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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • S. 6 applicable and S. 5 inapplicable to Hindus.26. Section 2
  • 1, Section 10 of the English Married Women's Property Act,
  • SECTION 6 MARRIED WOMEN S PROPERTY ACT
  • MARRIED WOMEN S PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 10 of the English Women's Property Act,
  • SECTION 4 SUCCESSION ACT
  • Women's Property Act, 1874 (Act 3 of 1874)
  • Sections 2 and 25 of the Contract Act,
  • Section 10 of the English Act of 1874
  • Section 11 of the English Act of 1882,
  • Section 1 of the English Act of 1870,
  • SECTION 82 TRUSTS ACT
  • Sections 3 to 11 of the Trusts Act
  • Section 2(d) of the Contract Act,
  • SECTION 2 CONTRACT ACT
  • Women's Property Act (3 of 1874),
  • Section 10 of the English Act
  • S. 6, of the Indian Act of 1874.
  • Women's Property Act of 1870,
  • Ss. 5 and 6, in Act 3 of 1874,
  • provisions of Act 3 of 1874
  • Women's Property Act, S. 6
  • S. 4 of Act 3 of 1874,
  • S. 6, Act 3 of 1874.
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • S. 6 applicable and S. 5 inapplicable to Hindus.26. Section 2
  • 1, Section 10 of the English Married Women's Property Act,
  • SECTION 6 MARRIED WOMEN S PROPERTY ACT
  • MARRIED WOMEN S PROPERTY ACT
  • Section 10 of the English Women's Property Act,
  • SECTION 4 SUCCESSION ACT
  • Women's Property Act, 1874 (Act 3 of 1874)
  • Sections 2 and 25 of the Contract Act,
  • Section 10 of the English Act of 1874
  • Section 11 of the English Act of 1882,
  • Section 1 of the English Act of 1870,
  • SECTION 82 TRUSTS ACT
  • Sections 3 to 11 of the Trusts Act
  • Section 2(d) of the Contract Act,
  • SECTION 2 CONTRACT ACT
  • Women's Property Act (3 of 1874),
  • Section 10 of the English Act
  • S. 6, of the Indian Act of 1874.
  • Women's Property Act of 1870,
  • Ss. 5 and 6, in Act 3 of 1874,
  • provisions of Act 3 of 1874
  • Women's Property Act, S. 6
  • S. 4 of Act 3 of 1874,
  • S. 6, Act 3 of 1874.
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case involves the insurance policy taken out by the deceased Venkataratnam, who insured his life for Rs. 2,000 with the Insurance Office, which agreed to pay the amount to his wife and children. The plaintiff obtained a decree against Venkataratnam and claimed the insurance money towards satisfying that decree, including the Rs. 400 share allocated to defendant 1, the daughter of Venkataratnam. The central dispute concerns whether the insurance money is protected under the Married Women's Property Act, 1874 (Act 3 of 1874), or forms part of the deceased’s estate. The opinion arises from an appeal challenging a prior decision that the Act did not apply to the insurance money.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Act 3 of 1874 (Married Women's Property Act) applies to Hindu married males who effect a policy of insurance on their own life for the benefit of their wife and children.
  2. Whether, in cases like the present, the daughter (defendant 1) is entitled to enforce her claim against the Insurance Office or creditors, or whether the insurance money forms part of the deceased’s estate subject to attachment.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju Held that the Married Women's Property Act does not apply to Hindus; insurance money forms part of the estate. The court questioned this precedent and expressed doubts, suggesting it should be reconsidered by a Full Bench.
Garrick v. Taylor Presumption that if a purchase is made in one’s name by another, it is a trust for the person who paid the money, except where a parent-child relationship exists. Applied to infer that insurance policies taken in the name of wife or children by the insured are presumed to be for their benefit.
Pfleger v. Browne Onus lies on the person claiming benefit under an insurance policy to prove entitlement even if the policy is in their name. Supported the principle that beneficial interest depends on evidence beyond the policy’s nominal holder.
In re Richardson Weston v. Richardson Recognized presumption of advancement in favor of children when insurance is effected in their name by the insured. Used to support the view that the daughter is a beneficiary under the policy by way of advancement.
Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya A third person not party to contract may sue if consideration moved indirectly from that person. Followed to hold wife and children may sue as promisees under the Contract Act, though with some reservations.
Samuel v. Ananthanatha Approved the principle in Venkata Chinnaya Rau regarding third-party enforcement of contracts. Referenced in support of third-party beneficiary claims under insurance contracts.
Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam Equity allows enforcement of claims by persons not parties to contract where strict English common law rules would cause injustice. Relied upon to argue for equitable enforcement rights of wife and children under Indian circumstances.
Maybrick case: Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association Policy money payable directly to beneficiaries; trust ceased to exist when policy terms changed. Distinguished from present case to analyze effect of policy terms on beneficiaries’ rights.
Shuppu Ammal v. Subramaniam, Arumuga Goundan v. Chinnammal, Rukmabai v. Govind, Protap Narain Mukerjee v. Sarat Kumari Debi Cases decided on principles of trusts relating to marriage settlements and provisions for children. Analogous principles cited to support the creation of trust in favor of wife and children under insurance policy.
Tweddle v. Atkinson English rule that only parties to contract can enforce it. Discussed critically; Indian courts may depart from this English rule in favor of equity.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the applicability of the Married Women's Property Act, 1874, particularly Section 6, which provides that an insurance policy effected by a married man on his own life for the benefit of his wife or children shall be deemed a trust for their benefit and not part of his estate. The key issue was whether this section applies to Hindu married males, given the saving clause in Section 2 excluding married women professing certain religions.

The court concluded that Section 6 applies to policies effected by Hindu males for the benefit of their wife and children. The saving clause in Section 2 excludes only married women professing certain religions and does not prevent the application of Section 6 to the husband or to the children. The court reasoned that the provision is independent of marriage law and is rooted in contract and trust law principles, intended to protect beneficiaries from creditors and the husband's control.

It was further reasoned that the premiums paid by the deceased were his self-acquired property, not joint family property, thus reinforcing the trust nature of the policy. The court also considered principles of contract law, equity, and trusts, including the doctrine that near relations may enforce contracts benefiting them, even if not parties to the contract, and that a trust arises in favor of the wife and children with the insurance company as trustee.

The court noted conflicting precedent, especially the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju decision, but expressed grave doubts about its correctness and referred the questions to a Full Bench for authoritative resolution.

Regarding enforcement by the daughter, the court distinguished cases where insurance policies were taken in the daughter’s name alone (suggesting a gift or advancement) from the present case where the policy was for the benefit of wife and children collectively. It held that the daughter’s claim is affected by Section 6 but whether she can enforce the claim directly against the insurance company or creditors depends on the policy’s terms and trust structure.

