Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The lower Courts found that the plaintiff is successor in title to P. Subba Naicka and C. Subba Naicka (the Subba Naick brothers), who had purchased the suit properties from Ayarappa Naick in 1900 (Ex. A). The defendants are in possession as successors in title of Manickam Chetty, who had possession as mortgagee under a deed dated 31st August, 1900 (Ex. B). Ayarappa had earlier executed a simple mortgage of a group of properties on 20th February, 1898 (Ex. XVIII). The mortgagee under Ex. XVIII had caused the mortgaged properties to be put up for Court sale; on 20th July, 1904 Ayarappa purported to sell certain properties to Manickam Chetty by Ex. XV and on that date Manickam paid Rs. 716-1-10 into Court to avoid a Court sale (payment said to relate to Ex. XVIII). Manickam later sold his rights (including under Ex. B and Ex. XV) on 7th October, 1918, and the defendants derive possession from purchasers under him.

At earlier stages the courts held the plaintiff to be owner of the equity of redemption and found the defendants to be entitled only to the usufructuary mortgage right of Rs. 500 under Ex. B — a right the plaintiff could redeem. The lower Courts had decreed unconditional possession to the plaintiff; the appellate court found that decree must be set aside because the plaintiff was entitled to possession only upon redeeming the mortgage. The respondent-plaintiff sought conversion of the decree to one for redemption; the defendants claimed entitlement to repayment (by way of contribution/subrogation) of sums paid to avoid the Court sale (Ex. XVIII) and sought to retain possession until such amounts were paid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Did Manickam Chetty pay any amount, and if so what amount, to avoid a Court sale of the properties covered by Ex. XVIII?
  2. Are the defendants entitled to payment of any or what amount on that account before giving up possession (i.e., can they insist on repayment as a condition of surrendering possession)?
  3. Whether a person in possession under a subsequent mortgage (here Ex. B) can use a right of contribution or subrogation (arising from payment of a prior mortgage debt) as a shield to retain possession until the contribution is paid?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The defendants asserted that they (in the right of Manickam Chetty) are purchasers from the mortgagee and that Manickam had paid sums (notably Rs. 716-1-10) to avoid a Court sale under Ex. XVIII; they claimed they should be repaid such amounts if redemption is to be effected.
  • The appellants contended that if the plaintiff seeks redemption, the defendants would be entitled to repayment of the amount paid under Ex. XVIII, and that they could therefore retain possession (i.e., use that entitlement as a shield) until they were paid that amount (the appellants argued the right to contribution should protect their possession).

