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citation codes
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  • Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, the expression in Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Civil Procedure Code itself, Section 266 was referred to in Section 354
  • Section 2(e) of the older Provincial Insolvency Act III of 1907
  • Civil Procedure Code or in the Provincial Insolvency Act.
  • Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act,
  • SECTION 52 PRESIDENCY TOWNS INSOLVENCY ACT
  • Section 266 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877
  • Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act,
  • Section 2(d) in the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Section 53 of the present Code of 1908.
  • Section 60 of the present Code of 1908.
  • Provincial Insolvency Act V of 1920
  • Provincial Insolvency Act the Act
  • PRESIDENCY TOWNS INSOLVENCY ACT
  • PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT
  • Section 52(2)(b)
  • Section 2(e). 26.
  • Section 2(d)
  • Section 2(e)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, the expression in Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Civil Procedure Code itself, Section 266 was referred to in Section 354
  • Section 2(e) of the older Provincial Insolvency Act III of 1907
  • Civil Procedure Code or in the Provincial Insolvency Act.
  • Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act,
  • SECTION 52 PRESIDENCY TOWNS INSOLVENCY ACT
  • Section 266 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877
  • Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act,
  • Section 2(d) in the Provincial Insolvency Act
  • Section 53 of the present Code of 1908.
  • Section 60 of the present Code of 1908.
  • Provincial Insolvency Act V of 1920
  • Provincial Insolvency Act the Act
  • PRESIDENCY TOWNS INSOLVENCY ACT
  • PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT
  • Section 52(2)(b)
  • Section 2(e). 26.
  • Section 2(d)
  • Section 2(e)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judicial Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns whether the Official Receiver (under the Provincial Insolvency Act, V of 1920) is entitled to sell joint family property of an insolvent Hindu father, including the undivided interests of his sons, to satisfy the father's debts so long as those debts are neither illegal nor immoral. The Lower Court held that the Official Receiver could sell the whole joint property and upheld a sale effected by the Receiver. The appellants (the sons) challenged that decision. The appeal was heard by a three-judge Bench. The record also shows that the insolvent father died before the Receiver effected the sale.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether under the Provincial Insolvency Act the Official Receiver acquires (a) the undivided share of the sons or (b) the father's conditional power of disposal over the joint family property, so as to be able to sell the whole joint property to pay the father's debts.
  2. What is the effect of the Privy Council decision in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) on the question in (1), particularly in view of differences between the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and the Provincial Insolvency Act?
  3. Whether the death of the insolvent father before the Receiver's sale prevents the Receiver from exercising any power of sale.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The Official Receiver has no power to sell the sons' undivided interests; the Receiver cannot be treated as having vested shares of the sons.
  • The Privy Council's ruling in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal implies that neither the shares of the sons nor the father's conditional power to dispose of them vests in an Official Assignee/Receiver; consequently, the Receiver can, if at all, only proceed against the sons' shares by suit.
  • Because the Provincial Insolvency Act lacks a provision analogous to Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, the Provincial Act should not be construed to vest in the Receiver the father's power to sell the whole joint property.
  • It was argued that a 'power' cannot be treated as 'property' (relying on Ex parte Gilchrist, In re Armstrong), suggesting the Receiver cannot be said to have acquired such a power as property.
  • It was argued that the death of the insolvent father before the sale meant the power came to an end and the Receiver's sale was therefore void (relying on Nichols to Nixey).

Respondent / Official Receiver (and supporting arguments in the opinion)

