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  • Sect. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act,
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Sect. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act,
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion (Krishnan, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

One Rangan Pattar obtained a mortgage decree against the plaintiff. Properties subject to that decree were sold at a Court auction. The present defendant (the purchaser at the auction) was a stranger to the original mortgage suit and to the decree. A sale-certificate was issued to the defendant and he obtained a delivery order; in execution of that order he received possession of plots A, B and C about 11½ years before the events giving rise to the present suit.

The plaintiff's position in the present suit is that only plot C was included in the decree and in the sale certificate and that the defendant was delivered plot C; plots A and B were not included in the decree but were subsequently trespassed upon by the defendant and belong to the plaintiff. The defendant pleaded that all three plots were included in the sale and were properly delivered to him by the Court.

The Lower Courts found that the defendant had been delivered the plaintiff's plots A and B by the Court Amin through mistake arising from erroneous measurements in the mortgage deed, decree, sale-certificate and delivery order; they also found that plots A and B were not truly included in the mortgage deed, decree, sale-certificate or delivery order. Applying Article 144 of the Limitation Act, the Lower Courts held the plaintiff's suit was not barred by limitation and granted a decree for the plots to the plaintiff.

In this Second Appeal the defendant-appellant challenged the suit's maintainability on the ground that Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) applies and bars the plaintiff's suit, his remedy being an application under Section 47 (which was not taken in the Lower Courts). The question of law was allowed to be raised on appeal despite not having been taken earlier.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit for recovery of plots A and B is barred by Section 47, Civil Procedure Code (i.e., whether the dispute is a matter "relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree" such that Section 47 applies).
  2. Whether a stranger purchaser at a Court sale can be treated as the representative of a decree-holder (or of the judgment-debtor) for the purposes of Section 47, and in particular whether the Full Bench decision in Veyindramuthu (Veyindra Muthu) Pillai v. Maya Nadan requires Section 47 to be applied even where the auction purchaser is a stranger to the suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant-Appellant's Arguments (Mr. Menon)

  • The defendant contended that the plaintiff's suit is a claim by the judgment-debtor under a mortgage-decree for recovery of property over-delivered in execution to the Court auction purchaser and therefore falls squarely within Section 47, CPC.
  • He argued that it makes no difference that the purchaser was a stranger to the mortgage suit: the purchaser should be treated as the representative of the decree-holder (or at least Section 47 should apply under the Full Bench ruling in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan).
  • If Section 47 applies, the defendant submitted the suit is barred and must be dismissed; the plaintiff cannot turn the matter into an ordinary suit with any advantage because an application under Section 47 would itself be barred by limitation.

Plaintiff's Case / Respondent Position (as found by the Lower Courts)

  • The plaintiff maintained that only plot C was included in the decree and sale-certificate and that plots A and B were not included and remained the plaintiff's property.
  • The plaintiff alleged that the defendant trespassed upon plots A and B and wrongfully obtained possession of them.
  • The Courts below found the Amin's delivery of plots A and B to the defendant arose from mistakes in the measurements appearing in the mortgage deed, decree, sale-certificate and delivery order; they found plots A and B were not actually included in the decree and were rightly decreed to the plaintiff, and applied Article 144 of the Limitation Act to hold the suit was not barred by limitation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatachalapathy Aiyen v. Perumul Aiyen and Kathirayasami Naicker v. Ramabadra Naidu Authorities in this Court used to support the proposition that the first condition of Section 47 (that the question relate to execution/discharge/satisfaction of a decree) is satisfied. The court treated these authorities as establishing that the present dispute satisfies the first statutory condition (i.e., it relates to execution).
Krishna Bhupati Devu v. Vikrama Devu Adopted by the Officiating Chief Justice in the Full Bench: view that an auction purchaser may represent the judgment-debtor to the extent of property purchased and may represent the decree-holder in respect of the right to bring that property to sale (representative character depends on nature of question). The court recited this view as belonging to one judge of the Full Bench but declined to follow it because the majority of the Full Bench held otherwise; Krishnan, J. follows the majority view of the Full Bench rather than this separate view.
Veyindramuthu (Veyindra Muthu) Pillai v. Maya Nadan Full Bench ruling that Section 47, CPC should be applied even where the auction purchaser is a stranger, where the question raised relates to execution and involves rival rights of the decree-holder and judgment-debtor; extended meaning given to the phrase "arising between the parties." The court treated the Full Bench decision as settling the law on whether a stranger purchaser's involvement takes the dispute out of Section 47; it followed the Full Bench and applied Section 47 to the present case.
Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal (Privy Council) Authority relied upon by the Full Bench to hold that, irrespective of representative character of the auction purchaser, Section 47 applies where the issues relate to execution and involve adverse interests between decree-holder and judgment-debtor. The court cited the Privy Council decision as a foundation for the Full Bench's view that Section 47 applies even if the person raising the issue is not strictly the representative of one of the parties, and adopted that application here.
Gour Mohun Gouli v. Dinonath Karmokar Referenced in the context that a purchaser in the position of the defendant would be treated as representative of the judgment-debtor and thus the dispute would be between a party and his representative. The court used this authority to support the conclusion that, under the majority Full Bench approach, the purchaser is the representative of the judgment-debtor; thus the issue is one between a party and his representative.
Het Ram v. Shadi Ram Authority cited in relation to Section 89, Transfer of Property Act, to demonstrate that on an order absolute for sale the right to redeem and the security are extinguished and thereafter the right is merely to sell (analogy to attachment under a money decree). The court invoked this case to justify treating the rights of a purchaser under a mortgage-decree sale as similar to the rights of a purchaser after attachment under a money decree, supporting parity between mortgage and money-decree purchasers for purposes of Section 47 analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court set out the statutory prerequisites for Section 47, CPC to apply: (1) the question must relate to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree; and (2) it must arise between the parties to the suit or their representatives. The court examined these two conditions against the facts found by the Lower Courts.

