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Case Number

Appeal from Original Decree no. 58 of 1921, from a decision of B. Suresh Chandra Sen, Special Subordinate Judge of Palamau, dated the 6th December, 1920,Appeal No. 58 of 1921

Attorney(S)

Hasan Imam (with him Khurshaid Husnain and Syed Ali Khan), for the appellant.
P.C Roy and Narendra Nath Sen, for the respondents.

Judges

Jwala Prasad
Adami, JJ.

Acts

SECTION 28 INDIAN REGISTRATION ACT

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Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary — Jwala Prasad and Adami, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns a suit for possession of disputed property arising from kabala (sale) transactions executed in 1895 and registered in Ranchi. The key documents are two sale deeds (referred to as Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 3-a). Exhibit 3 was a kabala executed by Deocharan purporting to sell a portion of a house in Ranchi to Janak Misra. Exhibit 3-a conveyed mauza Keri (in Palamau district) and immediately conveyed the house interest to the plaintiff, Mussammat Jasoda Kuer, wife of Bahadur Sahu.

The Subordinate Judge had held, under Issue no. 12, that the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi acted without jurisdiction in registering the documents because the vendors (Rupan, Gopal and Janak) had no property within the jurisdiction of the Ranchi Sub-Registry. The house and other properties at issue included mauza Keri (outside Ranchi, in Palamau district) and a portion of a house located in Ranchi. The register entries for the deeds were recorded in 1895 in Ranchi.

The appellate court (Jwala Prasad and Adami, JJ.) reviewed the evidence on limitation and title, considered the disputed questions (notably Issue no. 12 about the legality of the kabala and Issue no. 6 about the plaintiff's entitlement to possession), and proceeded to determine whether the registration at Ranchi was lawful and whether the plaintiff was entitled to decree and possession.

Legal Issues Presented

Issue no. 6: "Is the plaintiff entitled to get possession of the disputed property?"
Issue no. 12: "Whether the kabala which has been set up by the plaintiff is illegal? Does it affect the property conveyed thereby?"

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The kabala and sale deeds (Exhibits 3 and 3-a) were bona fide instruments entitling the plaintiff to the property.
The deeds were presented for registration and registered in Ranchi; registration was lawful because there existed a property (a house) within the jurisdiction of the Ranchi Sub-Registrar.
The plaintiff had been in possession of the property from 1895 to 1909 (over 12 years), openly and to the knowledge of relevant parties, thereby acquiring title by adverse possession.
The vendees (including Janak Misra) participated in the registration and related transactions and therefore cannot now challenge the registration as invalid.

Defendants' Arguments

The Subordinate Judge's position: the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi acted without jurisdiction because the vendors and the primary property (mauza Keri in Palamau) were outside the Ranchi Sub-Registry's jurisdiction.
It was contended that Deocharan had no real interest in the house and that Bahadur Sahu was the true owner (on the basis of a later sale deed, Exhibit A, dated 19 March 1902, which recites a prior purchase dated 25 June 1883 in the name of Liladhar and Ganpat but paid for by Bahadur).
The implication advanced by this line of argument is that the registration in Ranchi might have been improper or intended to avoid registration at Daltonganj, and that Deocharan's purported sale could be a sham if he lacked title.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Mussammat Dai v. Ram Chandrabali Debi	Cited in support of the proposition under Section 28 of the Indian Registration Act that registration requires the existence of a property within the jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar.	The court relied on the principle to hold that the presence of the house within the Ranchi jurisdiction sufficed to allow registration at Ranchi.
Harendra Lal Roy v. Hari Dasi Devi	Establishes that registration is invalid where the property mentioned in the document is fictitious and has no existence in the registration district.	The court distinguished this authority, noting the Ranchi house was not fictitious and therefore the case did not apply.
Bisiuanath Prasad v. Chandra Narain Chowdhury	Holds registration inoperative where the mortgagor had no title to the property, no delivery of possession, and both parties knew there was no title (i.e., registration outside law).	The court distinguished this authority on the facts: here prior documents (the 25 June 1883 sale) and the conduct of parties suggested an ostensible title and participation in the transaction, so Bisiuanath Prasad was inapplicable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in the following analytical steps, grounded in the record and the law as presented in the opinion:

Preliminary factual findings (recited at the outset): on evidence, the suit was not barred by limitation and the plaintiff's husband had not committed breach of faith in respect of the kabala; consequently the kabala was binding on the defendants on those bases.
Prioritization of issues: The court observed that Issue no. 12 (legality of the kabala/registration) had to be decided before Issue no. 6 (right to possession), because the legality of the instrument could affect title.
Assessment of the Subordinate Judge's jurisdictional finding: The Subordinate Judge had held the Ranchi Sub-Registrar acted without jurisdiction because the vendors and the principal property (mauza Keri) were outside Ranchi. The appellate court examined the deeds and facts and found that a portion of the house was situated within the Ranchi district, and that the sale deeds relating to both the house (Exhibit 3) and mauza Keri (Exhibit 3-a) were presented and registered in Ranchi.
Examination of motive and bona fides: The court noted that parties resided far from Daltonganj and that convenience in registering at Ranchi (a shorter or more practicable travel) was not, by itself, a dishonest motive. The court found no evidence of an intent to defraud creditors, hide the transaction, or otherwise engage in a sinister motive. The court concluded the registration was not rendered illegal by the mere fact of choosing Ranchi for registration.
Title inquiry limitations in registration proceedings: The court emphasized that in a proceeding about registration the title to property cannot be fully gone into. Given there was a house within Ranchi and Deocharan's kabala purported to sell a portion of it, the Sub-Registrar had jurisdiction to register the document relating to the house.
Evaluation of competing title evidence: The defendants relied on Exhibit A (a 1902 sale by Bahadur Sahu reciting a prior 1883 purchase in the names of Liladhar and Ganpat) to assert Deocharan had no title. The court examined the contemporaneous documents and relationships: Deocharan was brother of Liladhar; on the face of the 1883 deed Liladhar had an interest; Deocharan's kabala stated he possessed and claimed a half-share, and Bahadur Sahu participated in executing the 1895 deeds, permitting the sale by Deocharan. On balance the documents did not demonstrate that Deocharan lacked title as a matter of law at the registration stage.
Distinguishing precedent: The court considered cited authorities (Harendra Lal Roy and Bisiuanath Prasad) and found their facts distinguishable. Harendra Lal Roy involved a fictitious property; Bisiuanath involved clear absence of title and absence of delivery of possession known to both parties. The court found the present circumstances materially different: the house was real, prior documents suggested an interest, and the vendees had participated in the transaction.
Conclusion on Issue no. 12: The court held, disagreeing with the Subordinate Judge, that the document was not illegal on account of registration by the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi.
Resolution of Issue no. 6 and adverse possession: Having resolved Issue no. 12, the court turned to Issue no. 6 and found the plaintiff entitled to possession. The court emphasized that the plaintiff had been in possession from 1895 to 1909—over twelve years—openly and to the knowledge of Janak Misra (who had taken part in the exercise of the plaintiff's right of possession). The court held that the plaintiff thereby acquired absolute title by adverse possession.
Effect of adverse possession on challenges to registration: The court explicitly stated that even if the registration had been illegal, the plaintiff's title acquired through adverse possession for over twelve years remained intact; therefore the defendants had no right to dispossess her as they had in 1910 or thereafter.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the document registered at Ranchi was not illegal for want of jurisdiction of the Sub-Registrar, and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession. Suit decreed.

Implications and direct effects:

The plaintiff, Mussammat Jasoda Kuer, is entitled to possession of the disputed property and the suit in her favour must be decreed.
The plaintiff's long, open and adverse possession (1895–1909) was held sufficient to confer an absolute title by adverse possession against the defendants.
Because the court resolved title in the plaintiff's favour (partly on the basis of adverse possession and partly on the validity of registration), the defendants have no right to dispossess the plaintiff as they did in 1910 or thereafter.
The opinion distinguishes prior authorities on their facts; it does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond applying Section 28's requirement (existence of property within jurisdiction) and principles of adverse possession as factually applied here. The decision's immediate effect is the decree in favour of the plaintiff; broader precedent-setting is not asserted in the opinion.

Disposition: Suit decreed.

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Mussammat Jasoda Kuer v. Janak Missir

Jwala Prasad and Adami, JJ.:— [Their Lordships first stated the facts set out above and, on a consideration of the evidence, decided that the suit was not barred by limitation, that the plaintiff's husband had not committed any breach of faith in respect of the kabala and that, therefore, it was binding on the defendants.]

The next question would then naturally arise as is set forth in issue no. 6:

“Is the plaintiff entitled to get possession of the disputed property?”

