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  • Art. 132 of the Limitation Act.
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  • Art. 132 of the Limitation Act.
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Judicial Opinion — Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendant 3 (elder co-parcener) executed a simple mortgage in favour of Joganna for Rs. 100 dated 6 June 1908, payable 6 June 1909. In 1909 Defendant 5 obtained a partition decree entitling him to a half-share (the northern moiety) of the mortgaged property and also a costs decree against Defendant 3. Defendant 5 assigned his partition share to Defendant 1 (1914). Defendant 2 purchased Defendant 3's remaining half (the southern moiety) in execution of the costs decree in 1912 and obtained possession.

In 1914 Joganna sued for sale on his mortgage (Suit No. 478 of 1914), making only Defendant 3 a party; he obtained a decree for sale. The decree-holder's rights were assigned and, following execution, the Plaintiff in the present suit purchased the mortgaged property in a Court auction on 22 August 1924. The Plaintiff filed the present suit (1926) to recover possession. In 1927 he applied to amend his plaint to add a prayer that Defendants 1 and 2 be given an opportunity to redeem or to deliver possession and, failing that, that a decree for sale be passed against them.

The District Munsif refused the amendment and dismissed the suit. On appeal the District Judge allowed the amendment and remanded the matter for fresh disposal. The present appeal was taken against the remand order; a revision petition was also filed as an alternative.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether persons (Defendants 1 and 2) who became purchasers/transferees of the equity of redemption but were omitted from the prior mortgagee's suit can be subjected, in a subsequent suit brought by the mortgagee's purchaser, to remedies beyond a decree for sale (e.g., foreclosure or recovery of possession).
  2. If a second suit based upon the original simple mortgage is maintainable against such omitted transferees, from what date does limitation (time-bar) run for that suit?
  3. Whether the District Judge erred in allowing an amendment that effectively converted the Plaintiff's suit for possession into a suit for sale (a different cause of action) which was time-barred at the date the plaint was originally filed.
  4. Whether the High Court should exercise revisionary jurisdiction to correct a material irregularity where the appellate order remanding for retrial is not itself appealable.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments (as represented in the opinion)

  • Counsel for the Plaintiff (Mr. Govindarajachari) supported the District Judge's allowance of the amendment and argued that a second suit against Defendants 1 and 2 (after they were omitted from the mortgagee's suit) could be moulded to obtain remedies such as sale, and he contended the amendment embodied not only a prayer for sale but also foreclosure and recovery of possession (or at least that the amendment justified a fresh cause of action).
  • He relied upon decisions (including Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das, Birinchi Singh, Jugdeo Singh) suggesting that a purchaser of the equity of redemption left out of a mortgagee's suit had only a right to redeem and could be subjected to foreclosure or recovery if they failed to redeem.
  • He further contended that the omission of Defendants 1 and 2 from the prior suit did not deprive the Plaintiff of remedies against them in a subsequent suit; i.e., their right was only to redeem and nothing more.

Defendants' Arguments (as noted in the opinion)