Holding and Implications

The court held that Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1874, applies to life insurance policies effected by Hindu married males for the benefit of their wife and children or any of them. It held that the insurance money is deemed to be held in trust for the wife and children and is not part of the deceased’s estate subject to creditors’ claims, at least insofar as the daughter’s interest is concerned.

The court also held that the daughter (defendant 1) is not barred by the saving clause in Section 2 from benefiting under Section 6, as the clause applies to married women and not to daughters, even if married. However, the question of the daughter’s direct enforceability of the claim against the Insurance Office or creditors depends on the specific terms of the policy and was left open for further consideration.

The court expressed doubts about the previously followed decision in Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju and referred the important questions to a Full Bench for final determination.

No new precedent was set by this opinion; it clarifies the applicability of Section 6 and highlights the need for fuller adjudication by a Full Bench. The immediate effect is that insurance money under such policies may be protected from creditors and held in trust for the wife and children, including daughters, under the Married Women's Property Act, 1874.

    Pokkunuri Balamba v. Kakaraparti Krishnayya

    Sankaran Jair, J.:— (17th February 1913).— Defendant 1 is the daughter and defendants 2 and 3 are the sons, of one deceased Venkaratnam, who insured his life for Rs. 2,000 which the Insurance Office agreed to pay to his wife and children. The plaintiff got a decree against Venkataratnam and he claims the insurance money towards the decree including the Rs. 400 that fell to defendant 1.

    2. The first question for decision is whether the money insured is protected by the Married Women's Property Act (3 of 1874), or whether it is a part of the estate of the deceased. The Judge following the decision reported as Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju(1), as he was bound to do, held that the Act did not apply. This is an appeal from that decision. It is argued before us that judgment ought not to be followed, and that the Act is applicable to cases like the one before us. S. 6, Act 3 of 1874, runs thus:

    “A policy of insurance, effected by any married man on his own life, and expressed on the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife, or of his wife and children, or any of them, shall enure and be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife, or of his wife and children, or any of them according to the interest so expressed, and shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains, be subject to the control of the husband, or to his creditors or form part of his estate.” The Act applies to the whole of British India. Now the words of the section seem to be clear, and, according to it, the policy of insurance effected by the deceased Venkataratnam should enure for the benefit of defendant 1 and others. But it is argued that S. 2 shows that this S. 6 does not apply to Hindus. The clause relied upon runs thus:

    “But nothing herein contained applies to any married woman who at the time of her marriage professed the Hindu, Mahomedan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion, or whose husband at the time of such marriage professed any of those religions.” Now it is obvious that this clause applies only to a married woman who professed any of the religions referred to in the section, or who may be a follower of any other religion, say Christianity, but whose husband professed any one of those religions. The proviso therefore does not apply to all Hindus and it applies to others than Hindus. It does not apply to males whoprofess those religions. That this is so appears to be clear to me from the next clause which enables the Governor-General in Council to exempt from the operation of the Act members of any race. If therefore males who follow those religions have to be excluded, it must be by an order of the Governor-General in Council. This appears to be superfluous if the exemption clause applied to them also. The last clause of that section only states that Section 4 of the Succession Act, shall not apply, and shall be deeemed never to have applied to any marriage one or both parties to which professed any of the above religions and is confined solely to that provision of the. Succession Act. It appears to me therefore that S. 6 does clearly apply, and I am confirmed in this view by a consideration of the general scheme of Act 3 of 1874, which shows also why the clause in S. 2 is confined to the married women referred to therein. In order to understand it, it is necessary to make a brief reference to Act 10 of 1865. That Act, with the exception of S. 4, dealt with property which was taken by succession, either under a will or under intestacy, and it was provided by S. 331 that, with reference to such property, the Act should not extend to Hindus, Mahomedans or Buddhists. But S. 4 provided that “no person shall by marriage acquire any interest in the property of the person whom he or she marries, nor become incapable of doing any act in respect of his or her own property which he or she could have done if unmarried.” This section applied also to property taken otherwise than by succession, and as this provision was deemad to be a proper one with regard to property taken by way of succession, and as it affected the property relations of married people, it was deemed more convenient to affirm the broad principle than to have the property taken by succession alone regulated by that law. This clause therefore went further than the rest and enacted the law which was peculiar to marriage and had nothing to do with succession, while the rest of the law dealt with matters peculiar to succession and had nothing to do with marriage. Part 6, which is headed “On the Effect of Marriage,” does not touch this question. Now, there was no restriction as regards the communities affected by S. 4; Hindus and uddhists were not excluded.

    3. This Act was passed in 1865, and in 870 the Married Women's Property Act has passed in England (33 and 34 Vict., chap. 93), and it was deemed advisable a enact some provisions of that Act in India which was done by Act 3 of 1874, he legislature then proceeded on the view that, as the Hindus, etc., had their own marriage law and their own succession law, it was undesirable to interfere, with them and that the new provisions of be enacted need be made applicable ??? to those whose law of succession was governed by the Succession Act accordingly, it was provided by the last clause in Section 2 that Section 4 of the Succession Act, hall not apply, and shall be deemed lever to have applied, to any marriage ??? or both parties to which professed at the time of marriage any of those religions. The Sikh and Jaina religions were added as a doubt was entertained whether the Sikhs were Hindus and the Taints were Buddhists, as was thought it the time when the Succession Act was passed. Now, it will be noticed that all the sections except S. 6 referred of laws which were peculiar to English marriage. S. 4 of Act 3 of 1874, which was Section 1 of the English Act of 1870, was sanded to get rid of the right of the husband acquired by marriage under English law to strip his wife of her wages and earnings. S. 5 also, which is para. 1, Section 10 of the English Married Women's Property Act, had reference to the peculiar marriage law of England.

    4. Under that law, as it then stood, if a wife effected a policy of insurance on her own life or on her husband's life otherwise than by separate property and lied in her husband's lifetime, the husband, in the capacity of her administrator, became the absolute owner if the property. If a married woman had already separate property, and if she chose to make any arrangement by means of that separate property in any suit that may be instituted by her to enforce it, the husband must be a party, might raise any questions he liked and could tip up a good deal of domestic life to decide the question whether she had private property. The section avoided any such question as to what is separate property and laid down a rule that, if the wife contracts with an insurance office and provides the money by which the insurance is effected, the Insurance Office shall ask no question as to whether the property in question was her separate property or not. But the Insurance Office should be liable to the wife and to the wife alone. S. 7 of the Act referred to legal proceedings by and against a married woman. It also was intended to place beyond doubt the difficulties which arose on account of the English marriage law. So, too, Ss. 8 and 9. Now, all those sections, with the exception of S. 9, which were taken from the Married Women's Property Act of 1870, had reference to the disabilities of married women under the English law. S. 9 was intended to get rid of the husband's liability and was consequential on the removal of the wife's liabilities and deprivation of his rights by marriage. These sections had no reference whatever to the disabilities of married women under the Hindu law, and therefore S. 2 distinctly declared that these provisions shall not apply to any married woman who professed the Hindu or any other of the religions referred to therein.

