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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs (inamdars of Lupuchendrapet) sought to resume a parcel of plaint land that had been granted for "mudam" service and to recover possession along with mesne profits. The defendants asserted long family possession (about 150 years), denied any default in performing the mudam duties and contended that they were entitled to retain enjoyment of the land so long as they were willing and able to perform those duties.

At trial the District Munsif found the land not resumable; the Subordinate Judge confirmed that finding. The plaintiff appealed. On review, the Lower Appellate Court (Subordinate Judge) concluded the grant could not be resumed. The appellant sought reversal in the second appeal considered in this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the grant of the land (granted for mudam service) is resumable by the grantor (i.e., whether the inam is resumable).
  2. What is the correct legal classification of the grant — (a) a grant made in lieu of wages for service, or (b) an absolute grant burdened with a condition of service — and how that classification affects the right of resumption.
  3. Whether legal presumptions ought to be drawn (as contended by the appellant) that: (i) a service grant should be presumed to be a grant in lieu of wages; or (ii) where services are personal, the grant should be presumed to be in lieu of wages and therefore resumable.
  4. On whom lies the onus (burden) of proof when resumption is claimed — specifically, whether the grantor seeking resumption must establish his right to resume.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as described in the opinion)

  • The appellant's counsel argued for two presumptions: (a) a broad presumption that when the class of a specified grant is in question it should be presumed to be a grant made in lieu of wages for services (i.e., a resumable service-wage grant); and (b) a narrower presumption that once the grantor proves the services are personal, the court should infer the grant was made in lieu of wages (and therefore resumable).
  • The appellant asked the appellate court to reverse the Lower Appellate Court's finding that the grant was not resumable.

Defendants' Arguments (as described in the opinion)

  • The defendants contended the land had been in their family's possession for about 150 years, that they (and their ancestors) had performed the mudam duties and were entitled to enjoy the land so long as they were able and willing to perform those duties.
  • They asserted there had been no default in the performance of the mudam duties and that, on that basis, the land could not be resumed by the grantor.
  • The Subordinate Judge also relied on evidential matters favouring the defendants, including expenditures by the defendants (e.g., digging a well), long possession, and certain admissions by a plaintiff witness that the grant predated his time.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (1870) 13 MIA 438 Distinction between grants made in lieu of wages and grants burdened with service; onus lies on the grantor seeking resumption to make out a clear title to resume. The court relied on this Privy Council decision to reject the appellant's proposed presumptions and to hold that the onus of proof is upon the grantor claiming resumption.
Lakham Gavda v. Keshav Annaji (1901) ILR 28 Bom. 305 Classification of grants and the principle that the onus is upon the party claiming resumption. Followed the Privy Council authority; cited as supporting the proposition that the onus is on the plaintiff claiming resumption.
Yellava Sakreppa v. Bhimappa Gireppa (1914) ILR 39 Bom. 68 Rejection of any presumption that where services are personal the grantor has a right to resume; statement about the position under Bombay law. Quoted as authority rejecting the appellant's presumption; noted as followed in later Madras cases indicating similarity of law between provinces.
Chandrappa v. Bhima-bin-Dasappa (1918) ILR 43 Bom. 37 Refusal to recognise a distinction between public and private services for the purposes of presuming resumability. Cited to support the proposition that no such presumption ought to be drawn and that the attempted distinction is unsound.
Baslingappa v. Chandrappa (1916) 18 Bom. LR 695 Holding that the onus is upon the plaintiff seeking to resume. Referenced in support of the rule that the plaintiff/grantor seeking resumption must make out his case.
Ramaswami Pattar v. Lakshmi Varassiar (1923) 17 LW 514 Application of the principle in Lakham Gavda within this province. Referred to as following the principle that the onus of proof rests with the party claiming resumption.
Mrutyunjayudu v. Rajah of Pittapuram (1915) 30 MLJ 132 Discussion of whether the nature of services affects resumability; a later authority referred to on treatment of personal services. Referred to as a Madras decision that follows the view rejecting the appellant's presumption; used to show Madras law is not different from Bombay law on this point.
Radha Pershad Singh v. Budhu Dashad (1895) ILR 22 Cal 938 Two-fold classification distinguishing public/private services and grants in lieu of wages — treated in the opinion as based on a misconception. Criticised by the court as unnecessary and inconsistent with the main principle; not accepted as supporting a presumption in favour of the grantor.
Sanniyasi v. Salur Zamindar (1883) ILR 7 M 268 Sentence relied upon: "It is ordinarily competent to a Zemindar to dispense with such services and to resume the tenure." Interpreted narrowly by the court as at most supporting resumability only in cases where grants were in lieu of wages; not authority for the appellant's broader presumption.
Mahudevi v. Vikrama (1891) ILR 14 M 365 Passage indicating that "if the land was held on service tenure it is resumable at the will of the Zemindar" (as relied on by appellant). Court observed that the passage, taken literally, would be incorrect because not all service tenures are resumable; therefore it does not support the appellant's contention.
Sri Rajah Sohanadri Appa Rao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (1902) ILR 26 M 403 Observation that it is for the grantee to make out that land is not resumable; case was confirmed by the Privy Council with reservations. Noted that the Privy Council confirmed the result but did not adopt the Madras High Court's reasoning in entirety; therefore the observation must be treated with caution.
Vadisapu Appandra v. Vyrichendra Veerabhadraraja Bahadur (1911) 2 MWN 406 Passage that inclusion of land in zemindari at settlement creates a presumption that the Zemindar has the right of resumption; and a statement about burden when grants are subsequent to permanent settlement. Court treated the passage as limited to the zemindari/Settlement context (government v. zemindar question) and held it did not assist the appellant's general contention.
Gajapathi Maharaju Garu v. Sondi Praha-Ida Binoy Ratna (1914) MWN 179 Observation by Ayling, J. that personal services made inams resumable by the Zemindar (as relied on by appellant). The court regarded this observation as not quite accurate and noted subsequent judicial treatment where the view was expressed differently; thus it was not accepted as a controlling authority for the appellant's presumption.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a two-fold manner: first it evaluated the factual findings of the courts below; second it reviewed the legal principles and authorities relating to the classification of service grants and the burden of proof.

