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Court Opinion — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The facts as set out in the opinion are as follows. The seventh respondent was appointed guardian in 1922 of the properties of her sons and daughters (all minors at that time) left by their father Shumsudeen, who had died before 1922. On 24 September 1924 the seventh respondent, acting on her own behalf and as guardian of the ninth and tenth respondents and the sixth defendant, sold a house (left by Shumsudeen) to the appellant. The eighth respondent, being a major, joined in the conveyance. The seventh respondent did not obtain the court's sanction for the sale required by Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.

Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act renders such a disposal voidable at the instance of any person affected thereby, and Article 44 of the Limitation Act gives a ward three years from the date of attaining majority to sue to set aside such a transfer. On 31 January 1932 the ninth and tenth respondents and the sixth defendant sold their shares to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib, who filed the suit on 24 January 1933 to recover from the appellant the shares of his vendors. Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib died during the suit and his legal representatives (respondents 1 to 6) were substituted as plaintiffs.

The appellant defended on the grounds that the 1924 sale to him was valid and that the suit was barred by limitation (filed three years after the vendors had attained majority). The trial Court (District Munsif of Trichinopoly) held among other things that the vendors were not bound by the 1924 sale because court sanction had not been obtained; that the ninth respondent had attained majority more than three years before the suit; and that while the ninth and tenth respondents were majors at the time of the 1932 sale to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib, the sixth defendant was a minor.

The District Munsif (relying on Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib A.S. No. 526 of 1931) gave a decree for the plaintiffs. The Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly concurred and dismissed the appeal; the Subordinate Judge refused the appellant's application to amend his grounds of appeal to raise the contention that the sixth defendant, being a minor at the time of the 1932 sale, could not transfer her interest. A certificate under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent was granted by Horwill, J., limiting the scope of appeal to whether the case was governed by the Rahima Bi decision. The appellant appealed to this Court and challenged both the correctness of Rahima Bi and the validity of the limited certificate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a sale of immovable property by a guardian appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act made without the Court's sanction is void or merely voidable under Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act, and consequently whether Article 44 of the Limitation Act (three years from majority) applies.
  2. Whether the suit filed by Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib (and his successors) to recover the shares of his vendors was barred by limitation in respect of the interests of the ninth, tenth and sixth persons involved.
  3. Whether the Subordinate Judge and Horwill, J., were correct in refusing to allow the appellant to amend his grounds of appeal to raise the contention that the sixth defendant was a minor at the time of the 1932 sale and therefore could not convey her interest.
  4. Whether the single-Judge certificate under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent could properly be limited by the writing Judge to particular points of law or whether the certificate must be unrestricted as to the points to be raised on appeal.
  5. Whether the decision in Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib A.S. No. 526 of 1931 (as applied by the courts below) was correctly decided or was inconsistent with Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act and earlier decisions of this Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant contended that the 1924 sale to him was valid and that the subsequent suit (filed in 1933) was barred by limitation insofar as the vendors had attained majority more than three years before the suit was filed.
  • The appellant challenged the validity of the certificate granted by Horwill, J., on the ground that a certificate having been granted should permit him to raise the question that the Subordinate Judge and Horwill, J., erred in refusing to allow him to argue the effect of the sixth defendant's minority at the time of the 1932 sale.
  • The appellant argued that the decision in Rahima Bi was bad law and should not bind the Court.