On the first condition, the court held (on authorities in the High Court) that the present controversy does relate to execution and thus satisfies the first requirement of Section 47.

The central analytical focus was on the second condition — whether the dispute "arises between the parties" — in light of the purchaser being a stranger to the original mortgage suit. The defendant argued that a stranger purchaser should be regarded as representative of the decree-holder and that, regardless, the Full Bench in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan requires Section 47 to apply.

The court analyzed the Full Bench decision. It noted a divergence within the Full Bench about whether a stranger purchaser could represent the decree-holder: the Officiating Chief Justice (Oldfield, J.) adopted an approach that representation depends on the nature of the question and who the contesting party is (and relied on Krishna Bhupati Devu v. Vikrama Devu). The majority of the Full Bench, however, held that a stranger purchaser is the representative of the judgment-debtor only, and never of the decree-holder. Krishnan, J. accepted the majority view as settling the question.

The court then recounted the Full Bench's further holding — based on the Privy Council decision Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal — that Section 47 must be applied to applications by auction purchasers where the issue relates to execution and involves rival rights of the decree-holder and judgment-debtor, notwithstanding the strict representative status of the auction-purchaser. The Full Bench gave the words "arising between the parties" a broader meaning: the condition is satisfied where the issue is one in which the decree-holder and judgment-debtor have adverse interests, even if the person raising the issue is not the representative of the other party.

Applying that extended meaning to the present facts, the court reasoned that the dispute over which plots the decree covered is a matter in which the rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor must be decided. Although the present suit concerns alleged over-delivery to the purchaser (an issue of property claimed by the plaintiff to have been wrongly delivered), the court concluded that the decree-holder is nevertheless interested in what property the decree purported to cover. The court also emphasized that the mistake in the present case appears in the mortgage deed, the decree, the sale-certificate and the delivery order (i.e., the error existed throughout the execution documentation), and that rectification of such mistakes is appropriately undertaken by the executing Court under Section 47.

The court further observed that the plaintiff's long delay (about 11½ years) contributed to the result (described as laches), implying that the plaintiff's inaction militates against permitting an ordinary suit to decide what the executing Court should have determined.

On this basis, and following the Full Bench's construction and application of Section 47, Krishnan, J. concluded that Section 47, CPC applies to the present controversy and the plaintiff's remedy should have been by an application under Section 47 rather than an ordinary suit.

A concurring note by Sir William Ayling, J. stated that although the Full Bench interpretation arguably extends the applicability of Section 47 beyond the section's narrow wording, he felt bound to follow the Full Bench decision and thus concurred in the order proposed.

Holding and Implications

SECOND APPEAL ALLOWED; SUIT DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The Second Appeal was allowed and the plaintiff's suit for recovery of plots A and B was dismissed.
  • The dismissal was ordered "without costs in any of the Courts" (i.e., no costs awarded to either side in the Courts below or in this appeal).

Broader implications as stated in the opinion:

  • The court explicitly followed the Full Bench's extended construction of Section 47, CPC: where an issue arises that relates to execution and involves rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor, Section 47 applies even if the person raising the question is a stranger purchaser and not strictly the representative of one of the original parties.
  • The decision affirms that mistakes in execution documents (deed, decree, sale-certificate, delivery order) that affect what property was intended to be covered are properly addressed by the executing Court under Section 47 rather than by a separate ordinary suit; delay by the aggrieved party can be fatal (described as laches).
  • The court did not purport to overrule or depart from the Full Bench; rather it accepted and applied the Full Bench and Privy Council authorities cited. The opinion does not state that a new precedent is being created, but it applies and endorses the Full Bench's broader interpretation of Section 47 in the particular factual context of alleged over-delivery at execution sale.

