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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. P.R Ganapathy Ayyar for the Appellant.
  • Mr. P.V Rajamannar for the Respondents.
Judges
  • Varadachariar
  • Mockett, JJ.
Acts
  • S. 80(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1 of 1925,
  • S. 9, Cl. 5 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
  • Mr. P.R Ganapathy Ayyar for the Appellant.
  • Mr. P.V Rajamannar for the Respondents.
Judges
  • Varadachariar
  • Mockett, JJ.
Acts
  • S. 80(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1 of 1925,
  • S. 9, Cl. 5 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Varadachariar J. (with concurring remarks by Mockett J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from an application under S. 80(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1925, concerning the temple of Sri Ranganadhaswami at Hospet. Initially the petition asserted that the temple was a private one, but that part of the claim was not pursued and the sole remaining question was whether the temple fell within the statutory definition of "an excepted temple" in S. 9(5) of the Act.

The founder of the temple is found to be the petitioner's grandfather, Chelapathi Rao Naidu, who founded (wholly or in part) the temple about 1870. The District Judge found that, after the death of the original founder, management was not in the hands of his heirs but in the hands of certain agents (identified in the record as P.W.5 and his father and uncle) and of some persons related by marriage; there was insufficient evidence that the petitioner actively managed the temple until disputes arose between the agent and the local temple committee.

Procedurally, the Board had passed an order dated 21 April 1926. The present matter reached the High Court as an appeal and a connected civil revision petition challenging the District Judge's determination on whether succession to trusteeship was hereditary within the meaning of S.9, Cl.5(b) (as it stood prior to the 1930 amendment).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the temple in question falls within the definition of "an excepted temple" under S. 9(5) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, having regard to the question of whether succession to trusteeship is hereditary.
  2. Whether an appeal lies from the Board's order to the High Court in matters arising under the Religious Endowments Act, i.e., whether the appeal filed was competent in view of prior Full Bench authority.
  3. Whether, as a matter of Hindu law and statutory interpretation, proof that a temple was founded by an ancestor gives rise to a legal presumption of hereditary succession to trusteeship for descendants in the absence of contrary deed or usage (and whether that presumption affects the meaning of S.9, Cl.5).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar)

  • The Full Bench decision in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, which held that no appeal lay, should be reconsidered in light of the Privy Council decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin.
  • Reliance on the Privy Council decision in Gossami Sri Gridharji v. Romanlalji Gossami: once it is shown that a temple was founded by the claimant's ancestors, succession to trusteeship is presumed hereditary unless the deed of endowment or established usage proves otherwise; therefore, in the absence of contrary proof, the case should be treated as an "excepted temple" under S.9, Cl.5 even if succession had not in fact been continuously hereditary.
  • An asserted factual point: that the petitioner had become the manager and therefore should be regarded as exercising a hereditary right to management.

