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  • Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 55, Clause 2 of Transfer of Property Act
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  • Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section 55, Clause 2 of Transfer of Property Act
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute arises from a deed of sale exhibited as Ex. A, by which the vendor (father of Defendants 1 to 3) purported to sell to the 1st Plaintiff (1st Appellant) a parcel comprising 30 acres 59 cents. The sale to the appellants took place on 5th May 1896. Ex. A recited earlier link deeds (a sale of 16th March 1875 by Suryanarayanaraju's wife to Chinakondaraju; a sale of 21st February 1878 by Chinakondaraju to Jagannatha Raju; and a sale of 30th August 1878 by Jagannatha Raju to the vendor) and described the vendor conveying his "right, title and interest" in the property.

The Subordinate Judge construed Ex. A as not containing any express warranty of title and held that any warranty implied by Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act was negatived by special contract in Ex. A. Subsequently, the reversioners obtained a decree on 30th March 1911 setting aside the widow's sale (on which the vendor's title was based) and obtained possession on 29th November 1911. The High Court upheld that decree on 7th October 1914 on appeal from the present plaintiff. The present suit was instituted on 6th October 1917 challenging the defendant's dispossession and seeking damages for breach of covenant (including quiet enjoyment).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ex. A contains an express covenant for title (and for quiet enjoyment), or whether the implied warranty under Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act is negatived by the terms and recitals of Ex. A.
  2. Whether specific language in Ex. A — notably the recital of prior deeds, the use of the phrase "right, title and interest," and the omission of the word "others" in a customary covenant phrase — operates to exclude or qualify the vendor's covenant for title.
  3. When the cause of action for breach of covenant (particularly quiet enjoyment) accrues for limitation purposes: whether from the date of the first court's decree, from the appellate decision, from dispossession, or from the date of sale (where the sale is alleged to be void ab initio).
  4. Which article of limitation applies: Article 97 (three years for money paid on an existing consideration which afterwards failed) or Article 116 (six years for compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered), and the appropriate starting point for the prescribed period.
  5. The measure of relief if the plaintiffs succeed (assessment of damages, interest, mesne profits and costs) given the facts as found.

Arguments of the Parties

Lower Court's Finding / Respondent's Position (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The Subordinate Judge concluded Ex. A did not contain an express warranty of title.
  • He held that the warranty implied by Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act was negatived by a special contract to the contrary embodied in Ex. A, relying upon the recitals of previous deeds and the wording "right, title and interest".
  • Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the decision in Subramania Aiyar v. Saminatha Aiyar (1897) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 69, 7 M.L.J. 319, and argued that the existence of an express covenant may qualify or displace implied covenants; in that case an express contractual limitation of remedies was held effective.
  • An argument (as recorded) was made that the omission of the word "others" from a customary phrase ("free of obstruction arising from agnates or king or neighbour or others") was deliberate and intended to qualify the covenant for title in Ex. A.

