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  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I, Article 181,
  • Order 34, Rule 4, Sub-rule (1),
  • Order 34, Rule 5, Sub-rule (2)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
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  • Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I, Article 181,
  • Order 34, Rule 4, Sub-rule (1),
  • Order 34, Rule 5, Sub-rule (2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (C.M.S.A. Nos. 156 & 167 of 1930)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two second appeals arising out of a mortgage suit (O.S. No. 275 of 1918). A preliminary decree was passed by the District Munsif on 7 December 1918. A final decree in pursuance of that preliminary decree was obtained by Mangalathammal on 28 April 1919. The preliminary decree was appealed to the District Judge (appeal dismissed on 30 September 1920) and thereafter to this Court (second appeal dismissed on 6 April 1923). Mangalathammal died while the second appeal was pending and her son was added as her legal representative and later became the sole decree-holder.

On 5 March 1926 the appellant applied to the District Munsif for a final decree in pursuance of the decree of the second appellate Court; the District Munsif granted relief on 21 September 1926. On appeal the District Judge (28 September 1927) held that the appellant was not entitled to apply for a second final decree and that his remedy was to seek amendment or review of the old final decree, but nevertheless sent the petition back to the District Munsif to remain pending. Subsequent orders ensued: a District Munsif attempted to treat the petition as execution and amendment and ordered relief; a later District Judge (6 December 1928) set that order aside saying the District Munsif was not authorized to treat the petition as one for execution and remitted the matter again without guidance; a third District Munsif dismissed the petition on 17 January 1929 as illegal (an application for a fresh final decree), and the District Judge dismissed the appellant's appeal on 17 March 1930. The present second appeal (C.M.S.A. No. 156 of 1930) is from that dismissal.