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments

  • The plaintiff sought a decree for redemption (as had been granted by the District Munsif), offering redemption of the mortgage under Ex. B; the plaintiff did not accept that the defendants could use any right of contribution as a ground to refuse to surrender possession when redemption was effected.
  • Implicit in the proceedings is the plaintiff's position that any contribution liability should be limited to the proper share attributable to the suit property and should not operate as a continuing shield to possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kotappa v. Raghavayya (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 626 : 52 M.L.J. 532 The decision that the right to sue for a subrogated mortgage (which the subrogee has paid) arises on the date of the original mortgage. The court held itself bound by this authority and relied on it to reject the appellants' contention that a subrogee may use payment of the prior mortgage as a shield to retain possession under a different mortgage; the court treated Kotappa as an express authority against the appellants.
Sukhi v. Ghulam Safdar Khan (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 465 : I.L.R. 43 All. 469 : 42 M.L.J. 15 (P.C.) The Privy Council principle that an owner in the right of a first mortgagee (or of the original mortgagor as acquired at a sale under the first mortgage) is entitled, in a suit by a subsequent mortgagee, to set up the first mortgage as a shield when possession was obtained by sale under the first mortgage. The court cited this decision to explain the confined scope of the "shield" principle — applicable where possession was obtained by or in consequence of a sale under the prior mortgage — and contrasted those facts with the present case where there was no such sale under Ex. XVIII.
Chinnaswami v. Darmalinga (1932) I.L.R. 56 Mad. 115 at 131 : 63 M.L.J. 394 Relied on Sukhi v. Ghulam Safdar Khan (i.e., supports the shield principle in appropriate circumstances). The court cited it as an instance where Sukhi was relied upon; used to illustrate the limited application of the shield principle.
Adams v. Angell (1877) 5 Ch. D. 634 Example of a case involving sale by a trustee in bankruptcy of the mortgagor to the first mortgagee of the equity of redemption (contextual comparison). Referred to as a comparable authority illustrating situations in which purchaser-at-sale rights may operate to protect possession; cited for contrast with present facts.
Mirza Yadalli Beg v. Tukaram (1920) L.R. 47 I.A. 207 : I.L.R. 48 Cal. 22 : 39 M.L.J. 147 (P.C.) Case of sale to the first mortgagee of mortgaged property in pursuance of a compromise decree on the first mortgage (contextual comparison regarding shield principle). Used to illustrate situations where the shield principle applied because possession flowed from a sale under the first mortgage; contrasted with present facts.
Venkataramana Reddi v. Rangiah Chetti (1920) 41 M.L.J. 399 Relied upon by appellants; involved use of priority of mortgages as shield in limited circumstances similar to Sukhi. The court observed that this authority does not extend the shield principle beyond the scope established by Sukhi and related authorities and therefore did not assist the appellants.
Rangappa Kondappa v. Vithu Krishnaji (1913) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 652 Referenced by the appellants (contextual relevance to competing mortgage rights). Cited by appellants but the opinion does not record any specific rule from it beyond the fact of reliance; the court did not treat it as altering the analysis founded on Kotappa and Sukhi.
Jokhu Bhunja v. Sitla Baksh Singh (1929) I.L.R. 52 All. 539 Case in which there was an express stipulation that a simple mortgage amount be added to the amount due under a usufructuary mortgage before redeeming it (distinguishing factual stipulation). The court noted that the Allahabad case involved an express stipulation; used to distinguish facts where a contractual term required payment of other sums before redemption, which is different from the present facts.
Transfer of Property Act (rule cited) Rule in the Transfer of Property Act by which tacking is abolished (statutory principle limiting tacking of mortgages). The court invoked this statutory rule to caution against treating mortgages as tacked rights requiring payment of all earlier simple mortgages when redeeming a later usufructuary mortgage, unless there is an agreement to that effect.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the questions in two distinct strands: (A) the nature and effect of the payment of Rs. 716-1-10 by Manickam Chetty in 1904, and (B) whether the defendants can use any resultant right of contribution/subrogation as a shield to retain possession under Ex. B.

On the first strand (contribution/subrogation): the court accepted the subordinate Judge's finding (not seriously contested) that Manickam Chetty paid Rs. 716-1-10 on 27 July 1904 into Court to avoid a Court sale on the mortgage Ex. XVIII. The court reasoned that Manickam's payment was effectively made in his capacity as purchaser of other properties from Ayarappa (pursuant to Ex. XV) and not in his capacity as mortgagee of the suit properties under Ex. B. Even if it were treated as a payment under Ex. B (contrary to the facts), the rights arising could be no greater than if the mortgagors themselves (P. Subba Naicka and C. Subba Naicka) had paid the debt — i.e., the payment was made by a purchaser of part of the mortgaged properties. Therefore any contribution obligation of the plaintiff is limited to the proportionate share that the suit property bears to the rest of the properties comprised in Ex. XVIII. The appellants' advocate conceded that the plaintiff's contribution liability, if any, should be Rs. 100 in the circumstances agreed before the court.

On the second strand (use of contribution as a shield to possession): the court examined whether the defendants could refuse to surrender possession under Ex. B until they were paid that contribution (Rs. 100). The court noted that a fresh suit for contribution would be time-barred in any event, but the appellants argued that possession under Ex. B permitted them to use their contribution right as a shield. The court held that it was bound by Kotappa v. Raghavayya that the right to sue for a subrogated mortgage arises on the date of the original mortgage, and therefore rejected the proposition that such a right could be used to justify continuing possession under a different mortgage. The court further clarified the limited scope of the "shield" principle: it applies where possession has been obtained by or in consequence of a sale under a prior mortgage (or an equivalent situation where the defendant's possession stems from enforcement of that prior mortgage), enabling the person in possession to claim to be “put back into the situation” when they were originally put into possession (i.e., paid their debt). The present case involved no sale under Ex. XVIII nor possession by a purchaser under it; the defendants' possession rests on Ex. B (a usufructuary mortgage). Thus the defendants cannot use a claim for contribution (which, in any event, would be limited to Rs. 100) as a shield to retain possession. The opinion distinguished authorities relied on by the appellants (such as Venkataramana Reddi and Rangappa Kondappa) as not extending the shield principle beyond the established cases (Sukhi and related Privy Council authorities) and noted that contractual stipulations (as in Jokhu Bhunja) could alter the outcome in other factual contexts.