  • The Receiver acquired, by virtue of the Provincial Insolvency Act (in particular Section 28 and the definition of 'property' in Section 2(d)), the father's power to dispose of the joint family property for payment of his just debts; accordingly the Receiver was entitled to sell the whole joint property, including the sons' conditional interests, for such debts that were not illegal or immoral.
  • The Privy Council decision in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal, while holding that the sons' undivided shares do not vest in the Assignee under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, did not decide that the father's disposing power could not pass; their Lordships even observed that under Section 52 or otherwise the joint property "may in a proper case be made available for the payment of the father's just debts."
  • The English authority on general powers of appointment (Ex parte Gilchrist, In re Armstrong) is distinguishable because the Hindu father's conditional disposing power is different in nature from the English general power of appointment.
  • Section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act enables proceedings to continue after the death of the insolvent for realization and distribution of the property, so the Receiver could exercise the power of sale notwithstanding the father's death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Aiyar (1922) I.L.R. 46 M 54 : 43 M L J 569 Supported the proposition that the Official Assignee/Receiver acquires the father's power of disposition (not the sons' undivided shares themselves). Relied upon as part of a line of authorities holding that the Receiver has the father's disposing power and can deal with sons' interests to the extent the father could have lawfully done so.
Sellamuthu Servai, In re (1923) I.L.R. 47 M 87 : 46 M L J 86 (Full Bench) Affirmed that what vests is the father's power to dispose, not the sons' actual undivided shares. Used to show consistent Madras authority for vesting of the disposing power in the Receiver.
Sankaranarayana Pillai v. Rajamani (1923) I.L.R. 47 M 462 : 46 M L J 314 Affirmed that the Official Receiver can exercise the father's power to sell the whole joint estate to pay antecedent debts (not illegal or immoral). Cited as additional authority in support of the Receiver's power to sell the joint property.
Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan (1924) 47 M L J 487 Expressed the contrary view that the sons' undivided share itself vested in the Official Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act. The opinion in the present case expressly overruled this decision insofar as it held that the undivided share of the son itself vests in the Official Receiver.
Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L 1 : 47 M L J 857 (Privy Council) Held that the undivided shares of the sons do not vest in the Official Assignee under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act; discussed Section 52 and Section 2(e) and indicated that the property defined in Section 2(e) contemplates absolute and unconditional power of disposal. The Court treated this ruling as authoritative that the sons' shares do not vest; but it interpreted the Privy Council as not excluding the possibility that the father's conditional disposing power may vest (and therefore applied the Privy Council's reasoning to overrule Kuppuswami to the extent of protecting sons' shares while upholding vesting of the disposing power under the Provincial Act).
Ex parte Gilchrist, In re Armstrong (1886) 17 Q B D 521 Authority cited for the general proposition that a (general) power of appointment is not property in the English law context. The Court distinguished that English authority as dealing with an English general power of appointment, which differs from the Hindu father's conditional disposing power; therefore the English case was not treated as controlling the present issue.
Khem Chand v. Narain Das (1925) I.L.R. 6 L 493 Later authority consistent with the view that the disposing power vests (cited as supportive). Referred to as subsequent support for the Court's conclusion that the father's disposing power vests in the Receiver under the Provincial Act.
Shripad v. Basappa (1925) I.L.R. 49 B 785 Contains a dictum (Macleod, C.J.) expressing doubt that the father's disposing power vests in the Receiver. The Court noted this contrary dictum but observed it was not a considered opinion shared by the other member of the Bench; the Court rejected that dictum.
Nichols v. Nixey (1885) 29 Ch D 1005 English authority cited for the proposition that a trustee cannot exercise a power of appointment after the death of the donee of the power. The Court held the English authority inapplicable because Section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act allows proceedings to continue after the debtor's death for realization and distribution of property; hence death did not defeat the Receiver's power to realize assets.
Sahu Ramachandra v. Bhup Singh (1917) I.L.R. 39 A 437 : 33 M L J 14 (Privy Council) Privy Council decisions considered in the jurisprudential background concerning what vests on insolvency adjudication. Referred to as part of the body of Privy Council authority considered when assessing the correct construction of insolvency statutes and their effect on fathers' disposing powers.
Chet Ram v. Ram Singh (1922) I.L.R. 44 A 368 : 43 M L J 98 (Privy Council) Another Privy Council decision relevant to the interpretation of insolvency law and rights affected by insolvency adjudication. Referred to in the background on how Privy Council authority bears on the construction of insolvency statutes.
Behari Lal v. Sat Narain (1922) I.L.R. 3 L 329 (Full Bench of Lahore) Full Bench view that the sons' undivided interests passed to the Official Assignee (later reversed by Privy Council). Mentioned as the Lahore decision which the Privy Council reviewed and disagreed with; used in context to explain the legal controversy antecedent to the Privy Council decision.
Bank of England v. Vagliano Bros (1891) A C 107 An authority criticizing the method of construing a later Act by reference to prior Codes — used to caution against importing earlier Code constructions into insolvency legislation. Relied upon to reject an argument that the Provincial Insolvency Act should be construed by reference to the Civil Procedure Code decisions; supported the Court's approach to construe the insolvency statute on its own terms.
C.M.A. No. 115 of 1925 (unreported Bench decision of this Court) Unreported decision referred to as taking the same view (i.e., supporting vesting of the father's disposing power in the Receiver). Referred to as additional judicial support for the Court's conclusion; used as corroborative authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of linked legal determinations, staying strictly within the statutory language and the relevant precedents cited in the opinion:

  1. The Court framed the narrow core question as whether the Official Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act acquires the sons' undivided shares or at least the father's conditional power of disposal over joint family property so as to enable sale for payment of the father's debts that are not immoral or illegal.
  2. The Court surveyed existing decisions from this Court and other Indian High Courts. Most prior Indian decisions were read as endorsing that what vests in the Receiver is the father's disposing power (a "power" to sell the whole joint property for payment of debts) rather than the corporeal undivided shares of the sons; Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan was noted as a contrary decision which held that the sons' shares themselves vested.
  3. The Court examined the Privy Council's decision in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal. The Privy Council clearly held that the sons' undivided shares do not vest in the Official Assignee under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The Court accepted and applied that portion of the Privy Council's ruling to conclude that the undivided shares do not vest in the Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act either, and accordingly overruled Kuppuswami Goundan insofar as it held the shares themselves vested.
  4. The Court then addressed whether, notwithstanding that the sons' shares do not vest, the father's conditional power of disposal passes to the Receiver. The Court analysed the Provincial Insolvency Act provisions:
    • Section 28 (the vesting section) vests the whole of the property of the insolvent in the Official Receiver.
    • The definition of "property" in Section 2(d) (identical in wording to provisions used in earlier codes) can encompass rights of a Hindu father — i.e., his conditional disposing power over his sons' interests.
    The Court rejected the appellants' contention that the absence in the Provincial Act of a provision exactly like Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act prevented vesting of the power; instead, the Court held that Section 28 together with the definition of "property" sufficed to vest in the Receiver the father's disposing power as a species of property.
  5. The Court confronted the argument that a "power" cannot be treated as "property" (relying on Ex parte Gilchrist). It distinguished that English authority as addressing general powers of appointment under English law, different in character from the Hindu father's conditional disposing power. The Court also noted that Section 52 of the Presidency Act itself refers to such a power or capacity as a species of property, strengthening the conclusion that the Receiver acquires the disposing power.
  6. The Court addressed the effect of the insolvent father's death before the sale. It relied on Section 17 of the Provincial Insolvency Act, which provides that insolvency proceedings shall, unless the Court orders otherwise, be continued for realization and distribution of the property of the debtor. Thus, death did not prevent the Receiver from exercising the power of sale for realisation of assets. The English case Nichols v. Nixey was held inapplicable because it dealt with a different legal concept of power.
  7. On the cumulative basis of statutory construction (Sections 28, 2(d), and 17), precedent analysis (Madras High Court decisions and Privy Council guidance), and the statutory differences between the Presidency and Provincial enactments, the Court concluded that the Receiver was entitled to sell the whole joint property to satisfy the father's just debts (provided they were not illegal or immoral).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed; the Official Receiver's sale of the whole joint family property (including the exercise of the father's conditional power over his sons' undivided interests) to pay the father's just debts is upheld. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs to be paid out of the estate.

Implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Court expressly holds that the undivided shares of the sons do not vest in the Official Receiver as corporeal property; that aspect of Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan is overruled.
  • The father's conditional power of disposal over the joint family property is a form of "property" or proprietary capacity that vests in the Official Receiver under the Provincial Insolvency Act (in particular under Section 28 read with Section 2(d)), and the Receiver may exercise that power to sell the whole joint property to satisfy the father's legitimate debts (not illegal or immoral).
  • The death of the insolvent father before realization does not defeat the Receiver's authority to realize assets under Section 17 — the insolvency proceedings can be continued for realization and distribution.
  • No part of the Court's reasoning purports to create a broader rule beyond the statutory construction and precedent applied; the decision clarifies the application of the Provincial Insolvency Act in this factual situation and disapproves the contrary holding in Kuppuswami Goundan insofar as it held the sons' undivided shares vest.

Decision delivered by the Bench (including reasons and concurrence); costs awarded to be paid out of the estate as recorded in the judgment.

    T.S Balavenkata Seetharama Chettiar And Another (Petitioners), v. The Official Receiver, Tanjore, And 24 Others ( And Persons Added As Parties),

    1. The point for decision in this appeal is whether the Official Receiver in whom the property of an insolvent Hindu governed by the Law of Mitak-shara is vested under the Provincial Insolvency Act V of 1920 is entitled to sell the joint family property of the insolvent and his sons for his debts, they being neither illegal nor immoral. The Lower Court has held that he could and has upheld the sale by him. The appellants contend that he has no such power.