Plaintiffs-Respondents' Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiffs (successors to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib) sought a decree to recover the shares of their vendors and relied upon the trial Court and the decision in Rahima Bi to sustain their claim.
  • The plaintiffs adduced evidence which the opinion records as establishing that the sixth defendant was a minor at the time she purported to sell her interest to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib on 31 January 1932.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib and Ors. A.S. No. 526 of 1931 (unreported) Held (per Ramesam and Cornish, JJ.) that where a guardian appointed by the Court applied for and obtained permission subject to conditions which were not fulfilled, the sale was not binding on minors; stated that a sale by a de facto guardian or by a Court guardian without sanction or without complying with conditions need not be set aside by the minor. The Court (Mockett, J.) found this decision to be wrongly decided so far as it related to transfers by guardians appointed by the Court. The Court held that Rahima Bi conflicts with Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act and ignored earlier binding decisions; accordingly the portion of Rahima Bi concerning transfers by Court-appointed guardians was disapproved.
Sinnayya Pillai v. Munisami Iyan (1899) 9 M.L.J. 64 : I.L.R. 22 Mad. 289 Referenced as one of three earlier decisions of this Court that were binding authority on the point that a transfer by a lawful guardian without sanction is valid until set aside. The Court relied on its status as binding precedent which Rahima Bi had ignored; cited to support the proposition that a transfer made by a lawful guardian without court sanction is voidable (valid until set aside) under Section 30.
Periakaruppan Chetty v. Kandasami Chetty (1933) M.W.N. 791 Referenced as a binding decision relevant to the legal position under the Guardians and Wards Act concerning the effect of a guardian's transfer without court sanction. The Court treated it as one of the authorities that Rahima Bi neglected and which supported the view that such transfers are voidable and not automatically void.
Sivanmalai Goundan v. Arunachalam Goundan (1938) 2 M.L.J. 428 Referenced similarly as a binding decision supporting the statutory construction that transfers by lawful guardians without sanction remain valid until set aside. Used by the Court to demonstrate that the earlier Bench in Rahima Bi had overlooked binding authority; the Court relied on these authorities to hold Rahima Bi incorrect in part.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds in distinct steps addressing certification, the correctness of Rahima Bi, limitation, and the appellant's right to raise the sixth defendant's minority.

  1. On the Clause 15 certificate: The Court reasoned that Clause 15 permits a single Judge to declare "the case" a fit one for appeal but it is not the Judge's function to select which points are "fit" for appeal. If the Judge thinks the case is fit for appeal he may grant a certificate, but should not attempt to limit the questions that the higher appellate Court may entertain. Therefore the limitation placed by Horwill, J., on the certificate was improper and this Court could entertain the appellant's objections which had been excluded below.
  2. On the correctness of Rahima Bi: The Court examined the statements in Rahima Bi and found them inconsistent. In particular, Ramesam, J.'s two propositions—(a) that sales by a de jure guardian or a Court guardian with sanction are prima facie valid and (b) that sales by a de facto guardian or by a Court guardian without sanction need not be set aside by the minor—were held to be in conflict. The Court observed that the second statement ignored the clear language of Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act, which makes a disposal by a guardian without sanction voidable at the instance of a person affected rather than void ab initio.
  3. Statutory construction and application: Applying Section 30 together with Article 44 of the Limitation Act, the Court concluded that a transfer made by a guardian appointed by the Court without sanction is valid until set aside and that the ward (former minor) has three years from the date of attaining majority to sue to set aside the transfer. Thus, where such a right is not exercised within the statutory period the transferee's title becomes unassailable.
  4. Effect on the present facts—limitation: The Court applied this construction to the facts and held that the suit was barred by limitation in respect of the interest of the ninth respondent (i.e., the suit was filed after the three-year period following the ninth respondent's attainment of majority). However, the suit was not barred in respect of the tenth respondent because the suit was filed within three years of the tenth respondent's majority; consequently the purchaser Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib (and his successors) obtained a valid transfer of the tenth respondent's interest.
  5. Right to amend and the sixth defendant's interest: The Court examined the evidence relied upon by the parties and noted that the plaintiffs' own evidence established that the sixth defendant was a minor when she purported to sell her interest on 31 January 1932. Given that the plaintiffs' evidence negatived the appellant's earlier factual position, the appellant should have been allowed to amend his memorandum of appeal to raise the contention that the sixth defendant, being a minor at the time of the 1932 sale, could not confer title. The Subordinate Judge's refusal to permit the amendment and the resulting decree for the plaintiffs in respect of an interest they themselves had shown they lacked title to was held to be manifestly wrong.
  6. Remedies and orders: The Court concluded that the appeal must succeed insofar as it concerned the interests of the ninth respondent and the sixth defendant; the decree below would be amended to limit relief to the interest of the tenth respondent. The Court also set out the allocation of costs and remanded the case to the trial Court for a final decree for partition consistent with this judgment.

