41, R. 23 and that apart from the Code the Court has inherent power to remand a suit and that the Subordinate Judge having exercised that inherent power, the High Court has no power to interfere. There can be little doubt that, so far as the powers of remand are concerned by O.41, R. 23 are not exhaustive. There are cases where, though the suit is not disposed of on a preliminary point, yet owing to an improper or defective enquiry in the lower Court where for example relevant documents are not admitted or material witnesses have not been examined and the Appellate Court is not in a position to adjudicate finally upon the matters in dispute, the inherent jurisdiction to do justice between the parties has been invoked. The Civil Procedure Code of 1908 has expressly enacted Sect. 151 in order to help the Court in doing justice to the parties in cases where there is no express provision in the code; but the inherent power under Sect. 151 can only be exercised in cases where, to use the words of the section, it is necessary to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. A remand to a Lower Court implies that something has to be done by the Lower Court in relation to the matter remanded to it. In the present case it is difficult to see what the Lower Court can do as regards possession of the property. The finding of the Lower Appellate Court has left nothing to be done as regards the claim for possession and it is idle to remand the case, in so far as the claim to possession is concerned, to the Lower Court as all that it can do is to pass a decree for possession a step which was within the competence of the Appellate Court to take. In cases falling within O. 20 R. 12 we think the proper course for the Appellate Court to take is not to remand the suit where it finds that a person is entitled to possession but to pass a preliminary decree so far as possession is concerned and direct an enquiry as to the mesne profits in cases where the lower Court has not dealt with the question. The course adopted by the Subordinate Judge leads to the anomaly that there will be a fresh decree passed by the Lower Court and that it will be necessary to appeal against that decree including the decree for possession again to the Subordinate Judge who would be precluded on previous findings from going into the question of possession and to compel the party if he wants to appeal from the decree givirg possession to file an infructuous appeal to the Lower Appellate Court, before the question can be agitated in the High Court in second appeal. This we think is a procedure which apart from its cumbrousness and expense is not warranted by the provisions of the Code. We think that where an Appellate Court can pass a preliminary decree it is its duty to do so and that a remand as to matters which can be the subject matter of the preliminary decree is not warranted. It is contended by Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Ayyar for the respondent that, where several items of immoveable properties are concerned, difficulty would arise where the Subordinate Judge deals with only one or two items and that in such cases it would lead to difficulties if a preliminary decree is passed as regards those items and the suit remanded as regards the rest. In such cases, we are of opinion, that the various items of immoveable properties should for the purposes of O. 20, R. 12 be regarded as one subject matter for adjudication and that the Court is not bound to pass a preliminary decree for possession as regards each item. In Kamim Debi v. Promotho Nath it was held that if a decision of the Appellate Court in reality amounts to a preliminary decree within the meaning of the definition of decree in the Civil Procedure Code, and in cases falling within O. 20, R. 12 to 18 of Civil Procedure Code, the mere omission on the part of the Court to embody its effect in a formal expression in the form of a preliminary decree will not negative the right of the party affected to prefer an appeal. A similar view was taken in Kumud Lal v. Ramani Mohan. In Sidhanath Dhonddev v. Ganesh Govind, it was held that where the decision of a Court on certain issues conclusively determined the rights of tho parties regarding some matters in controversy so far as that Court was concerned, it was the duty of the Court to draw up a preliminary decree so as to enable the party aggrieved to appeal, Sir Basil Scott, C.J and Beaman, J. held that the Subordinate Judge, in declining to draw up a preliminary decree committed a material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction, entitling the High Court to interfere under sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code and observed “The decision of the issues to which we have referred conclusively determined the rights of parties regarding some matters in controversy so far as his Court was concerned, the decision on each of those issues therefore was sufficient to constitute a preliminary decree. The defendant has a right to appeal from a decision of the Court amounting to a preliminary decree but he can only appeal if the decree is existent in a formal shape. This was decided in Bai Divali v. Shah Vishnur Manordas. It is the duty of the Court, where it is applied to after the passing of a preliminary decree, to have the decree drawn up so as to enable the party aggrieved to appeal”. The High Court directed the lower Court to draw up a preliminary decree upon the questions decided. We do not think that in the present case it is necessary to send the case down for the Subordinate Judge to draw up a proper decree and to put the parties to the delay and expense involved in what we consider to be a purely formal matter. Now that the second appeal has been filed we think, following the views taken in Dorasami Iyar v. Venkatarama Iyar, Kumud Lal v. Ramani Mohan, and Kamini Debi v. Promotho Nath, it is open to us to treat the decree of the lower Court as a decree which in substance is a preliminary one and to allow the appellants to argue their appeal on the footing that though the form of the decree of the Appellate Court is wrong, it is in substance a decree adjudicating finally the rights of the parties as regards the immoveable properties and is thus appealable as a preliminary decree. We over rule the preliminary objection of the respondents.