    5. Now, S. 6 stands on a different footing. It had nothing to do with any marriage law, but dealt with the question of contract or of trust. Shortly before this Act 3 of 1874 was passed, the Legislature had passed the Contract Act, by which it is enacted, following the English Law, that the parties to a contract alone shall be entitled, save in exceptional cases, to enforce the contract. A third party to a contract, to whom the Insurance Office may have promised the money due under a policy of life insurance, cannot therefore enforce it. But it was deemed desirable for obvious reasons that there should be an exception in favour of wife and children, and that part of Section 10 of the English Women's Property Act, which refers to this matter, was enacted as S. 6, Act 3 of 1874. It will be noticed that Section 10 of the English Act was split into two separate sections, Ss. 5 and 6, in Act 3 of 1874, consistent with the intention to make S. 6 generally applicable and S. 5 inapplicable to Hindus. The reason is clear. The rule that debarred the wife from enforcing the provision in the contract between the husband and the Insurance Office in her favour is not a rule that depended upon any marriage law. Unlike the other sections of the Act, it dealt with a question which had reference not only to the Christians, but also to the Hindus and Mahomeda. The section did not interfere with the Hindu or Mahomedan marriage laws and did not contravene the general policy disclosed by the other provisions not to interfere with such laws.

    6. I am not at all sure that the Legislature, in enacting the Contract Act, did not depart from the Hindu Law, under which it is not at all clear that the wife and children were not entitled to claim the insurance money. I can therefore easily perceive the distinction between S. 6 which relates to married men and the other sections of the Code which refer to the disabilities of married women under the English Law and changes consequent thereon. For these reasons, I think the Legislature advisedly exempted only married women from the provisions of the Act.

    7. I am also of opinion that the premiums paid by the deceased Venkataratnam were his own self-acquired property. The Judge states that Venkataratnam “received a house from his brothers as his share of the family property and that in due course he sold it,” that it is therefore for the defence to show that he did not use this property and the sale proceeds, and that otherwise the presumption is that all property in the hands of Venkataratnam was family property. But it was apparently not brought to the notice of the Judge that the insurance policy was taken out in 1888 and that the sale of the house was only in the year 1904. The presumption therefore raised by the Judge does not apply. Prima facie, what is paid as premium is a man's own property. I am accordingly of opinion that the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving that this is joint family property.

    8. It has also been further argued before us that, even if the Act does not apply, defendant 1 and the others named in the policy must be treated as beneficiaries for whose benefit the policy was taken out by the deceased Venkataratnam. According to English Law, if a man purchase real property or an annuity, stock or other chattel interest, or take a bond in the name of a stranger, the equitable ownership results to the person who advanced the purchase-money. Bub an exception has always been recognized to this doctrine; that is, that if the person from whom the consideration move stands in loco parentis to the person in whose name the purchase is made, that gift or advancement, is presumed. This is what is stated by Lord Romilly in Garrick v. Taylor(2), which was confirmed in appeal: “If a purchase bi made by one in the name of another, the presumption is that the latter is a truster for the person who pays the money, unless the parties stand in the relation of parent and child.”

    9. The same principle has been applied to policies of life insurance in Pfleger v. Browne(3), which was a case where at Insurance Office issued a policy on Pfleger's life the premiums of which wen paid by Pfleger but the amount wai payable to Browne. It was held the onus of proof, when the benefit of it was claimed by Browne, lay on the latter even though the policy stood ii his name.

    10. The exception in favour of the children was recognized in In re Richardson Weston v. Richardson(4). In that case the question was whether the policy of life insurance effected by a man on his own life, but in his daughter's name was for his benefit or for that of his daughter. He retained the policy in his own possession and he paid all the premiums himself from time to time except the last which, on account of his want of money, his son paid. Kay J. held that “the legal right to call upon the office to pay the sum assured was clearly in the daughter, and not in the executor, the contract on the insurance company having been to pay her. That she was a daughter was sufficient to raise the presumption that there had been an advancement to her.” He further held that the mere retention by the father of the policy in his own hands did not show that the beneficial interest was not intended to pass to her.

    11. On the other hand the decision of the case In re Policy No. 6402 of the Scottish Equitable Life Assurance Society(5), in which many of, these cases are referred and principles explained, is an ??? where the Court refused to draw such presumption, though the policy was taken on a man's life “for the behoof of a lady who was his deceased wife's sister and with whom he, had gone through the ceremony of marriage. The question therefore is whether the relationship of the parties is such that we should presume a gift or an advancement in favour of the person in whose name the policy stands. In India, Section 82 of the Trusts Act, states that where property is transferred to A for a consideration paid or provided by B, the property is presumed to belong to A unless it appears that B did not intend to pay or provide such consideration for the benefit of A. In the Madras Presidency at any rate, there is an increasing disposition to make provision for the benefit of a person's wife, children including daughters, as against his joint family, to whom his property would survive at his death, or as against the male hairs. Accordingly, Turner, C.J, and Muthusami Aiyar, J., decided that where votes were purchased in the name of a wife out of funds belonging to the husband, “the presumption is that he intended that the notes transferred to his wife should become her property:” Narayana v. Kishna(6). This view has been accepted in Madras in the case of Hindu females. I have very little doubt that, when persons in the position of Venkataratnam take the policy in the name of either the wife or daughters, they intend it for their benefit and they must be deemed to be the beneficiaries under the policy.

    12. Various insurance offices in Southern India issue policies under which the moneys are to be paid to the daughters on their marriage. The consideration in such cases is not only the health, etc., of the person who pays the premiums, but also considerations affecting the daughter. I have no doubt that all these persons who have been effecting these insurance policies always treated the policy money as the property of the daughter payable to her at a certain fixed period. It is not open to the father or husband to revoke that disposition without the consent of either the wife or the daughter. I would accordingly hold that in this case there was a gift or advancement in favour of the daughter and that the plaintiff is not entitled, therefore to claim the share due to her.