The answer to this would have been a very simple one after what has been said above had it not been for Issue no. 12

“Whether the kabala which has been set up by the plaintiff is illegal? Does it affect the property conveyed thereby?”

Therefore, before Issue no. 6 is answered, Issue no. 12 must be disposed of. Under this issue the learned Subordinate Judge has decided that the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi, who registered the document, acted without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the vendors Rupan, Gopal and Janak had no property within the jurisdiction of the Ranchi Sub-Registry. Now, the properties conveyed by the sale deed are the properties in dispute, mauza Keri and its tolas (dependent hamlets) and a portion of a house situate in Ranchi. Mauza Keri appertains to Palamau district and is outside the Ranchi district. According to the finding of the Subordinate Judge village Keri is 85 miles from Daltonganj and 40 miles from Ranchi. The executants of the bonds are residents of mauza Keri. The vendee Mussammat Jasoda Kuer and her husband Bahadur Sahu were residents of mauza Harhanj in the district of Palamau, about 48 miles off. The house in question stood in the name of Liladhar Misra, am-mukhtear of Bahadur Sahu, and Ganpat Sahu, brother-in-law of Bahadur Sahu. The house originally belonged to a kumhar, who conveyed the same to Liladhar and Ganpat on the 25th of June, 1883. Deocharan, brother of Liladhar, executed a kabala (Exhibit 3) claiming half the share jointly with Liladhar in the house inquestion on the 22nd May, 1895, wherein he claimed that he along with his brother Liladhar had a half-share in the house which was purchased in the name of Liladhar and Ganpat, and he sold one of the rooms of that house roofed with this said to be in his possession for a sum of Rs. 10, to Janak Misra, one of the executants of the sale deed in question (Exhibit 3-a). The two sale deeds (Exhibits 3 and 3-a) were presented to the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi for registration almost simultaneously between 2 and 3 p.m and they were registered. The sale deed (Exhibit 3) relating to the house bears no. 2630 for 1895 entered in Book I, Volume 19, at pages 87-88. The sale deed (Exhibit 3-a) relating to mauza Keri in dispute bears no. 2632 for 1895 entered in Book I, Volume 13, at pages 275-279 Janak Misra in whose favour a portion of the house in Ranchi was sold by Exhibit 3 did not intend to keep the house to himself, for immediately he conveyed the same by means of the sale deed (Exhibit 3-a) to Mussammat Jasoda Kuer. Therefore the sale deed (Exhibit 3) was executed with a view to give him title to the house situate in Ranchi in order that the sale deed (Exhibit 3-a) with respect to mauza Keri, might be presented for registration and registered in Ranchi. Neither of the parties lived either at Ranchi or at Daltonganj, and the distance from their respective residences to Daltonganj was almost double. Obviously they thought it convenient to have the document registered at Ranchi instead of at Daltonganj, as 45 miles in that part of the country is an inconvenient distance to travel for ordinary people not having good conveyances at their disposal, the country being covered by hills and jungle. This in itself is not a dishonest motive and might in the circumstances be a good motive to avoid going to Daltonganj. In the present case nothing has been shewn why the parties should avoid having the document registered at Daltonganj, except the one ground referred to above. No circumstance has been shewn to indicate that the parties wanted to avoid publicity of the registration to the sale deed (Exhibit 3-a) in the Daltonganj district. There is nothing to show that they wanted to defeat or defraud any creditor or that they had any other sinister motive. Therefore the fact that Janak got the sale deed executed in his favour by Deocharan with respect to the house in Ranchi would not in itself affect the registration of the document provided it was a bonâ fide deed executed with a view to carry out the intentions of the parties in executing and registering the sale deed (Exhibit 3-a) in Ranchi with respect to mauza Keri. It is said that Deocharan had no interest in the house and that the house belonged to Bahadur Sahn and that he was the real purchaser under a sale deed, dated the 25th June, 1883, from a kumhar in the farzi name of his am-mukhtear Liladhar Misra and his brother-in-law Ganpat Sahu. In support of this reference is made to Exhibit A, a sale deed executed by Bahadur Sahu in favour of Akhouri Sundar Behasi Lal, dated the 19th March, 1902, several years after the kabala in question (Exhibit 3-a). In that sale deed Bahadur Sahu recites that he had purchased the house in question under a registered sale deed, dated the 25th June, 1883, with his own funds far zi in the name of his mukhtear-am Liladhar Misra and his brother-in-law Ganpat Sahu, and that he disposed of it to Akhouri Sundar Behari Lal for Rs. 125. Deocharan Misra, brother of Liladhar Misra, on the other hand, in the sale deed (Exhibit 3), stated that he was a co-sharer with Liladhar in the house in question and