Order: Second Appeal allowed; suit dismissed without costs.

    Jainulabdin v. Krishna Chettiar

    Krishnan, J. — The point taken before us in this Second Appeal for the defendant-appellant is that the plaintiff's suit is barred by Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, his only remedy being an application under that section. It was not taken in the Lower Courts but as it is a question of law arising on the facts found we have allowed it to be raised.

    The facts relevant for the argument are these. One Rangan Pattar obtained a mortgage decree against the plaintiff; the properties were sold in the Court auction and one of the items was purchased by the present defendant who was a stranger to the mortgage suit and to the decree. A sale certificate was issued to him and he obtained a delivery order. In execution of that order he got possession of plots A, B and C. This was about 11½ years ago. It is the plaintiff's case that plot C alone was included in the decree and in the sale certificate, and was delivered to the defendant, and that the defendant subsequently trespassed on the plots A and B, which are the subject matter of the present suit; he now sues to recover them. The defendant pleaded that all the plots were included in the Court sale and in his certificate, and that he got possession of them all properly through Court and that he was entitled to them. The Lower Courts have found that the alleged trespass is untrue and that the plaint plots were delivered to the defendant by the Court Amin. They have however also found that plots A and B were not really included in the mortgage deed, or in the decree, or in the sale certificate, or in the delivery order, which all contained the same description of the property as to boundaries and measurements. The Amin's mistake in delivering them to the defendant arose from a mistake in the measurements in the documents and the plots really belonged to the plaintiff. Applying Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, the Lower Courts held that the plaintiff was not barred by limitation and gave him a decree for the plots.

    Mr. Menon for the defendant-appellant contends that on the finding, this is a claim by the judgment-debtor under a mortgage-decree, for the recovery of property over-delivered, in execution, to the Court auction purchaser, and as such, this is a case to which Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code applies, even though the purchaser was a stranger to the mortgage suit. He urges that the present suit is thus barred by that section and should have been dismissed. If the section applies there can be no doubt that the plaintiff's claim must fail whatever the merits may be, for the suit cannot be treated as an application under the section, Cl. (2), with any advantage, as it will then have to be dismissed in limine, as barred by limitation.

    To make Sect. 47 applicable, it is clear from its language that two conditions are necessary to be fulfilled. The question raised must be one relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree, and it must also be one arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives. On the authorities in this Court, the first condition must be held to be satisfied in this case. See Venkatachalapathy Aiyen v. Perumul Aiyen and Kathirayasami Naicker v. Ramabadra Naidu. In the latter case, the second condition was also fulfilled as the parties to the application for redelivery were the judgment-debtor on one side, and the decree-holder purchaser on the other. In the present case, we have a stranger purchaser. Mr. Menon contends that this will make no difference, that the stranger purchaser should be looked upon as the representative of the decree holder in this matter and that whether he be such representative or not, the case falls under Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code under the recent ruling of the Full Bench in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan. In the Full Bench case the question arose in three appeals, two being between one V. Pillai, a stranger purchaser in execution of a money decree on one side, and one Maya Nadan the decree-holder purchaser of some of the items under the mortgage decree on the other side and the third appeal being one between the same V. Pillai and one Subbaya Nadan, a stranger purchaser of other items, in execution of the same mortgage decree. On the question of the representative character of these stranger purchasers there was a difference of opinion between the members of the Bench. The learned Officiating Chief Justice was of opinion that the question whether such a purchaser was the representative of the judgment-debtor, or of the decree-holder depended on the nature of the question raised and on who the contesting party was. See page 124. He adopted the view stated in Krishna Bhupati Devu v. Vikrama Devu(4) that such a purchaser represented the judgment-debtor to the extent of the property purchased, and the decree-holder, so far his right to bring to sale such property in execution of the decree was concerned. So that, according to his view the purchaser in asking for delivery of possession, or in resisting redelivery, would be a representative of the decree-holder. His view on this point was, however, not adopted by the majority, who held that such a purchaser was the representative of the judgment-debtor only, and never of the decree-holder. I must follow the view of the majority on this point, whatever my own view may be. There was a considerable conflict of opinion on the point in this High Court previously, and it was to settle the question that the reference was made, and we must take the Full Bench decision as settling it. I am net therefore referring to the previous authorities.

