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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 the Sections of the Code
  • Pensions Act or Sect. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provision of Sect. 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act
  • provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1865.
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Sect. 46 of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1865
  • Madras Civil Courts Act III of 1873, Sect. 28,
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Cause Courts Act, Sect. 17
  • Cause Courts Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 the Sections of the Code
  • Pensions Act or Sect. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • provision of Sect. 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act
  • provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1865.
  • PROVINCIAL SMALL CAUSE COURTS ACT
  • Sect. 46 of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1865
  • Madras Civil Courts Act III of 1873, Sect. 28,
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Cause Courts Act, Sect. 17
  • Cause Courts Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench) on Section 17 — Provincial Small Cause Courts Act

Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision Petition raised a question of statutory construction that had produced conflicting views within the High Court and between High Courts: whether Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act requires a defendant who seeks to set aside an ex parte decree to deposit the decree amount or give security at the time of presenting the application.

The matter had produced divergent authorities: earlier Divisional Bench and single-judge decisions had variously treated the provision as directory or mandatory; some decisions turned on limitation issues. Because of the difference of opinion within the Court and with other High Courts (notably Allahabad), the issue was referred to a Full Bench for determination. Counsel for the parties appeared before the Full Bench (Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Aiyar for the petitioner and Mr. C. Madhavan Nair for the respondent), and the Bench delivered the opinion summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the wording of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act makes it imperative (mandatory) that a party seeking to set aside an ex parte decree must deposit the decree amount in Court or give security at the time of presenting his application.
  2. Relatedly, whether a deposit made after presentation of the application but within the period of limitation prescribed by law suffices to comply with Section 17.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (as recorded in the opinion)

  • The petitioner's vakil argued that the phrase "as the Court may direct" should be read to mean that the deposit or security is required only if the Court so directs — i.e., that the provision is permissive/directory rather than peremptory/mandatory.
  • Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Aiyar (for the petitioner) referred to the history and language of earlier enactments (including Section 46 of the earlier Small Cause Courts Act) and urged that the present wording is materially different and should be construed so as not to impose an absolute condition precedent. He also advanced the view (by analogy with certain practices regarding deficient court-fees and late production of papers) that a deposit made before the conclusion of proceedings should be allowed to "date back" to the original application.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Ramasami v. Kurisu Held by a Divisional Bench of this Court that the provisions of Section 17 were merely directory and not mandatory. The opinion records this authority, notes Parker, J.'s disposition to hold Section 17 directory, but treats the case critically and does not accept it as conclusively dispositive for the present Full Bench's conclusion.
Chaturvedula Suryanarayana v. Chaturvedula Ramamma Considered Ramasami; decided the matter on a different point (that a deposit made after hearing was too late because of limitation). The Full Bench notes Miller, J.'s decision and records that it turned on limitation; the decision is treated as material to the question of whether belated deposits can validate an application.
Akula Achiah v. Lakshminarasimham Followed Ramasami (i.e., treated Section 17 as directory) though with hesitation due to long-standing practice. The opinion records that this Court previously followed Ramasami with hesitation; one of the Justices (Seshagiri Aiyar, J.) states he remains influenced by that earlier view.
Jagan Nath v. Chet Ram Allahabad High Court decision holding the words of Section 17 to be mandatory. The Full Bench expressly agrees with this view and regards the language of the section as prima facie mandatory (the Court states it "agree[s] with this view").
Chhotey Lal v. Lakhmi Chand Magan Lal Another Allahabad High Court decision treating the words of Section 17 as mandatory. The opinion cites this case as part of the Allahabad line of authority supporting a mandatory reading; the Full Bench aligns with that understanding of the text.
Jeun Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi Held that if the requirements of a provision like Section 17 are complied with within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, a belated deposit may be treated as sufficient. The Full Bench regards this ruling as authoritative on the point that a deposit made after the application but within the limitation period will validate the application; the Bench describes this as a "salutary rule" and adopts it.
Burjore and Bhawani Pershad v. Bhagana Judicial Committee decision cited regarding interpretation; the absence of a provision for dismissal for non-compliance tends to indicate a provision is permissive rather than mandatory. The opinion notes this decision as tending to show in similar contexts that a provision may be permissive; it is discussed as part of the authorities bearing on whether apparent mandatory language should be treated as directory.
Mahammad Azmat Ali Khan v. Lalli Begum Judicial Committee under the Pensions Act: production of required certificate during trial was held sufficient (indicating directory nature in that context). The Full Bench cites this as indicating that similar-looking statutory prerequisites have been held directory; the decision is used as an analogy in the Court's analysis.
Bepin v. Abdul; Ganpat Rao v. Anand Rao; Ganpat Rao v. Anant Rao Cases following the Judicial Committee approach that procedural or preliminary statutory prerequisites may be satisfied during trial. The opinion cites these decisions as following the Judicial Committee's view and as supporting the proposition that apparent conditions precedent have, in other contexts, been treated as directory.
Ramayyangar v. Krishnayyangar Held that Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code was satisfied by production of the sanction during the course of the suit. The Full Bench uses this as an analogous authority showing that sanctions or approvals expected before institution have been supplied during proceedings and accepted.
Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar Another decision treating Section 92's prerequisites as satisfied by production during the suit. Cited as further analogous authority for treating apparent prerequisites as capable of being supplied later in the proceedings.
Rendall v. Blair English decision discussed in Maxwell on statutory interpretation showing exceptions to the rule that recognizances and related conditions are ordinarily mandatory. The opinion refers to Rendall v. Blair to show that, despite authoritative statements that certain conditions should be treated as mandatory, English authorities recognize exceptions; this informs the Full Bench's caution.
Petition of Soorj Mukhi Koer (matter referred in opinion) Referred to in the discussion of Burjore/Bhawani Pershad and related authorities concerning absence of dismissal provision. Used in the opinion's discussion of whether lack of a dismissal provision indicates permissive intent; cited as part of the comparative authorities.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench conducted a textual and historical analysis of Section 17 and related enactments and then considered relevant judicial authorities. The reasoning proceeded in these main steps (as recorded in the opinion):