Based on these analyses, the court concluded the appellants' contention to retain possession until payment of Rs. 100 more (in addition to the mortgage amount under Ex. B) was unfounded.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the lower Court's decree for unconditional possession and, in modification of that decree, made a preliminary decree for redemption on payment of Rs. 500. In other words, the plaintiff is to be given redemption rights on payment of Rs. 500 to satisfy the mortgage rights under Ex. B.

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties is that the plaintiff cannot obtain unconditional possession without redeeming the mortgage; instead the plaintiff must pay Rs. 500 as a condition for redemption and possession.
  • The defendants are not entitled to retain possession by asserting a right of contribution (in respect of the Rs. 716-1-10 payment) as a shield; any contribution liability by the plaintiff was limited to the proportionate share (agreed at Rs. 100 if relevant) and cannot be used to prevent redemption.
  • The decision proceeds by applying existing authorities (notably Kotappa v. Raghavayya and the Privy Council authorities such as Sukhi v. Ghulam Safdar Khan) to the facts; the opinion applies established principles rather than announcing a novel legal rule.

    Draviam Chettiar And Another . v. Ramaiya Chettiar .

    1. The lower Courts have found that the plaintiff is successor in title to Subba Naick brothers who bought the property from Ayyarappa Naick, the former owner, in 1900 under Ex. A and that the defendants are in possession as successors in title of Manickam Chetty, the mortgagee with possession from Subba Naicks under Ex. B of 1900. It has also been found that the plea of adverse possession raised by defendants is not sustainable as Manickam Chetty was in possession as mortgagee till 1918 and after the sale deed by him of that year only 8 years had elapsed before the suit. In view of these findings the plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property but was bound to redeem the mortgage.

    2. The learned Judge's decree for unconditional possession has therefore to be set aside. The respondent-plaintiff asks that he may be given what the District Munsif gave him, a decree for redemption. Although there may have been a formal objection against converting a suit in ejectment to one for redemption if the defendants had been admittedly holding as mortgagee's, yet as the defendants were claiming as purchasers of an absolute interest from a mortgagee the District Munsif gave a decree if the plaint had contained an offer to redeem. The appellants (defendants) submit that in case of redemption they would be entitled to repayment of the amount of a previous hypothecation deed of 1889 Ex. XV111 which Manickam Chetty paid to set aside the Court sale of the property in execution of a decree on that hypothecation. As this point was not taken in the lower Courts whether the appellants are entitled to any such sum and if so how much, will have to be determined after further enquiry. The best course is therefore to remit the following issues, i.e. (1) Did Manickam Chetty pay any and what amount to avoid a Court sale of the property on Ex. XVIII?

    (2) Are the defendants entitled to payment of any or what amount on that account before giving up possession?

    8. On the first issue he finds that Manickam Chetty paid Rs. 716-1-10 on 27th July, 1904 into Court to avoid a Court sale to the suit properties and other properties, covered by Ex. XVIII the mortgage, dated 20th February, 1898, and that the payment was made in pursuance of his purchase Ex. XV, dated 20th July, 1904 for Rs. 1,000 of the suit properties and other properties comprised in that sale deed. I accept this finding which is not seriously objected to.

    9. On the second issue whether the defendants are entitled to payment of any and what amount on the above account before giving up possession, the Subordinate Judge has held relying on Kotappa v. Raghavayya (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 626 : 52 M.L.J. 532 that the defendants are not entitled to payment of any amount on account of that payment.

    10. The defendants-appellants object to this finding.

    11. The suit properties are 5 and odd-acres of land in Adangal Nos. 451 and 452 in Soorangudi Village. These and 29 other properties belonged to Ayarappa Naick who executed a simple mortgage of them on 20th February, 1898 (Ex. XVIII). On 31st August, 1900, by Ex. A he sold the suit properties and 14 others to P. Subba Naicka and C. Subba Naicka who on the same day by Ex. B mortgaged with possession the suit properties to Manickam Chetty. The mortgagee under Ex. XVIII having sued and brought the properties to sale, on 20th July, 1904, by Ex. XV Ayarappa purported to sell the suit properties and 9 other properties to Manickam Chetty for Rs. 1,000 to pay off the mortgage of 1898 and Manickam on the same date paid Rs. 716-1-10 to avoid the Court sale of those properties. On 2nd October, 1906, P. Subba Naicka and C. Subba Naick by Ex. D sold the suit properties to one Perumal. The plaintiff has acquired the rights of Perumal over the suit property on the latter's insolvency through steps it is not necessary to mention.