Holding and Implications

CORE RULING: The appeal is allowed in part. The Court held that the decision in Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib A.S. No. 526 of 1931 was wrongly decided so far as it related to transfers made by guardians appointed by the Court (such transfers are voidable under Section 30, not void ab initio). Applying Section 30 and Article 44 of the Limitation Act, the suit was held to be barred by limitation in respect of the ninth respondent's interest, but not in respect of the tenth respondent's interest. The sixth defendant's purported transfer in 1932 was held (on the plaintiffs' own evidence) to have been made while she was a minor; the appellant should have been permitted to raise that objection and the plaintiffs cannot recover that interest.

Implications for the parties:

  • The decree below is to be amended and limited to the interest of the tenth respondent only; the plaintiffs' claim to the ninth respondent's and the sixth defendant's interests is dismissed.
  • The appellant is awarded his costs before the Subordinate Judge, before Horwill, J., and in this Court. He is also entitled to costs in the trial Court proportionate to the value of the interests of the ninth respondent and the sixth defendant. The plaintiffs are to receive costs in the trial Court only for the value of the tenth respondent's interest and have no costs beyond that.
  • The matter is remanded to the trial Court to pass a final partition decree in accordance with this judgment.

As to precedent, the Court expressly disapproved the part of Rahima Bi that conflicted with Section 30 and earlier binding decisions; the opinion identifies and relies on earlier authorities to support that statutory construction.

    Mir Ghulam Hussain Sahib (), v. Ayesha Bibi And Twelve Others (S),

    1. The seventh respondent is the mother of the eighth, ninth and tenth respondents in this appeal and of the sixth defendant in the suit out of which the appeal arises. The sixth defendant died pending the litigation and is now represented by the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth respondents. The father, one Shumsudeen, died before 1922. In that year, the seventh respondent was appointed the guardian of the properties of her sons and daughters all of whom were minors. On the 24th of September, 1924, the seventh respondent, acting on her own behalf and as guardian of the ninth and tenth respondents and the sixth defendant, sold to the appellant a house which had been left by Shumsudeen. The eighth respondent was at this time a major and she joined in the conveyance. The seventh respondent did not obtain the sanction of the Court to the sale, as she was bound to do by reason of Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Her failure to obtain the necessary consent of the Court did not, however, avoid the transaction so far as the minors were concerned. The transaction was not void, but merely voidable. Section 30 says that the disposal of the immovable property by a guardian in contravention of Section 28 or Section 29 is voidable at the instance of any person affected thereby, and goes no further. Article 44 of the Limitation Act gives a ward three years from the date when he attains majority to sue to set aside a transfer of property made by his guardian. Therefore the minors were placed by statute in a position to sue to set aside the transaction within three years of attaining majority, but failure to exercise this right would make the appellant's title unassailable.

    2. On the 31st of January, 1932, the ninth and tenth respondents and the sixth defendant sold their shares in the property to one Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib, who, on the 24th of January, 1933, filed, the suit out of which this appeal arises to recover from the appellant the shares of his vendors in the property. Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib died during the pendency of the suit and his legal representatives, who are respondents 1 to 6 were made plaintiffs in his place. The suit was defended by the appellant, who contended that the sale was valid and that the suit was barred by limitation in that it had been filed three years after the ninth and tenth respondents and the sixth defendant had attained majority. The District Munsif of Trichinopoly who tried the suit held that (1) the vendors of Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib were not bound by the sale to the appellant of the 24th of September, because the Court's sanction had not been obtained for the transfer; (2) the ninth respondent alone had attained majority more than three years before the suit; and (3) the ninth and tenth respondents were majors at the time of the sale to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib, but that the sixth defendant was a minor. Relying on a decision of this Court (Ramesam and Cornish, JJ.), in the unreported case of Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib and Ors. A.S. No. 526 of 1931, the District Munsif held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decree for the shares of the ninth and tenth respondents and the sixth defendant. The appellant . appealed to the Subordinate Judge of Trichinopoly, who concurred in the judgment of the District Munsif and accordingly dismissed the appeal. Before the Subordinate Judge, the appellant applied to amend his grounds of appeal by setting out the contention that in any event the trial Court erred in giving the plaintiffs a decree for the share of the sixth defendant as she was a minor at the time of the sale and consequently could not transfer her interest to the vendee, Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib. The Subordinate Judge refused to allow this additional ground to be raised. The appellant then appealed to this Court. The appeal was heard by Horwill, J., who also was bound by the decision of this Court in Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib A.S. No. 526 of 1931. The learned Judge indicated that he was not in agreement with that judgment but being bound by it he was compelled to follow it. The learned Judge held that the Subordinate Judge was justified in not allowing the appellant to raise the contention with regard to the sixth defendant's inability to confer any title on the vendee, and in giving the certificate under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which has permitted of the present appeal he limited it to the question whether the case was governed by Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib A.S. No. 526 of 1931. The appellant, white conceding that that case did bind the Courts below, says that it is bad law. He also challenges the validity of the certificate granted by Horwill J., in that it limited his grounds of appeal. He says that as a certificate was granted he is at liberty to say that the Subordinate Judge and Horwill, J., erred in refusing to allow him to raise the question of the effect of the sixth defendant's minority at the time of the sale to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib.