The second matter (C.M.S.A. No. 167 of 1930) arises from a petition filed on 17 January 1929 seeking execution of the 28 April 1919 decree. The District Munsif held (and the District Judge confirmed) that this 1929 petition was time-barred as an execution application made ten years after the 1919 decree; the appellant attempted to excuse the delay by reference to his pending petition of 5 March 1926.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, when a preliminary mortgage decree is appealed and the appellate Court confirms the preliminary decree, the decree-holder who had earlier obtained a final decree in pursuance of the preliminary decree may, after the appellate decision, obtain a final decree in conformity with the appellate judgment (i.e., whether an application for a "second" final decree is legitimate).
  2. From which date does limitation run for making an application for a final decree arising from a preliminary decree that was the subject of appeal (whether limitation runs from the expiry of the time fixed by the preliminary decree or from the date of the appellate Court's decree)?
  3. Whether the decree-holder's right after the appellate decision is limited to executing the earlier final decree (subject to limitation) or includes a right to obtain a new final decree conforming to the appellate decision regardless of the earlier decree's limitation period.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant maintained that his petition of 5 March 1926 seeking a final decree in pursuance of the appellate decision was legitimate and, in fact, the only petition he could properly file after the second appeal. (The opinion records the view that Privy Council authority supported this position.)
  • Implicit in the appellant's position (as accepted by the Court) is that the right to ask for a final decree, where a preliminary decree has been under appeal, arises from the date of the judgment in the appeal and, therefore, the time for making such an application must be computed from that appellate judgment.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The learned Advocate for the respondent argued (and the Lower Courts accepted) that an application for a second final decree was illegal — i.e., that the decree-holder was not entitled to apply anew for a final decree after having obtained and, where applicable, executed an earlier final decree.
  • The respondent also advanced the contention that where a final decree had been obtained and execution was barred by lapse of more than three years, the subsequent appellate decision confirming the preliminary decree could not improve the decree-holder's position; the decree-holder's only right was to execute the original final decree subject to limitation.
  • The opinion records that the respondent's counsel (learned Advocate) conceded certain points — notably in cases where an appeal alters or sets aside the preliminary decree, the earlier final decree's validity is destroyed or altered; but he maintained his position where the appellate Court merely confirmed the preliminary decree and dismissed the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal (1917) I.L.R. 39 All. 641 (F.B.) Where an appeal is preferred from a preliminary mortgage decree, the limitation for an application for a decree absolute runs from the date of the decree of the final Court of appeal (not from expiry of time fixed by the original preliminary decree). The Court relied on this Full Bench decision to explain the correct doctrine and to correct the Lower Courts' misunderstanding that a second final decree is necessarily illegal.
Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh (1926) L.R. 53 I.A. 197 : I.L.R. 6 Pat. 24 : 51 M.L.J. 781 (P.C.) Where there has been an appeal from a preliminary mortgage decree under Order 34, Rule 4(1), and the appellate Court does not extend time for payment, the three-year period under Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I, Article 181, for an application under Order 34, Rule 5(2) runs from the date of the decree of the appellate Court. The Privy Council decision was cited and treated as approving the proposition that the right to obtain a final decree in conformity with the appellate judgment arises from the date of that judgment. The Court used it to support the appellant's entitlement to seek a final decree after the appellate decision.
Fitzhollnies v. Bank of Upper India (1924) I.L.R. 5 Lah. 257; Fitshohnes v. Bank of Upper India (1926) L.R. 54 I.A. 52 : I.L.R. 8 Lah. 253 : 52 M.L.J. 366 (P.C.) The preliminary decrees passed by trial Courts merge in the decrees of the appellate Court; the only decrees which can be made final are the decrees of the appellate Court. The Court referred to this authority as being to the same effect and as upholding the doctrine that the appellate decree is the decree which can be made final and relied on it to reinforce the principle applied in the present case.
Mahapatro v. Magata Patro (1932) 64 M.L.J. 695; Venkatarania Reddi v. Doddachariar (1929) 58 M.L.J. 207 These are decisions of this Court that carry out the doctrine laid down by the Privy Council — i.e., that the appellate decree is the proper basis for a final decree when a preliminary decree has been appealed. The Court cited these decisions as supportive local authority implementing the Privy Council's doctrine and used them to buttress its conclusion.
Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1914) I.L.R. 36 All. 350 : 27 M.L.J. 17 (P.C.) Identified in the opinion as a case which presents a different class of situation (an exception) where the general proposition may not apply. The Court noted that the present case was not similar to Abdul Majid and therefore the exception there was not applicable; it used the distinction to reject the respondent's contention.
Venkatarama Reddi v. Doddachariar (1929) 58 M.L.J. 207 (Wallace, J.) Confirmation of a Lower Court's judgment by an appellate Court and dismissal of the appeal with costs is a judgment on the merits as much as one reversing or varying the judgment. The Court relied on Wallace, J.'s observation in support of the proposition that confirmation by the appellate Court confers the decree-holder a right to obtain a final decree in conformity with that appellate decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's reasoning proceeds from chronology and from authoritative precedent. It first notes that while the Lower Courts thought an application for a second final decree illegal, the Privy Council and Full Bench authority establish the opposite: where a preliminary decree is appealed, the decree which may properly be made final (and the time for making such application runs) is the decree of the appellate Court.

The Court clarifies a misunderstanding of the phrase "there can be more final decrees than one." The correct understanding is that when there is an appeal from a preliminary decree the final decree must be based upon the appellate Court's decree; that does not mean a decree-holder who earlier obtained a final decree in pursuance of the lower Court's preliminary decree is thereby deprived of the later right to obtain a final decree conforming to the appellate decision.

The opinion explains the legal consequences when: (a) a final decree was obtained under the lower Court's preliminary decree and (b) the preliminary decree was the subject of appeal. It rejects the respondent's argument that execution of the earlier final decree (or lapse of three years after that earlier decree) exhausts the decree-holder's rights. The Court reasons that the appellate decision gives rise to a new right — the right to obtain a final decree in conformity with the appellate judgment — which may be exercised within three years from the date of the appellate decree (consistent with the Limitation Act and Order 34 rules as explained by the cited authorities).

The Court records that the respondent's counsel conceded aspects of this analysis in cases where the appellate Court alters or sets aside the preliminary decree, but argued that if the appellate Court merely confirmed the preliminary decree the decree-holder gains no new right. The Court rejects that contention, pointing out that confirmation by the appellate Court after judicial consideration is as much a judgment on the merits as a reversing or varying judgment and therefore does create the right to obtain a final decree conforming to the appellate decision (subject to the applicable limitation period measured from the appellate decree).

Applying this reasoning to the facts, the Court concluded that the Lower Courts erred in denying the appellant the right to obtain a final decree in conformity with the decision in S.A. No. 49 of 1921 (the second appeal). Accordingly, the Court set aside the decision of the lower appellate Court and remitted the appellant's petition of 5 March 1926 to the District Munsif for award of a final decree conforming to that appellate decision. The appellant was awarded costs from and including the District Munsif's dismissal of 17 January 1929.