  • Defendants 1 and 2 contended that they were purchasers/transferees of the equity of redemption at the time of the prior mortgagee's suit and that the decree in Suit No. 478 of 1914 (to which they were not parties) could not affect their rights.
  • They argued that Joganna's mortgage suit did not bind them and that the Plaintiff's cause of action based on the original mortgage (if asserted in a new suit) was barred by limitation because limitation for a suit on the mortgage runs from the date fixed for payment (6 June 1909) and not from the date of the mortgagee's decree.
  • They relied on the District Munsif's original finding that limitation barred the Plaintiff's claim to recover money by sale of the mortgaged property and that the amendment changing the nature of the suit could not be permitted because the fresh character of the suit was time-barred as of the date the plaint was filed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkata Reddi v. Kunjappa Goundan (Venkata Reddy v. Kunjappa Goundan) Holds that when the real owners of the equity of redemption are omitted from a prior mortgagee's suit, a second suit is maintainable against them to recover money by sale of the mortgage properties. The Court accepted this as authority for the proposition that a second suit is maintainable; however it stressed that Venkata Reddy does not address the question of limitation and is therefore not an authority on limitation issues arising here.
T. C. Bose v. Obedur Rahiman Chowdhury States that time for a suit on the mortgage runs from the date fixed for payment (or as extended by circumstances), not from the date of a mortgage decree. The Court relied on this to hold that limitation for a second suit runs from the date of payment fixed by the mortgage (6 June 1909) and therefore the second suit here was time-barred when the plaint was filed in 1926.
Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das Decided that a purchaser of the equity of redemption left out of a mortgagee's suit was entitled only to redeem and that foreclosure and recovery could be enforced against him if he did not redeem. The Court noted this decision supports the Plaintiff's counsel but expressly found the result irreconcilable with later Full Bench authority of this Court and declined to follow its reasoning.
Birinchi Singh v. Sarado Prasad Mukherji Stated that parties in the position of omitted purchasers had only a right of redemption and, if they did not redeem, could not resist recovery. The Court observed this decision was cited by the Plaintiff's counsel but rejected its broader inference in favor of Full Bench pronouncements of this Court.
Jugdeo Singh v. Habibullah Khan Similar position to Ram Prasad and Birinchi Singh suggesting limited rights to omitted purchasers (i.e., only redemption). The Court treated this as inconsistent with Full Bench authority and did not follow it when determining the proper remedies available to an auction-purchaser.
Mulla Vittil Seethi v. Achuthan Nair (Full Bench) Laid down that the purchaser of the equity of redemption after the first mortgage and the second mortgagee stand on the same footing; their rights are unaffected by a suit instituted by the first mortgagee to which they were not parties, and the decree and sale in that suit do not affect them. The Court treated this Full Bench decision as authoritative and central: it underpinned the conclusion that omitted purchasers are not bound by the prior suit and that their rights remain unimpaired; it was the basis for rejecting the contention that they could be subjected to remedies (like foreclosure) beyond what the original mortgagee had.
Chinnu Pillai v. Venkataswami Chettiar Asserts that a prior simple mortgagee cannot extinguish the right of a puisne (junior) mortgagee by foreclosure; the junior mortgagee's right is not solely one of redemption. The Court relied on these remarks to support the proposition that an omitted purchaser/puisne mortgagee cannot be foreclosed by the prior mortgagee and may possess rights beyond mere redemption.
Entoli Kizhakkikandy Kanaran v. Vallath Koylil Unnooli Decided that a purchaser in execution of a decree in a suit for sale on a mortgage cannot recover possession from a purchaser of the equity of redemption left out of that suit but can only bring a suit for sale against him. The Court cited it to support the limited remedy—an auction-purchaser can only bring a suit for sale against omitted purchasers rather than recover possession or obtain foreclosure.
Brojanath Koondoo Chowdry v. Khelut Chunder Ghose Affirms the general principle that no person should be prejudicially affected by proceedings to which he is not a party (quoted via Lord Justice James). Used to reinforce the general principle that omitted transferees cannot be affected by proceedings against another person; supported the Court's approach to the rights of omitted purchasers.
Umes Chunder Sircar v. Zahar Fatima (Privy Council) States that persons who have taken transfers of property subject to a mortgage cannot be bound by proceedings in a later suit between the prior mortgagee and the mortgagor to which they were never made parties. Invoked to support the proposition that transferees omitted from earlier proceedings are not bound by those proceedings and retain their rights.
Lakshmanan Chetty v. Muthayya Chetty Contains an observation by Justice Sadasiva Ayyar suggesting that a second suit based upon the original mortgage was not available in similar circumstances (expressed as an opinion in that case). The Court noted that later authorities (notably Venkata Reddy) examined and rejected that restrictive view; Lakshmanan Chetty was considered but not held decisive.
Dattatraya v. Venkatesh Bombay High Court acceptance that a second suit for sale is maintainable against omitted transferees. Cited as an authority from another High Court supporting the maintainability of a second suit; used to show consistent views across jurisdictions.
Lakshmi Naraindas (Lakshmi Narain Das) v. Hirdey Narain Discussed the question of remedies available in successive suits where prior mortgagee's proceedings omitted the real owners; considered by this Court and cited in relation to the point. Referred to as a case where the question has been elaborately discussed; used to support the Court's conclusion on the nature of the remedy and the limitation issue.
Sree Krishna Doss v. Chandook Chand Authority that the High Court will interfere in revision where there is no doubt as to the rights of the parties and non-interference will merely multiply proceedings. Relied upon by the Court to justify exercise of revisionary jurisdiction in this case to prevent futile retrial of a suit that on its face was barred by limitation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, closely following the facts and authorities discussed in the opinion:

  1. Identification of parties' positions: Defendants 1 and 2 had become transferees of the whole equity of redemption prior to the mortgagee's suit of 1914 (Defendant 1 by assignment from Defendant 5; Defendant 2 by purchase in execution). They were also in possession when Suit No. 478 of 1914 was instituted — thus the mortgagor (Defendant 3) did not represent their interests in that suit.
  2. Principle that proceedings cannot prejudice omitted parties: The Court reiterated the principle (supported by cited authorities, including Privy Council and this Court's precedents) that persons omitted from proceedings are not prejudiced by the decree in such proceedings; a suit between the prior mortgagee and the mortgagor cannot bind transferees in whose favour title has already passed.
  3. Maintainability of a second suit: The Court accepted authorities (notably Venkata Reddy and others) that a second suit, brought against the persons who actually held the equity of redemption, is maintainable to recover money due on the original simple mortgage — but emphasized the nature of the remedy in such a suit.
  4. Limited remedies available to an auction-purchaser: The Court held that the purchaser of the mortgage-debtor's right (or an assignee of the mortgagee's decree) is not entitled to recover possession or to obtain foreclosure against omitted transferees; the proper remedy is to sue on the original simple mortgage for sale of the hypothecated property (i.e., to recover money by sale).
  5. Limitation point: The Court relied on T. C. Bose to hold that limitation for a suit on a simple mortgage runs from the date fixed for payment (6 June 1909 here) and not from the date of the mortgagee's decree. Applying that rule, the Court found that any second suit to recover money based on the 1908 mortgage was already time-barred when the plaint was filed in 1926 and was certainly time-barred when the proposed amendment was sought in 1927.
  6. On the correctness of the District Judge's order: The Court concluded that the District Judge was wrong to allow an amendment which effectively converted a suit for possession into a suit for sale (a cause of action that was time-barred at the date the original plaint was filed). The District Munsif had correctly refused the amendment and dismissed the suit on limitation grounds.
  7. Jurisdictional remedy — revision: Although the remand order was not appealable under the procedural rule cited, the appellants had filed a revision petition. The Court held that it was appropriate to exercise revisionary powers to correct the material irregularity occasioned by allowing an amendment that would have required trial of a clearly time-barred cause of action, thereby avoiding multiplication of proceedings.
  8. Disposition and costs considerations: The Court proposed to allow the revision petition, dismiss the appeal, restore the District Munsif's decree dismissing the suit, and to allow Defendants 1 and 2 their costs before the District Judge and in the revision petition; no order as to costs in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal to the High Court.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The High Court allowed the revision petition and set aside the District Judge's order permitting the amendment and remanding the suit. The Court restored the District Munsif's decree dismissing the suit with costs.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The amendment that would have converted the Plaintiff's suit for possession into a suit to recover money by sale (i.e., a different cause of action) was impermissible because that cause of action was barred by limitation as of the date of the original plaint.
  • Defendants 1 and 2, who were omitted from the prior mortgagee's suit, cannot be affected by the decree in that suit and cannot be subjected to remedies greater than those available to the original mortgagee; the proper remedy (if any) against them arising from the original mortgage is a suit for sale to recover money due on the mortgage, but such a suit here is time-barred.
  • Direct outcome for the parties: The District Munsif's dismissal of the Plaintiff's suit is restored; Defendants 1 and 2 are awarded costs before the District Judge and in the revision petition. The Court made no order as to costs in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal to the High Court.
  • On broader precedent: The Court applied and reiterated existing principles established by earlier Full Bench and other authoritative decisions of this Court and the Privy Council; it did not announce a new legal doctrine but enforced the settled position that omitted transferees are not bound by prior mortgagee proceedings and that limitation is measured from the date fixed for payment under a simple mortgage.

Final procedural disposition (per the opinion): Revision allowed (C.R.P. No. 1337 of 1929). The District Judge's order allowing amendment and remand was reversed; the District Munsif's decree dismissing the suit was restored with costs (in the lower Appellate Court and in the revision). No order as to costs in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 359 of 1929.

    Chinta Chandramma v. Gunna Seethan Naidu

    Reilly, J. — Defendant 3 and Defendant 5 in this case were co-parceners in a joint family, Defendant 3 being the elder. In 1908 Defendant 3 executed a simple mortgage in favour of one Joganna for Rs. 100 the date for payment being the 6th June 1909. In 1909 Defendant 5 sued Defendant 3 for partition and got a decree for a half-share of their property, including a half-share of the property mortgaged to Joganna. He also got a decree against Defendant 3 for costs. His decree for costs be assigned to Defendant 2, who in execution of it bought Defendant 3's half-share of the mortgaged property in 1912. Afterwards Defendant 5 sold the half-share which he had got by his partition decree to Defendant 1. In 1914 Joganna sued for sale on his mortgage, making Defendant 3 and no one else a party to that suit. He got a decree for sale, and in execution of that decree the Plaintiff in the present suit eventually bought the mortgaged property in Court-auction in 1924. The Plaintiff in 1926 brought his present suit to recover possession; but in 1927 he put in an application to amend his plaint in order to get a decree that Defendants 1 and 2 should be given an opportunity to redeem or to deliver possession to him and that, if they failed to do so, he should have another decree for sale against them. The District Munsif, who tried this suit, refused that application for amendment and dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge has allowed the amendment and remanded the suit to the District Munsif for fresh disposal. The appeal before us is against that order of remand.

