Napier, J.:— This is an appeal arising cut of an execution application in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Madura (East) under O. 21, R. 90 of the CPC, in Original Suit No. 64 of 1909 The decree-holder in another suit, Original Suit No. 167 of 1908, had attached certain properties of the defendants and brought them to sale. The sale was held and the purchase money paid and received by the Courts. 14 days after this payment, the petitioner herein presented an application for execution of the decree, which he had obtained some time previously, by the attachment and sale of the properties above referred to with an application to set aside that sale and a further application for rateable distribution in the assets already realized by the sale. The Subordinate Judge dismissed his application for rateable distribution on the ground that he was not entitled to it not having applied to the Court for execution of his decree before the receipt of the assets by the Court, and for the same reason dismissed his application to set aside the sale. This appeal is from that order.
2. In this Court the appellant does not ask for rateable distribution of the realized assets, as he wishes the sale to be set aside on the ground of fraud. He does not claim to be a “person entitled to share in a rateable distribution of the assets,” but he contends that he is a person “whose interests are affected by the sale” and is therefore entitled to apply.
3. These words are newly inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure of 1908 and are also to be found in R. 72 of the order. The language-could certainly be read as wide enough to include a person in the appellant's position if taken by itself, and it is no answer that these words were inserted to set at rest doubts existing in the language of the old Code as to the meaning of the words whose immovable property has been sold.’ It may be that the legislature intended by these words to describe persons claiming in the judgment-debtor's interest, and it may also be that this is the true construction of the rule, but it cannot be so held for the mere reason that these wider words were substituted for the very narrow words in the previous Code, what we have to look to being the words themselves and not the intentions of the legislature. It is sufficient however for the purpose of this case to decide, as we do, that the applicant is not a person “whose interests are affected by the sale” within the meaning of the rule. This conclusion can be arrived at by two methods. The first is that adopted in Jogendra Nath Chatterjee v. Manmotha Nath Chose(1). There the Court held that the word “interests” must be limited to the property, the subject of the application, and that, as the subject-matter of the sale sought to be set aside was the immovable property sold, the interests that must have been affected by the sale must have reference to the same property. Taking that view the Court held that the applicant had no present interest in the property an attachment before judgment not giving him such interest.
4. We agree that it is a necessary limitation of the word “interests” to confine it to the property concerned, as any other construction would open up an inquiry as to whether the applicant's pecuniary interests required satisfaction out of the property sold or whether there was other property available to him. It would further be difficult to draw a line between a decree-holder and a person claiming to be a creditor and if a creditor was a person whose interests were affected, it would necessitate the trial of his suit in the execution proceedings, a procedure which could never have been contemplated. There is another process leading to the same result, which is this. The rule specifically gives power to apply to a person “entitled to share in a rateable distribution of the assets.” These words are added in the present Code, the old Code providing simply for the decree-holder. The words therefore Extend the right to a person other than a party to the suit or his representative, but confine it to a certain narrow class of persons. If a person of the class of the applicant, namely, another decree-holder not entitled to share, is to be considered as covered by the relative words whose interests are affected by the sale, we have this extraordinary result that the legislature, after inserting the words to extend the right and then confining it by very limited language, has nullified the effect of those words by words of wider application in the next sentence. In our opinion this is not an interpretation which can be properly port on the language of the rule were any other construction possible, and we hold that any decree holder who has not obtained the right to share in a rateable distribution is not entitled to apply under the wider words of the succeeding sentence. This appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— I entirely agree.
S.N/R.K
5. Appeal dismissed.