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Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion (Adoption Law)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are reversioners to the estate of Bhaskarayya. On his death he left a widow, Chidambaramma, and an only daughter, Ramalakshmamma (the 1st defendant). After the widow's death, Bhaskarayya's properties devolved on the 1st defendant. The plaint states that the 1st defendant became a widow soon after marriage (while still under age) and, in 1922, took the 2nd defendant (a distant agnatic relation of her father) in adoption. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of that adoption and sought a declaration that their reversionary rights were not affected.

Procedurally, the lower Court held that the widow's power to adopt had not been extinguished and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court heard extensive argument on the legal limit of a widow's power to adopt (particularly where joint-family property had been partitioned) and on conflicting lines of authority, and ultimately confirmed the lower Court's decision, dismissing the appeal with costs and allowing the Memorandum of Objections with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the widow's power to adopt is extinguished by a prior partition of the joint family property, thereby rendering an adoption made after partition invalid.
  2. What is the proper test or limiting principle for assessing the validity of an adoption by a widow — (a) the "divesting of estate of a third party" test advocated by the plaintiffs, or (b) the "spiritual purposes" test (as explained in Chandavarkar J.'s formulation in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao) relied upon by the defendants?
  3. Whether decisions of the Privy Council and various Indian courts support the plaintiffs' divesting test or the defendants' spiritual-purpose test and how those authorities should be reconciled.
  4. Whether an alternative factual contention (concerning the involvement of Rameswaramayya and a subsequent vesting of property in his widow) not pleaded in the plaint could be entertained at this stage.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments (Appellants)

  • The widow's power to adopt becomes incapable of execution when the joint family is extinguished (for example, by partition or by the estate passing to heirs), so that an adoption after such extinction is invalid.
  • The proper limiting test is whether the adoption divests an estate vested in a third party; if it does, the adoption is invalid. The existence or non-existence of a son is irrelevant under this test.
  • They relied on a number of Indian decisions that held adoptions by widows invalid where the effect would be to defeat rights of third parties who had taken by succession (examples cited in the opinion include Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarthi Gangaraju, Chandra v. Gojara Bai, and Sri Dharneedar v. Chinto).
  • An alternative contention (raised later) asserted that Rameswaramayya was a party to the partition and that on his death his allotted property vested in his widow Subbamma, thereby terminating the adopting widow's power; the plaintiffs pointed to some defence witness statements as admissions supporting that contention.

Defendants' Arguments (Respondents)