  1. Historical context: The Bench traced the provision back to the corresponding proviso in the earlier Small Cause Courts Act (Act XI of 1865), which was annexed to Section 21 and explicitly provided that no new trial should be granted unless the defendant, with his notice of application, deposited the amount. That earlier provision was treated as clearly mandatory.
  2. Legislative re-arrangement: When the Civil Procedure Code provisions were applied to Small Cause Courts (Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 and subsequent re-enactments), the proviso was rephrased and placed in Section 17 of the re-enacted Small Cause Courts Act. The Bench observed that the re-arrangement changed language but did not, on its face, indicate an intention by the Legislature to convert a previously mandatory requirement into a merely directory one.
  3. Plain meaning of the words: The phrase "the applicant shall either deposit the amount due or give security ... as the Court may direct" was examined. The Bench rejected the petitioner’s narrow reading that these words mean only "if the Court so directs." The Court emphasized the separate phrase "at the time of presenting the application" and treated those words as bearing their natural meaning rather than being meaningless formalities.
  4. Consideration of judicial authorities: The Bench reviewed several lines of authority:
    • Decisions treating Section 17 as directory (Ramasami v. Kurisu and cases following it) were noted but not accepted as dispositive.
    • Decisions of the Allahabad High Court holding the provision mandatory were regarded favorably by the Full Bench.
    • Decisions from the Judicial Committee and other High Court cases (e.g., under the Pensions Act and Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure) that accepted belated compliance in analogous contexts were considered persuasive, showing that apparent conditions precedent in other statutes had sometimes been treated as satisfied if complied with during the proceedings.
  5. Synthesis and practical rule: Balancing the language, legislative history and authorities, the Court concluded that although the wording of Section 17 is prima facie mandatory (especially given the statutory lineage), the decision in Jeun Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi established a practical rule that a deposit made after the application but within the period of limitation may validate the application. The Bench described this as a "salutary rule" that attracts the earlier application to the date of the deposit (or treats the application as having been effectively made on the date of deposit).
  6. Individual judges' notes: The opinion records that Oldfield, J. agreed and stressed consistency with the Act's object (cheap and expeditious resolution). Seshagiri Aiyar, J. expressed continuing adherence to the earlier Akula Achiah view that this Court need not align with other High Courts except for the Jeun Muchi principle. The Chief Justice emphasised the statutory history and the mandatory tenor of the words, while accepting the Jeun Muchi accommodation.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Full Bench concluded that the provision of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is prima facie mandatory in language; however, compliance with Section 17 will be satisfied if the required deposit is made within the period of limitation, even though the deposit did not accompany the original application to set aside the ex parte decree.