On the facts, the District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge had found that the grant was not resumable and that there had been no default by the defendants. The Subordinate Judge's conclusion rested on an appraisal of the whole evidence (including the plaintiffs' conduct in various proceedings, inconsistent statements by plaintiffs, long possession by the defendants and their ancestors, and the defendants' expenditure such as digging a well). The appellate court emphasised that the Subordinate Judge did not decide on the basis of any legal presumptions but on an independent appreciation of the evidence. Because it was not shown that the Subordinate Judge's finding was wrong or vitiated by any mistake, the appellate court accepted that factual conclusion in the second appeal.

On the law, the court explained the essential legal distinction between two principal types of grants:

  • Grants made in lieu of wages for service — these are essentially a master-servant relationship where land is substituted for wages; as an incident, the grantor may resume the grant when the employment (service) ceases, because the original bargain was one of service remuneration.
  • Absolute grants burdened with a condition of performance of service — these are otherwise absolute grants with a condition annexed; resumability follows only upon breach (default) of the service condition, not merely because the grantor no longer requires or desires the service.

The court also recognised a permissible, context-specific presumption in zemindari-settlement disputes: where land was included in the assets of the zemindari at settlement, there is a presumption the right of resumption vests in the zemindar; and the nature of services (if proved to be personal) may furnish a clue in that specific inquiry. However, the court made clear that this limited presumption should not be confused with the broader presumptions urged by the appellant.

Addressing the appellant's proposed presumptions, the court rejected both:

  • The court found no rational basis to presume at the outset that a service grant is necessarily a grant in lieu of wages; making such a broad presumption would be arbitrary because many diverse motives may determine the form of a grant.
  • The narrower presumption — that proof of personal services should lead to an immediate inference that the grant was in lieu of wages — was also rejected as contrary to reason and unsupported by authority. The court concluded there is no general principle that personal services raise a prima facie right of resumption in favour of the grantor.

The court then surveyed relevant case law (Privy Council and provincial decisions), concluding that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the onus of proving a right of resumption lies on the grantor seeking resumption. Several cited decisions (including Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee and Lakham Gavda v. Keshav Annaji) were relied upon to show that the party asserting resumption must make out a clear title to it. Decisions said to suggest the contrary were examined and either distinguished, explained as limited to special contexts (e.g., settlement questions), or criticised as resting on misconception.