As to C.M.S.A. No. 167 of 1930 (the 1929 petition to execute the 1919 decree), the Court observed that if treated solely as an execution petition it was plainly time-barred; because the appellant's attempt to rely upon the 5 March 1926 petition is vindicated by the present judgment, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the period during which the 5 March 1926 petition was pending should be deducted for limitation purposes. The appeal in No. 167 was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • The decision of the lower appellate Court in C.M.S.A. No. 156 of 1930 is set aside. The appellant's petition of 5 March 1926 is remitted to the District Munsif to be dealt with for the purpose of awarding the appellant a final decree in conformity with the decision in the second appeal (S.A. No. 49 of 1921). The appellant is entitled to costs from the respondent throughout, from and including the District Munsif's dismissal of 17 January 1929.
  • C.M.S.A. No. 167 of 1930 (the execution petition of 17 January 1929) — the appeal is dismissed. The 1929 petition to execute the 1919 decree was held to be barred by limitation as an execution petition made ten years after the 1919 decree; no order as to costs was made in that appeal.

Implications:

  • The Court applies existing Full Bench and Privy Council authorities to hold that where a preliminary mortgage decree has been appealed the right to ask for a final decree arises from the date of the appellate judgment; limitation for making that application runs from the date of the appellate decree (consistent with Order 34 and the Limitation Act as elaborated in the cited precedents).
  • Direct consequence for the parties: the appellant is entitled to pursue and obtain a final decree conforming to the appellate decision through the District Munsif (remitted for that purpose) and is awarded costs from the stated date; the separate execution petition of 1929 is dismissed as time-barred.
  • The opinion grounds its conclusion on established authorities (listed above) and clarifies a common lower-court misconception: obtaining an earlier final decree under a preliminary decree does not necessarily preclude the decree-holder from obtaining a final decree conforming to a later appellate judgment, and limitation for such an application is computed from the appellate judgment.

This summary is confined to information and holdings expressly contained in the provided opinion.

    Ramaswami Ayyar In Both, (Petitioner In Both). v. Pakkiri Pathar In Both. ( In Both)

    1. C.M.S.A. No. 156 of 1930.--The appellant is the decree-holder on a mortgage in favour of his deceased mother Mangalathammal and himself in O.S. No. 275 of 1918 in which a preliminary decree was passed on 7th December, 1918, by the District Munsif, from which an appeal was taken to the District Judge, which was dismissed on 30th September, 1920; and from which a second appeal was taken to this Court which was dismissed on 6th April, 1923. Mangalathammal having died pending the second appeal, the appellant was added as her legal representative. Soon after the preliminary decree by the District Munsif, the then decree-holder Mangalathammal obtained a final decree on 28th April, 1919. After the decision in second appeal, the appellant, his mother having died in the meanwhile, on 5th March, 1926, applied to the District Munsif for a final decree in pursuance of the decree of the second appellate Court. This was granted by him on 21st September, 1926. On appeal by the judgment-debtor, the then District Judge on 28th September, 1927, held that the appellant was not entitled to apply for a final decree a second time and that his only course was to apply to amend the old final decree or ask for a review of it. He however on a benevolent consideration which as it has turned out has prevented what would have otherwise been a grave miscarriage of justice, * allowed the petition of 5th March, 1926, to be pending and sent it back to the District Munsif. The District Munsif considered that he was substantially carrying out the direction of the District Judge by allowing the appellant to treat his petition as one for execution of the old final decree and to incorporate in it the information which would bring it into conformity with the High Court's decree; in short, he tried to save the decree-holder by treating his petition as one for execution and one for amendment both rolled into one and he gave the appellant relief by an order to execute the old final decree as so amended. The judgment-debtor again appealed. Another learned District Judge on 6th December, 1928, set aside the above-mentioned second order of the District Munsif because according to him the District Munsif was not authorised to regard the petition of 5th March, 1926, as one for execution. He therefore set aside that order and sent the case back for a second time but this time without giving any indication of what would be the proper way to deal with the appellant's grievance and contenting himself with saying that the matter was to be disposed of according to law. For the third time another District Munsif enquired into the appellant's petition of 5th March, 1926, and this time he made sure that no more fault should be found with him and dismissed that petition on 17th January, 1929, on the ground that an application for a fresh final decree was illegal. The appellant appealed in his turn to the learned District Judge, who, on 17th March, 1930, dismissed the appeal. The present second appeal is from that dismissal.