    Turning to the merits of the appeal, three points have been taken before us; (1) that the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the alienation was not binding on the plaintiffs and (2) that, as the alienation was good to the extent of the father's share, the lower Court, instead of decreeing possession and leaving the defendants to a separate suit for partition, should, in this suit at their instance, have decreed a partition and put the plaintiffs in possession of half the share and the defendants in possession of the remaining half (3) that mesne profits ought not to have been awarded.

    As regards the first point, we think that the finding of the Subordinate Judge is conclusive and that it is not open to us in second appeal to go behind it. The Subordinate Judge finds that there was no necessity for the alienation and that there were no bona-fide enquiries made by the defendants. There is therefore a clear finding of fact.

    As ragards the second contention, it is argued by Mr. Krishnaswami Iyer that it is open to a purchaser in a suit for possession by a co-parcener on the ground of the invalidity of the alienation and in cases where the alienation is not impeached to the extent of the father's share to require the plaintiff at his option either to consent to a partition of the specific items conveyed and to get possession of his share after partition by metes and bounds or to require a general partition of all the joint family properties so that the purchaser need not be driven to a separate suit. The right of a co-parcener to require an alienee to deliver possession of the entire joint family property in cases where the alienation is not binding on the plaintiff is clear and the current of authority has been simply to declare the interests of the purchaser and to leave the purchaser to a separate suit for partition, if he wants to work out his interests. So far as the co-parcener is concerred, it is open to him to accept the alienation as valid and seek a partition with the purchaser of the only properties in which the purchaser is interested vide Subramania Chettiar v. Padmanabha Chettiar, and Iburamsa Rowthan v. Thiruvenkatasami Naick. A purchaser, however, cannot sue for a partition of the item sold to him and obtain an allotment by metes and bounds of his vendor's share in that portion of the property but is bound to file a suit for a general partition (vide Venkatarama v. Meera Lubbai and Palani Konan v. Masakonam), though it has now been settled by the decision of the Full Bench in Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti, that there is no fluctuation in the share to which an alienee is entitled, his share being the share of the vendor at the date of the alienation subject of course to the equities in favour of the other members of the family against the transferor. It has also been settled that a vendee from a co-parcener is not a tenant in common with the other members. The view taken by Sundara Ayyar and Benson, JJ., in Subba Rao v. Ananthanarayana Ayyar, has not been followed in Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu and Manjaya v. Shanmuga and in Kota Balabhadra Patro v. Khetra Doss. A purchaser has only an equity as against the other members of the co-parcenery to work out his interests by a suit for a general partition. In cases where possession of the property is claimed by a co-parcener on the ground of the invalidity of the alienation as against him the current of authority is to decree possession and simply declare the right of the purchaser to a partition. In Deendyallal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh, their Lordships of the Privy Council, while directing possession of the property sold in execution of a decree to be given back to the co-parceners added a declaration that the appellant as purchaser in execution sale acquired the share and interest of the Judgment debtor in that property and was entitled to take proceedings to have that share ascertained. In Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Pershad Singh their Lordships of the Privy Council gave possession to the co-parceners who sued to set aside the sale in execution of a decree in respect of a debt which did not bind them but declared “that by virtue of the execution sale to them the respondents acquire only the one undivided third share in the eight anna share of Mouza Bissumbhurpore in the pleadings mentioned which formerly belonged to Adit Sahai with such power of ascertaining the extent of such third part or share by means of a partition as Adit Sahai possessed in his lifetime; and ordering that the appellants be confirmed in the possession of Mouza Bissumbhurpore subject to such proceedings as the respondents may take in order to enforce their rights above declared.” In Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser, it was held that where joint family property is sold in execution of a decree to satisfy a claim against a co-parcener personally all that the purchaser acquires, is merely the right of the Judgment debtor to compel a partition against the other co-sharers. The High Court, when the case came before it in appeal, added the necessary party and effected a partition of the property. Their Lordships in referring to this observed “According to the Judgment of their Lordships in Deendyal's case the decree, which ought properly to have been made, would have been that the plaintiff, the first respondent, should recover possession of the whole of the property with a declaration that the appellant, as purchaser at the execution sule, had acquired the share and interest of Shib Perkash Misser, and was entited to take proceedings to have ascertained by partition. So that, in fact, the appellant has got a decree more favourable to himself than he was entitled to. He retains possession of one third instead of being lurned out of the possession of the whole and left to demand a partition. Their Lordships therefore think that there is no ground for altering the decree of the High Court although it may have gone beyond what was necessary or proper. The decree is not strictly right, but the appellant does not suffer by that. He gets all that he would be entitled to if a partition were made”. It is clear from the above observations that their Lordships were of opinion that the only right which the purchaser had in such cases is to obtain a declaration which would entitle him in a separate suit for partition to work out his interests. In Mangaya v. Shanmuga, it was held that where a co-parcener alienates his share in certain specific family property the alienee does not acquire any interest in that property but only an equity to enforce his rights in a suit for partition and to have the property alienated set apart for the alienor's share if possible and that he is not therefore entitled to sue for partition and allotment to him of his share of the property alienated, nor has he a right to possession and to a status as a tenant in common. In Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji, it was held that in a suit by a co-parcener to recover possession of property conveyed without any necessity joint possession cannot be given to the purchaser but that he is merely entitled to a declaration that he has acquired the interest of the vendor whatever that may be in the particular property and a direction that he be left to recover that interest by separate suit for partition in which all necessary parties and properties should be joined. The learned Judges have followed the course taken by the Privy Council in Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh and Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser.