Because the Subordinate Judge's decision was founded on a considered appraisal of the evidence (not on a purported presumption) and no mistake was shown, the appellate court concluded that the lower court's factual conclusion should stand.

Holding and Implications

The second appeal is dismissed with costs.

Direct consequences:

  • The judgment of the Subordinate Judge (that the grant is not resumable and that there was no default by the defendants) stands and is not disturbed.
  • The plaintiffs (appellants) do not obtain resumption of the grant or recovery of possession on the basis of the record before the court.

The opinion contains an extended review of relevant authorities and sets out the court's view of the correct legal principles on classification of service grants and the burden of proof. The opinion does not purport to establish a novel binding rule beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; its direct practical effect is to affirm the lower courts' factual and legal conclusion in this case.

    (Kandala) Thiruvenkatacharlu v. Shaik Altoo Sahib

    1. The plaintiffs, who are the inamdars of Lupuchendrapet, seek to resume the plaint land which was granted for mudam service and to recover possession of it with mesne profits. The defendants contend that the land has been in the possession of their family for about 150 years and that they are entitled to enjoy it so long as they are able and willing to perform the duties of mudam, that there has been no default and that the land cannot, therefore, be resumed.

    2. The District Munsif has found that the land is not re-sumable and the Subordinate Judge has confirmed this finding.

    3. The plaintiff has filed the present appeal. The Lower Appellate Court on a review of the whole evidence has come to the conclusion that the grant cannot be resumed This is what the learned Judge says:

    I am not satisfied on the evidence that the inam is resumable.

    4. The appellant asks me to reverse this finding.

    5. The learned Judge has also found that there has been no default on the part of the defendants and the correctness of this part of his judgment has not been questioned.

    6. In arriving at his conclusion that the grant is not resumable, the Subordinate Judge has relied to some extent upon the conduct of the plaintiffs as disclosed in various proceedings and upon the incongruous statements which they made from time to time. He has also relied upon the fact that the defendants have expended money and dug a well. Further, the defendants and their ancestors have been long in possession and the second witness for the plaintiff, who is 70 years old, has admitted that the grant was made before his time.

    7. Mudam's duties are said to consist in looking after the harvest of the crops, watching the heaps of harvested produce, placing seals upon them, preventing removal of cow-dung from waste lands and general supervision of harvest operations. The first witness for the plaintiff admits that the inamdars as well as the ryots are interested in the performance of these duties. I need not go more minutely into the evidence. Although the Sub-Judge refers to certain authorities which contain observations regarding onus of proof, he has not himself decided the case with reference to any presumptions. His finding is the result of his appreciation of the evidence independent of the rule of onus of proof. It has not been shown that his finding is wrong or vitiated by any mistake and I must therefore accept it in Second Appeal.

    8. Regarding the nature and incidents of service tenure and the presumptions that may be drawn in dealing with such tenures, there has been a fairly long argument before me. I shall therefore proceed to discuss these points. The finding that the land is not resumable implies that the grant was burdened with service.

    9. To determine whether the grant is resumable or not, regard must be had to the nature of the tenure. Was the grant made in lieu of wages for service or was it an absolute grant subject to the condition of the performance of the service? First, dealing with grants of the former description, the relation between the grantor and the grantee is that of master and servant. Instead of remunerating the servant by wages, the master grants land to him and treating the rent payable as equivalent to wages the grantor makes a remission of the rent. The contract, however, is, in essence, one of service and as the master can, on terminating the employment, cease to pay wages, in like manner he may resume the grant on dispensing with services. The servant cannot compel his master to continue to employ him on the score that he is willing and able to serve.

    10. Now let me turn to the second description of grants, those burdened with service. The position here is that there is an absolute grant but a condition is annexed to it. On the breach of the condition, the grant may be resumed. The condition being the rendering of the service, if the grantee commits default in its performance, the grantor becomes ien-titled to resume the grant. The mere fact that the grantor no longer requires service does not give him the right to resume the grant. Whether he requires the service or not is immaterial, the only question being whether there has been default on the part of the grantee.

