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citation codes
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  • S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Civil Procedure Code, and therefore S. 3 of the Evidence Act
  • Ss. 65, 86, 88 and 99 of the Transfer of Property Act:
  • provisions of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 16 of the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Co-operative Societies Act. Several
  • CO OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1912
  • Co-operative Societies Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Civil Procedure Code, and therefore S. 3 of the Evidence Act
  • Ss. 65, 86, 88 and 99 of the Transfer of Property Act:
  • provisions of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • S. 16 of the Indian Arbitration Act
  • Co-operative Societies Act. Several
  • CO OPERATIVE SOCIETIES ACT 1912
  • Co-operative Societies Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (appellant) purchased two parcels of property (A schedule and B schedule). The A schedule property was originally sold on 9 December 1922 and additional shares were purchased by the plaintiff on 19 December 1923. The B schedule property was sold to the plaintiff on 27 June 1923. Both properties had been represented as free from encumbrances, but the plaintiff later discovered they were subject to a mortgage dated 17 August 1917 in favour of the 1st defendant, the Co-operative Rural Credit Society of Ulakottai.

The Co-operative Society, on default, obtained an award from the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies by proceedings (C.C.S I of 1922). An award dated 31 August 1922 was filed in Court along with an execution petition (E.P. No. 1650 of 1922) on 17 November 1922. Under that execution petition the properties were sold on 21 November 1923, the Society purchased the hypotheca, and the sale was confirmed on 22 February 1924.

The plaintiff sought to redeem the properties but was denied the right on the ground that his vendor's right of redemption had been extinguished. The material legal issue is whether the plaintiff's purchase was pendente lite — specifically whether the plaintiff's purchase was made after proceedings had become pending such that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applied.

At trial the Court held the proceedings before the Registrar were proceedings before a Court and therefore attracted S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. On appeal the Subordinate Judge disagreed about the Registrar's proceedings but held that the execution proceedings on the award were proceedings under S. 52 and thus the plaintiff's purchase was pendente lite. The plaintiff filed this second appeal against that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the proceedings before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies (under R. 14 of the Rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act) amount to proceedings before a "Court" such that S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act applies to purchases made after initiation of those proceedings.
  2. Whether, in any event, once an award of the Registrar is filed for execution in a competent Civil Court and the Court directs sale of the mortgaged property, a purchase made during those execution proceedings is made pendente lite (i.e., whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to such execution proceedings and sales).
  3. Whether R. 14 of the Rules under the Co-operative Societies Act authorises the Registrar to pass a mortgage decree (as opposed to only a money decree), and the consequent implications for puisne mortgagees and parties not before the Registrar.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents contended that the proceedings before the Registrar were proceedings before a Court; if so, the plaintiff's purchase was pendente lite.
  • They relied on precedents (including an authority referred to as In re Subbi Reddi) that treat the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as a Court for purposes of S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, and other decisions that treat similar tribunals or officers as Courts in particular statutory contexts.
  • They pointed to the Registrar's statutory powers under R. 14 (including the capacity to summon witnesses and the provision that awards are enforceable as if decrees) as demonstrating that the Registrar acts as a Court and that the award, once filed for execution, placed the matter under the jurisdiction of a Civil Court for execution.