    12. On 7th October, 1918, Manickam Chetty sold his rights under Ex. B, and Ex. XV to one Reddy from whom by family partition and sale from one of the sharers the defendants have got possession of the suit property.

    13. It has been held at the previous stages of this case that the plaintiff is the owner of the equity of redemption in pursuance of the sales A and D and the further devolution of that right and that the defendants in the right of Manickam Chetty are entitled to the usufructuary mortgage right of Rs. 500 under Ex. B, which the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem.

    14. The further question now left is whether Manickam Chetty having in pursuance of the sale deed Ex. XV for other properties (because his vendor had at that time no interest in the suit properties as they had been already sold under A) paid the debt under Ex. XVIII to save the mortgaged properties from Court sale, the defendants can in Manickam's right claim from plaintiff payment of the whole or any portion of Rs. 716 and odd and if so whether they can in this suit to redeem Ex. B, retain possession till the amount paid to satisfy the debt under Ex. XVIII is also paid.

    15. The above two questions are distinct and must be dealt with separately. The first question is one of contribution and of subrogation which depends on intention to be inferred from the facts. Ayarappa the owner of the suit properties and 29 others having jointly mortgaged them under Ex. XVIII and having then sold the suit properties with 14 others out of the above 29 to P. Subba Naicken and C. Subba Naicken who mortgaged suit properties to Manickam, and Manickam having under Ex. XV subsequently bought from the mortgagor Ayarappa under Ex. XV, 9 other properties included in Ex. XVIII (along with the suit properties over which his vendor had no title) and out of the purchase money paid off the mortgage Ex. XVIII. Manickam's payment of Ex. XVIII was really made as owner of the properties he bought from Ayarappa and not as mortgagee of the suit properties from P. Subba Naicken and C. Subba Naicken. Even if we regard his payment as made under the mortgage Ex. B, which is contrary to the fact, still the rights arising therefrom cannot be greater than if his mortgagors P. Subba Naicken and C. Subba Naicken had themselves paid the debt under Ex. XVIII in which case also the payment will be regarded as made by the purchasers of 14 of the properties mortgaged under Ex. XVIII. In either view the debt under Ex. XVIII was paid off by a purchaser of part of the mortgaged properties. In either case the plaintiff as owner of suit properties can only be asked to contribute the share of Rs. 716-1-10 which the value of the suit property bears to that of the rest of the properties mortgaged under Ex. XVIII. This was admitted by the appellants' Advocate.

    16. Though there was no discussion of the above facts in the Court below where the Judge dealt with the issue as a pure question of law, it was agreed before me that if the plaintiff is entitled to contribution and resist redemption till the amount is paid, the sum payable to plaintiff on this head should be Rs. 100.

    17. But the question remains whether the defendants can use this right of contribution to Ex. XVIII as a shield and refuse to give up possession till they are paid Rs. 100 in addition to the mortgage money under Ex. B.