    Now it will be seen that Defendant 5 got in his partition suit a decree for half of the property covered by the mortgage, and that half he subsequently transferred to Defendant 1. Defendant 2 in Court-auction bought Defendant 3's half-share. So in effect Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, even if Defendant 3 ever had an exclusive right to the property mortgaged, have become transferees of the whole equity of redemption. Neither Defendant 5 nor his transferee, Defendant 1, nor Defendant 2 was a party to Joganna's mortgage-suit. The result of that, it cannot be disputed, is that that suit did not affect their rights in any way. As they were left out of Joganna's suit, he could, and the Plaintiff after his purchase could, have brought another suit against Defendant 1 or Defendant 2 or both for sale on the mortgage. That is clear and was decided in Venkata Reddi v. Kunjappa Goundan . The learned Judge recognises that; but he is of opinion that time would run for such a suit from the date of the mortgage decree. I think it is obvious that he is wrong in that. Time for the second suit, if brought upon the mortgage, must run from the date for payment, or that date as extended by any circumstances which would extend it, and not from the date of the mortgage decree. That point was explicitly decided in T. C. Bose v. Obedur Rahiman Chowdhury (2). Now it happens that a second suit for sale on this mortgage was time-barred, not only at the date when the Plaintiff made his application to amend his plaint, but at the date when he put in his plaint itself in 1926. The learned District Judge has in effect by the amendment allowed the Plaintiff to change the entire character of his suit, to change his suit for possession into a suit of another character, which was barred at the date when he put in his plaint. That is a kind of amendment which can obviouly not be allowed.

    But Mr. Govindarajachari for the plaintiff has tried to find another property for the learned District Judge's decision. He represents that the amendment embodied not only a prayer for a decree for sale but for foreclosure and recovery of possession. The amendent itself does not put that explicitly. But, even if that was intended, as Mr. Govindarajachari has said, it would not be a prayer for foreclosure only. It is obviously a prayer for something more—for foreclosure and for possession. Apart from the fact that foreclosure and recovery of possession are hot remedies available to a simple mortgagee, if such a liability could be imposed upon Defendants 1 and 2, it would obviously be something more serious to them than liability to a decree for sale on the mortgage. If a decree for sale on the mortgage was still possible, that would mean that a preliminary decree might be made against them, giving them an opportunity to redeem, and, if they did not, the property would be put up for sale, and they would be entitled to any surplus over the amount due to the plaintiff. If they were liable to foreclosure and recovery, obviously there would be no surplus to go to them. In that way their position would be worse than if they were liable to a decree for sale. And in another way they would be in a worse position. As I have mentioned, a suit for a decree for sale was time-barred. But by this change of attack, this bringing in of a prayer for foreclosure, the Plaintiff hopes to extend his limitation by five times. In that way again the position of Defendants 1 and 2 would be much worse than if they were liable only to a decree for sale. Now, if Defendants 1 and 2 had been impleaded in Joganna's mortgage-suit, the only decree that could have been made against them would have been a decree for sale. As I have said, it cannot be disputed that that mortgage-suit, to which they were not made parties, cannot affect their interests; and yet, though that suit cannot affect their interests, we are asked to say in effect that their omission from that suit exposes them to liability much greater than could have been enforced against them if they had been parties to that suit. Put like that, if I may say so without offence, the contention appears to cross the border line of absurdity and is one to which on no principle or reasoning that I can see could we accede. It is impossible to reconcile the liability which on this contention the Plaintiff wishes to force on Defendants 1 and 2 with the principle that, because they were left out of Joganna's mortgage suit, that suit cannot affect them in any way and leaves them in just the position in which they were before it.

    But Mr. Govindarajachari has been able to point out to us some decisions which support his contention. In Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das it was decided that in a similar position a purchaser of the equity of redemption, who had been left out of the mortgagee's suit for sale, was entitled only to redeem and, if he did not do so within the time fixed, foreclosure and recovery of possession could be enforced against him. In Birinchi Singh v. Sarado Prasad Mukherji* it was stated that parties in the position of Defendants 1 and 2 here, had only a right of redemption, and, if they did not redeem, they could not resist recovery. There was a similar decision in Jugdeo Singh v. Habibullah Khan (3) in which other Calcutta cases are cited in its support. With the very greatest respect I find myself unable to follow the reasoning in those cases. Their results appear to me to be entirely irreconcilable with the principle that the owner of the equity of redemption, if left out of the mortgagee's suit for sale, cannot be affected by that suit, though I may mention that principle is explicitly mentioned both in Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das and Jugdeo Singh v. Habibullah Khan . But I do not think it is really necessary to discuss those cases in any detail. The principles have been made clear in cases of this Court. In Mulla Vittil Seethi v. Achuthan Nair a Full Bench laid down that “the purchaser of the equity of redemption after the first mortgage and the second mortgagee both stand on the same footing with reference to their respective rights against the first mortgagee when they have not been impleaded in the suit instituted by him on his mortgage”, and “these rights are unaffected by the suit of the first mortgagee to which they were not made parties and the decree passed therein and the sale made in pursuance thereof”. There we have the proposition clearly laid down that the purchaser of the equity of redemption is in those circumstances in the same position as a puisne mortgagee. If he is left out of the first mortgagee's suit or the puisne mortgagee's suit he is just as much free of it as the puisne mortgagee would be if he was left out. In Chinnu Pillai v. Venkataswami Chettiar (4) Justice K. Srinivasa Ayyangar said.