Implications (direct effect on the parties and practice, as stated in the opinion):

  • A defendant who has presented an application to set aside an ex parte decree but did not deposit the decree amount or give security at the time of presentation may nonetheless validate that application by making the deposit within the limitation period applicable to such an application.
  • The decision reconciles the apparent mandatory tenor of Section 17 with practical considerations and prior authorities (notably Jeun Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi): a later compliant deposit will "attract" the earlier application so that the requirements of Section 17 are regarded as fulfilled for limitation purposes.
  • The opinion does not purport simply to endorse every prior line of authority; it treats the provision as prima facie mandatory while adopting the limited rule that belated payment within the limitation period cures the initial omission. The Full Bench's ruling is an authoritative statement of the Court's position on this question.

The opinion contains detailed statutory and precedential analysis; the direct effect is stated above. The opinion does not purport to set out additional broader policy consequences beyond the interpretive and operative result recorded.

    V.M. Assan Mahomed Sahib v. M.E. Rahiman Sahib

    ORDER OF REFERENCE TO A FULL BENCH.

    The question that arises for our determination in this Civil Revision Petition is one upon which there has been considerable difference of opinion so far as this Court is concerned. It is whether the wording of Sect. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act makes it imperative that a party seeking to set aside an ex parte decree of a Small Cause Court should deposit the decree amount in Court or give security at the time of presenting his application.

    In Ramasami v. Kurisu(1), a case which went before a Full Bench on another point, the Divisional Bench that heard the Civil Revision Petition held that the provisions of this section were merely directory and not mandatory. In Chaturvedula Suryanarayana v. Chaturvedula Ramamma(2), Miller, J, considered this ruling but decided the case before him on another point namely, that a deposit made after the hearing of the petition was in any case too late and rendered the application liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.

    In Akula Achiah v. Lakshminarasimham(3), the authority of Ramasami v. Kurisu, was followed with some hesitation as the learned Judges were unwilling to make a departure from what had been held to be the law in this Presidency by the practice prevailing for over 30 years.

    On the other hand the Allahabad High Court has held in Jagan Nath v. Chet Ram(4), and Chhotey Lal v. Lakhmi Chand Magan Lal(5), that the words of this section are mandatory.

    We agree with this view. In our opinion the meaning of the section is clear. When it says that the applicant shall either deposit the amount due or give security * * *; as the Court may direct, it does not mean that this shall be done only “if the court so directs'’, which is the interpetation that the petitioner's vakil wishes us to place on these words.

    The deposit or the tender of security must also be made “at the time of presenting the application”. Those words cannot be treated as intended to be devoid of their natural meaning so as to leave it open to the applicant to make the deposit or tender the security at that time or at any other time.

    We therefore refer to a Full Bench the question whether the directions in Sect. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act as to the deposit of the decree amount or the giving of security at the time of presenting an application to set aside an ex parte decree are mandatory or not.

    [This petition came on for hearing on the 19th and 20th days of January 1920, in pursuance of the Order of Reference before a Full Bench, as constituted above.]
    Mr.T. M. Krishnaswami Aiyar for Petitioner.
    Mr. C. Madhavan Nair for the Respondent.

    OPINION

    The Chief Justice — The corresponding provision in the earlier Act XI of 1865 was enacted as a proviso to Sect 21, which, after enacting that all decrees and orders of the Court should be final and making provision for setting aside ex parte decrees and also for granting new trials in other cases, expressly provided that no such new trial should be granting to a defendant “unless he shall with his notice of application deposit in Court the amount” etc. Under this section there was clearly no jurisdiction to grant a new trial unless the proviso had been complied within terms Under that Act the procedure in these Courts was governed by rules made by the High Court under Sect. 46, but by Sect 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1877 the Sections of the Code set out in the second schedule were applied to Small Cause Courts, so far as applicable. The Sections so applied included the sections dealing with applications to set aside ex parte decrees and applications for review, and it was therefore only natural that the proviso now in question should appear in the present act as a proviso to Sect. 17 which again expressly provided that Small Cause Courts should follow the procedure prescribed in the chapters and sections of the Code of Civil Procedure specified in the second schedule. This re-arrangement necessitated some alteration in the language of the proviso, but that alteration in my opinion affords no ground for attributing to the Legislature an intention to modify the clearly mandatory nature of the earlier enactment, more especially as the new proviso is expressed in terms which are prima facie mandatory and have been so construed by the other High Courts. There are no doubt some English decisions in which the Courts have found indications in the particular enactments that provisions in form mandatory were only intended to be directory, but having regard to the history of the section there is its my opinion no room for any such conclusion here In Ramasami v. Kurisu, Parker, J. no doubt stated that he was disposed to hold that Sect. 17 was merely directory and not mannatory and went on to observe:—“The Court did require the costs to be deposited before the review was heard, and this, I think, is the intention of the section.