    13. As a beneficiary, there is no doubt that the defendant would be entitled to bring a suit against the Insurance Company for the recovery of the amount. No doubt, in England, it has been held that if she is not the beneficiary, and the amount is only payable to the daughter on the father's death, then the daughter is not entitled to sue. It is probable that in India this question may require further consideration on account of the ruling of the Privy Council Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan v. Nawab Hosaini Begam(7). The facts in this case show this was a settlement similar to the one in that case. But it is unnecessary to consider this question further in this case as the daughter is not the claimant. In Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammirajju the conclusions are, no doubt, opposed to mine in this case, but there the question was not considered. It was assumed that the Married Women's Property Act in its entirety did not apply to Hindus. There the counsel for the Insurance Office conceded in appeal the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the money. The question of advancement or gift or trust was not raised in that case.

    14. I doubt therefore whether that is authority to be followed. But as the question is of general importance it is desirable that it should be decided by a Full Bench. We accordingly refer to the Full Bench the questions involved for decision:

    (1) Whether Act 3 of 1874 applies to Hindu married males or not?

    (2) Whether in cases similar to the one before us, the daughter is not entitled to enforce her claim against the Insurance Office or a creditor?

    Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— I agree with my learned brother in the finding of fact that the deceased paid his premia out of his self-acquired moneys, and it is unnecessary to repeat the reasons given by him for arriving at that conclusion. The further question arising in the case, and which we have resolved to refer for the opinion of a Full Bench is of great importance. That question is whether, when a Hindu male has insured his life with a company by an agreement under which the Insurance Company undertook to pay the insurance money on the death of the insured to his wife and children, the said wife and children, or at least the children, are entitled to that money, or whether such money is part of the estate of the deceased to which his male children who are his heirs are alone entitled. This question has been answered in favour of the second alternative in the case reported as Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju. As at present advised, and with the greatest respect, I feel grave doubts as to whether that decision does not require re-consideration. The question involved might be considered under four heads:

    (a) Whether under the Contract Act, the wife and children can enforce a promise made by the Insurance Company as if the wife and children were promisees under the Contract Act.

    (b) Whether the wife and children can take advantage of Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act 3 of 1874, and claim that a trust for their benefit was created when the policy of insurance was effected.

    (c) Whether, even if the Contract Act and the Married Women's Property Act did not apply, the wife and children could sue under the common law prevailing in India as near relations of the insured intended to be benefited by the insured.

    (d) Whether under the Trusts Act the wife and children became the cestui que trustent and the company became trustees, and thus the trust could be enforced by the wife and children.

    15. As regards the first point it was held in Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya(8) that a third person who was not a party to a contract could sue the promisor though the consideration proceeded from the third person's stepmother and not from third person himself. Innes, J., held that the consideration moved indirectly from the third person and hence the third person himself became a promisee under the Contract Act. He relied upon the old case of Dutton v. Poole(9), decided in 1868 Kindersley, J., held that under Section 2(d) of the Contract Act, the consideration need not flow from the promisee and hence even a third person could sue as promisee though no consideration flowed from him. Dutton v. Poole went upon the ground that, having regard to the near relationship between the plaintiff and the party from whom the consideration moved, the plaintiff might be considered to be a party to the consideration and that was also the ground on which Innes, J., based his decision.

    16. According to the argument of Kindersly, J., neir relationship between the brother and the person from whom the consideration moved was not important under the Contract Act. This case of Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya seems to have been approved of in Samuel v. Ananthanatha(10). If Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya, decided in 1881, is good law, then the wife and children of the insured are entitled to sue as if they were parties to the contract itself bet-wean the insured and the Insurance Company. But Pollock and Mulla point out (see their notes to S. 2, p. 17) that in the two cases of Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya and Samuel v. Ananthanatha, Cls. (a), (b) and (c), Section 2 of the Contract Act, have been overlooked and Cl. (d) alone has been considered. Though under Cl. (d) the consideration may move from the promisee or any other person, under Cls. (1), (b) and (c) no man could be called a promisee and no man could therefore become entitled to bring a suit as promisee unless he has accepted the proposal of the promisor and thus comes under the definition of “promisee” in S. 1(c). Here the wife and children were not asked by the promissor whether they assented to the proposal to benefit them, and they did not accept any such proposal and hence cannot come under the Contract Act definition of “promisee”. So also in Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya the beneficiary under the agreement was not a party to the agreement as he had not accepted any proposal and hence cannot be called a “promisee” under the Contract Act. However I am willing to follow Venkata Chinnaya Rau v. Venkataramaya, as it was decided so far back as 1881, and its authority has not been expressly overruled, though, if I were to construe the sections of the Contract Act itself, I am inclined to agree with the criticisms of Pollak and Mulla.

    17. The next branch of the question relates to Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act. In the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju it was held that no person following the Hindu law can take advantage of that section because S. 2, para. 2, provided that Act should not apply to any married woman who or whose husband at the time of her marriage professed the Hindu religion. It seems to me there are three answers to the argument based on S. 2. In the first place S. 6 speaks of a policy of insurance effected by any married man, and hence the words in S. 2, which exclude the applicability of the Act to a Hindu married woman, cannot have any bearing upon the provisions of S. 6 which relate to a policy of insurance effected by any married man and not by any married woman whether Hindu or otherwise. In the second place, even if S. 2 will exclude a married Hindu woman from the benefit of a policy effected by her husband, his children cannot come under the phrase “married women” in S. 2 and if the insurance was in favour of the children also S. 6 must apply because S. 6 says that the insurance shall be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife and children or any of them according to the interests so expressed. Because the wife cannot take, I do not see why the children “should not take. In the third place, the title of Act 3 of 1874 says that it is an Act, not only “to explain and amend the law relating to certain married woman” but also an Act “for other purposes,” referring evidently to the beneficient insurance provision laid down in S. 6. The preamble says that it is expedient to make provision for insurance on lives by persons married before or after that date. It does not say that the provision is restricted to insurances on lives of other than those of the Hindu, Mahomedan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jain religions. Though the Act is called the Married Women's Property Act, this question of insurance was also considered as an important matter falling to be dealt with by the Act, and the provisions under S. 6 have nothing to do with the religion of the parties, but are beneficient provisions, the reasons for enacting which are applicable whether the husband who insures his life belongs to one religion or to another. It is clear from the history of the legislation that provision, as Mr. Hobhouse says, was necessitated by the old doctrine of the English Courts, that a husband as such had no insurable interest in his wife's life and similar doctrines. It was also necessitated by the view of English Courts, that such a policy even when allowed by statute overriding the common law, would only be in the nature of a voluntary settlement and hence would be liable to the dangers to which such settlements are exposed. It is well known that the legislature wanted to encourage those life insurance policies which make provisions for wife and children and not to subject such policies to the dangers to which they were subjected under the English decisions, Judges of English Courts being too much bound down by technicalities and precedents. In introducing the Bill: (see extra supplement of 2nd August 1873 of the Gazette of India), Mr. Hobhouse said:

    “Some gentlemen connected with Insurance Offices in this country applied to the Government a short time ago stating that those provisions,” i.e, the provisions of the English statute which overruled the English decisions, “were found exceedingly beneficial and they did not see why they should not be applied to India. We now propose therefore to introduce an Act which should embody for India the same provisions as those which had been thought fit for the people of England.”

