Plaintiffs in two connected suits Nos. 475 and 476 of 1922, District Munsif's Court, Poonamallee brought under Sect. 9 of the Specific Relief Act were unsuited on the ground that on the date of the suits the plaint lands although trespassed upon by defendants were leased to others and therefore only their lessees and not plaintiffs themselves were entitled to sue. This petition is brought in order to revise the decision.
1. Plaintiffs have their remedy by way of suit and in such circumstances this Court will not ordinarily interfere by way of revision; Devata Sri Ramamurti v. Venkata Sitaramachandra Row (5).
2. But if the remedy is clear, the parties will not necessarily be driven to another suit Sree Krishna Doss v. Chandook Chand. Therefore the question for determination in this case resolves itself into whether there is clear authority supporting or controverting the decision of the District Munsif.
3. There has been sharp divergence of judicial opinion upon this point as was clearly revealed when it came before a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Blennerhassett, J., could see no reason why a land lord who has put a tenant in possession should not himself sue to eject a trespasser. Edge, C.J, affirmed as prevailing all the world over that when a man creates a tenancy under him which entitles the tenant to the exclusive use of the property the man creating the tenancy cannot have any right to actual possession so long as the tenant is entitled to possession. It was accordingly held with the concurrence of four other judges that in these circumstances plaintiffs might be entitled to a declaratory decree that the trespasser could not interfere with his right to receive rent and a decree to be put into possession of the rents; but so long as he did not himself possess the right to enjoy physical possession he could not eject the trespasser; Sita Ram v. Ram Lal.
4. Two years later the question came before a bench of this Court which assumed; it to be an elementary rule that a plaintiff who seeks possession must show that at the date of the suit he was entitled to such relief Ramanadan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai .
5. So far the law on the matter was clear. The next Madras ruling Jaganathacharry v. Rama Rayer, hardly affected the previous decision; for it was held that the landlord must be entitled to possession at the time of suit, and he was so entitled in that case because the lease had terminated immediately after the dispossession of the tenant by a third person and the tenant was no longer interested in the matter. But unfortunately the head-note to this ruling is drafted as if affirming that a landlord can always bring a suit for possession when his tenant has been dispossessed by a third party. For this unqualified statement there might seem at first to be better authority in Rangasawmi Aiyangar v. Krishna Goundan, when Sankaran Nair, J. sitting alone does appear to allow a landlord to sue for physical possession of property of which his tenant had been dispossessed. But though that is the effect of the judgment the reasoning proceeds on the assumption that it is only a question of receiving rent, a matter about which as Sir John Edge showed in Sita Ram v. Ram Lal, there is no difficulty. An earlier Madras case is cited, Innasi Pillai v. Sivagnana Desikar alias Gnana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi, which also is entirely confined to the question of rent; and before concluding Sankaran Nair, J., makes it clear that he is not differing from Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai. It is not an easy judgment to understand but it is no authority for holding that the landlord can sue in these cases.
6. In Krishnan Nambudri v. The Secretary of State, Wallis, J., and Abdur Rahim, J., reaffirmed Ramanadan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai , and its statement of the elementary rule. Thus it may be said that at this date there was no real difference of opinion and the ruling of the Allahabad Full Bench prevailed.
7. In Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayar, a plaintiff who had long been out of possession seems to have suggested that if his tenant had been in possession (which was not the fact) there would be no bar of limitation. His plea was rejected on the facts but his hypothesis was fully discussed by Sundara Aiyar, J., who has assembled the various rulings on the point His Lordship says that it is held that the landlord where his tenant is ousted by a trespasser may sue under Sect. 9 of the Specific Relief Act in Rangaswami Aiyangar v. Krishna Goundan(6), Jagannatha Charry…() v. Rama Rayer…(Petitioner) .* (7), and Innasi Pillai v. Sivagnana Desikar alias Gnana Sambanda Pandara Sannadhi. But as shown above none of these cases is real authority for that broad proposition. He acknowledges that Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai, and Krishnan Nambudri v. The Secretary of State, are against him, but on the whole is inclined to hold that the landlord has a cause of action; See page 155. This opinion it may be noted is obiter and is not very strongly expressed.