  • The decisive test is whether the spiritual purposes of adoption (i.e., the performance of requisite religious services by a son) are satisfied — adoption is essentially a religious act and must be judged primarily by spiritual considerations rather than by whether it divests temporal estate.
  • The principle enunciated by Chandavarkar, J. in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao — that the widow's power is extinguished only when the widow's husband had a son (natural or adopted) or the son attained capacity to continue the line — is the correct limiting principle.
  • The 1st defendant had obtained the consent of all her husband's agnates before making the adoption; therefore, the adoption should be upheld as valid under the correct legal test.
  • They opposed allowing the alternative contention about Rameswaramayya because it was not pleaded nor dealt with in the lower Court's judgment and therefore should not be allowed to be raised at the appellate stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao Chandavarkar J.'s formula: where a Hindu dies leaving a widow and a son, and that son dies leaving a son (natural or adopted) or leaving only his widow who can continue the line by adoption, the former widow's power is extinguished and cannot be revived. The defendants relied on this as the decisive limiting principle; the appellate court treated this passage as authoritative and adopted the "spiritual purposes" test it embodies when analysing the competing theories.
Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishore (first Chinnakimedi case) Privy Council held an adoption valid though it divested the person in possession (Raghunatha); emphasized spiritual rather than temporal considerations in determining validity. The court used this case to show that the mere fact of divesting a temporal estate does not automatically invalidate an adoption and to illustrate the Privy Council's emphasis on spiritual purposes.
Madan Mohana v. Purushothama (second Chinnakimedi case) Privy Council held a subsequent adoption bad where Brojo (the earlier adopted son) had died after attaining full legal capacity to continue the line (i.e., spiritual purposes could have been satisfied). The court treated this decision as compatible with Chandavarkar J.'s rule and as supporting the "spiritual purposes" test rather than the divesting-of-estate test.
Ananga Bhima Deo v. Kunja Behari Deo (third Chinnakimedi case) Judgments of Sir John Wallis and Seshagiri Aiyar interpreted the Privy Council decisions and supported the analysis that the second Chinnakimedi case rests on Chandavarkar's principle. The court cited these judgments as showing that the Privy Council decisions are reconcilable on the basis of the spiritual-purpose test.
Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore Privy Council decision declaring an adoption invalid in circumstances where spiritual purposes could have been satisfied by other means; referred to "all the spiritual purposes of a son". The court treated this case as aligned with the spiritual-purpose approach and as a precedent that emphasises religious considerations over mere divesting of property.
Raja Velanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkatarama Lakshmi Narasayya Referenced in context of Privy Council and related decisions; observations exist adverting to the divesting rule. The court noted that occasional references to a divesting rule in such decisions do not mean that divesting was the foundational ground of decision; the spiritual-purpose test is primary.
Collector of Madura v. Ramalinga Sethupathy (Ramnad Case) Described adoption as a meritorious act and stressed "religious obligation to adopt" to fulfil defective religious rites and the existence of a direct line to perform religious duties. The court cited this to underscore the Privy Council's consistent focus on religious/spiritual purposes in adoption cases.
Pratab Singh v. Agar Singh Re-affirmed the principles in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore and Madan Mohana v. Purushothama; held that detracting from a plaintiff's right did not prevent an adoption being valid where the power was not exhausted. The court used this to demonstrate that the Privy Council did not apply a strict divesting rule and sometimes upheld adoptions despite detriment to others when the limiting principle had not been reached.
Sukhdevdoss v. Mussamat Choti Bai; Venkatarama Aiyar v. Gopalan; Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar Decisions cited by the court as examples where judges did not accept Mr. Somayya's contention based on the divesting-rule. The court referenced these decisions to show that other courts/judges had taken a different view from the plaintiffs' divesting test.
Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarthi Gangaraju; Chandra v. Gojara Bai; Sri Dharneedar v. Chinto Indian court cases where widow's adoption was held invalid where joint-family property had passed by succession to heirs (the decisions rested on the estate vesting in heirs). The appellate court acknowledged these cases but declined to express an opinion on whether they must be followed as stare decisis; it declined to extend their rule to cases where extinction of the joint family resulted from partition rather than succession.
Pudma Kumari Debi v. The Court of Wards; Thayarammal v. Venkatarama Aiyar Instances where adoptions were invalidated not only as against the person divested but as against distant reversioners. The court referred to them while questioning the plaintiffs' justification for treating the power as permanently extinguished once rights of third parties exist.
Krishna v. Sami (Full Bench) Full Bench deduced a principle opposite to Sirkar Sastry's view (i.e., indicated that an adopted son could claim portion after partition if adoption was later exercised). The court noted this Full Bench passage as potentially directly supporting the respondents, though it observed that such remarks might be obiter.
Sirkar Sastry (authoritative commentary) Sirkar Sastry's opinion: "the power of adoption cannot be exercised after a partition of the family property takes place" — grounded on convenience objections to reopening partition. The court acknowledged this authoritative view but rejected it on principle, noting it is not free from difficulty and that relevant Privy Council authority points the other way when partition (not extinction by succession) is involved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a step-by-step analysis rooted in the authorities and the facts:

  1. The court first framed the core conflict as between (i) the plaintiffs' "divesting of estate" test (the limit is reached when an adoption would divest an estate vested in a third party) and (ii) the defendants' "spiritual purposes" test derived from Chandavarkar J.'s judgment in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao (that the widow's power is extinguished only on specified events when spiritual purposes could have been satisfied).
  2. It examined the Privy Council Chinnakimedi decisions (Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishore; Madan Mohana v. Purushothama) and concluded these are reconcilable if the proper emphasis is placed on the spiritual purpose of adoption rather than on a mechanical divesting-of-estate rule. The first Chinnakimedi case upheld an adoption even though it divested a person in possession; the second invalidated an adoption where the earlier adopted son had died having attained full capacity to continue the line. The court read the Privy Council decisions as approving Chandavarkar J.'s rule.
  3. The court observed that some decisions and commentators (e.g., Sirkar Sastry) support the plaintiffs' position, but also recorded that this point is not free from difficulty and that Indian decisions exist on both sides. The appellate court explicitly refused to extend the rule from Indian cases that invalidated widows' adoptions where extinction occurred by succession to cases where extinction occurred by partition.
  4. Analysing the rationale behind assigning a limit to a widow's power (to safeguard rights of third parties), the court found that the plaintiffs' circular argument (that the power once ended cannot be revived) did not satisfactorily protect third parties' interests — because a rule of abeyance would already safeguard rights without carving out permanent extinction. By contrast, if spiritual purposes of a son have been satisfied (the limiting event in Chandavarkar's formulation), the power is properly treated as finally exhausted.
  5. The court emphasized that validity of an adoption must be judged on intrinsic merits and not by extraneous considerations (such as whether the adoption affects estates in which the plaintiffs have an interest that are unrelated to the adopting widow's husband's estate). In the present case the 1st defendant obtained the consent of her husband's agnates before adopting; moreover, the estate in question belonged to her father, not to her husband, so the plaintiffs and the husband's agnates had no direct interest in the husband's estate at issue.
  6. The court rejected the plaintiffs' alternative factual contention (that Rameswaramayya participated in the partition and his widow later acquired property) because it was not pleaded, not referred to in the lower Court's judgment, and the defendants had not admitted it in their pleadings; the appellate court would not permit a new, unpleaded point of that importance to be raised.
  7. On the totality of authorities and principles, the court concluded the adoption by the 1st defendant was valid and that the lower Court's dismissal of the suit should be affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appellate court affirmed the lower Court's decision and dismissed the appeal with costs. It also allowed the Memorandum of Objections with costs. The adoption made by the 1st defendant was held to be valid.

Implications:

  • The direct consequence is that the plaintiffs' challenge to the adoption fails and their claim that their reversionary rights are unaffected by the adoption is dismissed.
  • The court preferred the "spiritual purposes" limiting principle (as reflected in Chandavarkar J.'s statement in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao and as interpreted by Privy Council authority) over a categorical divesting-of-estate test; however, the court did not purport to lay down an entirely novel rule of law nor to resolve every conflict among Indian decisions — it expressly declined to pronounce on stare decisis where Indian cases conflict.
  • The court refused to entertain an alternative, unpleaded factual contention on appeal (concerning Rameswaramayya), reinforcing that significant factual points must be properly pleaded and considered at trial.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed; Memorandum of Objections allowed — all with costs.

    Panyam v. Avadhanam Rama Lakshmamma

    This appeal raises an important question relating to the law of adoption not covered by any direct authority. The plaintiffs are the reversioners to the estate of one Bhaskarayya. He died leaving him surviving his widow, Chidambaramma, and his only daughter, Ramalakshmamma, the 1st defendant. After the death of his widow, Bhaskarayya's properties devolved on the 1st desendant. It is stated in the plaint that soon after the latter's marriage, more than 40 years ago, she became a widow, while still under age. In the year 1922, the 2nd defendant, a distant agnatic relation of her father, was taken by her in adoption. The plaintiffs attack the adoption as being invalid and pray for a declaration that their reversionary right is not affected by it.