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant argued by citation of various authorities that some officials (Official Assignee, Registrar of Assurances, certain revenue officers, District Registrar, and other officers) are not Courts for the purposes of particular statutory provisions, and hence by analogy the Registrar of Co-operative Societies should not be treated as a Court for the purposes of S. 52.
  • It was contended that R. 14 only enables the Registrar to pass a money decree and not a mortgage decree; enforcement of mortgage rights (including sale) must follow the procedure in Order 34, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code and the provisions of Sections 65, 86, 88 and 99 of the Transfer of Property Act, which require proper parties (including puisne mortgagees) to be before the Court.
  • The appellant further argued that the Registrar is akin to officers in other cases where the High Court's writ jurisdiction could not be equated with ordinary appellate jurisdiction, and that absence of High Court supervisory powers should bear upon whether the Registrar is a Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Subbi Reddi That the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a "Court" for the purposes of S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code (single Judge decision). Viewed as a direct decision favouring the respondents' position; relied upon as the only directly reported decision of this Court on the point supporting that the Registrar is a Court.
Nanda Lal Ganguli v. Khetra Mohan Ghose A tribunal constituted by statute (Calcutta Improvement Act) is a "Court" within S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code. Used to show other statutory tribunals have been held to be Courts in analogous contexts.
Queen-Empress v. Munda Shetti That a Tahsildar enquiring into revenue registry is a revenue Court. Illustrative of statutory officers being treated as Courts; cited in discussion comparing types of officers/tribunals.
In re Nataraja Iyer That a Divisional Officer hearing appeals under the Income-tax Act is a Court. Referenced as another instance of statutory tribunal being treated as Court.
Gopinath v. Ramnath Registrar of Co-operative Societies or arbitrators appointed by him are given powers of a Civil Court for summoning witnesses; awards enforceable as if they were decrees. Cited to support the proposition that the Registrar performs functions similar to a Civil Court and his awards are enforceable as decrees.
Beardsell and Co. v. Abdul Gunni Sahib That an Official Assignee is not a Court. Quoted by appellant to argue certain officers are not Courts; the Court considered but distinguished such authorities from the Registrar's position under R. 14.
Krishnammal v. Krishna Ayyangar (Full Bench) That a Registrar of Assurances registering a will is not a Court for purposes of privileged statements under S. 195. Appellant relied on it; Court noted the distinction from Registrar under R. 14 since the Registrar under R. 14 may compel decisions binding on parties.
Rajah of Mandasa v. Jagannayakulu A revenue officer exercising jurisdiction under Chapter XI of the Estates Land Act is not a Court (Full Bench decision). Appellant relied on it; Court distinguished that revenue officers had power to disregard contracts and to act differently from Registrar under R. 14.
Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddi That a District Registrar is not a Court for the purpose of S. 622, Civil Procedure Code, 1882. Cited by appellant as an instance of an official not being a Court; Court considered the distinctions in statutory scheme.
Lakshmanan Chetty v. Kannappar The Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court acting as persona designata is not a Court when hearing objections on an election petition. Appellant cited it; Court treated it as another example to be distinguished from Registrar under R. 14.
59 M.L.J. 229 Reported decision of this Court on the point that the Registrar is a Court (as referenced in the opinion). Referred to as the only actual reported decision of this Court on the specific question; the court followed it in holding the Registrar to be a Court under these circumstances.
Gladstone Wyllie & Co. v. Joosub Peer Mahomed & Co. For recognising transfers under O. 21, R. 16, Civil Procedure Code, the Court in which execution is taken is to be deemed the Court which passed the decree. Used to support the proposition that the executing Court can be treated as the Court that must execute/recognise the award as if it were its own decree.
Krishnaji Shridhar Barde v. Mahadeo Sakharam Patil An award of a co-operative officer filed for execution in one Court can be transferred by that Court to another since the executing Court can execute it as if it had passed it. Used to show flexibility in execution of awards and to support treating execution proceedings as invoking court execution powers.
Ahmad Yar v. Co-operative Credit Society That a Court executing an award under the Co-operative Societies Act has power only to execute the award as if it were a decree of the executing Court; an order refusing to do so was appealable. Relied on as authority that the executing Court cannot amend or refuse execution of the award and must execute it as a decree; the Court said it entirely agreed with this decision.
Baijnath v. Ahmed Musaji Saleji When an award under S. 16 of the Indian Arbitration Act has been filed, there is an award enforceable as a decree rather than a suit with a decree. Cited by the appellant; the Court held this and a similar decision under the Arbitration Act did not throw light on the present question.
Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarty Under the Indian Arbitration Act, a decree cannot be passed on the award as is done under Schedule II of the Civil Procedure Code. Referenced by the Court as not directly solving the present issue concerning co-operative awards and execution under R. 14.
Pranjivan Govardhan Das v. Baju That presentation in Court of an award is equivalent to presentation of a plaint for specific performance and proceedings consequent thereto constitute lis pendens. Cited as a direct authority that filing an award in Court and consequent proceedings create lis pendens affecting subsequent purchasers.
Mati Lall Pal v. Preo Lall Mitra Principle regarding lis pendens continuing in certain post-decree circumstances (cited in relation to mortgage suits and sale orders). Used to explain that lis pendens may continue after decree if property is directed to be sold; cited in support of lis pendens applying to execution sales after award filing.
Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Govinda Iyer That in a mortgage suit the basis for the doctrine of lis pendens after decree is that the property is directed to be sold (and not merely that applications are presented to enforce the decree). Used to support the view that execution proceedings leading to sale create lis pendens affecting subsequent purchasers.
Chundra Nath Dey v. Burroda Shoondury Ghose References to Sections 65, 86, 88 and 99 of the Transfer of Property Act concerning procedure to enforce mortgage rights and parties to be joined in mortgage suits. Cited by the appellant to argue that mortgage enforcement has prescribed procedures and requirements for parties which may not be met under R. 14; the Court observed the argument but found the question did not arise on the facts of the case.
Har Shankar Prasad Singh v. Shew Gobind Shaw That a subsequent purchaser at a Court sale in execution has no more rights against the purchaser at a prior sale than his vendor had; the vendor should have paid decree amount before confirmation. Applied to the facts to hold the plaintiff had no greater rights than his vendor and should have acted earlier to protect redemption rights.
24 Mad. 121 and 36 Mad. 72 Rulings relating to the absence of direct High Court control not preventing an officer or tribunal from being a Court. Referred to in rejecting the argument that absence of broader High Court jurisdiction over the Registrar prevents him from being a Court under the relevant statutory scheme.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the matter in two principal strands.