    On the first part of his contention, Mr. Menon cannot therefore succeed, as on the view above stated, his client will be a representative of the plaintiff, judgment-debtor, and the question here will thus be one between a party and his own representative. See Gour Mohun Gouli v. Dinonath Karmokar. It is how ever suggested by him, that the Full Bench did not consider the question of the representative character of the mortgage-decree-purchaser, which is the point before us, but confined itself to that of the money-decree-purchaser, and that there is a difference between the two kinds of purchasers in the matter. The last question referred to the Full Bench specifically raises the question as to the mortgagee-decree-purchaser. See p. 113, and though Oldfield, J. has not answered the question, the other judges have dealt with it and have made no distinction between the two. Taking the view of the Full Bench, regarding the money-decree-purchaser. I think no proper distinction can be made on the point between him and the mortgage-decree-purchaser. Sect. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, under which the order absolute for sale was made in the present case, declares that, on such an order being made, the right to redeem and the security shall both be extinguished. Thereafter, there is only a right to sell the property, just as there is after attachment under a money decree. See Het Ram v. Shadi Ram, and the rights flowing from the purchaser are the same. The fact that as a matter of equity, the purchaser under a mortgage decree is allowed under certain circumstances to plead the mortgagee's right in the property purchased as a sheild has no bearing on this question.

    The Full Bench however went further and held on the authority of the Privy Council decision in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal, that irrespective of any question of the representative character of the auction purchaser applicant, Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, should be applied to his case, where the question raised is one relating to execution and is one in which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor are adversely interested. Seshagiri Aiyar, J., puts it thus: “What the Courts have to see is whether issues arising for decision relate (a) to execution, (b) to deciding rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor in the subject matter. If those conditions are satisfied, the fact that others are interested in the result of the decision should not affect the jurisdiction and competency of the executing Court to deal with the matter.” On this point, the Full Bench were unanimous, and it was, I think, on the application of this view that the case between the stranger money decree purchaser, V. Pillai, and the stranger mortgage decree purchaser, Subbaya Nadan, was held to fall under Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code, the question for delivery of property purchased in Court sale being evidently held to be one, relating to execution and one in which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor are adversely interested. It is statedly on this view that Oldfield, J., thought it unnecessary to answer the last question referred to the Full Bench. This is made further clear by the subsequent judgment of the referring Judges reported in Veyindra Muthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan. They applied Sect. 47 to all the three cases. Except on this view, Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, could not well have been applied, in Subbayya Nadan's case, as he would be the representative, only of the judgment-debtor, V. Pillai, the other party to that application. I am unable to accept the suggestion that Sect. 47 was applied to that case by over-sight. The Full Bench as I understand them hold that the condition in Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code that the question should be one “arising between the parties” is satisfied by the question being one of a nature in which the parties to the suit are adversely interested, though the person actually raising it in any particular case against one party may not be the representative of the other party. In fact they gave an extended meaning to these words.

    Applying this view to the present case, we have to see whether the question raised here is one in which the rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor have to be decided. In the Full Bench case, the application was for delivery of properties included in the decree and purchased in Court sale. That question was treated as falling within Sect. 47, even where the purchaser was a stranger. The present case no doubt refers to property claimed by one side to be included in the decree and denied by the other side to be so included and found by the Court to be not so included. Does that make a difference? I was at first inclined to think that it did and that the decree-holder was not interested in the present controversy, as it refers to property over-delivered to the purchaser. But on further consideration, I have come to the conclusion that it is not correct. If the decree-holder can be held to be interested in the delivery of the property included in the decree to the purchaser, as was done by the Full Bench, I think we must hold consistently with that view that he is also interested in the question as to what properties that decree covered. The mistake in the boundaries in the present case is not merely in the delivery order but also in the mortgage deed and in the decree and in the sale-certificate, and if the decree, or the sale certificate had been asked to be rectified on the point, the question would clearly have arisen between the parties to the suit. The fact that it is now raised against the purchaser should not make any difference as to whether it is to be done in execution or not. It is clearly appropriate that these mistakes in execution proceedings should be rectified by the executing Court itself, and we should not put too narrow a construction on Sect. 47 and drive parties to suits for the purpose. If plaintiff in the present suit loses his property on this view, it is only due to his own laches, in delaying for so many years.

    I would therefore hold Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, applies to the present case, a as the result, I will allow the Second Appeal and dismiss the suit, but, in the circumstances, without costs in any of the Courts.

    Sir William Ayling, J.—I am not prepared to dissent from my learned brother's view of the meaning of the Full Bench judgments in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Mayanadan and although they seem to me to extend the applicability of Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, to a decree hardly suggested by the wording of the section I feel bound to follow them.

    I concur in the order proposed.

    S. S.Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Jainulabdin v. Krishna Chettiar
    (Feb 15, 1921)