    For understanding the objection taken to the adoption, we must turn to the pedigree, which sets forth her husband's relations, although the last full owner of the estate in question was her father and not her husband.

    The pedigree is as follows:—

    Ramakrishnayya, the husband of the 1st defendant died about 1892 when the family was joint. But there was subsequently a partition among the members of the family. It is admitted that the adoption was made after that partition and the contention advanced for the plaintiffs is, that with the extinction of the joint family, the widow's power to adopt came to an end and became incapable of execution. It is worthy of note that before making the adoption, she obtained the consent of all her husband's agnates. But it is argued for the plaintiffs, that the power having once come to an end, it cannot be subsequently revived by consent. The lower Court, holding that the widow's power did not become extinguished and that the adoption was therefore valid, dismissed the suit.

    The question argued before us is, what is the proper limit to the exercise of the widow's power? According to the plaintiffs, the limit is reached when the adoption divests an estate vested in a third party. Thus, the widow of a separated husband can adopt either when she takes his estate from him immediately or as heiress of her son who surviving his father dies subsequently. In these two cases, the adoption cannot divest any estate other than that vested in the adopting widow herself and this is said to be the reason for the adoption being treated as valid. Applying this rule, if, on the son's death, his estate vests in his widow or his son, the original widow's power comes to an end and on the principle that what is gone cannot be revived, she is forbidden to adopt, even though she succeeds to the estate on the death of the son's nearer heir. So much then for an adoption to a separated Hindu.

    Now turning to the case of a joint family, the widow, of a deceased member can adopt, provided the family is still joint when the adoption is made; for, what is defeated by the adoption is not an absolute estate, the vesting in the survivors being only provisional. On this principle, it is argued, that if the co-parcenary becomes extint, either because the surviving members have come to a partition, or because the joint property has passed by succession from the last survivor to his heirs, the power to adopt becomes exhausted and is incapable of execution.

    These rules, Mr. Somayya, the plaintiffs' leanred Counsel, contends, are deducible from the decisions on the subject. The adoption in question, if allowed, would defeat the estate taken by the survivors absolutely on partition. On that ground it is impeached as being invalid.

    The test then of the principle defining the limit, which Mr. Somayya deduces from the numerous cases referred to by him in his lucid and exhaustive argument, depends upon whether the adoption divests or not the estate vested in a third party. Whether a Hindu dies leaving a son or not, or, whether he had no son ever born to him at all (as in the present case), is, if this be the true test, an irrelevant consideration. According to Mr. Kodandaramayya, the defendants' learned Counsel, the decisive factor is not, whether some estate is or is not divested, but whether, the adoption being in essence a religious act, the spiritual purposes of a son have been satisfied. He contends, that, if the effect of invalidating an adoption would be to deprive a Hindu father of the services of a competent son, the result would be repugnant to the spirit of the Hindu Law. The test of the limiting principle, according to him, is that laid down by the Full Bench in the judgment of Chandavarkar, J., in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao namely,

    “Where a Hindu dies, leaving a widow and a son, and that son himself dies leaving a natural born or adopted son or leaving no son but his own widow to continue the line by means of adoption, the power of the former widow is extinguished and can never afterwards be revived.”

    Both sides have relied upon the decisions of the Privy Council, and the question is, what is the correct test that is deducible from them? There are two cases decided by the Board relating to the same estate, which throw a good deal of light on the point. Let us take the following pedigree:—