    11. It is also recognised that in the case of a grant burdened with service, it may be made a condition of the grant that it should cease when the services are no longer required. But in the absence of a provision to that effect, land held under that grant is not resumable unless the grantee commits default. This does not affect the main division of the grants under two headings, namely, those burdened with service and those made in lieu of wages. See Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (1870) 13 MIA 438 Lakham Gavda v. Keshav Annaji (1901) ILR 28 Bom. 305 and Yellava Sakreppa v. Bhimappa Gireppa (1914) ilr 39 Bom. 68.

    12. Where there is a grant in writing and it is produced, on a construction of it, will depend the nature of the tenure, whether the grant was made in lieu of wages or was burdened with service. But, where, as in the present case, either the original grant was not in writing or in any event is not before the Court, the nature of the tenure can be determined only on the evidence given. The Subordinate Judge agreeing with the Trial Court has found on the evidence that the grant is not resumable. Where an inference is drawn from certain facts or circumstances, it must be shown that the Lower Appellate Court has made some mistake before its finding can be set aside in second appeal. I am not satisfied that the appellant has succeeded in showing that the finding is liable to be reversed.

    13. The appellant's learned vakil has contended that this appeal ought to be decided with reference to two presumptions: one of them broad, the other more limited. When the question arises as to the class to which a specified grant belongs, he contends that it should be presumed that the grant was one made in lieu of wages for services. Putting it in other words, the grantor has only to come to Court and show that it is a service grant. Nothing further need be done by him and the Court is bound to presume that the grant was in lieu of wages. The next presumption which he asks should be drawn is, that when the grantor proves that the services are personal the Court should infer that the grant was made in lieu of wages. The range of this presumption is somewhat more limited, for, this assumes that the grantor has at least to prove one fact, do nothing more and the Court will at once presume that the grant is resumable.

    14. For making either of these presumptions, I do not believe there is the slightest ground. Presumptions are not made at random. Some connection must be shown to exist between the fact proving and the fact to be proved, which warrants an inference from the one to the other when the two are brought into proximity. On many and varied circumstances may depend what kind of grant a man may choose to make. To presume at the very outset of a case that the grant is one in lieu of wages, does not seem to be in conformity with reason.

    15. The second presumption referred to is, in my opinion, also opposed to reason. Having regard to the springs of human action, can it be said that a man is less likely to make an absolute grant burdened with personal service, or again, can it be said that when services are of a public nature there is any strong impelling motive for not making the grant in lieu of remuneration for those services? There exists thus on principle no ground for making either of the two presumptions. I am also satisfied that this is the position established by authority.

    16. Before discussing the cases on the point, I should like, in order to remove a confusion that prevails, to refer to a presumption that is permissible and has often to be drawn. When a Zemindar seeks to resume a grant, the question arises, is the land included in the zemindari? This will depend upon whether the revenue from the land was or was not included in the assets of the zemindari at the time of the settlement. If, it was included, the right of resumption would be with the Zemindar, if not, he would not have that right. If there is no direct evidence to show whether the revenue was or was not included, you may turn to the nature of the services as they may furnish a clue. If the services were personal to the Zemindar, it may reasonably be assumed that the Government would not have exempted the land from the, revenue but would have treated it for the purpose of the settle-ment as Eevenue-paying land. The reason is obvious. It was the Zemindar that had the benefit of the services and there would be no reason why the Government should not assess the land to revenue, for, the services were after all an equivalent of the rent. A presumption is therefore made that when the services are proved to be personal, the right of resumption, if it exists, vests in the Zemindar. This is the presumption that decided cases very often refer to and this presumption and its implications are misunderstood and some loose thinking has, I am afraid, given rise to some laxity of expression.