  1. Whether the Registrar is a Court under R. 14:
    • The Court began by considering the respondents' contention that the proceedings before the Registrar are proceedings before a Court. It identified a direct decision (In re Subbi Reddi / 59 M.L.J. 229) of this Court holding the Registrar to be a Court for purposes of S. 195, CrPC, and noted no decision to the contrary by this Court.
    • The Court distinguished the Registrar under R. 14 from an arbitrator in the usual sense: arbitrators are chosen by consent; by contrast R. 14 allows one party to refer the matter and compels the Registrar to dispose of the case. The Registrar can, in a statutory sense, compel a decision binding on a party.
    • The rules under R. 14 enable the Registrar to decide matters which would otherwise have been referred to a Court, and his awards are enforceable by a Civil Court as if they were decrees. The Registrar also has powers similar to a Civil Court for summoning witnesses. These features, the Court held, make his position "that of a Court" in the circumstances of R. 14.
    • The Court considered and distinguished authorities relied upon by the appellant where other officials were held not to be Courts, noting differences in statutory power and procedure (for example, revenue officers having power to disregard contracts, or officers acting purely in a ministerial or persona designata capacity).
    • Relying on the earlier reported decision of this Court and these distinctions, the Court held that the Registrar is a Court acting in these circumstances; accordingly, the plaintiff's purchase (which occurred after the initiation of those proceedings) was pendente lite.
  2. Alternate ground: lis pendens applying to execution on the award:
    • Even if the Registrar were not held to be a Court, the Court agreed with the appellate Court that once the award had been placed before a competent Civil Court in execution and the Court directed sale of the mortgaged property, any purchase during such execution proceedings would be pendente lite.
    • The Court observed that S. 141 CPC does not apply to execution proceedings, but rejected the argument that S. 52 Transfer of Property Act (general rule of lis pendens) did not apply. The Court treated S. 52 as a general rule designed to avoid multiplicity of suits and stated it has wide application, including to sales in execution following an award filed in Court.
    • The Court cited authorities (including Pranjivan Govardhan Das v. Baju) that presentation of an award in Court is equivalent to presentation of a plaint for purposes of lis pendens, and other cases (Gladstone Wyllie, Krishnaji Shridhar Barde) establishing that an award filed for execution is to be treated as a decree enforceable by the executing Court.
    • Ahmad Yar v. Co-operative Credit Society supported the proposition that an executing Court can only execute the award as if it were its own decree and cannot otherwise amend or refuse execution. The Court relied on that principle to conclude that the executing Court was bound to execute the award and that a subsequent purchaser had no greater rights than his vendor.
  3. On the appellant's separate contention (R. 14 permits only money decrees):
    • The Court noted this was a significant legal question with weighty arguments for the appellant but observed it was not raised before the lower Courts and that the plaint itself treated the decree as existing and enforceable. The plaint expressly acknowledged the decree and the plaintiff sought to pay and redeem under it.
    • Because the plaintiff's purchase was subsequent to the award and the initiation of execution proceedings, the plaintiff could not have been made a party to those proceedings. The Court observed that the executing Court could not refuse to execute the award nor could it amend it (citing Ahmad Yar).
    • Although the Court acknowledged that the appellant might have a possible avenue in a separate suit to set aside an award on the ground that R. 14 does not contemplate a mortgage decree, the Court concluded that on the face of the award there was no jurisdictional defect and therefore execution proceedings had to be carried out. Consequently the question did not arise for decision in the present case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court affirmed the lower appellate Court's decision. The second appeal was dismissed and the decree of the lower appellate Court was confirmed. The judgment concludes with an order for costs (one set) and the formal dismissal of the appeal.