    On the death of Adikonda, a member of a joint Hindu family, his brother Raghunadha took possession of the Zemindari. Kundana Devi, acting on her husband's authority, adopted Brojo Deo. The adopted son filed a suit to recover the Zemindari from Raghunadha and the Privy Council, holding his adoption valid, upheld his claim. These are the facts of Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishore (2) (the first Chinnakimedi case). Then certain further events happened and the same estate came up again before the Privy Council. Brojo the adopted son recovered possession and died about 30 years afterwards leaving his widow Ratnamala but no son. Possession of the Zemindari was then taken by Vaishnava Deo who was in his turn succeeded by his son Purushothama. The widow of Adikonda purported to make a second adoption to her husband by adopting the person shown as the plaintiff in the pedigree. The latter thereupon claiming the zemindari filed a suit for recovering it. The Judicial Committee, holding that the adoption was bad, dismissed the suit. These are the facts of Madan Mohana v. Purushothama , (the second Chinnakimedi case). Do these decisions support the theory put forward by Mr. Somayya? On both the occasions, the adopting widow belonged to a joint family. Her first adoption was held good, but the second bad. Mr. Somayya suggests that in the first case the family being a joint one, the vesting of the joint family property was only provisional and that therefore the adoption was upheld. This contention is obviously wrong, for, although the family was joint, the zemindari, being an impartible one, was held in severalty and not in co-parcenary. On Adikonda's death, it did not pass to the surviving members, but to a single heir, Raghunatha. His succession was no doubt in a sense provisional as stated by the Judicial Committee, but it was not provisional in the sense that a co-parcener's share is liable by fluctuation to increase or diminish. The point to note is, that the adoption was held valid in spite of the fact that Raghunatha was thereby divested. Now, turning to the second case, was the adoption by Kundana Devi held invalid on the ground that it would divest Purushothama? His succession, like that of his predecessor Raghunatha, was in a sense provisional, for it was “subject to defeasance by the emergence of a male heir” to the last full owner, who, however, was not Adikonda but Brojo Deo. In other words, if the adoption had been made by Ratnamala, on the very grounds stated by the Privy Council, it would have been upheld (granting it was otherwise valid). That this is the effect of the decision is shown by the judgments of Sir John Wallis, C. J., and Seshagiri Aiyar, J. in Ananga Bhima Deo v. Kunja Behari Deo , (the third Chinnakimedi case). Mr. Somayya says that the first Chinnakimedi case was understood as validating an adoption made by the widow of an unseparated Hindu on the ground of the vesting of the co-parcenary property being provisional—although, in the case itself, there was no reference to the existence of any partible property. If that be so, in the second Chinnakimedi case also, the adoption should have been held valid; but he suggests that this case is generally regarded as having established a new principle. He is constrained to put forward this argument, as otherwise, his theory, that the divesting rule furnishes the limiting principle, must fall to the ground. If, on the other hand, the principle, contended for by Mr. Kodandaramayya is accepted, these two decisions become perfectly reconcilable. What distinguishes the first from the second case is, that in the latter, Brojo died “after attaining full legal capacity to continue the line either by the birth of a natural-born son or by the adoption to him of a son by his own widow.” It must not be forgotten that in the passage immediately preceding these words, their Lordships expressly affirm and approve the principle enunciated by Chandavarkar, J., in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao . These words, therefore, mean neither more nor less than the passage already quoted by us from Chandavarkar, J's Judgment.

    Madan Mohana v. Purushothama (the second Chinnakimedi case), bears a close resemblance to Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore (3), which is referred to and followed in the previous case. Gaur Kishore died leaving Bhavani Kishore, his only son, and his widow Chandrabulli. On Bhavani Kishore's death leaving Bhoobun Moyee as his widow, Chandrabulli purported to take in adoption Ram Kishore. The Judicial Committee held that adoption bad. The only difference (and that is immaterial) between this and Madan Mohana v. Purushothama is, that whereas in the first case, the son (Bhavani Kishore) was a natural-born son, in the second, he (Brojo Deo) was an adopted son. In both the cases, as we have pointed out, the adoption was declared invalid. We have examined the grounds of the decision in the second case. Let us now turn to the first. Their Lordships refer to “all the spiritual purposes of a son” which would, in a certain event, have been satisfied and to “all the religious services, which a son could perform for a father.” The true test, therefore, of the principle defining the limit, is to be sought not in the rule of divesting or otherwise of an estate, but in the rule that requires the continuance of a parson to perform all the requisite religious services. The line must be drawn somewhere in applying this principle and it must be taken as established that the limit is reached on the happening of the event mentioned in the judgment of Chandavarkar, J. In some decisions of the Judicial Committee, such as Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore already cited and Raja Velanki Venkata Krishna Rao v. Venkatarama Lakshmi Narasayya (4), there are no doubt observations adverting to the divesting rule; but the principle of divesting must not be taken as having furnished the ground of decision, but the divesting or otherwise of the estate must be understood as having been referred to as the result of the adoption being held either good or bad. That their Lordships always laid stress on the religious aspect of the act of adoption appears from several cases. In the Ramnad Case Collector of Madura v. Ramalinga Sethupathy , their Lordships describe it as a meritorious act and refer to “the existence of a direct line competent to the full performance of religious duties” and to the “religious obligation to adopt a son in order to complete or fulfil defective religious rites.” The following observations of their Lordships in the first Chinnakimedi cas8 Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishore are pertinent to the matter in hand.