The opinion does not contain a detailed statement of any specific arguments advanced by the Board or other respondents beyond references to the Board's earlier order and the District Judge's findings.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board (Full Bench, Madras) Held that no appeal lies against certain orders under the Religious Endowments Act; distinguishes matters to be treated as 'suit' vs 'application'. The court regarded this Full Bench ruling as binding on the question of whether the appeal was competent and accordingly held the appeal to be incompetent, following the Full Bench decision.
Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin (Privy Council) Considered in relation to whether it introduced any new principle affecting the Full Bench ruling on appeals; cited by appellant to seek reconsideration. The court found that Maung Ba Thaw did not enunciate any new principle that would disturb the Full Bench decision and therefore did not alter the binding nature of the Full Bench ruling.
Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao (Madras) Earlier decision considered by the Privy Council and discussed at length by the Full Bench; used in debate about appealability and the nature of proceedings. The court noted that the Privy Council in Maung Ba Thaw reaffirmed principles from this case and that the Full Bench had fully considered it; it did not change the court's view on appeal competency.
Gossami Sri Gridharji v. Romanlalji Gossami (Privy Council) States that, in Hindu law, where a temple is shown to have been founded by the claimant's ancestors, the claimant's right to trusteeship is presumed in his favour unless the deed or usage proves otherwise. Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar relied on this rule to argue that succession should be treated as hereditary. The court (following its earlier single-judge decision) held that this presumption of Hindu law does not satisfy the statutory requirement under S.9, Cl.5 for de facto hereditary succession; mere presumption not exercised over generations is insufficient.
Kallepalle Krishnamurthi v. The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board (Single Judge) Interpreted the statutory language (including the effect of words like "has been" and "is hereditary") and held that the statute contemplates de facto hereditary succession rather than mere presumption from ancient founding. The court accepted and followed this earlier single-judge decision as correctly stating the statutory scheme: the relevant inquiry is whether succession has in fact been devolving hereditarily (de facto), not whether there is a mere presumption based on an old founder.
Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam (Madras) Later local High Court treatment of Maung Ba Thaw and the effect (or lack of it) on Full Bench authority. Mockett J. cited this decision as supporting the conclusion that Maung Ba Thaw did not alter the position established by the Full Bench, reinforcing the view that the Full Bench remains binding for present purposes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two principal stages: a jurisdictional/competency analysis and a substantive assessment of the statutory test for an "excepted temple."

Jurisdiction and Competency

The court observed that the Full Bench decision in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board had held that no appeal lay in similar matters under the Religious Endowments Act. Although counsel for the appellant urged reconsideration of that Full Bench ruling in light of the Privy Council decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, the court found that Maung Ba Thaw did not introduce any new legal principle that would undermine the Full Bench's reasoning. The court therefore concluded that the appeal was incompetent and could not be entertained as an appeal.

Treatment as a Revision Petition and Factual Findings

Having disposed of the appeal on competency grounds, the court addressed the matter as if coming before it on revision. It found no material irregularity in the District Court proceedings and accepted the District Judge's factual findings: the original founder was Chelapathi Rao Naidu; after his death management appears to have been in the hands of agents (P.W.5 and his relatives) and persons related by marriage; and there was insufficient evidence that succession to trusteeship had been exercised hereditarily by the founder's heirs such that the petitioner had de facto succeeded as heir to the last trustee.

Substantive Law — Heredity, Presumptions, and Statutory Construction

On the legal question whether proof of founding by an ancestor gives rise to a conclusive or sufficient legal presumption of hereditary succession for the purposes of S.9, Cl.5(b), the court reviewed authorities. Counsel relied on the Privy Council rule in Gossami Sri Gridharji v. Romanlalji Gossami (a rule of Hindu law presuming succession where a temple was founded by the claimant's ancestors). The court, however, followed its earlier single-judge decision in Kallepalle Krishnamurthi v. The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board, and held that the statutory test requires consideration of de facto hereditary succession (succession that has in fact been devolving hereditarily) rather than mere presumption based on an ancient foundation. The court also addressed textual variations (the words "is hereditary" versus "has been") and concluded that both expressions refer to the same substantive situation: actual, continuing hereditary succession.

The court further rejected the contention that the petitioner’s asserted management alone amounted to hereditary succession, noting that the evidence did not show effective entry into management as an heir of a predecessor trustee, nor that the predecessor had held office as an heir of his predecessor. Thus, even if some evidence suggested the petitioner acted as manager, that did not meet the statutory requirement for hereditary succession.

Concurring Observations (Mockett J.)

Mockett J. concurred with Varadachariar J. and added two points: (1) the Privy Council decision in Maung Ba Thaw did not disturb the Full Bench authority; and (2) he agreed with the treatment of the Gossami rule in Kallepalle Krishnamurthi — that statutory construction under the Religious Endowments Act is concerned with the de facto exercise of hereditary right, not a mere presumption not exercised over several generations.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED: The court held that the appeal was incompetent (in view of binding Full Bench authority) and, treating the matter on revision, found no grounds to interfere with the District Judge's conclusions. Both the appeal and the connected Civil Revision Petition were dismissed.