Appellate Court / Position advanced before the Court (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Appellate Court assessed Ex. A and found that the document, when properly construed with reference to the subject matter, contains an express covenant for title and for quiet enjoyment.
  • The court also held that even if Ex. A were not to be treated as containing an express covenant, Section 55, Clause (2) would nevertheless import into the contract a seller's assurance that the interest he professes to transfer subsists and that he has power to transfer it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Section v. Maph, 68 E.R. 859 Principle that a vendor who intends to limit or qualify the purchaser's position must express himself with reasonable clearness; ambiguous words are construed in the purchaser's favour. The court relied on this authority to emphasise that clear and unambiguous language is required to negative a covenant for title; ambiguous recitals cannot be held to deprive a purchaser of the benefit of a covenant for title.
Page v. Midland Railway Co. (1894) L.R. 1 Ch. 11 at p. 20 Rule that a vendor who does not intend a covenant for title to extend to defects disclosed must word his covenant to cover or exclude such defects — the covenant must be clearly explained and controlled. Used to support the proposition that recitals of defects or prior transactions do not automatically exclude an express covenant; the vendor must take care to word any exclusion clearly.
Raghava Aiyangar v. Samachariar (1918) I.L.W. 8 Restatement of the rule that a vendor must use clear words if he intends to limit or qualify a covenant for title. Cited to show that the same construction rule is followed in the local jurisprudence and to support the court's insistence on clarity where a covenant is to be negatived.
Digambar Das v. Srimathi Nishibala Debi (1910) 15 C.W.N. 655 at 659 Same rule of construction regarding vendor's covenant for title. Cited as being consistent with the principle applied by the court that ambiguous or unclear words will not be held to exclude a covenant for title.
Subramania Aiyar v. Saminatha Aiyar (1897) I.L.R. 21 Mad. 69, 7 M.L.J. 319 Held that an express covenant can qualify or restrain the operation of implied covenants; an express contractual limitation on remedies may preclude other rights which general law would otherwise give. The respondents relied on this case, but the appellate court held that it did not lay down a different rule of law; it confirms that express covenants can displace implied ones but does not justify construing Ex. A as negativing the vendor's covenant here.
Subbaraya Reddiar v. Rajagopala Reddiar (1914) M.W.N. 376 Authority for the proposition that mere knowledge by the vendee of a defect does not by itself defeat the vendee's right under Section 55, Clause (2). Cited to support the principle that recitals or known defects do not automatically absolve a vendor from liability under an implied covenant.
Thekkamangalath Raman alias Kochu Podwal v. Kakkasai Pozhiyot Manakkal Karnavan (1916) 28 M.L.J. 184 Support for the proposition that the vendee's knowledge of defects does not per se defeat the implied covenant under Section 55, Clause (2). Relied upon to reinforce that knowledge of defects disclosed by recitals does not cancel the vendor's implied contractual obligations.
Vellayappa Rowthen v. Bava Rowthen (1916) 29 I.C. 747 Similar authority that mere knowledge is not enough to negate the protections of Section 55, Clause (2). Used in the same way as the other local authorities to show continuity of the rule in local decisions.
Rajagopalan v. Thiruppanandel Tambiran (1909) 17 M.L.J. 149 Authority relied upon by the Subordinate Judge to count limitation time from the date of the decision of the High Court (appellate decree). The appellate court held that this ruling (and similar ones) must be regarded as not good law to the extent that they postpone the running of limitation until the appellate decision; it instead followed the Privy Council authority described below.
Juscurn Bold v. Pirthi Chaand Lal Chowdhury (1918) I.L.R. 46 Cal. 670 (Privy Council) Held that where failure of consideration (or relevant event) occurs at the date of the first court's decree, limitation runs from that first decree and is not postponed until the appellate decision; an original decree is not suspended by appeal for limitation purposes. The court relied on this Privy Council decision to hold that time runs from the judgment of the first Court, thereby displacing the Subordinate Judge's reliance on Rajagopalan for that proposition.
Venkata Narasimhulu v. Peramma (1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 173 : 5 M.L.J. 32 Authority that if a deed of sale is void ab initio, the cause of action for breach of covenant for title may arise on the date of sale (relevant to suits under Article 62). The court distinguished this authority on the facts, noting the present sale was voidable (at the instance of the reversioners) rather than void ab initio; therefore the cause of action for quiet enjoyment arose on dispossession, not on the date of sale.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a textual and contextual construction of Ex. A. Key steps in the reasoning were:

  1. Construction of Ex. A: The court examined the recital of prior deeds and the operative words of conveyance ("right, title and interest") and concluded that these words must be construed with reference to the subject matter. The vendor clearly intended to convey the fee simple of the land he claimed to be entitled to; the phrase did not mean "right, title and interest, if any" and could not be read to protect a vendor who had no saleable interest at all.
  2. On the customary covenant phrase and omission of "others": The court addressed the argument that the omission of the word "others" from a customary local covenant phrase was deliberate and meant to qualify the covenant. The court found this contention untenable: if the phrase imports a general covenant for title, omission of the single word "others" made no material difference, particularly in light of the subsequent clause promising that the vendor would "see that the sale is given effect to in your favour without any obstruction."
  3. Effect of recitals: The court rejected the lower court's view that recitals of prior transactions and the wording of Ex. A operate as a warning that the vendor had no title or that his title was liable to be defeated so as to exempt him from liability. Recitals of the chain of title do not automatically negate a covenant for title.
  4. Express vs. implied covenant: The court held that Ex. A contains an express covenant for title (and for quiet enjoyment). It further observed that even if Ex. A were construed not to contain an express covenant, Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act would itself import a seller's contractual assurance that the interest he professed to transfer subsisted and that he had power to transfer it; the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that the terms of Ex. A negatived the effect of Section 55.
  5. On limitation and accrual of cause of action: The court analysed the timeline: widow's sale set aside 30th March 1911; dispossession happened 29th November 1911; appellate decision upholding the first decree was on 7th October 1914; suit initiated 6th October 1917. The Subordinate Judge had applied Article 97, treating time from the date of failure (counted from the High Court decision per Rajagopalan). The appellate court, relying on the Privy Council decision in Juscurn Bold v. Pirthi Chaand Lal Chowdhury, held that time runs from the first Court's judgment rather than being postponed until the appellate decision. Consequently, the Subordinate Judge's reliance on Article 97 and the flow of time from the appellate decision was incorrect to that extent.
  6. However, the court agreed with the Subordinate Judge's application of Article 116 (six years for compensation for breach of a contract in writing registered), adopting the view that the covenant for quiet enjoyment was broken when the plaintiffs were dispossessed (29th November 1911) and that limitation should be counted from that date. The court distinguished authorities that treat the cause of action as arising on the date of sale where the sale is void ab initio (e.g., Venkata Narasimhulu v. Peramma), noting that in the present case the sale was voidable (by the reversioners) and that the covenant for quiet enjoyment could not be said to be broken until actual dispossession.
  7. Remedy calculation: Having found a breach of covenant for title and quiet enjoyment, the court assessed damages by reference to the purchase price and consequential payments by the appellants (mesne profits and costs obtained under the reversioners' decree), and directed interest at six per cent from the date of dispossession.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding (core ruling): The appellate court reversed the Subordinate Judge's conclusion that Ex. A negatived an express or implied covenant under Section 55, Clause (2). It held that Ex. A contains an express covenant for title and for quiet enjoyment (and, alternatively, that Section 55(2) would import the seller's assurance if no express covenant were found). The court also held that the cause of action for breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment accrued on dispossession (29th November 1911) and that Article 116 (six-year period) applied; it rejected the Subordinate Judge's reliance on counting time from the appellate decision in the way he applied Article 97.

Immediate consequences and relief awarded:

  • The plaintiffs (appellants) were awarded a decree for damages calculated as: Rs. 2,800 (the purchase price) plus interest on that amount at six per cent from the date of dispossession (29th November 1911), plus mesne profits paid under the reversioners' decree (Rs. 1,071), plus costs paid under that decree (Rs. 1,272-10-0).
  • The appellants were awarded their costs against the respondents in both the present Court and the lower Court.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates established rules on construction of covenants for title and on the accrual of causes of action for breach of quiet enjoyment. The opinion does not announce a novel legal principle beyond the application and clarification of existing authorities to the facts; its effect is primarily to resolve the parties' rights and liabilities in this litigation.

This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added or inferred.

    Muhammad Ali Sheriff Sahib v. Budharaju Venkatapathi Raju

    1. Upon the construction of Ex. A which is a deed of sale in favour of the 1st Plaintiff (1st Appellant) by the father of Defendants 1 to 3 the Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion that, it did not contain any express warranty of title and that the warranty implied by Section 55, Clause 2 of Transfer of Property Act was negatived by special contract to the contrary embodied in Ex. A. Ex. A recites " it has been settled previously to dispose of by sale to you for Rs. 2,800 my right, title and interest in the marginally noted 30 acres 59 cents of land." Then it sets out the title of the vendor beginning with a deed of sale of 16th March, 1875,exe-cuted by D, Suryanarayanaraju's wife Venkataramanaiah alias Ramaniah in favour of Chinakondaraju and next the sale, dated 21st February, 1878, by Chinakondaraju to Jagannatha Raju who sold the property to the vendor under Ex. A by a deed, dated 30th August, 1878. It goes on to state that the vendee and the others had been in possession of the land under a cowle granted by the vendor and that " you, the vendee shall henceforward be enjoying the same hereditarily and with right of alienation by gift, sale or otherwise as you please. Removing the hindrances to this arising from my agnates or king or neighbour I shall see that the sale is given effect to in your favour without any obstruction. We understand that the phrase " free of obstruction arising from agnates or king or neighbour or others" is the usual covenant for title used in deeds of sale in Telugu districts. But it is pointed out that if that phrase imports a general covenant for title, we must hold that the omission of the word " others" was deliberate and meant to qualify that covenant. It is not possible to accept this contention unless the phrase was used as an absolute covenant for title it is difficult to understand what else could have been meant by providing against obstruction from vendor's agnates, the vendor being a male or from his neighbour. In our opinion the omission of the word " others " can make no difference in this connection. And this is made quite clear from the next clause " I shall see that the sale is given effect to in your favour without any obstruction."