    2. The rulings of this Court have been in favour of recognizing such power and holding such sales to be valid both in the Presidency Town and in the mofussil. [See Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Aiyar (1922) I.L.R. 46 M 54 : 43 M L J 569, Sellamuthu Servai, In re (1923) I.L.R. 47 M 87 : 46 M L J 86 (F B), Sankaranarayana Pillai v. Rajamani (1923) I.L.R. 47 M 462 : 46 M L J 314 and Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan (1924) 47 M L J 487]. There was a difference of opinion as to whether the power to sell the joint property alone vested in the Official Assignee or Receiver or whether the undivided share itself of the sons vested in him. In the first three cases quoted above it Was ruled that the power alone vested but in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan (1924) 47 M L J 487 the opinion was expressed that the share itself vested. But all the cases were agreed that the Official Assignee or Receiver was entitled to sell the whole joint property and give a good title to the purchaser provided that the debts were such as the sons were, on account of their pious obligation, bound to pay from their joint property.

    3. The question has again been raised now on account of the recent ruling of the Privy Council in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L 1 : 47 M L J 857 (P C) and it is contended that the result of that decision is to compel us to hold that neither the shares of the sons nor the power to sell such shares vests in the Official Receiver and that he can proceed against the sons' share if at all only by way of suit. The Privy Council has no doubt clearly laid down that the shares of the sons do not vest in the Official Assignee. That decision was under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and one of the arguments used by their Lordships to arrive at their conclusion is based on the existence and the language of section 52 of that act, a section which finds no counterpart in the Provincial Insolvency Act. Nevertheless as the other arguments apply equally to the latter Act it seems to me that we must hold that the same principle governs cases under it in the mofussil. As a result we must overrule the decision in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan (1924) 47 M L J 487 in so far as it holds that the undivided share of the son itself vests in the Official Receiver.

    4. That does not however carry the appellants far enough to enable them to succeed in their appeal, for, if the Official Receiver has got the father's power to sell the joint property vested in him, he will be entitled to sell the whole joint property himself. It is therefore argued for the appellant that though under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act such a power may be vested in the Assignee by virtue of Section 52 there is no provision in the Provincial Insolvency Act to so vest it. 1 do not think the Legislature intended to make any such distinction between the Madras and the mofussil insolvencies as suggested by this argument. It cannot be said that their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down that such a power will not pass to the Official Assignee; it was not necessary lor them to do so for the purpose of the case before them which was one of a right of pre-emption claimed by the insolvent's son as owner of his share of the family property. The vesting of a power to sell it in the Official Assignee would not interfere with that right till he actually exercises that power and sells; a thing which had not been done in that case. In fact their Lordships expressly say: " It may be that under the provisions of section 52 or in some other way that property (i. e. the joint property) may in a proper case be made available for the payment of the father's just debts. " The contention, however, is that the effect of their Lordships' judgment is to prevent any vesting of such a power in mofussil cases at any rate as there is no express provision for it in the mofussil Act. It seems to me, however, that the provisions we have in the Act are sufficient to vest such a power. Section 28, which is the vesting section, vests the whole of the property of the insolvent in the Official Receiver. In the joint family property the insolvent father is not only entitled to his own share but has also got a power to sell the whole property including the son's share for payment of his just debts. it seems to me that under Section 28 itself his share as well as the power will vest in the Receiver as the insolvent's property It is not necessary to pray in aid the definition of "property" in Section 2(d) tor this purpose. There may be a difficulty in doing so as their Lordships seem to have been of opinion that Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, the wording of which is the same as that of Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act, contemplates only an " absolute and unconditional power of disposal " which a father's power is not as it depends upon the existence of debts liable to be satisfied out of the son's share. Section 28, however, by itself is enough, it seems to me, to vest that power in the Receiver as a species of property belonging to the father.

    5. Now it is argued that a power can never be treated as property and reliance is placed upon the case of Ex parte Gilchrist, In re Armstrong (1886) 17 Q B D 521, especially on the judgment of Fry, L.J., on page 531. In that case the learned Judges were dealing with what is called a general power of appointment under the English Law which is a very different thing in law from the power of the Hindu father under the Hindu Law which we are dealing with. Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act itself speaks of such a power or capacity of the father to sell as a species of property. I hold therefore that the Receiver had in this case the power to sell the whole joint property to pay the father's debts as they were neither immoral nor illegal debts and his sale must be upheld.

    6. I am fortified in my view as the same view was taken by a Bench of this Court in C.M.A. No. 115 of 1925 unreported and also by the Lahore High Court in Khem Chand v. Narain Das (1925) I.L.R. 6 L 493. There is an expression of opinion to the contrary by Macleod, C.J., in Shripad v. Basappa (1925) I.L.R. 49 B 785 who says on p. 787:

    "Speaking for myself, I do not think that when the manager of a joint Hindu family is adjudicated insolvent, the power which he had before his insolvency to dispose of family estate for proper purposes, must be considered as vesting in the Receiver or Official Assignee."
    It does not seem to be a considered opinion nor is it shared by Coyajee, J., who sat with him. The Chief Justice makes no reference to Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. With all respect I am unable to accept the Chief Justice's dictum.