Core legal conclusions explicitly stated by the Court:

  • The Registrar of Co-operative Societies, acting under R. 14 of the Rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act and in the circumstances before the Court, is a Court (the Court so held).
  • Accordingly, the plaintiff's purchase, which was subsequent to the initiation of those proceedings, was pendente lite and therefore subject to the doctrine of lis pendens.
  • Even if the Registrar were not a Court, once an award is filed for execution in a competent Civil Court and that Court directs sale of the mortgaged property, purchase during such execution proceedings is pendente lite.

Implications for the parties:

  • The plaintiff's purchase is treated as pendente lite and the plaintiff has no greater rights against the purchaser at the execution sale than his vendor had. The vendor should have paid the decree amount before confirmation of the sale.
  • The executing Court was required to execute the award as if it were a decree and could not amend or refuse execution on the face of the award.
  • The appeal was dismissed and the decree below confirmed; costs were awarded to the respondents (one set).

Note: The Court observed a separate legal argument (whether R. 14 only permits money decrees and not mortgage decrees) but found that issue did not arise for determination in the present case because of the plaintiff's pleadings and the procedural posture.

    Velayuda Mudali v. Co-Operative Rural Credit Society No. A-203 Of No. 55, Ulakottai Village

    JUDGMENT

    The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit relates to two items-of property. The A schedule property belongs to one Kuppuswami Padayachi and was sold to the appellant and two others on 9th December 1922 (Ex. C). The other two vendees sold their share to the plaintiff on 19th December 1923 (Ex. D). The B schedule property belonging to one Thangavelu Padayachi was sold to the plaintiff on 27th June 1923 (Ex. E). The properties were sold as free of encumbrance. But plaintiff found that they were both subject to a mortgage on 17th August 1917 for Rs. 460 in favour of the 1st defendant, the Co-operative Rural Credit Society of Ulakottai village. Default having been made under the mortgage to the Co-operative Society, it proceeded by C.C.S I of 1922 to obtain an award from the Assistant Registrar of Co-operative Societies. An award was passed on 31st August 1922 directing the mortgagor to pay the amount. It was filed in Court with an execution petition, E.P No. 1650 of 1922, on 17th November 1922. Under this execution petition the properties were sold on 21st November 1923 and the Society purchased the hypotheca. The sale was confirmed on 22nd February 1924. Plaintiff wanted to redeem the properties but his right was denied and it was said that his vendor's right to redeem had disappeared. The sale to the plaintiff was subsequent to the filing of the execution petition on 17th November 1922 and the main question at issue is whether his purchase was pendente lite or not. The 2nd respondent is the subsequent purchaser from the Society and his defence is the same as that of the Society. The trial Court held that the proceedings under Ex. I before the Registrar were proceedings before a Court and therefore attracted the provisions of S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. On appeal the Subordinate Judge held that the proceedings before the Registrar were not proceedings before a Court and therefore S. 52 does not apply, but he held that the execution proceedings on the award were proceedings under S. 52 and therefore the plaintiff's purchase was pendente lite. Against this decision this second appeal has been filed.

    It may be more convenient first to discuss the matter from the respondents' stand-point since they contend that the trial Court was correct in considering that the proceedings before the Registrar were proceedings before a Court. If that is made out, except for a general argument, which was not raised at all in the Courts below and to which I shall allude later on, it is clear that the plaintiff's purchase was pendente lite. There is one direct decision of this Court that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is a Court for purposes of S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code [In re Subbi Reddi.] It is a decision, no doubt, of a single Judge and is confined to S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code but it is on the exact point and there is no decision to the contrary by this Court. In Nanda Lal Ganguli v. Khetra Mohan Ghose(2) it was held that a tribunal constituted by the Calcutta Improvement Act is a Court within the meaning of S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code. In Queen-Empress v. Munda Shetti(3) it was held that a Tahsildar enquiring into revenue registry is a revenue Court and In re Nataraja Iyer(4) held that a Divisional Officer hearing appeals under the Incometax Act is a Court. In Gopinath v. Ramnath(5) it was remarked that the Registrar of Co-operative Societies or the arbitrators appointed by him are given the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of summoning witnesses and that it is laid down that their award shall be enforceable by a Civil Court in the same manner as if it were a decree passed by such a Court.