    17. I shall now examine the cases on the point. Forbes v. Nicer Mahomed Tuquec (1870) 13 MIA 438 is one of the earliest and most authoritative of the decisions. The Zemindar sued for the resumption of a jaghir. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee deal with two questions (1) regarding the nature of the tenure on which the lands were held, (2) whether the jaghir lands were made the subject of assessment at the settlement. Having held on the second point that the jaghir was included in the zemindari, their Lordships proceed to ask the question: ''But is it a necessary consequence of this finding that the appellant is entitled to resume these jaghir lands?" They then observe that his right to do so must depend upon the nature of the tenure. They distinguish between the two categories of grant and conclude that the grant before them is one burdened with service. In the course of the discussion they observe that the grantees they were dealing with were not the private servants of the Zemindar. But they do not anywhere say that if the services were private or personal, there would arise a presumption that the grant was made in lieu of wages. On the contrary, in the conclucling paragraphs of their judgment, they remark that it lay emphatically upon the Zemindar who. is seeking to dispossess or to rackrent the grantees to make out a clear title to resumption. He, in their opinion, failed to discharge the onus and his suit was therefore dismissed. This case, therefore, far from recognising the rule of presumption contended for by the appllant, clearly lays down that the rule is the other way, namely, that the onus of proof is upon the grantor claiming resumption.

    18. Lakham Gavda v. Keshav Annaji (1901) ILR 28 Bom. 305 is a suit by the inamdar to resume lands alleged to be held on service tenure.

    19. Jenkins, C.J. and Chandavarkar, J.,assume for the purpose of their judgment that the tenure was connected with services and proceed to examine if the plaintiff was entitled to resume. They refer to Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (1870) 13 MIA 438) and the classification of grants adopted in that case, and in the end dismiss the plaintiff's suit observing that it lay upon him to make out that the combination of the grantee's interest and his obligation to serve was such, as to permit of resumption. This case follows the Privy Council decision and holds that the onus is upon the party claiming the right to resume.

    20. A contention similar to the one advanced by the appellants was raised in Yellava Sakreppa v. Bhimappa Gireppa (1914) ILR 39 Bom. 68 The learned Judges rejected it saying that there is no presumption that where the services are personal the grantor has a right to resume the land. They say"that that is the Bombay law, though they add very guardedly, that the law is possibly different in Calcutta and Madras. This does not show that the law is in fact different in these provinces but it clearly shows that in Bombay such a presumption is not drawn.

    21. The question again arose in Chandrappa v. Bhima-bin-Dasappa (1918) ILR 43 Bom. 37 Beaman, J. refused to recognise any such distinction between public and private services remarking that the distinction attempted is vicious.

    22. In Baslingappa v. Chandrappa (1916) 18 Bom. LR 695 it was again held that the onus is upon the plaintiff seeking to resume.

    23. With reference to the observation in Yellava Sakreppa v. Bhimappa Gireppa (1914)ILR 39 Bom. 68 that possibly the law in Madras is different, I must point out that Lakham Gavda v. Keshav Annaji (1901) ILR 28 Bom. 305 has been followed in this province in Ramaswami Pattar v. Lakshmi Varassiar (1923)17 LW 514 and that Yellava Sakreppa v. Bhimappa Gireppa (1914)ILR 39 Bom. 68 has been referred to and followed by Seshagiri Aiyar, J. in Mrutyunjayudu v. Rajah of Pitta-puram (1915) 30 MLJ 132 It cannot therefore be said that the Madras law is different from the Bombay law on this point.

    24. Radha Pershad Singh v. Budhu Dashad (1895) ILR 22 Cal 938 relied on by the appellant proceeds, with all respect, on a misconception. In it, a two-fold classification of grants is made. First, it is said there is a distinction between a grant for services of a public nature and a grant for services of a private nature In the former the Zemindar cannot resume, while in the latter, he may. Secondly, it is said, that there is distinction between grants of an estate burdened with service and grants in lieu of wages. This two-fold classification is, in my opinion, unnecessary and loses sight of the real principle involved. The main division as pointed out by Beaman, J. in Chandrappa V. Bhima-bin-Dasappa (1918) ILR 43 Bom.37 is that of grants burdened with service and that of grants by way of wages for service. Each of these two main categories may again be sub-divided according to the nature of the services, personal or public. The judgment in Radha Pershad Singh v. Budhu Dashad (1895) ILR 22 Cal 938 loses its value by reason of this mistake and I am not prepared to agree with the view that when services to be rendered are personal the grantor has a prima facie right to resume the grant. It further seems to me that Radha Pershad Singh v. Budhu Dashad (1895) ILR 22 Cal 938 is opposed to the authority of the Privy Council decision in Forbes v. Meer Mahomed Tuquee (1870) 13 MIA 438

    25. If the Madras cases are examined they do not support the appellant's contention.

    26. The sentence in Sanniyasi v. Salur Zamindar (1883) ILR 7 M 268 that is relied on reads thus:

    It is ordinarily competent to a Zemindar to dispense with such services and to resume the tenure.