    7. In this case one further argument has to be considered and that is that because the insolvent father died before the Receiver effected his sale, the sale was without authority and void. It is argued that the power came to an end with the death of the father and that the Receiver was no longer entitled to exercise it. For this argument reliance is placed on the case of Nichols to Nixey (1885) 29 Ch D 1005. The answer to this contention is provided for by Section 17 of the Act which deals with cases where the insolvent debtor dies pending proceedings in insolvency. That section enacts that unless the Court otherwise orders, the proceedings shall be continued so far as may be necessary for the realisation and distribution of the property of the debtor. The power of sale can thus be exercised for the realisation of the assets of the insolvent even though he is dead. The English case cited is thus not applicable.

    8. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs, to be paid out of the estate, of the Official Receiver and alienees each one set.

    Ramesam, J.

    9. As I agree with the judgments of my learned brothers, I will briefly give my reasons for doing so.

    10. Having regard to the reference to Section 52 of the Act at page 24 of the judgment in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L I : 47 M L J 857 (P C), I think there is very little doubt that the Privy Council intended to hold that the right of alienation of a Hindu father in respect of joint family property passes to the Official Assignee under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. I think the point is not capable of much argument. The more difficult question that arises before us is, whether in the case of the Provincial Insolvency Act the absence of a provision like Section 52 makes any difference, and, if so, what? The question turns upon what construction one may place on the definition of 'property in Section 2(d) of the Act. This definition is identical in language with Section 2(e) of the older Provincial Insolvency Act III of 1907 which has been repealed by the present Act. On the one hand Mr. Varada-chari contends that seeing that, under the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 which contained provisions relating to Provincial Insolvency, Section 266 should vest in the Receiver and that the Provincial Insolvency Act is only intended to consolidate the preceding state of the law, the definition of the word 'property' in the Provincial Insolvency Act ought to be construed so as to include the property itself and not merely the father's rights over it. To this argument, however, there are three replies. First, the Privy Council have pointed out that decisions under the Civil Procedure Code ought not to be used for construing the Insolvency Acts. The Code had a history of its own culminating in Section 53 of the present Code of 1908. Secondly, the House of Lords in Bank of England y. Vagliano Bros (1891) A C 107 condemned this mode of construing an Act, that is, we ought to look at the Insolvency Act by itself and not to be influenced by the fact that it was a continuation of the previous Civil Procedure Code of 1882. Thirdly, the identical words in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act have been construed by the Privy Council in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L I : 47 M L J 857 (P C) as applying only to property over which the insolvent had absolute power of disposal and until we see a reason to the contrary in the Act we are now considering I think, if possible, the words in this Act ought to receive the same construction. I must therefore reject Mr. Varadachari's contention that the property (including the son's share) itself vests in the Official Assignee. On the other hand it is contended by Mr. Rangachan that not even the father's rights over the property passed to the Official Assignee. Now, there is no doubt that the word 'property' may include without doing any violence to the term the rights of a Hindu father over joint family property under the Mitakshara Law. This is shown by Section 52 in the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. The only question is, whether we should construe the word 'property' in the Provincial Insolvency Act so as to exclude such rights. I am not able to see any reason why we should the absence of a section like Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act throwing no light on the matter. I therefore agree with the conclusion of my learned brothers.

    11. On the third point, namely, whether the death of the insolvent makes any difference, I agree that it does not.

    Venkatasubba Rao, J.

    12. This appeal raises a very important question, namely, what is the effect of the decision of the Judicial Committee in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L I : 47 M L J 857 (P C)? The Hindu Law recognises the power of a father, subject to certain conditions and restrictions, to deal with his son's undivided interest in joint family property. On a father being adjudicated an insolvent, what is the nature of the right, if any, that passes to the Official Assignee or the Official Receiver as the case may be? This is the question that this appeal raises. The appellants before us are the sons of an insolvent and they challenge the act of the Official Receiver, who, for paying off the father's debts, exercised the power to sell the son's interest also in family properties. The learned District Judge has held that the Receiver could validly exercise such a power in respect of debts not shown to be either illegal or immoral.