    18. If the defendants had to bring a suit for contribution on the mortgage Ex. XVIII, apparently it was barred long before 1926 when this suit was brought, whether the cause of action arose on the date of the mortgage of 1898or on the date of payment of the decree on it in 1904. But the appellant argues that he is in possession under Ex. B, and is a defendant and is entitled to use his right to the amount of Rs. 100 as a shield to protect his possession. In other words the fact that a new suit for contribution under Ex. XVIII would be barred is no answer to his right to remain in possession so long as he is not paid that amount also. Kotappa v. Raghavayya (1926) I.L.R. 50 Mad. 626 : 52 M.L.J. 532 is an express authority against the appellant on the point that the right to sue for a sub-rogated mortgage which the subrogee has paid arises on the date of the original mortgage. As I am bound by this decision I am not competent to consider whether this view is right. It would seem by implication to be an authority also on the point that on facts like the present, the subrogee cannot use such payment as a shield to protect his possession under another mortgage and insist on keeping it till he is paid the subrogated amount also. This last point was not raised or considered in that case. But if it were a good ground, it would probably have been. However that may be as pointed out for the respondent (plaintiff) the principle of using a mortgage debt as a shield for possession is confined to possession obtained by Court sale or otherwise in satisfaction of that debt in which case the defendant before he is deprived of his possession can claim to be put back into the situation when he was put into possession, i.e., when he was entitled to be paid his debt. As the Privy Council put it, the owner of property who is in the right of a first mortgagee and of the original mortgagor as acquired at a sale under the first mortgage is entitled at a suit of a subsequent mortgagee who is not bound by the sale or the decree on which it proceeded to set up the first mortgage as a shield Sukhi v. Ghulam Safdar Khan (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 465 : I.L.R. 43 All. 469 : 42 M.L.J. 15 (P.C.) relied on in Chinnaswami v. Darmalinga (1932) I.L.R. 56 Mad. 115 at 131 : 63 M.L.J. 394 and Compare, Adams v. Angell (1877) 5 Ch. D. 634 a case of sale by the trustee in Bankruptcy of the mortgagor to the first mortgagee of the equity of redemption on the mortgaged property; and Mirza Yadalli Beg v. Tukaram (1920) L.R. 47 I.A. 207 : I.L.R. 48 Cal. 22 : 39 M.L.J. 147 (P.C.) a case of sale to the first mortgagee of mortgaged property in pursuance of a compromise decree on the first mortgage to which the second mortgagee was not a party. Here there has been no sale on the first mortgage Ex. XVIII, nor possession by any purchaser under it which is endangered at the suit of a subsequent mortgagee. The only possession of the defendant is under the mortgage Ex. B, sought to be redeemed and the defendant is proposing to use the first mortgage contribution to which he may have been entitled had he enforced it in proper time not as a shield to protect his own possession obtained in lieu thereof but as sword against the owner's independent equity of redemption. The appellants relied on Venkataramana Reddi v. Rangiah Chetii (1920) 41 M.L.J. 399 as in their favour. But it does not carry the principle of shield any further than the above authorities. On the facts which are rather complicated being disentangled, it will be found that all that was held was that the purchaser at a Court sale on a third mortgage who had been, put in possession and the 25th defendant appellant claiming under him as a mortgagee, could use as a shield to protect his-possession the priority of the third mortgage over the fourth mortgage rights of the plaintiff who had not been impleaded in the third mortgagee's suit though a fresh suit on the third mortgage would have been time barred on the date when the subsequent question arose. This is the same but no more than the principle enunciated in Sukhi v. Ghulam Safdar Khan (1921) L.R. 48 I.A. 465 : I.L.R. 43 All. 469 : 42 M.L.J. 15 (P.C.) and is of no assistance to the appellant. The appellant also relied on. Rangappa Kondappa v. Vithu Krishnaji (1913) I.L.R. 47 Bom. 652 and Jokhu Bhunja v. Sitla Baksh Singh (1929) I.L.R. 52 All. 539. In the latter case there was an express stipulation that a simple mortgage amount was to be added to the amount due under a usufructuary mortgage before redeeming it. In the former case there were four mortgages the first three of which were simple and the last usufructuary. It was held that the mortgagor could not redeem the usufructuary mortgage without paying off the amount of the simple mortgages. It does not appear whether there was a stipulation similar to the one in the Allahabad case. The Chief Justice said

    "If this decision were to stand (permitting redemption on payment of the usufructuary mortgage alone) it would follow-that the mortgagee in possession though he could not sue for the mortgage debt would still be liable to be redeemed without receiving any of the mortgage money."
    If by this is meant that where there are several mortgages to the same person of the same property, one of which is usufructuary the mortgagor seeking to redeem the usufructuary mortgage must redeem the simple mortgages also, then it is clearly against the Madras case and the rule in the Transfer of Property Act by which tacking is abolished. But the report is silent as to the stipulation in the mortgage deeds and I am inclined to think that there was some agreement binding the mortgagor to pay off all the mortgages before demanding back possession.

    19. The appellant's contention about retaining possession till he is paid Rs. 100 more is thus unfounded. In the result in modification of the decree of the lower Court there must be a preliminary decree for redemption on payment of Rs. 500.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Draviam Chettiar And Another . v. Ramaiya Chettiar .
    (Mar 20, 1934)