    2. I have mentioned the dates in the above narration because, while these orders were being passed by the Lower Courts, the Privy Council had decided that the appellant's petition of 5th March, 1926, was entirely legitimate and was the only petition he could file. Far from it being the case that an application for a second final decree is illegal, the true doctrine is that the right to ask for a final decree arises where the preliminary decree has been under appeal, from the date of the judgment in appeal. In cases where there has been a final decree in pursuance of the preliminary decree of the Lower Court pending the appeal, that final decree is valid and binding to the extent but only to the extent to which it is not altered by the appellate decree, and a decree of the appellate Court confirming after judicial consideration the preliminary decree of a Lower Court is for this purpose one altering it. The consequence is that where there is, as in this case, a final decree obtained in pursuance of the Lower Court's preliminary decree and that preliminary decree is taken up in appeal and the appellate Court on a judicial determination confirms the preliminary decree and dismisses the appeal, the decree-holder has the right, which he may exercise within three years from the date of the decree in final appeal, to obtain a final decree in conformity with that appellate decision or, if that is the proper way of expressing it, amending the old final decree so as to bring it into such conformity.

    3. In 1917 in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal (1917) I.L.R. 39 All. 641 (F.B.) it was held that:

    In a suit for sale on a mortgage, if an appeal has been preferred from the preliminary decree, the decree which is to be made absolute is the decree of the final Court of appeal. In such a case, therefore, limitation for an application for a decree absolute runs, not from the expiry of the term fixed for payment by the original decree, but from the date of the decree of the final Court of appeal.

    4. In that case as in this the decree of the High Court was one confirming the decree of the Lower Courts but that made no difference to the proposition stated, for it was pointed out that the plaintiff's application for interest for the period subsequent to the decree of the first Court and for subsequent costs could not have been made before the decree of the High Court was passed. It was in this connection that the proposition was stated that it was impossible to hold that there can be more final decrees than one in a suit for sale upon a mortgage. This, which is perfectly right when properly understood, namely, that where there is an appeal from a preliminary decree the final decree can only be based upon the decree of the appellate Court, has been misunderstood by the Lower Courts as if it meant that where a final decree in pursuance of the first Court's preliminary decree has been passed, there can be no further application for final decree because there can be no two final decrees. This is an entire misunderstanding of the passage.

    5. This decision was approved by the Privy Council in June, 1926, in Jowad Hussain v. Gendan Singh (1926) L.R. 53 I.A. 197 : I.L.R. 6 Pat. 24 : 51 M.L.J. 781 (P.C), where it was held that where there has been an appeal from a preliminary mortgage decree under Order 34, Rule 4, Sub-rule (1), and the appellate Court has not extended the time for payment, the period of three years within which, under the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, Sch. I, Article 181, an application for a final decree under Order 34, Rule 5, Sub-rule (2) must be made, runs from the date of the decree of the appellate Court, not from the expiry of the time for payment fixed by the preliminary decree. The above is the case, although the appeal is by the mortgagee, and questions merely the amount for which the preliminary decree is made, and although the appeal is dismissed. Their Lordships cited with approval passages from the judgments of two learned Judges in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jhvan Lal (1917) I.L.R. 39 All. 641 (F.B.) to the effect that when the decree of the appellate Court is passed, it is that decree and only that which can be made final in the cause between the parties.

    6. The decision of the Lahore High Court in 1924 in Fitzholnies v. Bank of Upper India (1924) I.L.R. 5 Lah. 257 is to the same effect and follows the Full Bench decision in Gajadhar Singh v. Kishan Jiwan Lal (1917) I.L.R. 39 All. 641 (F.B.) on the ground that the preliminary decrees passed by the trial Courts in such cases merge in the decrees of the appellate Court and that the only decrees which can be made final are the decrees of the appellate Court. This was upheld on appeal by the Privy Council in Fitshohnes v. Bank of Upper India (1926) L.R. 54 I.A. 52 : I.L.R. 8 Lah. 253 : 52 M.L.J. 366 (P.C.). It is only necessary to refer to two decisions of this Court which carry out the doctrine laid down by the Privy Council Mahapatro v. Magata Patro (1932) 64 M.L.J. 695 and Venkatarania Reddi v. Doddachariar (1929) 58 M.L.J. 207.