    13. Mr. Rangachari, the appellants' learned vakil, contends before us, that the judgment of the Judicial Committee must be taken to amount to a pronouncement, that on a father being adjudicated an insolvent, neither the son's undivided share nor the father's conditional power to dispose of that share, vests in the Official Assignee. The case decides unmistakably so far as the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is concerned, that the son's share as such does not vest in the Official Assignee. Does it further decide that the insolvent's conditional power to dispose of his son's interest does not also pass to the Official Assignee? The case having been decided with reference to the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, a further question arises, what is the bearing of that decision on the scope, in this respect, of the Provincial Insolvency Act the Act under which the present appeal has to be decided?

    14. The points raised being of considerable importance, this Bench, consisting of three Judges, has been specially constituted to hear this appeal.

    15. In order to understand properly the decision of the Judicial Committee, it is necessary to have regard first to the facts with reference to which the judgment was given, and, secondly, to bear in mind the divergent views on the subject taken by the Courts in India. In the case before the Privy Council, the question arose in regard to the right of pre-emption, which a son as a member of a joint family, claimed to exercise, after adjudication of his father, as an insolvent; and against the son the contention was put forward that the entire property having previously vested in the Official Assignee, 'the son ceased to have any proprietary interest in the property which would entitle him to exercise the right of pre-emption. A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court decided that on adjudication of the father which was before the suit, the son s undivided interest also passed to the Official Assignee and that consequently there was no right left in the son outstanding, which could be enforced in the suit. Did the undivided share of the son vest or not vest in the Official Assignee? This was the question that the. Judicial Committee had to decide, and disagreeing with the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court their Lordships held that it did not vest. If the High Court had held that what passed to the Official Assignee was not the son's undivided interest but the father's conditional power of disposal, the plaintiff's suit would not have been dismissed. In the light of these facts is there anything to show that the Judicial Committee intended to lay down that even the disposing power of the father did not pass? That the Judicial Committee has not said so in express terms is not disputed. The decreeing of the plaintiff's claim is not inconsistent, as I have said, with the recognition of the father's disposing power having passed to the Official Assignee.

    16. Then, in regard to the views held by the Indian Courts, there was a sharp divergence of opinion as to what vested in the Official Assignee on the adjudication of a Hindu father belonging to a joint undivided Hindu family. To bring out the real point at issue, I shall refer to a few recent cases decided by the High Courts in India. In the Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Aiyar (1922) I.L.R. 46 M 54 : 43 M L J 569 the Official Assignee contended that on the adjudication of the father, the interest of the minor sons of the insolvent in the family property vested in him. Sir Walter Schwabe, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court consisting of himself and Coutts Trotter, J., observes that it may be taken as established law, that the Official Assignee is not entitled to have vested in him the shares of the other members, although he can deal with them if the insolvent could lawfully have done so had there been no insolvency. In Sellamuthu Servai v. Ramaiya (1923) I.L.R. 47 M 87 : 46 M L J 86 (F B) the question had to be considered whether the Privy Council decisions in Sahu Rama-chandra v. Bhup Singh (1917) I.L.R. 39 A 437 : 33 M L J 14 (P C) and Chet Ram v. Ram Singh (1922) I.L.R. 44 A 368 : 43 M L J 98 (P C) affected the law as understood, in regard to the Official Assignee's power to deal with the son's interest during the insolvent's life-time. In each of the three separate judgments that were delivered, the point is emphasised that the accepted law is, that it is the father's power that vests in the Official Assignee and not the undivided share of the son Coutts Trotter, J. says thus:

    It was decided by a Bench of this Court consisting of two members of the present Bench in Official Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Aiyar (1922) I.L.R. 46 M 54 : 43 M L J 569 that the Official Assignee, though it cannot be said that the shares of the minors actually vest in him, has nevertheless the same rights of disposition of the family property for the satisfaction of the debts of the manager as the manager would himself have been entitled to exercise, if he had not been adjudicated insolvent.

    17. Krishnan, J. refers to it as settled law, that if the father has the right to sell the whole joint estate to pay off his antecedent debts, that power can be exercised by the Official Assignee. In Sankaranarayana Pillai v. Rajamani (1923) I.L.R. 47 M 462 : 46 M L J 314, the law was again stated in similar terms. Phillips, J. observes:

    Applying this principle to the present case, we find that (he Official Receiver had power to sell not only the share of the,adult insolvents but also it vested in him the power of these insolvents as father to sell their sons' interest in the property for the payment of antecedent debts.

    18. In my own judgment in that case, I expressed myself thus:

    The learned Subordinate Judge has found that the debts of the 1st and 2nd defendants were not incurred for illegal or immoral purposes and it is now a settled rule that the Official Receiver can exercise the right of the father to dispose of the son's interest in ancestral immoveable estate for the payment of the father's debts not tainted with illegality or immorality.