Consequences on the parties: the District Judge's factual findings (that succession had not been in fact hereditary and that management was in the hands of agents rather than the heirs) were left undisturbed. The appeal was dismissed as incompetent; the civil revision petition also failed. The judgment orders costs specifically in the appeal only.

Broader implications: the court explicitly adhered to existing Full Bench and single-judge precedent and declined to treat the Privy Council decisions cited as altering that position. The decision does not purport to establish a new legal principle; it applies and reaffirms the approach that the statutory concept of hereditary succession for an "excepted temple" requires evidence of de facto hereditary succession rather than reliance on an evidentiary presumption based solely on a remote founder.

N.R.R. — Appeal and Petition dismissed.
Show full summary ...

    C.V. Chelapathi Rao Naidu v. Board Of Commissioner For Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras

    JUDGMENT

    Varadachariar J:—This appeal and the connected revision petition arise out of an application under S. 80(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1 of 1925, in respect of the temple of Sri Ranganadhaswami at Hospet. In the first instance, it was claimed both before the Board and before the District Court that the temple was a private one but that part of the claim has not been pressed and the only point remaining to be determined is whether or not it falls within the definition of “an excepted temple” in S. 9(5) of the Act.

    The learned District Judge has referred to one or two errors into which the Board had fallen when passing its order dated 21st April 1926. As the learned District Judge has dealt with the matter fully, I do not see that anything turns upon the errors found in the Board's order. The learned District Judge has held that though the petitioner's grandfather one Mr. Chelapathi Rao Naidu was the founder (wholly or at least in part) of the temple about the year 1870 it is not possible to say that the right to succession to the office of trustee in this case is hereditary, as required by S. 9, Cl. 5(b) (as it stood prior to the amendment in 1930). This conclusion is based on his finding that after the death of the original Chelapathi Rao Naidu, the management has not been in the hands of his heirs but of some persons related to him by marriage. The evidence shows that the management has for a long time been in the hands of some agents, namely, P.W 5 and his father and uncle. In some of the documents reference is made to one or another of Chelapathi Rao Naidu's relations but beyond that it is difficult to find any indication of the part that they took in the management. As regards the petitioner, it is not possible to say from the evidence that he took any part in the management till disputes arose between the agent and the local temple committee.

    In the ordinary course, I should have followed the judgment of the Full Bench in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras and held that no appeal lay. But Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar contended that judgment required reconsideration, in the light of the decision of the Privy Council in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin. It is true that the decision in the Rangoon case was pronounced after the judgment of the Full Bench but I do not find in it the enunciation of any new principle not present to the minds of the learned Judges who pronounced the Full Bench decision. In the recent case, their Lordships only reaffirmed the principle of their earlier decision in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao and that judgment has been considered at great length in the Full Bench judgments. Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar suggested that two at least of the learned Judges who took part in the Full Bench case have proceeded on the footing that Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao turned upon the language of the definition of “decree” found in the Code of 1882, and therefore afforded no guidance under the Code of 1908; and he asked us to say that the decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin shows that assumption is not right. Whatever may be said against some of the observations in the Full Bench case, I do not understand the basis of the Full Bench decision to be as assumed by Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar. It seems to me to proceed on the footing that the Religious Endowments Act has by its own scheme clearly indicated a distinction between cases in which questions arising under it are to be dealt with by a Civil Court as in a ‘suit’ and cases in which questions are to be dealt with in a Civil Court as on an ‘application.’ In the latter case, it cannot be denied that under the scheme of the Code no appeal will lie unless specially provided for. I therefore see no reason for not following the Full Bench ruling and accordingly hold that the appeal is incompetent.