    “in no case can a prior simple mortgagee extinguish the right of the puisne mortgagee by foreclosure. Sufficient attention has not always been paid to this important fact where it is said that the junior mortgagee is bound to redeem or his only right is to redeem or that the senior mortgagee can compel redemption.”

    We are entitled to substitute “the purchaser of the equity of redemption” for “the puisne mortgagee” or “the junior mortgagee” in those remarks of Mr. Justice Srinivasa Ayyangar which, if I may say so with respect, put the position clearly and correctly. In Entoli Kizhakkikandy Kanaran v. Vallath Koylil Unnooli (5) a bench of this Court decided that in a case such as this the purchaser in execution of a decree in a suit for sale on a mortgage cannot recover possession from the purchaser of the equity of redemption left out of that suit but can only bring a suit for sale against him.

    That being the position, in my opinion the learned Judge was wrong in allowing this amendment to be made. It was too late to make an amendment which would convert the Plaintiff's suit into a suit for sale, and that was the only kind of suit which he was entitled to bring against Defendants 1 and 2. As has been, urged before us, the remand order is not one of those which is subject to appeal, and so the appeal which has been preferred cannot be allowed. But the Appellants have been careful to put in also a revision petition. In my opinion this is certainly a case for the exercise of our powers of revision. When the learned District Judge allowed the suit by amendment to be converted into a suit of another character, which was barred at the time the plaint had been put in, he was in my opinion guilty of a material irregularity, which should be put right by revision. I therefore propose that the revision petition be allowed and the appeal dismissed and that the decree of the learned District Munsif dismissing the suit with costs be restored and that Defendants 1 and 2 be allowed their costs before the District Judge and in their revision petition here. In the appeal to us in my opinion there should be no order as to costs.

    Ananthakrishna Agyar, J.—I agree. In Jones on Mortgages, paragraph 1395, the learned author states that

    While it is expensive and inconvenient to join all persons interested in a mortgage suit, it is much more expensive and inconvenient to go on with such a suit omitting any such party’.

    The present case illustrates the wisdom of the observation made by the learned author, if the reported cases are not sufficient to bring home to litigants the importance of having all interested persons as parties to suits relating to mortgages.

    The 3rd Defendant executed a simple mortgage over the suit property in favour of Joganna on 6th June 1908, Ex. D. The term fixed in the mortgage was one year, so that the amount became payable on 6th June 1909. In 1909 the 5th Defendant, a co-parcener of the 3rd Defendant, filed a suit for partition of the suit property making the 3rd Defendant a party Defendant to the suit. There was a decree in favour of the 5th Defendant for a moiety of the suit property (mentioned in the present proceedings as the northern moiety). The 5th Defendant in execution obtained possession of that half, and he assigned his rights over that portion in favour of the 1st Defendant under Ex. III on the 12th May 1914. The 5th Defendant also obtained a decree for costs against the 3rd in that partition suit, O.S No. 729 of 1909. In execution of the decree relating to costs, the 2nd Defendant to whom that portion of the decree had been assigned by the 5th Defendant brought the other moiety belonging to the 3rd Defendant, (the southern moiety), to sale and the 2nd Defendant became himself the purchaser. The sale certificate (Ex. VI) is dated 11th November 1912, and he got possession on the 30th November 1912 (Vide Ex. VII) About two years afterwards, Joganna the mortgagee from the 3rd Defendant filed a Suit No. 478 of 1914 on the 2nd October 1914 to recover the money due on his hypothecation bond Ex. D. He made as party Defendant to his suit only the 3rd Defendant, and not the 1st and 2nd Defendants who at that time had become owners of the two moieties of this property and who were in possession of the same on the date of the plaint. Having obtained a decree, the decree-holder assigned his rights to Janaki Ramayya who brought the properties to sale and the present Plaintiff became purchaser of the properties in Court-auction under Ex. A on the 22nd August 1924. When he proceeded to obtain possession he was obstructed by Defendants 1 and 2, and accordingly he instituted the original suit (which has given rise to the present appeal and revision petition) to eject the Defendants and to recover possession of the properties from them. Defendants 1 and 2, raised the contention that the decree in Suit No. 478 of 1914 was not binding upon them, that 3rd Defendant had no rights in the property at the time of that suit; and they also pleaded that the decree in that suit could not in any way affect their rights and that the Plaintiff's right to enforce the mortgage in favour of Joganna was barred by limitation. The learned District Munsif found this point in favour of defendants 1 and 2 and he dismissed the suit. In his judgment he recorded findings on the other issues that were framed in the case. On appeal by the Plaintiff an application was made before the learned District Judge for an amendment of the plaint. The way in which the plaint was sought to be amended is this:

    “If the defendants 1 and 2 did not redeem the simple mortgage in Suit No. 478 of 1914 and did not deliver possession of the suit item, the Plaintiff may be entitled to collect the decree amount Rs. 702-14-6 with interest up to the date of the Court-sale and costs by the re-sale of the suit item.”