    “They may, however, observe that a distinction which is founded on the nature of property seems to belong to the law of property, and to militate against the principle which Mr. Justice Holloway has himself strenuously insisted upon elsewhere, viz., that the validity of an adoption is to be determined by spritual rather than temporal considerations; that the substitution of a son of the deceased for spiritual reasons is the essence of the thing, and the consequent devolution of property a mere accessory to it”.

    It is unnecessary to refer to the more recent Privy Council cases beyond stating that in Pratab Singh v. Agar Singh , the principle laid down in Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore and Madan Mohana v. Purushothama (5) has been re-affirmed. Incidentally, it may be remarked that in that case Pratab Singh v. Agar Singh , the fact that the adoption would detract from the plaintiff's right, did not stand in the way of the adoption being held valid, on the ground that the power had not become exhausted. The result, then, of this examination of the Privy Council cases is, that, when properly understood, they do not bear out Mr. Somayya's contention (See the judgments of Reilly, J., in Sukhdevdoss v. Mussamat Choti Bai (6), of Oldfield, J., in Venkatarama Aiyar v. Gopalan (7), and of Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in Maharaja of Kolhapur v. Sundaram Ayyar (8).

    Mr. Somayya has referred us to numerous decisions of the Indian Courts, where the adoption by a widow was held invalid, although the result of so holding would be that her deceased husband, would never have had any male issue to continue his line. As typical of these cases may be mentioned Adivi Suryaprakasa Rao v. Nidamarthi Gangaraju (9), Chandra v. Gojara Bai (10) and Sri Dharneedar v. Chinto (11). These are cases, where the widow's deceased husband was an unseparated Hindu, but by the time she made the adoption, the joint property had passed by succession from the last survivor to his heirs. The reason for holding the adoption invalid, was, that when the estate vested in the heir, the power of the widow came to an end. Whether these decisions, though in conflict with the principle affirmed by the Judicial Committee, will, so far as they go, be followed or not on the ground of stare decisis, is a point on which we need express no opinion; but there is no warrant for extending the rule beyond the facts of those cases. As we have said, those facts are, that the co-parcenary became extinct by the death of the last survivor and his property thereupon devolved on his heir. The facts in the present case are different. The co-parcenary became extinct not in that manner, but by the survivors having come to a partition of the joint family property. We are not prepared to hold that in such a case the widow's power comes to an end.

    There is no reported decision on the actual point raised in the appeal. But the opinion of Mr. Sirkar Sastry supports the plaintiffs' contention. According to that learned author, “the power of adoption cannot be exercised after a partition of the family property takes place” and this view is based on grounds of supposed convenience. Says Sirkar Sastry:

    “To re-open the partition for giving a share to the adopted son, would lead to great difficulties, for one of the co-sharers might alienate his share to a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice.”