    With all respect this appears to me to be importing into the section a new mandatory provision not to be found there. It does not appear from the report in that case whether the time prescribed in the Limitation Act for making an application under Sect. 17 had expired when the costs were deposited. In Jeun Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi, where the application was made without making a deposit or giving security, it was held by Brett and Mookerjee, J.J, that, if the requirements of the section were complied with within the period prescribed for such applications in the Limitation Act, it might be treated as sufficient, as no objection could have been taken if a fresh application had been presented when security was deposited. I think that this interpretation of the requirements of the section may well be followed having regard to the practice which has prevailed in this Presidency, and would answer accordingly that the provision in question is mandatory, but is sufficiently complied with satisfying the requirements of the section before the time prescribed for such applicatiosn in the Limitation Act as elapsed.

    Oldfield, J.—I entirely agree and add only that the interpretation we are adopting is consistent with the object of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the provision of a simple procedure for the cheap and expeditious disposal of petty claims.

    Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—After the very full discussion which this case has received, I am confirmed in the view I took in Akula Achiah v. Lakshmi Narasimham, that there is not necessity for bringing our decision into line with the decisions of the other High Courts except with Jeur Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi

    On the question whether the language of Sect. 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is only directory, there can be difference of opinion. The position is this. Before the enactment of Act IX of 1887, the procedure for the trial of Small Cause Suits and the procedure for the trial of regular suits were regulated by distinct legislative enactments. By the Madras Civil Courts Act III of 1873, Sect. 28, power was conferred upon the Local Government to invest District Munsifs and Subordinate Judges with Small Cause Court jurisdiction in regard to suits of a particular description. My impression is, that until the enactment of this provision, there were separate Small Cause Courts in defined centres, and the regular tribunals of the presidency were not invested with small cause powers. Then came the Civil Procedure Code of 1877. It was intended to regulate the procedure not only in the regular Courts but also in the Small Cause Courts. The Civil Procedure Code of 1882 recognised this principle, and also provided for the repeal of some of the provisions of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1865. When the present Small Cause Courts Act was re-enacted, provisions were introduced into it which while confirming the right of a small cause suit or to have his case tried according to the procedure prescribed in the Civil Procedure Code, imposed limitations upon the exercise of some of the powers. Sect. 17 is an instance of this kind. In granting applications for setting aside ex parte decrees, the Small Cause Courts Act, Sect. 17 imposes a limitation upon the right of the suitor. Whereas, under the ordinary law, what the Courts have to be satisfied is that the party has not been duly served and that he had no opportunity of defending the suit, under the Small Cause Courts Act, in addition to satisfying these requirements, the defendant is required to deposit the amount of the decree. Therefore Sect. 17 should be read not as conferring a new jurisdiction subject to certain conditions, but, as limiting the exercise of jurisdiction by imposing conditions. This aspect of the history of legislation is essential for finding out whether Sect. 17 is directory or mandatory. Mr. Krishnaswamy Aiyar referred to Sect. 46 of the Small Cause Courts Act of 1865 and drew our attention to the fact that the language in the present Small Cause Courts Act is materially different. I think there is force in this contention. The language of Sect. 17 suggests ex facie that the deposit of the decree amount should precede the application for setting aside the ex parte decree; but there are no words in the section that, if the deposit is not made, the application should not be received. That seems to be one of the criteria for construing a statutory provision to be mandatory; I do not say that that is the sole criterion. This view gathers strength from the decision of the judicial Committee to which Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar drew our attention, namely, Burjore and Bhawani Pershad v. Bhagana Their Lordships accepted the view taken. In the matter of the petition of Soorj Mukhi Koer, that the absence of a provision for the dismissal of a suit or application for failure to comply with a condition is a circumstance tending to show that the provision is permissive and not mandatory.

    Even more significant is the decision of the Judicial Committee under the Pensions Act in Mahammad Azmat Ali Khan v. Lalli Begum

    In that Act, Sects. 4 and 6 read together make the institution of a suit in the Civil Courts dependent upon the production of a certificate from the Collector; and yet the Judicial Committee held that the production of a certificate during the course of the trial would be sufficient, thereby indicating that the sections are only directory. This view has been followed in Madras and the other High Courts; See Bepin v. Abdul, Ganpat Rao v. Anand Rao, and Ganpat Rao v. Anant Rao(6).