    18. It will be found from this quotation that the religion of the parties had nothing to do with the introduction of these provisions in the Act; just as the “people of England” were sought to be benefited by the English Act, and protected against the English decision, so the people of India were sought to be protected by the introduction of this Section 6 in the Married Women's Property Act. Mr. Hobhouse in another speech said (see Extra Supplement dated 6th September 1873, p. 12 of the Gazette of India):

    “We must remember that a wife's contributions to the family wealth did not usually consist in payment of money. She may bring to her husband no money at all and yet may be a very treasure to him even if measured by a mere pecuniary standard. If the wife kept the household together, brought up the children, governed his servants, conducted all his petty dealings with tradesmen, and performed other similar domestic duties, the husband might be a far richer man for her services, although he might provide all the actual money that comes into the family. Then, if he chose that his wife should take every year so much out of the common stock, or out of his stock, and spend it in an insurance for herself or her children, why should she not do so? If the husband chose that should be done with his property from time to time, Mr. Hobhouse did not see it was a matter for legal question, or that there should be any legal difficulty placed in the way of the wife's enforcing the contracts. It might be the most prudent, the most wise, and the most beneficial arrangement for the whole family, the very best mode of making a provision for them, and it also might be, and often was a matter of absolute justice as between husband and wife which he or his creditors ought not to dispute at any future time. Mr. Hobhouse, therefore thought that we ought not to import nice legal questions into such transactions; the broad intelligible mode of treating them was that if the wife contracted independently with the Insurance Office, and paid the money, the Insurance Office should ask no questions, but should be liable to the wife and to the wife alone.

    “Section 6 provided that: “A policy of insurance effected by any married man on his own life, and expressed on the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children or any of them, shall enure and be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children, or any of them, according to the interests so expressed, and shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains, be subject to the control of the husband, or to his creditors, or form part of the estate.”

    “Mr. Hobhouse could not say that he attached a great deal of importance to that section. In the first place, such transactions were not very often effected because people did not like putting their property beyond their control. In the second place, the thing could be done as the law now stood. The effect of the section would be to place such an arrangement on a safer basis.

    “At present, it would be in the nature of what lawyers call a “voluntary settlement” and without leading the Council into technicalities relating to voluntary settlements, he would only state that in contests with the creditors of the settlor, those settlements stood on a less favourable footing than settlements made for valuable consideration. We propose to follow the example of the English legislature in enacting that settlements effected in this particular way should be good as against creditors, but at the end of the section there was an express reservation of the rights of creditors in the case of fraud. He did not attach much importance to that; for fraud would vitiate any transaction whether it was expressly so provided or not and he did not believe in those fore-sighted, long-headed arrangements for the purpose of defrauding creditors, and in practice, had never known a single instance in which people deliberately plotted beforehand to defraud their creditors in this kind of way. At the same time, those who opposed alterations of the law of property in the case of husband and wife, always insisted on the possibility of frauds being facilitated thereby and we followed the English statute in putting on the face of our bill a warning that such things could not be dona more easily than now.”

    19. I have quoted thus at length in order to show that the religion of the insured had nothing to do with the introduction of the beneficent provision contained in S. 6 of the Act. It seams to me therefore that Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act does apply to a policy of insurance effected by a Hindu married man on his own life and expressed on the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children or any of them and that S. 2 does not prevent the application of the provisions of S. 6 to any such policy. Having regard however to the case of the Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju. I do not wish to treat this as my final considered opinion till I have heard further arguments on this point.

    20. Then the third branch of this question concerns the argument that under the common law of India, a person who is the near relation of the party from whom the consideration has proceeded is entitled to sue the promisor, though he may not come within the strict definition of a promisee under the Contract Act. I think this is a very tenable position having regard to Dutton v. Poole. The ratio decidendi of that case appears to me as valid, and though that case is usually treated as overruled by Tweddle v. Atkinson(11) that fact (namely, that the later English case has overruled the earlier English case) need not prevent Indian Courts from adopting and following the overruled case if it lays down that rule of law which appeals to the Indian Courts as the more equitable rule.

    “Consideration” in the Indian law under the Contract Act need not be given the restricted meaning given by later English decisions and as Shepherd, J., points out in his notes to Sections 2 and 25 of the Contract Act, the word “consideration” in Indian law comes nearer to the notion of “Causa” as understood in the Roman law. A motive based on near relationship or upon the moral obligation to provide for dependent relations must surely be treated as a very lawful consideration indirectly proceeding from the relative so as to enable such relation to bring a suit against the promisor though, if the person intended to be benefited was not such a dependent relative, the law might hesitate to allow that stranger to sue upon the promise made for his benefit. The cases of Chinnaya Rau v. Ramaya and Samuel Pillai v. Ananthanatha Pillai, already referred to, might be treated as authorities on this basis, though the observations therein in respect of the two provisions of the Contract Act may be of doubtful validity. The Privy Council case of Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam seems to me to lend very great support to the above conclusion. Their Lordships say: “First it is contended, on the authority of Tweddle v. Atkinson, that as the plaintiff was no party to the agreement, she cannot take advantage of its provisions. With reference to this, it is enough to say that the case relied upon was an action of assumpsit, and that the rule of (English) Common law on the basis of which it was dismissed is not in their Lordships' opinion applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case……. In their Lordships' judgment, although no party to the document, she is clearly entitled to proceed in equity to enforce her claim. Their Lordships desire to observe that in India and among communities circumstanced as the Mahomedans, among whom marriages are contracted for minors by parents and guardians, it might occasion serious injustice if the Common law doctrine was applied to agreements or arrangements entered into in connexion with such contracts. On analogous principles, it seems to me that cases decided under the English law about consideration having to flow from the promisee or about persons having insurable interests only in the lives of particular persons and all such technicalities of English law should not be applied in India so as to defeat plain equities favouring the wife and children of an insured person.