    19. The first two cases arose under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act and the third under the Provincial Insolvency Act and in each of these cases it was assumed that what vested in the Official Assignee was not the undivided share of the son but the conditional power of disposal possessed by the Hindu father.

    20. The point again came up before a Bench of the Madras High Court in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Marimuthu Goundan (1924) 47 M L J 487. That was a case under the Provincial Insolvency Act. It was there decided, contrary to the trend of the authority of this Court, that the entire undivided interest of the son vested in the Official Receiver as distinguished from the mere disposing power of the father. Spencer, O.C.J. thought that Official 'Assignee of Madras v. Ramachandra Aiyar (1922) I.L.R. 46 M 54 : 43 M L J 569 was wrongly decided owing to a concession errone ously made by the Advocate-General who argued that cas and preferred to follow the judgment of the Lahore High Court in Behari Lal v. Sat Narain (1922) I.L.R. 3 L 329 (F B), the very same deci sion which was later upset by the Privy Council in the case cited at the opening of this judgment, Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L 1 : 47 M L J 857 (P C). Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., who concurred with Spencer, O.C.J., felt bound to follow the Lahore decision and held that the share itself vested. He observed, however, that if the matter had been res Integra he would have taken the view that it was the bare power that vested and not the corporeal undivided interest.

    21. It was after these cases were decided by the Madras High Court that the question was raised before the Judicial Committee in the appeal from the Lahore case. The Madras cases to which I have made reference illustrate the conflict that prevailed in the Indian Courts on this question. Sir Shadi Lal, C.J., as one of the members of the Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, clearly indicated that if he had not been bound by authority he would have held that what vested was only the father's conditional power and not the son's undivided share. The Privy Council directed the whole of their judgment to show that the Lahore High Court's view, namely, that the share itself vested in the Official Assignee, was wrong. When their Lordships expressly say that they disapprove of one of these aforesaid two views, it seems to me that it would be most improper to read into their judgment, an intention to overrule by implication, the other and the exactly opposite view which had been repeatedly taken on this subject. These considerations seem to me to point strongly to the fact that the Judicial Committee could not have intended to lay down the very wide proposition for which Mr. Rangachari contends.

    22. A careful examination of the judgment itself leads me, on the contrary to the conclusion, that their Lordships recognise that although the son's undivided share does not pass, the father's conditional power of disposal does pass. Reference is made to Section 2(e) where the word 'property' is said to include any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit. They then refer to Section 52(2)(b) which enacts that the property of the insolvent shall comprise the capacity to exercise all such powers in respect of property as might have been exercised by the insolvent for his own benefit at the commencement of his insolvency. Under the first of these sections, it is the property that vests, under the second, it is the power that vests, and their Lordships point out that it is difficult to reconcile Section 52 with the proposition that the property itself vests in the Assignee. While thus they reject the doctrine that the property vests, they impliedly accept the theory that the power Vests. They again refer to Section 52 as containing a provision which enables the Official Assignee to have recourse to the son's share for the payment of the father's just debts. Section 52 can be invoked only by reason of the fact that under the section, the property that vests in the Official Assignee includes the capacity to exercise a power of disposal. The following sentence in their Lordships' judgment makes their meaning even more clear:

    It is certainly a startling proposition that the insolvency of one member of the family should of itself and immediately take from the other male members of the family their interests in the joint property and from the female members their right to maintenance and transfer the whole estate to an assignee of the insolvent for the benefit of his creditors.

    23. It admits of no doubt, that what their Lordships were combating in the whole of their judgment, was the view that the physical, corporeal, undivided shares of the son immediately vests in the Assignee as contrasted with, and distinguished from, the bare right of conditional disposal possessed by the Hindu father. It is also significant that it is stated towards the close of their judgment that the cases cited by their Lordships are not inconsistent with the conclusion at which they have arrived.

    24. I am therefore satisfied that Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L 1 : 47 M L J 857 (P C) is not an authority for the proposition that under the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act the conditional power of disposal of the father does not vest in the Official Assignee.

    25. I shall now proceed to deal with the second part of the question, viz., what bearing has this ruling on the scope of the Provincial Insolvency Act in this respect? The argument for the appellant may be shortly put thus: Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act is identical in language with Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The interpretation put by the Judicial Committee on Section 2(d) must therefore hold good in respect of Section 2(e).