    27. This may only mean that if the grant is in lieu of wages it may ordinarily be resumed. There is nothing to show that the learned Judges meant to say that if the services are personal they would presume that the grant was one made in lieu of wages. I cannot regard this as an authority for the proposition contended for.

    28. In Mahudevi v. Vikrama (1891) ILR 14 M 365 the following passage is relied on:

    Now it is admitted on behalf of the appellants that if the land was held on service tenure it is resumable at the will of the Zemindar for the time being in possession.

    29. What is the tenure that is referred to in the above passage? All lands held on service tenure are not resumable. There are two kinds of service tenures. The learned Judges were presumably referring to grants made in lieu of wages. The words literally taken mean that both kinds of grants are resumable which, of course, is not the case. I am unable to see how this supports the appellant's contention.

    30. In Sri Rajah Sohanadri Appa Rao Bahadur v. Sri Rajah Venkatanarasimha Appa Rao Bahadur (1902) ILR 26 M 403 there is an observation at page 408 that it is for the grantee to make out that the land is not resumable. This case went up to the Privy Council and the decision of the Madras High Court was confirmed. But their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, while agreeing with the conclusion of the learned Judges, observe that their judgment does not imply that they adopt in entirety their reasoning. This is an important reservation and must not be lost sight of.

    31. In Vadisapu Appandra v. Vyrichendra Veerabhadraraja Bahadur (1911) 2 MWN 406 there is a passage at page 408 to the effect that in this Presidency there is a series of decisions and that where a land granted on service tenure was included in the assets of zemindari at the time of the settlement there is a presumption that the Zemindar can resume. This only means that if the question is between the Zemindar and the Government as to who has the right to resume, the fact that the land is included in the zemindari. indicates that the right vests in the zemindar. This passage does not help the appellant. There is another passage at p. 409 where the learned Judges say that in the case of a grant subsequent to permanent settlement to which personal services are attached, the burden of proving that it is not resumable is on the grantee. In the first place, with all respect, I cannot accede to this proposition. Secondly what difference does it make in regard to the present question, whether the grant was prior to or subsequent to the permanent settlement?

    32. There is one other case cited by the appellant to which I must refer. In Gajapathi Maharaju Garu v. Sondi Praha-Ida Binoy Ratna (1914) MWN 179 Ayling, J., observes at page 180 that the services are of a personal character and for that reason the inams are resumable by the Zemindar. This observation, if I may say so with respect, is not quite accurate and I may point out that in a later case the same learned Judge expresses his view somewhat very differently. In Mrutyunjayudu v. Rajah of Pittapuram (1915) 30 MIJ 132 Ayling, J., differing from Sadasiva Aiyar, J., observes:

    I can find no authority for holding that the nature of the services makes any difference in the case of such. a grant, though in the case of a service grant, where lands are held and enjoyed in lieu of wages, the power of arbitrary resumption would largely turn on whether the services were private or public.

    33. By reason of the difference of opinion there was a Letters Patent Appeal and Seshagiri Aiyar and Phillips, JJ., held, Sir John Wallis, C.J., dissenting, that the grant was a grant burdened with service and was not resumable. The judgment of Ayling, J., was upheld. Seshagiri Aiyar, J., at page 144 observes:

    The next contention is that as the service was personal it was open to the Zemindar' to dispense with it and to resume the land. Here again, it is not in every case of personal service that the grant can be resumed.

    34. It is thus clear that both on principle and on authority, neither of the presumptions contended for by the appellant can be accepted. The plaintiff who seeks to resume must make out his title.

    34. As the appeal has been argued at some length, I have reviewed the law and shown what in my opinion the right principle is. But as I have said, the Lower Appellate Court has not considered the case with reference to any rule of onus of proof, but has on the other hand arrived at a finding on a consideration of the entire evidence. Whether my view is correct or not it follows that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge must stand. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

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    (Kandala) Thiruvenkatacharlu v. Shaik Altoo Sahib
    (Nov 3, 1925)