    21. The fourth branch of the argument is based on the doctrine of trusts. I have gone through Sections 3 to 11 of the Trusts Act with some care and I am unable to see any difficulty in holding that a married man, who insures his life for the benefit of his wife and children in a company which promises to pay the insurance money at his death to the said wife and children creates a “trust,” that he becomes the author of the trust, that the company becomes the trustee, and that the wife and children are beneficiaries. It seems to me that the cases of Shuppu Ammal v. Subramaniam(12), Arumuga Goundan v. Chinnammal(13), Rukmabai v. Govind(14) and Protap Narain Mukerjee v. Sarat Kumari Debi(15) have been decided on analogous-principles. As Sundara Aiyar, J., points out in Kosuri Rajagopala Raju v. Datta Radhaya(16), marriage settlements are included in trusts, and Pollock points out as follows: “Closely connected with the cases covered by the doctrine of trusts, but extending beyond them we have the rules of equity by which special favour is extended to provisions made by parents for their children.” A policy of insurance effected by the father of a family for his children should therefore be looked upon with great favour by Courts of equity and I see no reason why the children should not directly claim rights against the promisor or trustee who has undertaken to act for their benefit. For all the above four reasons, I concur in referring the question for the decision of a Full Bench.

    OPINIONS

    White, C.J:— The first question which has been referred; to us is whether the Married Women's Property Act, 1874 (Act 3 of 1874) applies to Hindu males.

    22. I feel a difficulty in answering this question in the form in which it has been framed. A general answer might possibly cover a case not contemplated in the order of reference and not argued before us. The argument before us was confined to the question whether where a Hindu male effected a policy of insurance on his own life, which expressed on the face of it that it was for the benefit of his wife or his wife and children or any of them, S. 6 of the Act applied. This is the question I propose to deal with.

    23. Under S. 2 of the Act, nothing in the Act applies to a married woman who at the time of her of marriage professed the Hindu religion or whose husband at the time of the marriage professed the Hindu religion.

    24. I am of opinion that Ss. 4, 5, 7 and 8 do not apply where either of the spouses professed the Hindu religion at the time of the marriage. These sections contain the words “married women” and therefore S. 2 applies to them in terms. They are intended to confer rights on a married woman which under the law of England she did not possess, and to remove disabilities imposed on her by the law of England. These enactments, if not in conflict with, are entirely foreign to Hindu law. The words married women do not occur in S. 9, but the subject-matter of the section is foreign to Hindu law and in my opinion this section also does not apply where either of the spouses was at the time of the marriage a Hindu.

    25. Then as to S. 6, the words “married women” do not occur in the section. The section no doubt is in the interest of the wife and children but its primary object is to enable a man to make provision for his wife and children by insuring his life for their benefit without executing a separate deed of trust. The section enables a Hindu male to do something which but for the section he would not be able to do. The result may be that Hindu woman derives a benefit but I do not feel bound to hold that she is shut out from this benefit by reason of the general enactment that the Act shall not apply to Hindu women. As Sankaran Nair, J., points out in the order of reference, Section 10 of the English Act of 1874 was split into two sections in the Indian Act, Ss. 5 and 6, which is consistent with an intention to make S. 6 applicable and S. 5 inapplicable to Hindus.

    26. Section 2 only excludes the operation of the Act as regards the married women. There is no exclusion as regards children. If a Hindu male can take the benefit of the section for the purpose of providing for his children but is precluded from taking the benefit of the section in order to make provision for his wife, a curious anomaly arises, and a state of things is brought about which can scarcely have been intended by the legislature.

    27. This suggested anomaly was met by the contention that a similar anomaly arose under the language of S. 6 itself, since the words “or any of them” only apply to children, and that a policy for the benefit of one or more children to the exclusion of the wife, did not come within the terms of the section. The words of the Indian Act are the same as those of Section 10 of the English Act of 1874 (except that the English Act says “be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife and of his children or any of them,” whilst the Indian Act says “be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife, or of his wife and children, or any of them).”

    28. These words may be ambiguous, but, in Section 11 of the English Act of 1882, we have the words “for the benefit of his wife or of his children, or of his wife and children, or any of them.” This makes the matter quite clear, and, in my opinion, this is the sense in which we should construe the words in S. 6, of the Indian Act of 1874. This seems to dispose of the argument that the section itself creates an anomalous distinction between wife and children.

    29. There are three possible views, as it seems to me:

    (1) That the section does not apply to a policy of insurance, effected by a Hindu male.

    (2) That it applies to a policy effected by a Hindu male for the benefit of his children, but not to a policy effected for the benefit of his wife.

    (3) That it applies to a policy effected for the benefit of his wife or of his children, or of his wife and children, or any of them.

    30. In my opinion the third view is the right one S. 6 dispenses with the necessity for a separate deed of trust. It does not affect the law of contract or the law of trusts as regards the persons entitled to enforce the contract under the policy. When by virtue of the section a trust is created, the person entitled to enforce the rights of the beneficiary is the trustee, if a trustee has been appointed, and if no special trustee has been appointed the Official Trustee to whom the money is payable under para. 2 of the section.

    31. Limiting my answer to the first question, the question whether S. 6 of the Act applies, I would answer it in the affirmative.

    32. The second question is: ‘Whether in cases similar to the one before us, the daughter is not entitled to enforce her claim against the insurance officer or a creditor.” The first point to be considered is, assuming S. 6 (in accordance with the view I have already expressed) would apply if the facts brought the case within the section, whether this particular policy enures as a trust for the wife and children, or forms part of the estate of the assured.

    33. In the case before us, the Insurance Company contracted to pay not the parties for whose benefit the policy purports to have been taken out, but the executors, administrators or assigns of the assured, whereas in Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju and in the Maybrick case Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association(17), the company contracted to pay the parties for whose benefit the policy purported to be taken out. In the Maybrick case, the contract was to pay to the beneficiary.

    34. In Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju the contract was to pay to the trustees who might be appointed under the Married Women's Property Act and, failing trustees, to the beneficiaries. There is nothing on the face of the policy in the present case to indicate that it was for the benefit of his wife and children except the words “for the benefit of his wife and children,” which are written in ink, in the printed form. There is no evidence as to how or when these words came to be written. For all we know they have been written in by the assured after the policy had been taken out. I will assume, however that the words “for the benefit of his wife and children” were part of the policy when the contract was made. How would the matter standi then? I do not think there would be a trust if the section did not apply. The legal interest in the policy money could not be said to vest in the executors in trust for the wife and children or in the company in trust for the wife and children, because the trust, if any, would, in my opinion, be, by reason of the operation of the section, and under the section itself, if no trustee is appointed, the legal interest vests in the Public Trustee. Further, so far as the company are concerned, they are under contractual obligation to pay the executors.