    Dealing with the matter as one coming up in revision there can be no question as to the jurisdiction of the lower Court and I find nothing in the way of material irregularity alleged against the proceedings in the lower Court. At best, all that could be said is that the learned Judge has either misinterpreted the definition of “an excepted temple” or erred in holding that the succession in this case has not been hereditary. It seems to me very doubtful if either of these grounds will suffice to bring the case under the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. So far as the finding of fact is concerned, I see no reason to differ from it, even if I could.

    On the point of law, Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Gossami Sri Gridharji v. Romanlalji Gossami and contended that once the Court holds that the temple was founded by a private founder it must follow as a matter of law that succession to it is hereditary unless the deed of endowment or the usage of the institution proves the contrary; and there being nothing to the contrary in this case, he argued that the learned Judge should have held that the case falls within the definition of “an excepted temple” even if succession has not in fact been hereditary since the days of the original founder. This point was dealt with by me as a single Judge in Kallepalle Krishnamurthi v. The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. Having carefully listened to the arguments of Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar I have not been persuaded that the view there expressed is not correct, so far as the scheme of the Religious Endowments Act is concerned. A distinction was attempted to be made on the ground that in this case the petitioner has become manager and that therefore his management should be held to be in his hereditary right. I am not by any means satisfied on the evidence that he has really entered upon the management in any effective sense. But even if a different conclusion should be possible on the facts, I do not see that it affects the legal position because he has not succeeded as the heir of the last trustee nor was the last trustee in office as the heir of his predecessor. In Kallepalle Krishnamurthi v. The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board, stress was no doubt laid upon the use of the expression “has been” in the amendment introduced in 1930 but it does not appear to me that the expression “is hereditary” in S. 9, Cl. 5(b) means anything different. Both of them seem to me to refer to cases in which succession has in fact been devolving hereditarily from the founder. Both the appeal and the Civil Revision Petition therefore fail and are dismissed with costs in the appeal only.

    Mockett J.—I agree. I desire to add a few words with regard to two arguments of Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar.

    He argued that the authority of the Full Bench decision in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras, was shaken by the subsequent decision of the Judicial Committee reported in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin. It will be seen that the Board in that case referred to its own decision in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chellikani Rama Rao, a Madras case, and it does not seem to me that the decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, has in any way altered the position as it stood at the date of the decision of the Full Bench. The case in Secretary of State for India in Council v. Chellikani Rama Rao, was fully considered by the Full Bench and the actual decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin has been the subject of discussion in a later decision by a Bench of this High Court reported in Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. Special Deputy Collector of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam. In that case Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair expresses the view that nothing that he had read in the Rangoon case affects the opinion expressed by him in the Full Bench case. These matters are therein fully considered and I agree with my learned brother that there is no material before us on which we can hold that we are not bound by the Full Bench decision.

    Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar argued further an interesting point. He points out that it is settled law according to the decision of the Judicial Committee in Gossami Sri Gridharji v. Romanlalji Gossami(6), that the right of the claimant to the trusteeship of a temple is presumed in his favour if it can be shown that the temple had been founded by the claimant's ancestors and no proof of any usage at variance with this presumption is forthcoming. That rule of Hindu law, says Mr. Ganapathi Ayyar, affects the meaning of S. 9, Cl. 5 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act. That very point has been dealt with by my learned brother in the case reported in Kallepalle Krishnamurthi v. The Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. I desire to express my complete agreement with that decision and in particular for the reasons given at page 387. It seems too that whether the words are “is” or “has been” the effect is the same. As my learned brother points out, the fact that many years ago this temple was founded is not surely what is contemplated by the Act but what is contemplated is a consideration of the de facto exercise of the hereditary right and not a mere presumptive right not exercised for several generations. I agree that this appeal and the Civil Revision Petition must be dismissed for the reasons given.

    N.R.RAppeal and Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    C.V. Chelapathi Rao Naidu v. Board Of Commissioner For Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras
    (Aug 3, 1936)