    3. It will be convenient to deal first of all with the contention that the learned Judge was wrong in attempting to limit his certificate. I consider that the appellant's objection is well founded. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent permits of an appeal from a single Judge of this Court sitting on the appellate side, where the Judge declares that "the case is a fit one for appeal". It is no function of the learned Judge to say what points are fit for appeal. It is for him to say whether 'the case' is a fit one for appeal. If he considers that it is, he can give the certificate, but he must leave the matter there. It is for the higher appellate Court to say what are the questions it will allow to be raised. It follows that in my opinion it is open to the Court to hear and decide the appellant's objection with regard to. the course taken below in respect of the contention which the appellant raised regarding the sixth defendant's capacity to contract.

    4. In my judgment, the appellant's objection that Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib and Ors. A.S. No. 526 of 1931 was wrongly decided is also well founded. In that case, as in the one now before us, a person had been appointed under the Guardians and Wards Act to be the guardian of the property of Mohamedan minors. The guardian applied for permission to Court to sell certain properties and permission was given subject to a condition which was not fulfilled. The question was whether in those circumstances the sale was a valid one. Ramesam, J., who delivered the judgment of the Bench after observing, Whereas in the case of a sale by a de jure guardian or a sale by a Court guardian who has obtained the permission of the Court and who has complied with the conditions precedent to the sale, if any, the sale is presumed to be prima facie valid and the quondam minor has to sue to set aside the sale and therefore Article 44 will become applicable, went on to say:

    . . . . but if the case is of a sale by a de facto guardian or by a Court guardian without obtaining sanction or without complying with the conditions precedent imposed by the Court granting sanction, then the minor is not bound to set aside the sale.

    5. These two statements are in conflict and the second statement ignores altogether the provisions of Section 30 of the Guardians and Wards Act. While the statement that an unlawful sale by a de facto guardian does not bind the minors can be taken to be correct so far as a guardian of a Mohamedan minor is concerned, it is certainly not the case where a guardian, appointed by the Court under the Guardians and Wards Act, has conveyed property without the sanction of the Court. As I have already observed, the transaction is voidable and not void and operates as a valid transfer unless set aside at the instance of the minor or minors concerned within the period allowed by the law of limitation. The decision of Ramesam and Cornish,. JJ., not only runs directly contrary to unambiguous words of the statute, it ignores three decisions of this Court which were binding upon the learned Judges, namely, Sinnayya Pillai v. "Munisami Iyan (1899) 9 M.L.J. 64 : I.L.R. 22 Mad. 289, Periakaruppan Chetty v. Kandasami Chetty 1933 M.W.N. 791 and Sivanmalai Goundan v. Arunachalam Goundan (1938) 2 M.L.J. 428. I fail to understand the reference made to a sale which is 'prima facie valid', because the statute leaves no doubt that a transfer made by a lawful guardian without sanction of the Court is valid until it is set aside. The decision in Rahima Bi v. Abdul Vakil Sahib A.S. No. 526 of 1931 cannot be allowed to stand in so far as it relates to transfers made by guardians appointed by the Court. Where the transfer is made by a de facto guardian the position may be very different. Therefore, I would allow this objection and hold that the suit is barred by limitation so far as the interest of the ninth respondent is concerned. It is not barred so far as the interest of the tenth respondent is concerned because the suit was filed within three years of the date on which he attained majority and Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib obtained a valid transfer of his interest in the property.