    The learned District Judge relying on the decision of this Court in Venkata Reddy v. Kunjappa Goundan allowed the Plaintiff's prayer for amendment, and accordingly directed a retrial of the suit on the basis of the amended plaint. Defendants 1 and 2 have preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal and Revision Petition.

    As generally happens in such cases, Counsel felt difficulty whether an appeal lies, and has accordingly filed an alternative Civil Revision Petition in respect of the same matter.

    Now on these facts it follows that when Suit No. 478 of 1914 was instituted on the 2nd October 1914, the equity of redemption in the mortgaged property had become vested in defendants 1 and 2. For this purpose it is not necessary for us to canvass the position whether the property belonged absolutely to the 3rd Defendant or belonged to the 3rd defendant and the 5th Defendant in moieties as members of a co-parcenary. In the view most favourable to the plaintiff I am prepared to assume that the 3rd Defendant was solely entitled to the suit property. The result, however, of the decree in Suit No. 729 of 1909 was directly to effect a statutory transfer in respect of a moiety of the property in favour of the 5th Defendant when it was decreed in that suit that the suit item should be divided into two moieties and in pursuance of the decree the northern moiety was delivered to the 5th Defendant; so that, as regards that moiety, the 3rd Defendant must be taken to have parted with his right in the same in favour of the 5th Defendant who in his turn conveyed his rights therein to the 1st Defendant Similarly, as regards the other moiety, the 3rd Defendant's remaining interest in the same, subject to the mortgage, passed to the 2nd Defendant who purchased the same in execution of the decree for costs, which was passed by the Court in Suit No. 729 of 1909 against the 3rd Defendant and in favour of the 5th. Defendants 1 and 2 were also in possession on the date of the plaint in Suit No. 478 of 1914. It follows therefore that they were the persons entitled to the equity of redemption at the time of the prior mortgagee's suit in 1914. The mortgagor, 3rd Defendant, had no interest in the property, and as far as the properties are concerned he could in no way represent the owners in whom the right had become vested at that time. The effect of a decree obtained by a prior mortgagee in a suit to which the owners of the equity of redemption were not parties had to be considered in various cases in this Court. It has been laid down that the general rule that no person should be affected prejudicially by proceedings to which he is not a party is applicable to mortgage suits also. In the words of Lord Justice James “It is difficult to see how a right of entry or cause of action against one man in respect of his property could be either lost or gained by proceedings against another man in respect of his property.” See Brojanath Koondoo Chowdry v. Khelut Chunder Ghose . Similarly, in a later case, in Umes Chunder Sircar v. Zahar Fatima , this is what the Privy Council says:

    “Persons: who have taken transfers of property subject to a mortgage Cannot be bound by proceedings in a subsequent suit between the prior mortgagee and the mortgagor to which they were never made parties.”

    The above general principle accordingly applies to cases of owners of the equity of redemption not made parties to the prior mortgagee's suit.

    The learned Advocate for the Plaintiff (Respondent) however argued that the result would only be that the right of redemption which Defendants 1 and 2 had should not be taken to have been lost to them, and he urged that that is their only right after the decree in the mortgage suit aforesaid. I think it is too late In the day to contend for such a proposition. The question was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Mulla Vittil Seethi v. Achuthan Nair , where it was held that none of the rights of persons who were omitted to be made parties would be affected by reason of a decree obtained behind their back. It was also suggested by the Plaintiff's learned Advocate Mr. Govindarajachari that the present is a case where the person left out was not a puisne mortgagee but a purchaser of the equity of redemption. If there is any difference, it seems to me that the effect of the difference would be more against his client than in his favour; but I need not stop to enquire whether there is any material difference on this point between the case of a puisne encumbrancer left out and a subsequent purchaser of the equity of redemption left out in the circumstances, for in the Full Bench case in Mulla Vittil Seethi v. Achuthan Nair the learned Judges stated the second proposition, which they took to be established, as follows:—

    “The purchaser of the equity of redemption after the first mortgage and the second mortgagee both stand on the same footing with reference to their respective rights against the first mortgagee when they have not been impleaded in the suit instituted by him on his mortgage.”