    35. If the policy had been in the same terms as the policy in Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju, and the company had contracted to pay the parties for whose benefit the policy was taken out (and this is the assumption on which the order of reference was made), I think there would have been a trust under the section; but the person entitled to enforce the claim as against the company would have been, not the daughter, the beneficiary, but, if no trustee had been appointed, the party in whom, under the section the legal interest vests, viz. the Public Trustee.

    36. As regards the case of Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju, the question whether a male Hindu could take the benefit of Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, does not appear to have been argued. All that the learned Judges say upon the point is: “We may point out that the Married Wow en's Property Act is not applicable to Hindus.” With all respect to the learned Judges, I cannot accept this proposition in its entirety. For the reasons I have stated, I think a male Hindu can take the benefit of S. 6.

    37. If the view taken by the learned Judges as to the Married Women's Property Act was right, I should agree with their conclusion in that case, that no cause of action arose to the beneficiaries and that the policy moneys formed part of the estate of the assured, notwithstanding that under the contract the money was payable to the benefieiaries in default of trustees. In the Maybrick case, on the facts, the trust created by the Act ceased to exist. The policy moneys therefore formed part of the estate of the assured and were payable to his executors. In the case of Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vantedu Ammiraju, in the view taken by the Judges with regard to the Married Women's Property Act, S. 6 did not apply, and no trust, in my opinion, was created apart from the Act. The moneys, therefore as it seems to me, were payable to the executors, since the wife was no party to the contract with the company. The decision of the Privy Council in Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam, has been relied upon as an authority in support of the contention that the daughter in the present case can enforce the contract, but in the Privy Council case the facts were of a special character, and the agreement on which the plaintiff was held entitled to sue, though not a party thereto, gave her a charge on immovable property. I do not think the present case, on the facts, comes within the principle of the decision in Nawab Khwaja Muhammad Khan v. Nawab Husaini Begam.

    38. There is no doubt, a special class of cases of which Weston v. Richardson is an example if a man insures his own life in his daughter's name, this may amount to a complete gift to the daughter so as to entitle her on her father's death to sue for the policy moneys. But the daughter can sue in this class of cases because the fact that she is a daughter raises the presumption that there was an advancement to her by way of gift.

    39. In the case before us it seems to me that any presumption that an advancement to a daughter is intended is rebutted by the words “for the benefit of his wife and children”. I do not think we can hold that, although there is no gift to the wife under the doctrine of “advancement,” there is a gift to such of the children as may be daughters.

    40. My answer to the second question therefore is that the daughter is not entitled to enforce her claim as against the Insurance Office or against a creditor.

    Sankaran Nair, J.:— I agree with the Chief Justice that S. 6 of the Act applies to a policy of insurance effected by a Hindu male for the benefit of his wife or his children or of his wife and children or any them. I adopt the reasons given in his judgment.

    41. The question whether there was an advancement by way of gift, as held by me in the order of reference, does not arise on the facts; of the case. It is pointed out that the Insurance Office did not agree to pay the money to the daughter.

    Tyabji, J.:— I agree with the learned Chief Justice, except that on some of the points mentioned by him, I wish to express no opinion.

    42. The first question referred to us is:

    “Whether Act 3 of 1874 applies to any Hindu married males or not.”

    43. Section 2 of the Act, so far as material, is as follows:

    “Nothing herein contained applies to any married woman who, at the time of her marriage, professed the Hindu, Mahomedan, Buddhist, Sikh or Jaina religion, or whose husband at the time of such marriage, professed any of those religions.” This clause (to which I shall hereinafter refer as the “saving clause”) provides merely that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to any such married woman as is mentioned in the clause. It is not easy to determine with precision what is meant by “anything contained in the Act applying to a person,” within the meaning of the saving clause I wish to express no opinion, in any part of this judgment, on the point whether line may be provisions in the Act, altering the rights or liabilities of a married woman, which provisions, by reason of their nature, or form, or otherwise, cannot be described as applying to a married woman within the meaning of the saving clause; in any case, provisions which do not alter the rights or liabilities of a person cannot, in my opinion be said so to apply to that person. Hence it would seem to follow that if any provisions contained in the Act affect the rights or liabilities of a person, Hindu or otherwise and whether married or not, then those provisions are not prevented from having full effect by reason of the saying clause, so long at least as those provisions do not come into operation by affecting in the first instance the rights of any such married woman.

    44. If the first question referred to us is meant to raise the point whether any provisions of Act 3 of 1874 are operative (in spite of the saving clause) in case a Hindu married male effects a policy of insurance and the referring judgments contain indications to that effect—the main arguments before us also being based on the same interpretation of the question, then, in my opinion the answer to the question is that the Act operates at least in so far as it does not purport to affect the rights or liabilities of any such married woman a? is referred to in the saving clause;as to whether or not the saving clause prevents the Act from ope rating in so far as it affects the rights or liabilities of any married woman under a policy of insurance effected by her husband, that question, obviously, does not arise on the facts now before us, because we have to deal with the rights of the daughter of the person effecting the policy of insurance, and not with the rights of his wife, and I express no opinion on the rights of the wife. The point that does arise is more definitely referred to us under the second question that we are asked to answer, and I will deal with it, in answering that question.

    45. The second question referred to us is as follows:

    “Whether, in cases similar to the one before us, the daughter is not entitled to enforce her claim against the Insurance office or a creditor.”

    46. Section 6 of the Act lays down that “a policy of insurance effected by any married man on his own life, and expressed on the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife, or of his wife and children, or any of them, shall enure and be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children or any of them, according to the interest so expressed, and shall not, so long as any object of the trust remains, be subject to the control of the husband, or to his creditors, or form part of his estate.”

    47. The second question, as I understand it, is framed for the purpose of having it determined whether these provisions of S. 6 can be said to apply to defendant 1 in this case within the terms of the saving clause above referred to. That question, it seems to me, must be determined in the following manner: If, under the facts of this case, the rights or liabilities of defendant 1 would become altered on the supposition that those rights or liabilities are governed by S. 6, in that case alone and not otherwise may S. 6 be said to apply to defendant 1; and in that case we should have the further question to determine, whether defendant 1 is a married woman within the terms of the saving clause; for if she is such than her rights or liabilities are not to be altered by reason of the said section, but must continue to be the same as they would have been had the said section not been enacted.

