AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Act VI of 1913("Mussalman 'Wakf Validating Act")
  • Act VI of 1913 by Section 3
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Act VI of 1913("Mussalman 'Wakf Validating Act")
  • Act VI of 1913 by Section 3
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The central question before the Lower Courts and on this Second Appeal was whether two documents (referred to as Exhibits A and B) created a valid wakf. At trial the District Munsif held that the dedication evidenced by Exs. A and B — namely, of properties whose income was to be devoted to reading the Koran at a private tomb — was invalid under Muhammadan law, relying on the decision in Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib. The Subordinate Judge reached a contrary view, relying on the opinion of Mr. Ameer Ali and on Mazhar Husain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan (where Banerji, J. expressed a favorable view). The appeal came on for further consideration, and the appellate court examined prior authorities (including conflicting statements within them), statutory provisions (Act VI of 1913, the Mussalman "Wakf" Validating Act), and the nature of the objects of the dedication (reading the Koran over a private tomb, specifically the tomb of a person described as a Thangal, i.e., a descendant of the Prophet) to determine whether the dedication created a valid wakf.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the two documents (Exs. A and B), which dedicate property for the purpose of reading the Koran over a private tomb, constitute a valid wakf under Muhammadan law.
  2. Whether Act VI of 1913 (the Mussalman "Wakf" Validating Act), particularly Section 3 and its proviso, effected a change in the law such that a wakf need only be "religious and pious" (and not also charitable) to be valid.
  3. Whether the fact that the tomb over which the Koran was to be read was that of a Thangal (a descendant of the Prophet) distinguishes the case and affects the validity of the wakf.

Arguments of the Parties

Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon)

  • Argued that Act VI of 1913, by Section 3 and the proviso, altered the law so that a wakf would be valid if it is religious and pious even if not strictly charitable; the words "or charitable" in the proviso were said to permit a wakf to be religious/pious without a charitable element.

The opinion records the Subordinate Judge's reliance on Ameer Ali's commentary and on Mazhar Husain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan as supporting the validity of fateha expenses, but it does not present a detailed adversarial set of written submissions from both parties beyond the contention recorded above. The opinion therefore contains only limited detail of the parties' arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 201 : 5 M.L.J. 40 Held that dedication for performance of fateha ceremonies (and similar purposes) was not a valid wakf under Muhammadan law; used by the District Munsif as authority to declare Exs. A and B invalid. The court observed that this decision (which included fateha ceremonies among invalid objects) had been followed by the District Munsif, but also noted that subsequent authorities and statutory developments meant Kaleloola could no longer be treated as controlling in all respects (specifically because later decisions and Act VI of 1913 changed the legal landscape). Nevertheless the court distinguished the present dedication from other cases and ultimately upheld the District Munsif's conclusion on different reasoning.
Mazhar Husain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan (1911) I.L.R. 33 All. 400 Contains an opinion (Banerji, J.) holding that fateha expenses are a valid object of wakf; but the Bench included Stanley, C.J., who expressed an opposite view in the course of the same judgment. The court criticized the Subordinate Judge for relying on Banerji, J.'s view while omitting Stanley, C.J.'s contrary statement that fateha expenses and salaries for Quran readers are not proper objects. The court relied on the full context of Mazhar (including Stanley, C.J.'s view) in assessing the validity of the dedication in the present case.
Fakhr-ud-din Shah v. Kifayat-ul-lah (1910) 7 A.L.J. 1095 Referenced in support of Stanley, C.J.'s view in Mazhar that fateha expenses and similar payments are not proper objects of wakf (Karamat Hussain, J.'s view was cited). The court noted that Stanley, C.J. referred to Karamat Hussain, J.'s view in Fakhr-ud-din Shah v. Kifayat-ul-lah and that these views strengthened the conclusion that fateha expenses may not be proper wakf objects; the court relied on Stanley's reasoning as part of its analysis.
Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim (1900) L.R. 28 I.A. 15 : I.L.R. 23 All. 233 : 11 M.L.J. 58 (P.C.) Lord Robertson's test: a deed is a valid deed of wakf if its effect is to give the property in substance to charitable uses; it is not valid if its effect is to give the property in substance to the testator's family. The court applied Lord Robertson's test to the present case and concluded that the dedication (limited to reading the Koran over a tomb, with no distribution of alms or other charitable benefits) was not, in substance, a dedication to charitable uses and therefore was invalid as a wakf.
Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) L.R. 44 I.A. 21 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 116 : 32 M.L.J. 101 (P.C.) Clarified that, prior to Act VI of 1913, the test was whether the effect of a deed was to give property substantially to charitable uses (valid) or substantially to the settlor's family (invalid). It also explained the effect of Act VI of 1913 in validating certain family-support wakfs, and classified charitable objects in a particular case (including fateha with distribution of food/alms). The court relied on Ramanandan to explain that Kaleloola was no longer wholly good law where it conflicted with the test recognized by the Privy Council; but the court emphasized a crucial distinction — in Ramanandan and similar cases fateha expenditures were accompanied by distributive charitable acts (food, alms), whereas the present dedication provided only for reciting the Koran over a tomb. Applying Ramanandan and the established test, the court found the present dedication not to be charitable in substance and therefore invalid.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a structured analysis, grounded in authorities and the statutory context set out in the record:

  1. It identified the precise question before the Lower Courts and the inconsistency in their decisions: the District Munsif held the dedication invalid relying on Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib; the Subordinate Judge took a different view relying upon Ameer Ali's commentary and Banerji, J.'s opinion in Mazhar Husain Khan.
  2. The court examined the full context of the authorities relied on by the Subordinate Judge and observed that the Subordinate Judge omitted Stanley, C.J.'s contrary observations in Mazhar Husain Khan (where Stanley C.J. expressly doubted that fateha expenses and salaries of Quran readers are proper wakf objects). The appellate court considered Stanley, C.J.'s view significant and criticized the omission.
  3. The court then turned to the larger doctrinal test set out by Lord Robertson in Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim: a deed of wakf is valid if, in substance, it gives property to charitable uses; it is invalid if it gives property in substance to the settlor's family. The court treated this test as authoritative and applicable to the present controversy.
  4. The court considered the effect of Act VI of 1913 (the Mussalman "Wakf" Validating Act), noting that the Act validated wakfs for family maintenance in certain terms. It concluded that the Act did not eliminate the need for a charitable element in religious wakfs nor did the proviso convert "charitable" into an alternative to "religious" and "pious." The court held that the Act's object was to remove doubts about family-support wakfs but did not alter the longstanding requirement that charitable purposes remain central to assessing validity.
  5. The court applied the Lord Robertson test and the reasoning in Ramanandan Chettiar to the facts: the dedication in Exs. A and B provided only for reading the Koran over a private tomb and did not include distributions of food, alms, or other charitable benefits that would make the dedication charitable in substance. By contrast, cases upholding fateha-related provisions involved fateha combined with distributive charitable acts.
  6. The court rejected the suggestion that the tomb being that of a Thangal (a descendant of the Prophet) made any legal difference: there was no evidence that reciting the Koran over a Thangal's tomb is different in law from reciting it over any other Mussalman's tomb, and thus the claimed distinction could not be relied upon.
  7. Having examined authority, statutory context and the substance of the dedication, the court concluded that the dedication at issue was not, in substance, a gift to charitable uses and therefore did not create a valid wakf.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Second Appeal allowed; the order of the District Munsif is restored.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The court restored the District Munsif's finding that the dedication evidenced by Exs. A and B did not create a valid wakf because the dedication was limited to reading the Koran over a private tomb and did not constitute a dedication to charitable uses in substance.
  • The Second Appeal was allowed with costs both in the present court and in the lower Appellate Court, as ordered by the court.
  • The court reaffirmed and applied the established test (articulated by Lord Robertson and applied in Ramanandan Chettiar) that the validity of a wakf depends on whether the effect of the deed is to give property in substance to charitable uses; mere religious or pious acts unaccompanied by charitable distributions do not, by themselves, make a wakf valid.
  • The court rejected the contention that Act VI of 1913 altered this requirement by allowing purely religious and pious purposes (without charitable substance) to be valid; instead, it treated the Act as validating certain family-support wakfs but not as displacing the importance of charitable purposes in the assessment of a wakf's validity.
  • No broader or novel legal principle was announced beyond the court's application and reaffirmation of existing authorities and distinctions; the decision operates to dispose of the appeal and to restore the District Munsif's order in the particular factual context before the court.