    It is therefore not possible to draw any difference between the position of a subsequent mortgagee and a subsequent purchaser of the equity of redemption so far as the principle now sought to be made applicable is concerned. Then, the learned Advocate argued that if they had been made parties they would be entitled to redeem, and that he submitted, is their only right. That position again is answered by the Full Bench, the third proposition laid down by the Court being that

    “those rights (rights possessed by persons who are not made parties to such suits) are unaffected by the suit of tile first mortgagee to which they were not made parties and the decree passed therein and the sale made in pursuance thereof.”

    See also Chinuu Pillai v. Venkataswami Chettiar . If that be so, the question arises, what exactly are the rights of a puisne mortgagee or the owner of the equity of redemption in such circumstances. It is clear that the first mortgagee could not, by reason of his own wrong or default, acquire any higher rights than he had otherwise. A hypothecatee is not entitled to possession, nor is he entitled to any remedy by way of foreclosure. The substance of Mr. Govindarajachari's argument (if I followed him correctly) is that though as hypothecatee the prior mortgagee is not entitled either to possession or to a remedy by way of foreclosure, yet as a result of the prior decree he has acquired these special rights. That is going in the teeth of the pronouncements made by authorities which are binding upon us. He cannot take advantage of his own wrong; he cannot acquire higher rights by reason of a litigation to which the owners of the equity of redemption were not made parties. That being so, if the puisne mortgagee or the owner of the equity of redemption be entitled to other rights and remedies over and above the right of redemption, such other rights and remedies would not be lost to them, and the Plaintiff cannot be heard to say that those remedies were lost to them as a result of the suit to which they were not parties. Now the learned Advocate drew our attention to certain passages from three decisions where it is generally stated that persons in the position of Defendants 1 and 2 have got the right to redeem. Nobody would think it worth while to quarrel with such a proposition if it means what it states, namely, that they have got the right of redemption; but if it be intended to lay down that they have got only the right of redemption, then both on principle and by virtue of authorities which are binding on us, that position does not seem to be tenable. In Ghinnu Pillai v. Venkataswami Chettiar , Justice Coutts Trotter, as he then was, observed as follows:

    “The principle is that of any number of mortgagees, the later can always redeem the earlier, but cannot be compelled to do so, and the earlier cannot redeem the later except by consent.”

    The matter is put very tersely by Justice K. Srinivasa Aiyangar, at page 85, where it is stated:—

    “In no case can a prior simple mortgagee extinguish the right of the puisne mortgagee by foreclosure. Sufficient attention has not always been paid to this important fact, where it is said that the junior mortgagee is bound to redeem, or his only right is to redeem or that the senior mortgagee can compel redemption.”

    As has been already mentioned, the right to redeem is a right and not an obligation. If a person has got also other rights to exercise, it is not open to a person in the position of the plaintiff to compel such person to exercise any one right rather than any other. It is therefore clear that the present plaintiff would not be entitled to claim any rights higher than the rights of the original mortgagee Joganna and could not derive special rights by virtue of a suit filed by Joganna against persons other than the real owners of the equity of redemption.

    This leads to the consideration of the question as to what exactly are the remedies open to an auction-purchaser in the position of the plaintiff. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar, in the case reported in Lakshmanan Chetty v. Muthayya Chetty, would seem to have been of opinion—I say ‘opinion,’ because it was not necessary for the decision of the case—that a second suit based upon the original mortgage was not available in the circumstances. That question had to be considered in a later case by a Bench of this Court, Kumaraswami Sastri and Waller, JJ., in Venkata Reddy v. Kunjappa Goundan . After referring to the observations of Sadasivier, J., in the case already mentioned, the learned Judges proceeded to consider whether there is anything in the Code or any other provision of law which would disentitle the plaintiff from maintaining a second suit based upon the original mortgage. They came to the conclusion that he could do so, and, if I may say so with respect, quite correctly. The circumstance that the mortgagee filed a suit against a wrong person does not affect the rights of the real owners of the equity of redemption. If it does not affect them at all, one fails to see how they could be heard to say that by virtue of the prior suit—which admittedly does not affect them, a (second) suit against them is not maintainable. So far as they are concerned, the second is the only suit against them and the first suit and the proceedings connected with the same must be taken to be ‘nonest’ in the eye of law. The extreme contentions urged on both sides is unsustainable. It being therefore clear that a second suit is maintainable to recover money due on the mortgage, after making the necessary persons interested in the equity of redemption parties to the suit, the question will then arise as to the exact remedy that they would be entitled to in such a suit. Before considering this, I may just mention that the maintainablity of the second suit in such circumstances has been accepted by the Bombay High Court in Dattatraya v. Venkatesh , by the Rangoon High Court in T.C Bose v. Obedur Rahiman Chowdhury , and by the Allahabad High Court in Lakshmi Naraindas v. Hirdey Narain . As I already mentioned Venkata Reddi v. Kunjappa Goundan , is also an authority in favour of such a proposition. I may also state that as early as Entoli Kizhakkikandy Kanaran v. Vallatha Koylil Umooli (6) Justice Boddam and Justice Miller were of opinion that a second suit for sale in such circumstances is maintainable and is the proper remedy.