    For the appellant it is pointed out that an Official Assignee is not a Court, Beardsell and Co. v. Abdul Gunni Sahib(6), nor is a Registrar of Assurances in registering a will a Court for the purpose of rendering a statement made by an opposing party in an objection petition, a statement made on a privileged occasion, Krishnammal v. Krishna Ayyangar (Full Bench of this Court), that under the amended S. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, a Registrar of Assurances is not a Court for purposes of that section, that a revenue officer when exercising jurisdiction under Chapter XI of the Estates Land Act in relation to settlement of rents is not a Court [Rajah of Mandasa v. Jagannayakulu] that a District Registrar is also not a Court for the purpose of S. 622, Civil Procedure Code, 1882, as the High Court has no power to reverse his order under that section, Manavala Goundan v. Kumarappa Reddi and that the Chief Judge of a Small Cause Court hearing objections on an election petition acts as a persona designata and is not a Court: Lakshmanan Chetty v. Kannappar.

    None of the above instances cited for the appellant deals with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies Acting under R. 14 of the rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act. Several points with regard to his position may be noted. The first is that he is not an arbitrator in the sense in which that word is understood under the Arbitration Act or in Sch. II of the Civil Procedure Code, and therefore S. 3 of the Evidence Act which excludes arbitrators from the definition of Court is not of much assistance. The essential characteristic of an arbitrator is that the matter is referred to him by consent of both parties. But under R. 14 any one party may make a reference to the Registrar and on receipt of such reference he is bound to dispose of the case. He can no doubt refer it to an “arbitrator” appointed by him or to several arbitrators (the word is used in a special sense here). But his position in this matter is that of a Court to whose decision one party can compel the other party to submit. Then, it has to be noticed that the whole procedure under R. 14 appears to be devised as a short-cut by which the Registrar takes the place of the Court, decides a matter which would otherwise have been referred to it, and passes an award which becomes a decree of a Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the decision when that Court is asked to enforce it. Unlike revenue officers appointed to fix rents there is no provision that the Registrar can disregard contracts between the parties or import his own knowledge into the matter. This makes his position entirely different from that of such an officer as is dealt with in the Full Bench decision, Rajah of Mandasa v. Jagannayakulu. It is argued that if he were a Court, he would be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court beyond that which it can exercise by a writ of certiorari. But the fact that the High Court has not any other jurisdiction over him would not, in the light of the rulings in 24 Mad. 121 and 36 Mad. 72, prevent his being a Court. Neither of the officers in those two cases is subject to direct control by the High Court. On the whole, following the only actual reported decision on the point, of this Court, namely, 59 M.L.J 229, I hold that the Registrar is a Court acting in these circumstances. If that is so, it is clear that the plaintiff's purchase was made pendente lite.

    Even if that view is not correct I agree with the lower appellate Court that when once the award has been put before a competent Civil Court in execution, as in this case, and the Court directs the sale of the mortgaged property, any purchase during such proceedings is made pendente lite. No doubt, it is true that S. 141, Civil Procedure Code, does not apply to execution proceedings but I am not convinced that this argument applies to S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. S. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is a general rule of lis pendens to avoid multiplicity of suits and the principle applies whether S. 52 is in terms applicable or not. It has been held that even sales in invitum would fall under it, and the principle was applied even in the case of moveables so that it is a section of very wide application. It was argued for the appellant that in a mortgage suit the lis commences with the suit but that while ordinarily the lis terminates with the decree, there is an exception in mortgage suits if the decree directs the sale of the property. That position, however, cannot be maintained because the lis may also continue in a suit for specific performance after decree: Mati Lall Pal v. Preo Lall Mitra. In Ramaswami Aiyangar v. Govinda Iyer, it was laid down that in a mortgage suit the basis of the doctrine of lis pendens after the decree is the fact that the property is directed to be sold, and not the fact that applications are presented to enforce the terms of the decree. Therefore the argument that if the Registrar is not a Court the award which he passes can never become a decree of the executing Court cannot, I think, be sustained. R. 14, (5b) of the Rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act 1912, says that on application to the Civil Court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the decision or award, that Court may enforce that decision or award as if it were a decree of the Court. In the case reported in Gladstone Wyllie & Co. v. Joosub Peer Mahomed & Co., it was held that for the purpose of recognising the transfer under O. 21, R. 16, Civil Procedure Code, it was the Court in which execution was taken that must be deemed to be the Court which passed the decree. In Krishnaji Shridhar Barde…Applicant; v. Mahadeo Sakharam Patil…Opponent., it was held that an award of a co-operative officer filed for execution in one Court can be transferred by that Court to another Court inasmuch as that Court could execute it as if it had passed it. Ahmad Yar v. Co-operative Credit Society is a decision of considerable importance with regard to another argument raised. There it was held that a Court executing an award under the Co-operative Societies Act has no power to do anything except to execute the award as if it were a decree of the executing Court, and that an order refusing to do so was appealable. On the other side was quoted Baijnath v. Ahmed Musaji Saleji, in which it was held that when an award under S. 16 of the Indian Arbitration Act has been filed, the result is not that there is a suit in which a decree has been passed but that there is an award which is enforceable as a decree, and in Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri v. Rabindra Nath Chakravarty, a case under the Indian Arbitration Act, it was held that a decree cannot be passed on the award as is done under Sch. II of the Civil Procedure Code. These last two decisions do not, I consider throw any light on the question at issue here. It certainly cannot be held to be correct law that when a matter has been referred to arbitrators and they have submitted an award, subsequent to the award being filed in Court the property can be sold without such sale falling under the rule of lis pendens. Pranjivan Govardhan Das v. Baju, is a direct authority on the point. It was there held that the presentation in Court of the award obtained by the plaintiff was equivalent to the presentation of a plaint for the specific performance of the contract of mortgage and the proceedings consequent thereon constituted a lis pendens. I stated at the outset that a general argument had been raised in this Court for the first time which was not raised at all before the lower Courts and which is in my opinion contrary to the pleading in the plaint. It is that R. 14 of the Rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act only enables the Registrar to pass a money decree and not a mortgage decree. The relevant words of the rule are these:

    “Similarly in the case of a dispute relating to a debt due to the Society by a member or past member or persons claiming through a member or past member, a reference in writing may be made by either party to the Registrar.’

    It is argued that the only procedure by which a mortgage debt can be enforced is by the sale of the mortgaged property under O. 34, R. 14, Civil Procedure Code, that under O. 34, R. 1, all puisne mortgagees should be made parties to the mortgage suit, and that if the decree in a mortgage suit does not order the sale of the mortgaged property, the property could not be sold unless a proper suit is brought in the way prescribed by Ss. 65, 86, 88 and 99 of the Transfer of Property Act: Chundra Nath Dey v. Burroda Shoondury Ghose. It is argued that there might be puisne mortgagees who are not members of the Society and over whom the Registrar could have no control and it is urged that if the Registrar could pass a mortgage decree there would have been more elaborate and specific rules as to the parties to be added, the form of the decree etc. On the other side, it is pointed out that a great part of the loans of these societies are granted on mortgages (vide by-law 44, page 35 of the Manual). The legal question raised is no doubt of very great importance and the arguments of the learned Advocate for the appellant have considerable weight. But in the present case, I do not think the question arises for several reasons. The plaint recognises the decree distinctly. In paragraph 8 it says:

    “As the hypothecation effected in favour of the defendant Co-operative Rural Credit Society was a transaction which took place prior to the sale effected in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to pay to the defendant the amounts etc., due under the decree passed in respect of the said bond and redeem the hypotheca.”

    There is no doubt that if the decree had not ordered the sale of the property the plaintiff would have been the first to rely on such a fact. In this particular case there was no possibility of making the plaintiff a party either to the proceedings before the Registrar or to the execution proceedings because his purchase was subsequent to the award and also to the institution of the execution proceedings. In my opinion the executing Court could not refuse to execute the award nor could it amend it in any way. That is laid down in Ahmad Yar v. Co-operative Credit Society. It is no doubt the decision of a single Judge but with respect I entirely agree with it. It cannot be said that on the face of it the award was passed without jurisdiction. It is just possible that if the plaintiff brought a regular suit to set aside the award on the ground that such an award is not contemplated by R. 14, he might possibly succeed on the legal arguments now addressed to me. But certainly it cannot be said that the award was on its face one passed without jurisdiction. The Court was therefore bound to execute it and a subsequent purchaser had no more rights against the purchaser at the Court sale in execution of the decree than his vendor had. It was the business of the latter to have paid up the decree amount at least before the confirmation of the sale: Har Shankar Prasad Singh v. Shew Gobind Shaw.

    In the result, therefore, the decree of the lower appellate Court is confirmed and the second appeal is dismissed with costs (one set).

    N.R.R Appeal dismissed.

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    Velayuda Mudali v. Co-Operative Rural Credit Society No. A-203 Of No. 55, Ulakottai Village
    (Apr 26, 1933)