    26. It is next urged that Section 2(e) has been construed as referring only to property over which the insolvent has an absolute and unconditional power of disposal, whereas a Hindu father's right is only a conditional right. The answer is twofold. Their Lordships were concerned with pointing out that Section 52 which vests merely the power, is irreconcilable with Section 2(e) which vests the property. In regard to Section 2(e) at the top of page 22, after saying that property is defined as including any property over which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit, they go on to say:

    And it may be said that a Hindu father's power to sell the joint property and apply the proceeds to the payment of his debts, is such a power.

    Later on at the same page.they observe:

    And S. a seems to contemplate an absolute and unconditional power of disposal.

    27. Their Lordships were clearly pointing out that the definition in Section 2 applied " unless there is something repugnant in the subject or context " and that Section 52 renders it repugnant to hold that in contravention of its express terms the property itself vests. However this may be, it seems to me to be somewhat far-fetched to suggest that such construction as might be deemed to have been placed upon the words in Section 2(e) was intended to be absolute and final irrespective of the context or the enactment where those words may occur. In the Provincial Insolvency Act there is no provision corresponding to Section 52(2)(b) which refers to the exercise of power over property. in construing therefore of Section 2(d) in the Provincial Insolvency Act we are not hampered by the fact of co-existence in the same enactment of another provision in apparent or real conflict with that section. These very words have been used by the Indian Legislature in enactment after enactment, in part materia with the Provincial Insolvency Act, to signify the conditional and restricted power possessed by a Hindu father. These identical words are used in Section 266 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1877 and 1882 and are reproduced in Section 60 of the present Code of 1908. In all these enactments, as in the Provincial Insolvency Act with which we are at present concerned, these words stand alone and are not controlled by a different set of words such as those that occur in Section 52 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. It must be borne in mind that their Lordships throughout in their judgment repeatedly point out that their decision is given in respect of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act alone. When the Law of Insolvency for the mofussil was a part of the Civil Procedure Code itself, Section 266 was referred to in Section 354 of the two earlier Codes, under which section the property of the insolvent vested in the Receiver. I am therefore of opinion that whatever be the meaning of the words in Section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, the expression in Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act includes the qualified and restricted power of a Hindu father.

    28. The only difficulty that still remains is, under this section, is it the property or the power that vests in the Official Receiver? The Privy Council have in very emphatic terms shown the unsoundness of the position that the property itself vests and although the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act alone was under discussion, their observations are of general application. In the face of those remarks it is impossible to hold that the property itself vests. Sir Shadi Lal, C.J. in the Lahore case, after adverting to cases under the Civil Procedure Code, felt bound to hold that it is the undivided share and not the qualified power that vests. It seems to me that there is nothing in the case decided under the various Codes that compels one to take the view that the property itself as distinguished from the power vests in the Official Receiver. The Legislature in using the phraseology it did in Section 2(d) of the Provincial Insolvency Act did no more than intend to enact that the insolvent's property includes also, in the case of a Hindu father, his disposing power over his son's undivided interest. This construction seems to me to be equally applicable whether the words are used in. the Civil Procedure Code or in the Provincial Insolvency Act. Till a contrary opinion was expressed in Kuppuswami Goundart v. Marimuthu Goundan (1924) 47 M L J 487 (which must now be regarded as overruled) this is the view that was taken by the Madras High Court in regard to the Presidency as well as the Provincial Insolvency Acts. In my opinion the authority of the Madras cases that have held that a Hindu father's qualified and restricted power to dispose of his son's undivided interest vests on his adjudication, in the Official Receiver has not been shaken by the recent pronouncement of the Privy Council in Sat Narain v. Behari Lal (1924) I.L.R. 6 L I : 47 M L J 857 (P C).

    29. I may add that my view receives support from two cases decided since the Privy Council ruling, one, a decision of a Bench of this Court (Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ.) in C.M.A. No. 115 of 1925, and the other a decision of the Lahore High Court, Khem Chand v. Narain Das (1925) I.L.R. 6 L 493.

    30. In the present case, after adjudication, the insolvent died. Does this fact make any difference? As the learned District Judge points out, Section 17 provides for this contingency, which runs thus:

    If a debtor by or against whom an insolvency petition has been presented dies, the proceedings in the matter shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be continued so far as may be necessary, for the realisation and distribution of the property of the debtor.

    31. Nichols to Nixey (1885) 29 Ch D 1005 has been cited for the proposition that the trustee cannot exercise a power of appointment after the death of the bankrupt, the donee of the power. The obvious answer to this is, that a decision which applies to powers in the ordinary legal sense of that term cannot be treated as an authority in regard to what is an entirely different thing, namely, the right, which has come to be described as power, under the Hindu Law of the father to dispose of his son's interest in the joint family property.

    32. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs as provided for in the judgment of my learned brother Krishnan, J.

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