    But he goes on to observe that the point is not free from difficulty and refers to some conflict, which he supposes to exist between the two Privy Council decisions, Bhoobun Moyee v. Ram Kishore and the first Chinnakimedi Case: Sarkar's Hindu Law of Adoption, 1891 Edition, pages 253 and 254. In Krishna v. Sami a Full Bench of five Judges deduces from the Hindu Law a principle which is the exact opposite of that stated by Mr. Sirkar Sastry. The following passage contains the relevant observation:

    “Again, let. C have died before partition, leaving a widow and having given her power to adopt which she does not exercises till after a partition has been made by B, D and E. When she exercises her power we apprehend that the adopted son would be entitled to call upon his uncles to make over to him a portion of the wealth equal to that which would have been taken by his father: Sri Raghunadha v. Sri Brozo Kishore ”

    If these observations were not merely obiter, the case would have been a direct authority in favour of the respondents.

    We shall now examine the matter on principle. What does the statement, that when the rights acquired by third parties are defeated, the widow's power comes to an end, imply? That the object of assigning a limit to the widow's power is to safeguard the rights of such third parties. If this be the true view to take, why should it be held that the adoption is bad when the adopting widow as in Ramakrishna v. Sham Rao is the very person whose estate is thereby defeated? Again, why should the adoption be held invalid not only as against the person whom it divests, but even as against (as held in Pudma Kumari Debi v. The Court of Wards and Thayarammal v. Venkatarama Aiyar ) distant reversioners? Mr. Somayya's answer is, that the power having come to an end, cannot be revived. This is merely arguing in a circle. Why should it be held at all on his theory that the power came to an end? The object being, the safeguarding of other people's rights (as his argument assumes), it would be sufficient for achieving that end, to hold that the power is in abeyance ready to revive on the removal of the obstruction. If, on the other hand, the test of the limiting principle is what we have stated above, it stands to reason that when once the spiritual purposes are satisfied, the power to adopt finally and for ever comes to an end.

    Again, the validity of an adoption must be judged intrinsically on its own merits, and not with reference to considerations extraneous to it. The fact of the present case which are somewhat unusual, serve forcibly to illustrate the incongruity of the position taken up by the plaintiffs. The suit relates to the estate not of the adopting widow's husband but of her father. The plaintiffs are not interested in the rights which are said to be defeated, nor are the husband's agnates interested in the estate which the plaintiffs represent. The adoption in this case having been made with the consent of those agnates, no question of the safeguarding of their rights can arise. The test suggested by the plaintiffs is altogether unsatisfactory and cannot furnish the true criterion.

    Mr. Somayya advances an alternative contention. He puts his case thus. Rameswaramayya died after the partition and the properties alloted to him vested on his death in his widow Subbamma. The argument is that whether or not the widow's power became extinct on the partition, it came to an end, at any rate, on Subbamma succeeding to her husband. The plaint proceeds on an altogether different assumption. It is stated in paragraph 3 that the joint family consisted only of four brothers, the name of Rameswaramayya being omitted. Then the plaint goes on to say, that Ramakrishniah (1st defendant's husband) died first and then Sivaramiah and that the two remaining brothers (Venkatachalamiah and Ramasubbiah) entered into a partition. There is thus no mention of Rameswaramayya. Nor have the defendants alleged in their written statement that he also was a party to the partition. The parties thus when they went to trial, entirely ignored Rameswaramayya. But the alternative contention not only assumes that he was a party to the partition, but that, on his death, his property vested in his widow. Even the lower Court's judgment does not contain any reference to this argument. But the plaintiffs point to some statements made by the defence witnesses, which we are asked to treat as admissions. We do not think that a point of this importance, not raised in the pleadings and not referred to in the lower Court's judgment should be allowed to be raised.

    In the result, we hold that the adoption made by the 1st defendant is valid and confirming the decision of the lower Court, dismiss the appeal with costs.

    The Memorandum of Objections is allowed with costs.

    N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.

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    Panyam v. Avadhanam Rama Lakshmamma
    (Oct 22, 1931)