    A third class of cases was referred to by me in my judgment in Akula Achiah v. Lahshmi Narasimham(7) In Ramayyangar v. Krishnayyangar(8), and in Srinivasa Chariar v. Raghava Chariar(9), it was held that Sect. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code which, on a plain reading of it, indicates that the sanction of the Collector or the Advocate General is a condition precedent to the institution of a suit, was satisfied by the production of the sanction during the course of the suit. I cannot say that the language of Sect. 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act is more imperative than Sects. 4 and 6 of the Pensions Act or Sect. 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore the principle which underlies the decisions in these latter acts are equally applicable to the construction of Sect. 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act.

    In Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes, it is stated in one place that the conditions relating to the giving of recognizances or to the trials in suits should ordinarily be regarded as mandatory; But a reference to the decision in Rendall v. Blair will show that this statement is subject to many exceptions. In that case, the question was that whether if the consent of the Charity Commissioners was not obtained prior to the institution of an action; the action failed. Justice Bay, in the first Court held that it was a fatal objection. The learned Judge says, “Another objection is this: if I allow the action to stand over in order that leave may be obtained, the writ, which was issued more than a year ago, must be treated as a writ issued nen, pro tune, and amendment must be allowed to the effect that the action was commenced after that leave obtained. I think that would be wrong. It would, I think, be entirely against the object and purpose of this section to allow the action to stand over for leave to be obtained.” In Appeal, all the Lord Justices agreed that time should be given for obtaining the consent. Lord Justice Bowen said “whether, supposing the consent of the Commissioner was necessary, it would be right to dismiss the action altogether………………… It does not seem to me that the proper course, if an action appears to the learned Judge at the hearing to be an action which falls within Sect. 17, would be to dismiss it altogether; on the contrary, I think you ought to allow it to stand over to see if the consent of the Commissioners can be obtained.” Then the learned Judge examines the language of the statute which is in these terms:—“Before any suit, petition, or other proceeding for obtaining any relief etc., relating to any charity, shall be commenced, presented or taken, there shall be transmitted notice in writing to the Board ……. and the said Board, if upon a consideration of the circumstances they think fit, may, by an order or certificate direct any suit, petition or proceeding be next presented etc.,…………and save as herein otherwise provided no suit, petition or other proceeding shall be entertained or proceeded with by the Court except upon and in conformity with the order or certificate of the said Board.” On this language Bowen Lord Justice says, “This section is not framed in the way in which sections are framed when it is intended that some preliminary steps should be taken before the action is maintainable at all. On the contrary, both from the way in which it is framed, from the omission of the usual words, and also from the presence of words which seem to me to indicate that the absence of the consent of the Commissioners is only a bar to the Courts dealing with the action, and not a bar to the original institution of the suit”. This decision in my opinion, which was concurred in on this point by Lord Justices Fry and Cotton, furnishes a clue for the construction of the section we are dealing with. I am not therefore prepared to say that the section is mandatory.

    However that may be, in Jeun Muchi v. Budhiram Muchi it is laid down that even though the original application may not be accompanied by a deposit once the application is on record, a deposit subsequently received within the time limited by law, would validate the application. This seems to be a very salutary rule. The later deposit would attract to itself the earlier application, and the application itself may be regarded as having been made on the date of the deposit. While this view would still make it permissible to the suitor to come into Court with an application unaccompanied by a deposit, it would also compel him to pay the money within the time limited by law As against this view, there is the answer suggested by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar that, whenever a deposit is made before the conclusion of the trial, it should date back to the date of the original application. In support of this view, there is the analogy of the practice in this and the other Courts by which deficient Court fees paid subsequent to the date of filing of the appeal and the filing of necessary papers which did not accompany the memorandum of appeal have been regarded as enabling the party to claim that the additional payment and the later production of documents should date back to the presentation of the appeal. In such cases the office fixes a time within which the deficiency or the omission should be set right. If this is done, the delay is excused in the Admission Court.

    My answer to the question is that the provision of Sect. 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act will be complied with, if the deposit required by that section is made within the period of limitation, although it did pot accompany the application for setting aside the ex parte decree.

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    Comments

    V.M. Assan Mahomed Sahib v. M.E. Rahiman Sahib
    (Feb 23, 1919)