8. In 1914 it was held Somiammal v. Vellaya Sethurayan, that if a landlord had given a lease to a tenant the landlord might eject a trespasser in order to put his tenant into possession. The tenant in that case “had not been put in possession at all, but was anxious to obtain possession.” Such a case seems to proceed on the assumption that the landlord has a right to immediate possession in order to fulfil his contract and the elementary rule in Ramanadan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai, would not then be infringed. It is not as though only the tenant had the right of immediate possession.
9. In Tiruvengada Konan v. Venkatachala Konan it was ruled that though a landlord is not entitled to immediate or Khas possession, he may obtain a decree for the possession of the reversion and for formal possession. This ruling practically follows Sit a Ram v. Ram Lal. It also questions whether the obiter dictum in Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayar, is not too broadly stated.
10. In 1916 the question came before Oldfield, J., and Phillips, J., Kathiri Kutti Musaliar v. Chekkutti Musaliar. They held that a landlord could sue to enable himself to fulfil his contract to give or restore possession to his tenant. Of course if the ruling stopped at the words ‘to give’ it would merely reaffirm Somiammal v. Vellaya Sethurayan, but the addition, of the words “to restore” opens up the whole question, and in effect this is a ruling contrary to Ramanadan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai. Oldfield, J., begins by remarking that the exposition of the law in Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayar, is consistent with the decisions in Narayanaswami Naidu Garu v. Yerramilli Ramakrishnayya and Somiammal v. Vellaya Sethurayan. The former merely states what is more elaborately developed in the latter ruling that a landlord can sue in order to fulfil his contract to put his lessee in possession. Of course the broader proposition in Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayar, that he can sue whenever his tenant is dispossessed is not inconsistent with these rulings. Then Oldfield, J., finds that these rulings admit exceptions to the general rule, though it seems that they establish only one exception, if it can indeed be called an exception. This rule is that on the date of the suit the landlord must show that he has a right to be in possession. If he has never put his tenant in possession and has to get possession in order to do so, he has a right to be in possession and his suit is not in contravention of the rule. But when it is also claimed that after a landlord has put his tenant into possession and that tenant has been dispossessed, the landlord may sue to restore his possession, it is not to set up an exception to the rule, it is to negative the rule altogether. Oldfield, J., proceeds that he cannot follow Krishna Nambudri v. The Secretary of State, in so far as it rules that a landlord cannot give or restore. Krishna Nambudri v. The Secretary of State, is not concerned with the question whether he can give; but it certainly rules that he cannot restore and in declining to follow this ruling, Oldfield, J., is maintaining the opposite and overriding Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai. No doubt his Lordship seeks to distinguish this ruling by finding on the facts that the trespasser colluded with the tenant and is therefore (see concurring judgment of Phillips, J.), only the licensee of the tenant against whom the landlord can have no cause of action during the continuance of the lease. But in Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai, although it was alleged in the plaint that the tenant and trespasser had colluded, there is no finding to that effect nor any mention of collusion in the body of the judgment. When their Lordships lay down the elementary rule they are not considering collusion. Kathirikutti Musaliar v. Chekutti Musaliar must be taken as contrary to Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai. In fact Phillips, J., practically states as much in his concluding sentence.
11. The whole question was then reviewed by Wallis, C.J, in Mohideen Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyar. The principle underlying the rule is fully explained; and the three ruling cases Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai, and Krishna Nambudri v. The Secretary of State, and Sita Ram v. Ram Lal, approved. The acceptance of the obiter dictum in Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayar, as authority is deprecated with an expression of regret that Sita Ram v. Ram Lal, was not brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The learned C. J., even goes so far as to find that the landlord cannot sue in order to fulfil his contract at page 940, differing from the view already expressed by Sadasiva Aiyar, J., in Somiammal v. Vellaya Sethurayan , which view Sadasiva Aiyar, J., reaffirms in a dissenting judgment in this case.
12. In Udaykumar Das v. Katyani Debi, it is held that the view of Sundara Aiyar, J., in Ambalavana Chetty v. Singaravelu Odayai, cannot be justified on principle and is opposed to what is regarded by Lord Alverstone, C.J, as well established doctrine.
13. I think it clear from the above examination of the authorities that the view of the learned District Munsif is well supported, and there is no justification for revision. I consider that the question is concluded by Sita Ram v. Ram Lal, and Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai, and Mohideen Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyyar. The petition is dismissed with costs.
K. S. D.Petition dismissed.