    Now in the second suit what is the remedy that the plaintiff is entitled to? For reasons already mentioned, he would not be entitled to recover possession, because the second suit is based on the original simple mortgage and not on the footing of any decree—in the first suit—which ex hypothesi is not binding on the contesting Defendants. Further, the second suit could not be to foreclose the Defendants, because it is not a relief to which a hypothecatee is entitled. That being so, it is clear that the only remedy that the plaintiff in the circumstances would be entitled to is to recover his money by the sale of the hypothecated property, and that is the view that has found acceptance in all the cases I have mentioned above. No doubt the learned Advocate for the Respondents right in saying that the decisions in Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das , Jugdeo Singh v. Habibulla Khan , and Birinchi Singhi v. Sarada Prasad Makerji support the position adopted by the lower appellate Court. Of these, Ram Prasad v. Bhikari Das and Jugdeo Singh v. Habibulla Khan were prior to the Full Bench decisions of this High Court reported in Mulla Vittil Seethi v. Achuthan Nair , and have been considered there; and the propositions enunciated by the learned Judges of the Full Bench involve the inference that the decisions in those two cases were not acceptable to them. We are bound by the Full Bench decision, and that being so, we cannot accept the contention based on those other decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the Respondent.

    As we have come to the conclusion that a suit for sale is the only relief to which the person in the position of the Plaintiff is entitled, the question arises whether the lower appellate Court was right in having allowed the plaint to be amended by also adding a prayer for the recovery of money by the sale of the properties. The learned District Munsif declined to allow the amendment on the ground that the suit to recover money by sale of the mortgaged property would be barred by limitation; however the learned District Judge allowed the amendent; but as the suit to recover money based upon a mortgage of 1908 is clearly barred by limitation (because the period of limitation began to run from 6th June 1909, when the amount became payable, and the present plaint was filed only in 1926), there is no use in allowing the plaint to be amended. The suit being one to recover money due upon a mortgage, the period of limitation applicable to such a suit is Art. 132 of the Limitation Act. Of course, proceedings in the prior suit or any other proceedings, might be relied on, if there be acknowledgment of the plaintiff's right, or there might be part payments, which might save limitation. But it is not pretended that there are any such in the present case, and neither the plaint nor the application for amendment in the case before us suggests the existence of any such factor which would save limitation. The suit being therefore prima facie barred by limitation in so far as the prayer to recover money by the sale of the properties is concerned, I think that the present is a case where we should interfere in revision, inasmuch as the learned Advocate for the Respondent is right in contending that an appeal does not lie having regard to the wording of O. 43, R. 1 (u), Civil Procedure Code. I am of opinion that the present is pre-eminently a case for interference in revision, if the result of the amendment would be to direct a plaint to be tried which, on the face of it, is barred by limitation. As remarked by Miller, J., in Sree Krishna Doss v. Chandook Chand , the High Court will interfere in revision where there is no doubt as to the rights of the parties, and the result of non-interference will only be to multiply proceedings and to direct an enquiry which should result in nothing favourable to the plaintiff having regard to the clear law applicable to the case. We have followed that decision of Justice Miller recently and I think that the present is a case where we should interfere in revision.

    I may state that this question as regards the rights of parties and how far the subsequent suit should be only to recover money due on the mortgage, has been elaborately discussed by the learned Judge, Mookerjee, J., in Lakshmi Narain Das v. Hirdey Narain .

    I do not think it necessary to refer in detail to the observations in that case, nor to the observations in T. C. Bose v. Obedur Rahiman Chowdhary which are also to the point.

    In the view I take, I need not consider in this case the principles which should guide the Court in fixing the amount that should be decreed to the Plaintiff, if the claim be not barred by limitation.

    The decision in Venkata Reddy v. Kunjappa Goundan relied on by the learned District Judge only lays down that a second suit is maintainable in the circumstances to recover money by sale of the mortgage properties. No question of limitation arose in that case, because the mortgage deed was dated in 1914 and the second suit was instituted in 1919, before the expiry of twelve years. That case is therefore no authority on the question of limitation which arises in this case.

    In my opinion the learned Judge's order allowing the amendment of the plaint and remanding the suit for retrial is not sustainable and should be set aside.

    In the exercise of our powers of revision, we allow C.R.P No. 1337 of 1929, and reverse the decision of the learned District Judge and restore the decision of the District Munsif with costs in the lower Appellate Court, and in the revision petition. As my learned brother has stated in his judgment, there will be no order as to costs in the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 359 of 1929.

    N. R. R.Revision allowed.

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