    48. The fact of the case now before us, in so far as this Court is concerned, are as follows: One Venkataratnam (to whom I shall hereafter refer as the “assured”) insured his life for Rs. 1,000 under each of two policies of insurance Exs. 1 and 1(a) which are in identical terms, and are dated 5th June 1888. The policies commence with a recital that the assured “hath proposed to effect an insurance for the benefit of his wife and children” with the Insurance Company. The latter portion of the insurance policy is not printed, but the arguments addressed to us were on the basis that each of the policies of insurance in question was “expressed on the faca of it to be for the benefit of his (the assured's) wife, or of his wife and children, or any of them” within the terms of S. 6, and my judgment is on the same basis. It seems to me to be beyond our province to deal with the question whether defendant 1 acquires any interest and, if so, what interest under the insurance policy. I confine myself to the question whether, assuming that the policy is such as is referred to in Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, defendant 1's rights and liabilities, if any, are affected by S. 6, notwithstanding the saving clause leaving it to the Bench who have referred the case to determine the rights of defendant 1 on a construction of the policy. The assured died leaving one daughter and two sons (being respectively defendants 1, 2 and 3). The question arose whether, if it be a fact that some portion of the insurance money was payable to defendant 1 on the death of the assured, the portion formed part of the estate of the deceased and was thus payable to the creditors of the deceased or whether it belonged absolutely to defendant 1, and, as such, was not liable to be attached in execution of the debts of the deceased. If S. 6 governs the rights of the parties, then (if the provisions of the policies be, as is above mentioned), the legal result will be that the policies “shall enure and be deemed to be a trust for the benefit of his wife, or of his wife and children, or any of them, according to the interest expressed (in the policies of insurance) and shall not, so long as any; object of the trust remains, be subject to the control of the husband (the assured), or to his creditors or form part of his estate.” Speaking with reference to the facts of this particular case, if S. 6 governs them, then, assuming that the policies in question are of the nature referred to in S. 6, the interest of defendant 1 under the policies or the moneys payable to defendant 1 by reason of them, will not be capable of being attached in execution of the plaintiff's decree; otherwise the interest of defendant 1 under the policies will form part of the estate of the assured, and be subject to attachment by his creditors.

    49. Therefore it seems to me, that we must hold that the operation of S. 6 would affect the rights or liabilities of defendant 1 if it governs the facts of this case; or to use the expression contained in the saving clause it would, in that case, prima facie, apply to defendant 1.

    50. Is then the operation of S. 6 on the rights of defendant 1 prevented by the saving clause? I think not. The said clause says that “nothing in the Act shall apply to a married woman.” In order that the saving clause should have any bearing upon the operation of a provision contained in the Act and affecting any person's rights or liabilities, it is necessary, not only that person's rights or liabilities should be affected by that provision of the Act, but it is also necessary that person should be such a married women as is referred to in the clause. It seems to me that defendant 1 cannot betaken to be included within the description of a “married woman” within that clause. It is true that defendant 1 may, as a matter of fact, be married, but I think that, for the purposes of the question before us, the expression “married woman” cannot refer to any woman other than one who is married to the assured. I express no opinion on the point whether it would refer even to the women married to the assured. All I hold is that it does not refer to the daughter of the assured, even if she is married: it is obvious that the rights of defendant 1 do not arise in any way out of the application of any part to the Act to a married woman, unless defendant 1 is herself a married woman within the Act.

    51. Hence, in answer to the second question referred to us, I would say that the daughter's rights under the insurance policies are affected by Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, and that the operation of that section on her rights is not prevented by the saving clause. The second question referred to us apparently involves not only the point with which I have dealt, viz. whether or not S. 6 of the Act operates on the incidents of policy of insurance effected by a Hindu married man and expressed on the face of it to be for the benefit of his wife or of his wife and children or any of them, but it also involves the further point whether, in either alternative, on the construction of the particular policies before us, defendant 1 is or is not entitled to enforce her claim against the Insurance Office or a creditor. The latter point does not seam to me to have been alluded to in the referring judgments nor in the arguments before us as I understood them. The operative portion of the policies has not as I have already said, even been printed. For these reasons, I desire, with deference, to express no opinion on the construction to be placed upon them, except in so far as appears from my judgment.

    52. What I have stated above is enough in my opinion, for furnishing answers to the questions referred to us so far as those questions are really contemplated by the order of reference. If the mode of dealing with the matter which I have adopted is correct, then the allusions to the policy underlying the Act, which were made by the learned Judges who referred the case to us, need not be considered. According to the opinion expressed in those judgments, it would appear that, if defendant 1, instead of being the daughter of the assured, had been his wife, her rights would equally have been governed by Section 6 of the Married Women's Property Act, as the operation of that section on the wife's rights would equally have been unaffected by the saving clause. I am conscious that if the reasoning on which I have proceeded in this judgment is correct and the results arrived at on the basis of that reasoning are not to be modified by any other considerations, then the rights of the widow of the assured might have to be held to be different from the rights of his daughter inasmuch as the rights of the daughter have been determined by me on the basis that S. 6 of the Act governs them, whereas the rights of the widow might have to be determined on the basis that the effect on them of S. 6 of the Act is excluded by the saving clause, because the reasons, which I have referred to as being sufficient to prevent the applicability of the saving clause to the rights of the daughter, may have no bearing in a case where the rights of a widow are in question. This result would, no doubt be anomalous, but it would be so only if I had expressed the opinion that the Act should be construed solely on the principles adopted in this judgment, even where the rights in question are those of the widow under S. 6 and that there is nothing in the policy of the legislature or otherwise to show that the saving clause was not intended to interfere with the operation of S. 6 upon the rights of even the widow. If a construction can be put upon the Act which would bring about the result of giving to the widow the same rights, as according to my view the daughter has under the Act, it would not necessarily be opposed to the reasoning adopted in this judgment. But I do not feel called upon to express any opinion on that point at present; I allude to it as in the first place, I wish to guard myself from appearing to lay down that because I have pursued a particular mode of interpreting this Act in order to arrive at a decision on the questions now before us, that mode of interpreting the Act may not have to be modified by taking into consideration other matters when the question relates to the rights of the widow. I have construed the Act in accordance with the strict meaning of its terms because I find that it would do violence to the language of the Act to hold that the saving clause prevents the daughter's rights from being governed by S. 6 of the Act. I do not base any part of my judgment on the considerations on which my learned brothers rely, viz., the general policy of the legislature, because for the purposes of the questions now before us, it is unnecessary to rely on those considerations; and I find that on a strict consideration of the Act the re suit at which I arrive is the same as-would be arrived at on a consideration of what my learned brothers have stated to be the underlying policy of the Act. It is unnecessary to express any opinion on the point whether those considerations would require or permit of the same result being arrived at when the person whose rights are in question is not the daughter but the widow of the assured.

    S.N/R.K

    53. Referenced ansivered.

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    Pokkunuri Balamba v. Kakaraparti Krishnayya
    (Apr 1, 1913)