    2. The argument which found favour with the lower court was based on the fact that the previous deeds of sale of this land including the one by Suryanarayanaraju's widow are specifically recited and also on the statement in Ex. A that the " right, title and interest " of the vendor in the land was intended to be sold. As regards the last that must be construed with reference to the subject matter of the conveyance. What the vendor clearly wanted to convey was the fee simple of the land to which he claimed to be entitled and the phrase "right, title and interest" does not mean right title and interest if any and the phrase could not be taken to protect a vendor who it turns out had no saleable interest at all in the property. The recital of the previous transactions which formed the links in the chain of the vendor's title has not the effect in law of warning the vendee that the vendor had no title or that he had a title liable to be defeated because of some hidden defect so as to exempt the vendor from all liability. We think Ex. A contains an express covenant for title. Even supposing that it does not, still a contract on the part of the seller would be imported by virtue of Section 55, Clause (2) of the Transfer of Property Act to the effect that the interest which he professed to transfer to the buyer subsisted and that he had power to transfer the same. We have already indicated that upon the terms of the document the Subordinate Judge was wrong in holding that a contract to the contrary could be gathered from the terms of Ex. A within the meaning ot Section 55.

    3. The law is well settled that the effect of a covenant for title is not to be got rid of except by the vendor indicating to the purchaser by use of clear and unambiguous expressions that he did not mean to guarantee that he had a good title to the property and was entitled to convey the same. It will be sufficient in this connection to refer to the case of Section v. Maph 68 E.R. 859 where at p. 862 Knight Bruce V.C. says " when the vendor sells property under stipulations which are against common right and place the purchaser in a position less advantageous than that in which he otherwise would be, it is incumbent on the vendor to express himself with reasonable clearness ; if he uses expressions reasonably capable of misconstruction, if he uses ambiguous words the purchaser may generally construe them in the manner most advantageous to himself " and to the case of Page v. Midland 'Railway Co. (1894) L.R. 1 Ch. 11 at p. 20 where it is stated "If a vendor does not intend that his covenant for title shall extend to defects disclosed to the purchaser whether on the face of the deed or aliunde the vendor must take care to word his covenant, so as in terms to cover such defects, or he must insert some clause in the deed clearly by explaining and controlling his covenant. This is in accordance with the ordinary rules of construction and with fair dealing.... There is no authority for not giving effect to the clear and express words of a vendor's covenant for title simply because a defect covered by them was disclosed by a recital in the conveyance." The same rule of law is laid down in Raghava Aiyangar v. Samachariar (1918) I.L.W. 8 and Digambar Das v. Srimathi Nishibala Debi (1910) 15 C.W.N. 655 at 659.

    4. Reliance was placed by the learned Vakil for the respondent on a judgment of Subramania Aiyar and Davies, JJ. in Subramania Aiyar v. Saminatha Aiyar (1897) I.L.R 21 Mad. 69, 7 M.L.J. 319. We do not find that the law is laid down differently there, All that is laid down is that an express covenant will do away with the effect of all the implied ones and that the insertion of any express covenant on the part of the grantor would qualify and restrain the force and operation of an implied covenant within the import and effect of an express, covenant. In that case it was held that there was a special contract by which the vendor bound himself to pay a fixed sum of money by way of damages and that the plaintiff therefore was not entitled to any other rights which the general law but for this contract would have given him. It must be taken to be well established that mere knowledge on the part of the vendee of a defect in the title of the vendor would not by itself defeat the Vendee's right on the basis of a covenant implied by Section 55 Clause (2). See Subbaraya Reddiar v. Rajagopala Reddiar (1914) M.W.N. 376. Thekkamangalath Raman alias Kochu Podwal v. Kakkasai Pozhiyot Manakkal Karnavan (1916) 28 M.L.J. 184 and Vellayappa Rowthen v. Bava Rowthen (1916) 29 I.C. 747.