    C. Kunhamutty . v. Thondikkodan Ahmad Mudaliar And Others

    1. The question in both the Lower Courts was whether two documents (Exs. A and B) created a valid wakf. The trial Judge (the District Munsif) held on the authority of Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 201 : M.L.J. 40 by which case he felt himself bound, that the dedication which Exs. A and B evidence, namely, of properties the income of which is to be devoted to reading the Koran at a private tomb is invalid under the Muhammadan Law; and unless it had been shown that the decision referred to above had been expressly or impliedly overruled or dissented from in later decisions of the Madras High Court, the learned District Munsif was perfectly correct in accepting that position as he states that his attention was not drawn to any such decision. The learned Subordinate Judge, however, has relied upon the opinion expressed by Mr. Ameer Ali in his work on Muhammadan Law, Vol. I, page 351, where the correctness of Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib (1984) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 201 : 5 M.L.J. 40 is questioned. He has also referred to Mazhar Husain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan (1911) I.L.R. 33 All. 400 and the opinion there stated (at page 412) of Banerji, J., where in dealing with Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib (1894) I.L.R. 18 M.L.J. 201 : 5 M.L.J. 40 he states:

    No authority was referred to by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court for holding a contrary opinion, and I see no reason to accept it. I hold that fateha expenses are a valid object of waqf.

    2. This, it seems to us, is a most unfortunate reference since the learned Subordinate Judge omits to observe that Stanley, C.J., who with Banerji, J., formed the Bench in that case, stated in the course of his judgment on page 404:

    But as regards the expenses of fateha ceremonies and the salary of Hafiz and readers of the Quran, I am disposed to think that these are not proper objects of wakf.

    3. In support of this opinion Stanley, C.J., refers to the view expressed by Karamat Hussain, J., of the same High Court in Fakhr-ud-din Shah v. Kifayat-ul-lah (1910) 7 A.L.J. 1095. We do not propose to refer to those views which are quite sufficiently set out in the judgment of Stanley, C.J., on pages 404 and 405. It is difficult to understand why the learned Subordinate Judge omitted all reference to the views of Stanley, C.J., having regard to the fact that the head-note clearly shows that he had, to say the least, doubts about the matter. It must be observed also that the facts were a good deal stronger there than in the present case. He then refers to Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) L.R. 44 I.A. 21 : I.L.R. 40 M.L.J. 16 : 32 M.L.J. 101 (P.C.). There it was held that the test of whether a deed was, or was not, valid as a wakf in the cases decided before Act VI of 1913("Mussalman 'Wakf Validating Act") was that if the effect of the deed was to give the property substantially to charitable uses it would be valid but if the effect of it was to give the property in substance to the settlor's family it would be invalid under Muhammadan Law. In that case the charitable objects were classified under four heads: - (1) cash doles to the poor on the 28th and 29th of the Ramzan month, which among Muhammadans is regarded as a holy month in which giving alms to the poor is enjoined as a duty; (2) distribution of clothes to the poor on those days; (3) distribution of conjee to the poor on a misjed during the thirty days of that month (Ramzan); (4) performance of fatehas on three days of ancestors and feeding of friends and the poor. Their Lordships further point out on page 121 that Act VI of 1913 by Section 3 expressly enacted that it shall be lawful for any person professing the Mussalman faith to create a wakf which in "all other respects is in accordance with the provisions of the Mussalman Law ' for the maintenance and support, wholly or partially, of his family, children or descendants". They add:

    It was not contended that this statute affects the present appeal, and the following decisions of this Board, which their Lordships think they are bound to follow, clearly establish that the Muhammadan Law, as "interpreted by the Board, does not treat such a gift per se as a good and valid wakf.

    and amongst other cases Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim (1900) L.R. 28 I.A. 15 : I.L.R. 23 All. 233 at 242 : 11 M.L.J. 58 (P.C.) and the observations of Lord Robertson in that case at p. 243 are set out. They are as follows:

    Their Lordships have, however, considered the question whether even assuming it to have been registered, the deed is, according to its terms, a valid deed of wakf. It will be "so if the effect of the deed is to give the property in substance to charitable uses. It will not be so if the effect is to give the property in substance to the testator's family.

    4. It is to be observed that the accuracy of the test laid down by Lord Robertson was not questioned in that appeal. The effect of the decision in Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) L.R. 44 I.A. 21 : I.L.R. 40 M.L.J. 116 : 32 M.L.J. 101 (P.C.) is that whereas before the Mussalman "Wakf" Validating Act (VI of 1913) provision for the maintenance and support wholly or partially of the family, children or descendants of a person professing the Mussalman faith would not be a valid object of wakf, that Act validated such a provision and their Lordships were clearly of the opinion that the test laid down by Lord Robertson in the case referred to was the correct one, namely, the charitable purpose or purposes of the endowment. In view of this decision it must be conceded that Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib (1894) I.L.R. 18 M.L.J. 201 : 5 M.L.J. 40 is no longer good law because there the performance of fateha ceremonies was one of the purposes of the dedication. This, however, by no means disposes of the matter, as the learned Subordinate Judge certainly ought to have recognised, because there is an all important distinction between the purposes of the dedication in Kaleloola Sahib v. Nuseerudeen Sahib (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 201 : 5 M.L.J. 40 and the purpose in this case. Here the object of the wakf is to read the Koran over a tomb. The test laid down by Lord Robertson in Mujib-un-nissa v. Abdur Rahim (1900) L.R. 28 I.A. 15 : I.L.R. 23 All. 233 at 243 : 11 M.L.J. 58 (P.C.) when applied to this case clearly makes this dedication invalid because it is not in substance a dedication to charitable use. There is no provision for anything more than reading the Koran at the tomb and no distribution of food or alms among the poor which the fateha ceremony consists of. In Mazhar Husain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan (1911) I.L.R. 33 All. 400 there were fateha expenses provided for; similarly in Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) L.R. 44 I.A. 21 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 116 : 32 M.L.J. 101 (P.C.). This important distinction has been overlooked by the learned Subordinate Judge who thinks also that the fact that the tomb over which the Koran is to be read is that of a descendant of the prophet and not that of the donor, makes some difference. He says:

    Atta Beevi in whose favour these two documents were executed was the daughter of Syed Hussain Jafri Seyd Alavi Koya Thangal of Kotinhi mosque. A Thangal is supposed to be a direct descendant of the prophet.

    5. The District Munsif on the other hand says:

    Though Atta Beevi is described as the daughter of a Thangal, there is no evidence on record to show that she was a saintly or even a pious woman.

    6. Unless it is to be held that reciting the Koran over the tomb of a Thangal is different from reciting the Koran over the tomb of any other Mussalman - and in support of this view there is no evidence whatsoever--we are quite unable to regard this as a distinguishing feature. But it was contended by Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon that the Mussalman "Wakf" Validating Act (VI of 1913) has effected a change in the law because of Section 3 and the proviso thereto which read as follows:

    It shall be lawful for any person professing the Mussalman faith to create a wakf which in all other respects is in accordance with the provisions of Mussalman law for the following among other purposes:

    (a) "for the maintenance and support wholly or partially of his family, children or descendants, and

    (b) "where the person creating a wakf is a Hanafi Mussalman, also for his own maintenance and support during his lifetime or for the payment of his debts out of the rents and profits of the property dedicated:

    Provided that the ultimate benefit is in such cases expressly or impliedly reserved for the poor or for any other purpose recognised by the Mussalman law as a religious, pious or charitable purpose of a permanent character.

    7. By reason of the proviso he argues that a wakf will be valid if it is religious and pious only and that it need not be charitable as well because of the words "or charitable" in the proviso. We are unable to agree with this contention. The object of the Act was to declare the rights of Mussalmans to make settlements of property by way of 'wakf in favour of their families, children and descendants and to remove any doubts previously existing regarding the validity of wakfs so created and to include such objects as the latter. In our view, no change in the law was brought about with regard to the' purposes, namely, "religious, pious or charitable". Those purposes had always previously been recognised and this is perfectly clear from the Privy Council decision in Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) L.R. 44 I.A. 21 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 116 : 32 M.L.J. 101 (P.C.) and other cases and it is not right to say that the words "or charitable" really provide an alternative to "religious and pious". On page 124 of Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) L.R. 44 I.A. 21 : I.L.R. 40 Mad. 116 : 32 M.L.J. 101 (P.C.) Lord Buckmaster says:

    The trustees are, in their Lordships' view, at the least bound so far as the funds under their control will permit, to make such provisions for the other chanties as in the circumstances of the case a pious and charitable Muhammadan would consider reasonable and proper.

    8. According to Lord Robertson the test must be the charitable use or uses; and even before Act VI of 1913, the purpose according to the decisions had to be religious or charitable The words then were exactly the same as they are now; and it appears to us that in all cases upon this point the charitable purposes of the gift have always been stressed as the important ones. This question has been considered by myself and Bardswell, J., in O.S. A. No. 71 of 1932 in a judgment delivered on the 19th December, 1933, at present unreported We there held, after an examination of a number of cases some of them relating to wakfs and one of them being Mazhar Husain Khan v. Abdul Hadi Khan (1911) I.L.R. 33 All. 400 before-mentioned, that to create a valid trust for religious purposes there must be now, as there was then, a charitable object and we see no reason whatever for coming to any different conclusion. In our view, it is quite clear that the dedication in question being merely for the purpose of reciting the Koran over a tomb of a private person did not create a valid wakf and that the District Munsif was correct in so holding. It follows that this Second Appeal must be allowed with costs here and in the lower Appellate Court and the order of the District Munsif restored.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    C. Kunhamutty . v. Thondikkodan Ahmad Mudaliar And Others
    (Sep 11, 1934)