    7. But it has been argued that in the above cases there was no final decree passed in pursuance of the preliminary decree of the first Court pending the appeal and that where there is such a final decree, the cases do not apply. No decision making any such distinction has been brought to my notice and it seems to me on principle it cannot be supported. The argument is that where a final decree in a mortgage suit is passed pending appeal on the preliminary decree, it is the decree-holder's duty and in fact his only right to execute that decree for what it is worth and to do so in the time limited by law for execution of such decrees. From that it is further contended that where the execution of such decree has become barred by the lapse of more than three years, the fact of the appellate Court passing a modified preliminary decree in no way improves the position of the decree-holder who is bound by the final decree which he has already obtained. It is not correct to say that when an appeal is taken from a preliminary decree on which the validity of the final decree depends but from which no appeal is taken, the only right of the decree-holder is to put the final decree in execution irrespective of the result of the appeal from the preliminary decree. This is conceded by the learned Advocate for the respondent at least in cases where the appeal from the preliminary decree sets it aside or alters its provisions and terms. The reason for this concession is that the old final decree in such circumstances is a dependent decree the validity of which is destroyed by the preliminary decree itself being destroyed and similarly is altered to the extent to which the preliminary decree has suffered any alteration by the decree in appeal. It is therefore indisputable that notwithstanding an earlier final decree based upon the preliminary decree of the first Court the decree-holder has a right which he gets for the first time on the decision of the appeal to get a final decree in conformity with the appellate decision and this right cannot be affected by any particular period of time, such as three years, having elapsed after the earlier final decree. It is a confusion of ideas to think of the decree-holder's right consequent upon the decision of the appellate Court as if it were confined to execution of the final decree Obtained first and as if it were limited to the time for execution of that decree; and it is an equal confusion to consider that right as if it were to get the old final decree amended or that unless the amendment is sought for within three years of the original decree, the amendment cannot be granted because the original decree of itself has become barred by limitation. All this is not seriously disputed by the learned Advocate for the respondent.

    8. But he insists that where the appellate decree simply confirms the preliminary decree of the first Court and dismisses the appeal with costs, there is no such variation as to confer any new right to get the final decree first obtained into conformity with the appellate decree. That this argument is wrong follows from the fact that assuming there has been a judicial determination in the appeal and that the case is not one which is similar to the one decided by the Privy Council in Abdul Majid v. Jawahir Lal (1914) I.L.R. 36 All. 350 : 27 M.L.J. 17 (P.C.) the decision of the appellate Court confirming the Lower Court's judgment and dismissing the appeal with costs is as much a judgment on the merits as one reversing or varying a judgment and this is well pointed out by Wallace, J. in Venkatarama Reddi v. Doddachariar (1929) 58 M.L.J. 207.

    9. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that both the Lower Courts have erred in thinking that the decree-holder was not entitled to get a final decree in conformity with the judgment in S. A. No. 49 of 1921. The decision of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the appellant's petition of 5th March, 1926, remitted to the District Munsif for the purpose of awarding to the appellant a final decree in conformity with the decision in that second appeal. The appellant has had to run the gauntlet of Courts for three successive times to get what appears to be a plain enough remedy, and he must have his costs from the respondent throughout, from and including the District Munsif's dismissal of 17th January, 1929.

    10. C.M.S.A. No. 167 of 1930.--It is sufficient to deal with this case very briefly in view of the judgment which I have just delivered in C. M. S. A. No. 156 of 1930. This was a petition by the appellant filed on 17th January, 1929, after the District Munsif had on the third occasion when he dealt with it dismissed the petition of 5th March, 1926. The petition was for executing the only final decree to which the Courts had reduced him, namely, the one dated 28th April, 1919. Obviously as a petition to execute a decree of 1919, the application of 1929 made ten years afterwards was barred by limitation and it was so held by the District Munsif, an opinion which the learned District Judge confirmed. The appellant tried to get excused the period when he was wandering in the woods by promoting his petition of 5th March, 1926, which was ultimately dismissed on 17th January, 1929. As I have held that that dismissal was wrong, it becomes unnecessary to consider whether the appellant is entitled to deduct the period when the petition of 5th March, 1926, was pending. The appeal is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs.

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    Ramaswami Ayyar In Both, (Petitioner In Both). v. Pakkiri Pathar In Both. ( In Both)
    (Apr 26, 1933)