    Reliance was placed by Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar on Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal, which was a suit by the members of a joint family to set aside their father's alienation of ancestral property. The respondents in that case objected inter alia to the form of the suit which they contended should have been for partition. The suit was decided in the lower Court without any evidence and on the allegations in the plaint and written statement. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in holding that the plaintiffs would in the absence of any other defence be entitled to succeed went on to observe as follows:—

    “With respect to the form of the suit, it was rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellants that to deny any relief except in a suit for partition would be to deny the right of relief altogether, since the basis of their claim is that they are still entitled to the estate as a joint undivided estate, and desire to enjoy it as such. It may well be, however, that, as between Kedarnath and Jainarayan, the latter may be entitled to insist that he stands in the shoes of the former as to the share which would come to Kedarnath upon a partition; and that the Court, if that position were established, would itself, at Jainarayan's instance, decree a partition as between the plaintiffs on the one hand and Kedarnath on the other. Their Lordships think that on the present pleadings it is open to Jainarayan to set up such a case, but express no opinion as to its validity either in law or fact.” Their Lordships therefore remanded the case for trial “with a declaration that it is competent for the Court, in the event of the respondent Jainarayan failing in his other defences, to make the whole or any part of the relief granted to the plaintiffs conditional on their assenting to a partition so far as regards Kedarnath's interests in the estate so as to give effect to any right to which the respondent may be entitled claiming through Kedarnath”. It is argued that these observations show that the Privy Council upheld the right of an alienee from a member of a joint family to require that a partition should be effected in a suit filed at the instance of the co-parcener without the necessity of a separate suit being filed. We do not think that this is the effect of the observations. Their Lordships were dealing with a case where the suit was disposed of on a preliminary question. This contention was never raised before them and they guard themselves by stating that though it may be open to the defendant to raise that point they expressed no opinion as to its validity either in law or fact. We do not think that their Lordships intended to overrule the plain dictum in Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser where they held that relief by way of partition was not open to the purchaser in a suit by a co-parcener. Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Subbaya Mudaliar v. Tulasi Mudaliar was of opinion that their Lordships of the Privy Council did not decide the point in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jayanarayan Ramrachpal and guarded themselves against any idea that they expressed any opinion as to the validity of the contention either in law or in fact.

    Having regard to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code which do not allow any wide rights of counter-claim it is difficult to see how a suit by the plaintiffs for possession and mesne profits can be converted at the instance of the defendants into one for a general partition which would involve the presence of other parties and an enquiry into the debts and liabilities of the family. If the claim of the defendants is to be treated as a cross suit and if the written statement is to be stamped as a plaint in such cross suit claiming a general partition there is no reason why the defendants should not file their own suit for a general partition and work out any decree which they may obtain in the decree in the suit by the co-parcener. There is no special advantage in the defendants' doing in their written statement what they could easily do in a plaint filed by them. It is open to them as soon as a co-parcener files a suit for possession to file a suit for partition and were proper grounds exist the Court would try the suits together so as to afford relief to all parties. On the point of view of hardship we think that the hardship would be greater if a simple suit for possession which the co-parcener is in law entitled to file in cases of invalid alienations is converted into an elaborate enquiry as to a general partition of the family.

    We are of opinion that the defendants are not in this suit entitled to a partition either of the specific item conveyed or of the joint family properties generally.

    As regards the claim for mesne profits we do not see any reason for mesne profits being allowed before the suit. The alienation by the father to the extent of his share will be good.

    In the case of sales by a father or managing member of the joint family for alleged necessity, we think the sale will be good till avoided as it is open to the other co-parceners to affirm the transaction. The position of such a purchaser cannot be worse than that of a purchaser from a widow without legal necessity in whose, case it has been held that the sale is good till repudiated by the reversioners. We respectfully dissent from the view taken by Krishnaswami Ayyar, J. in Kandasami Asari v. Somaskanda Ela Nidhi, that a sale without necessity is incapable of ratification by the other co-parceners. Following the decision in Bhirgu Nath Chambi v. Narsing Tiveri, we think the claim for mesne profits should be limited to the period from the date of suit as there was no repudiation before the suit. There will be a declaration that the defendants are entitled to the half share of the vendor which they will be at liberty to work out by a suit for partition. The decree of the Subordinate Judge will be modified accordingly. Memorandum of Objection is dismissed with costs.

    As the appellants have substantially failed, we direct them to pay the respondent's costs,

    S.SAppeal and memorandum of objections dismissed.

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