    6. It remains to" decide the appellant's contention that he should have been allowed to have raised his objection with regard to the passing of the sixth defendant's interest. I consider that inasmuch as the evidence on which the plaintiffs relied showed conclusively that the sixth defendant was a minor when she purported to sell her interest to Mohamed Ghulam Hussain Sahib on the 31st of January, 1932, the appellant should have been allowed to amend his memorandum of appeal and the Court should have dealt with this additional objection. It is true that the appellant did not raise this contention in his written statement and the evidence on which he was relying was adduced in order to establish the contention that the sixth defendant was a major, but the plaintiffs succeeded in negativing this evidence and establishing that the sixth defendant was a minor. In these circumstances, the appellant was entitled to say to the Court that even on the plaintiffs' own evidence, they are not entitled to a decree for the sixth defendant's interest. But instead of allowing the contention to be raised, the Subordinate Judge gave a decree to the plaintiffs in respect of property to which they themselves had shown that they had no title. It would be manifestly wrong to give the plaintiffs a decree for property in respect of which they clearly have no title, and consequently, I would allow this further objection.

    7. The result is that the appeal succeeds so far as it concerns the interest of the ninth respondent and the sixth defendant. Therefore the decree will be amended by limiting it to the interest of the tenth respondent. The appellant is entitled to his costs before the Subordinate Judge, Horwill, J., and in this Court; he will also get his costs in the trial Court proportionate to the value of the interests of the ninth respondent and the sixth defendant. The plaintiffs-respondents will get costs in the trial Court based on the value of the tenth respondent's interest in the property. They will have no costs beyond this. The case will be remanded to the trial Court to pass a final decree for partition based on this judgment.

    Mockett, J.

    8. I entirely agree. As we are overruling a judgment of a Bench 'of this Court, I desire to note a certain aspect of the judgment of the Bench which I find it difficult to follow. Section 29 of the Guardians and Wards Act provides for the alienation of minor's property by his guardian and sets out the circumstances under which it may or may not be alienated. It may not, without the previous permission of the Court, be mortgaged, charged or transferred and there is a restriction on leases. Section 31 gives the Court power to attach to the acts mentioned in Section 29 a number of conditions, if the Court thinks fit. It is obvious from a reading of Section 30 that a disposal of immovable property in contravention of Section 29 read if necessary with Section 31, which the Act enables 'any other person affected' to attack is valid unless held to be otherwise. Ramesam, J., has stated thus:

    Whereas in the case of a sale by a de jure guardian or a sale by a Court : guardian who has obtained the permission of the Court and who has complied with the conditions precedent to the sale, if any, the sale is presumed to be prima facie valid and the quondam minor has to sue to set aside the sale and therefore Article 44 will become applicable.

    9. In other words, the learned Judge envisages a suit e.g., by a minor attacking the transfer by a lawful guardian who has in every way complied with all the conditions which the Court has set out. Exactly what sort of suit that is, I find it difficult to understand unless it relates to a transfer obtained by fraud under a cloak of lawful authority. The suit which the Act does envisage, e.g., in the case of a sale by a Court guardian without obtaining sanction or without complying with conditions precedent which has to be set aside under Section 30 and to which Article 44 applies the learned Judge expressly says need not be instituted for a period of twelve years and then not for an order setting aside the sale but under Article 144, Limitation Act, for possession. I have merely set out this distinction in the judgment to lend emphasis to my respectful dissent from it.

    Krishnaswami Aiyangar, J.

    10. I agree with the judgment of my Lord, the Chief Justice and have nothing further to add.

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    Comments

    Mir Ghulam Hussain Sahib (), v. Ayesha Bibi And Twelve Others (S),
    (Feb 18, 1941)