    5. The next question argued before us is one of limitation and the facts which gave rise to it are as follows :--The sale to the appellants as already stated was on the 5th May 1896. The reversioners to the estate of Suryanarayanaraju to whom this property belonged and whose widow made the sale on which the present vendor's title is based obtained a decree on 30th March 1911 setting aside the widow's sale. They obtained possession on 29th November 1911. An appeal having been filed from that decree by the present plaintiff the decree of the first Court was upheld by the High Court on the 7th October 1914. The present suit was instituted on the 6th October 1917. The learned Subordinate Judge overruled the plea of limitation firstly on the ground that Article 97 which lays down three years for a suit for money paid upon an existing consideration which afterwards failed, from the date of the failure applied, and following the decision of this Court in Rajagopalan v. Thiruppanandel Tambiran (1909) 17 M.L.J. 149 he held that time Would be counted from the date of the decision of the High Court, that is 7th October 1914. So far as Article 97 is concerned according to a very recent decision of the Privy Council in Juscurn Bold v. Pirthi Chaand Lal Chowdhury (1918) I.L.R. 46 Cal. 670 time would run from the judgment of the first Court and would not be postponed till the decision of the Appellate Court. Sir Lawrence Jenkins who delivered the judgment of the Board says at page 678

    " Both Courts have held that the failure of consideration was at the date of the first Court's decree. Their Lordships feel no doubt that as between these two decrees this is the correct view, for whatever may be the theory under other systems of law, under the Indian law and procedure an original decree is not suspended by the presentation of an appeal nor its operation interrupted where the decree on appeal is one of dismissal."
    The ruling of this Court relied on by the Subordinate Judge and other rulings to that effect must therefore to this extent be held not to be good law. But we think that the Subordinate Judge was right in applying Article 116, which allows 6 years for a suit for compensation for the breach of the contract in writing registered from the date of the breach. In this case there is not only an express covenant for title but also one for quiet enjoyment and that latter covenant must be taken to have been broken when the plaintiff was dispossessed and possession was given to the reversioners, i.e., on the 29th November 1911. In the case before the Judicial Committee above referred to it was also contended that the period of limitation should be taken to have begun to run when the plaintiff's possession was lost. But they held that the quality of possession acquired by the purchaser in that case (it was apparently merely formal and not actual possession) was such as to exclude the idea that the starting point was to be sought in the disturbance of possession. But that could not be predicated of the possession of the present plaintiffs who were in actual possession and enjoyment of the property until dispossessed in execution of the decree obtained by the reversioners. It has been held in some cases that where a deed of sale is found to be void ab initio the cause of action for breach of covenant for title arises on the date of the sale See Venkata Narasimhulu v. Peramma ( 1894) I.L.R. 18 Mad. 173 : 5 M.L.J. 32 if the suit is one covered by Article 62. But in this case it could not be said that the cause of action for compensation for breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment arose on the date of sale. The sale was not void ab initio but only voidable at the instance of the reversioners. The covenant for quiet possession could not be said to have been broken until the date of disturbance of the plaintiff's possession.

    6. The appeal must be allowed and the plaintiffs will have a decree for damages which will be assessed as follows : Rs. 2,800 the price which the first plaintiff paid for the property plus interest on that amount at six per cent, from the date of dispossession, namely, 29th November 1911, plus the amount of mesne profits which they had to pay under the decree in the reversioner's suit, namely, Rs. 1,071 and also costs paid by them under that decree amounting to Rs. 1,272-10-0. The appellants will have their costs from the respondents both in this and in the lower Court.

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    Muhammad Ali Sheriff Sahib v. Budharaju Venkatapathi Raju
    (Jan 28, 1920)