that he owned and possessed one of the rooms of that house and that he sold that off to Janak Misra per sale deed (Exhibit 3) on the 22nd May, 1895. Bahadur Sahu took part in the execution of the sale deed (Exhibit 3-a) in favour of his wife, the plaintiff in the case. The deed confirmed the sale of the house by Deocharan to Janak by Exhibit 3. Bahadur Sahu, therefore, allowed the property to be sold by Deocharan Misra in favour of Janak Misra. The sale deed of the 25th June, 1883, in favour of Liladhar Misra and Gopal Sahu on the face of it shows that Liladhar Misra had an interest, and Deocharan is brother of Liladhar. Therefore, upon the document as it stands it cannot be said that Liladhar or Deocharan had no title to the house in question. According to the tenor of the document and the relationship that existed between Deocharan and Liladhar, the former would appear to have title to the house in question which he purported to convey by the sale deed (Exhibit 3) to Janak. In a proceeding for registration, of a document title to property cannot be gone into. There was a property, namely, the house situate within the Ranchi district and the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi had jurisdiction to register the document relating to the house in question. Deocharan Misra purported by kabala (Exhibit 3) to sell a portion of that house to Janak Misra, and Janak Misra, therefore, under that sale deed, acquired an ostensible title which he forthwith conveyed by Exhibit 3-a to the plaintiff. Section 28 of the Indian Registration Act does not require anything more than the existence of a property within the jurisdiction of a particular Sub-Registrar in order to entitle him to register the same [Mussammat Dai v. Ram Chandrabali Debi]. The cases cited are distinguishable. In Harendra Lal Roy v. Hari Dasi Devi the property mentioned in the mortgage bond in question was a fictitious property. It had no existence in Calcutta, and, therefore, under section 28 the registration of the document was invalid. In the case of Bisiuanath Prasad v. Chandra Narain Chowdhury, the sale deed with respect to 2 bighas, 1 katha, in Kolhua in the district of Muzaffarpur, which purported to give title to a party to a mortgage in order to entitle the registration thereof in the district of Muzaffarpur was not produced not was it shewn that there was delivery of possession by virtue of the sale deed. In that case it was found that to the knowledge of both parties the mortgagor had no title to that property and that he never intended to part with that property. In those circumstances the registration of the doeument in the district of Muzaffarpur was held to be inoperative having been registered outside the registration law. The circumstances of this case are quite different from any of those cases. The first case obviously does not apply, inasmuch as the house in the district of Ranchi is not a fictitious property. The second case does not apply; inasmuch as on the face of the previous sale deed on the 25th June, 1883, Liladhar Misra, brother of Deocharan Misra, had title to the property, and Bahadur Sahu, who took part in the execution of both the sale deeds (Exhibits 3 and 3-a), led Janak Misra to believe that Deocharan had title to the house and did not disclose his own title if any. Therefore, these decisions of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee do not apply to the present case. The vendees themselves took part in the transaction regarding the registration of the documents (Exhibits 3 and 3-a) and cannot be permitted to take this plea.

We, therefore, hold, in disagreement with the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge, that the document in question is not illegal on account of its having been registered by the Sub-Registrar of Ranchi. Issue no. 12 having been thus answered, the answer to Issue no. 6 is obvious, and that answer is in the affirmative.

The plaintiff is entitled to get possession of the disputed property. The plaintiff's title is fortified in this case by the fact that she had been in possession of the property for over 12 years from 1895 to 1909. Her possession was to the knowledge of Janak Misra who had taken part in the exercise of right of possession by the plaintiff, some of the counter foils having been signed by himself. She, therefore, acquired an absolute title to the property by adverse possession for over 12 years, having exercised it openly and adversely to the knowledge of the defendants. Therefore even if the registration of the document was illegal, the title acquired by her by adverse possession remains intact, and the defendants have no right to dispossess her in the manner in which they did in the year 1910 or thereafter.

The obvious result of these findings is that the plaintiff is entitled to succeed in the suit, and the suit, must be decreed.

S.A.K

Suit decreed.

Mussammat Jasoda Kuer v. Janak Missir

Judicial Opinion Summary — Jwala Prasad and Adami, JJ.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Defendants' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Mussammat Jasoda Kuer v. Janak Missir

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