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Case Number

Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 488 of 1923.

Attorney(S)

Mr. C. V. Ananthakrishna Aiyar (The Government Pleader)
Messrs. Nugent Grant, R. N. Aingar, O. T. Govindan Nambiar and Messrs. King and Partridge

Judges

Sir Walter Salis Schwabe
K.C, C.J
Coutts Trotter, J.

Acts

Section 51(1)(9) of the Income Tax Act, VII of 1918.
SECTION 51 INCOME TAX ACT
(Arbitration) Act, 1909, (Edw. VII, C. 20) Section 1,
SECTION 106 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
Income-Tax Act VII of 1918. By Section 57
rules of the Civil Procedure Code
Madras Forest Act, V of 1882,
LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Traffic Act, 1888,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council (the Privy Council) from a decision of the High Court given on a reference made to it under Section 51 of the Income-Tax Act, VII of 1918. The Chief Revenue Authority had referred a question of income-tax law to the High Court; the amount directly involved in the reference was approximately Rs. 6,000. The Revenue Authority, being dissatisfied with the High Court's determination, sought leave to appeal to the Privy Council. The opinion records that the legal question involved is difficult and of very great and general importance, and the court considered whether it had the power to certify leave to appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court's decision on a reference under Section 51 (and related provisions) of the Income-Tax Act, VII of 1918, constitutes a "final judgment" of the High Court such that leave to appeal to the Privy Council can be granted under Clause 39 of the Letters Patent.
Whether the High Court, when given jurisdiction over income-tax matters by statute, sits in such a way that the ordinary incidents of its jurisdiction (including appellate routes and the Civil Procedure Code machinery) apply, thereby permitting appeals or leave to appeal to the Privy Council even if the special Act is silent on an express right of appeal.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by Mr. Grant (assessee)

The Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to the reference proceedings under the Income-Tax Act; the Income-Tax Act provides a special and exhaustive machinery for resolution of the question.
Section 106 of the Government of India Act debarred ordinary courts from inquiring into matters concerning the revenue; therefore the Income-Tax Act's special procedure should be treated as exclusive.
Because the special statutory procedure does not contain an express provision for appeal to the Privy Council, there is no jurisdiction in the High Court to grant leave to appeal. The right to appeal must be expressly conferred by statute (relying on the principle stated in Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Railway Company).
He relied strongly on Rangoon Botatoung Co., Limited v. Collector of Rangoon (a Privy Council decision) as authority for the proposition that where the statute creates arbitral-like proceedings and denominates the outcome an "award" rather than a "judgment," no appeal to a higher court exists absent express provision.

Other party's arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the other party's (Revenue Authority's or Crown's) separate oral submissions in the same level of specificity as Mr. Grant's arguments. However, the Court considered and applied authorities and legal principles supportive of the proposition that extending jurisdiction to the High Court by statute carries with it the ordinary incidents of Court jurisdiction, including appellate incidents under the Letters Patent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster-General (1913) A.C. 546	Where by statute matters are referred to a Court of Record without further provision, it is implied the Court will determine them as a Court and the usual incidents of jurisdiction (including the right of appeal) remain.	The Court relied on this principle to hold that when income-tax jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court by statute, the ordinary rights of appeal (and the procedural machinery) attach, supporting grant of leave to appeal.
Rangoon Botatoung Co., Ltd. v. Collector of Rangoon (1912) (Privy Council)	Held that where proceedings are essentially arbitration proceedings and the statute describes the outcome as an "award," no appeal exists unless expressly provided by statute; an appeal must be created by express enactment.	The decision was relied upon by Mr. Grant against the existence of a right of appeal; the Court analyzed and distinguished it, noting Rangoon concerned arbitration-like proceedings and did not displace the general principle in National Telephone Co.
Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Railway Company (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 1	Observation (by Bramwell, L.J.) that a right of appeal does not exist by nature and must be given by express enactment.	Quoted in support of Rangoon; used by the opinion to identify the narrow proposition that appeals require express statutory conferment where proceedings are truly arbitral in character.
Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao (Privy Council)	Where a statute gives jurisdiction to a District Judge (or similar court) that court is to be treated as an ordinary court of the country, and the ordinary rules of procedure and rights of appeal (e.g., under Civil Procedure Code) apply.	The opinion relied on this case to support the proposition that statutory extension of jurisdiction makes the new matters subject to ordinary Court machinery and appellate rights.
Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao (1922) (Privy Council)	Explained the Rangoon decision as being that the proceedings were essentially arbitration proceedings.	The opinion cites this explanation to show Rangoon's limit and to support the view that Rangoon does not negate the broader principle in National Telephone Co.
Navivaku v. Turner (Judicial Committee)	Established for India the position that jurisdiction extended by statute brings into operation ordinary procedural machinery and appellate incidents.	Used as earlier authority confirming the principle applied by the Court that statutory extension of jurisdiction carries ordinary incidentals, supporting leave to appeal.
Chappan v. Moidin Kutti	Illustrative authority concerning the capacities in which the High Court sits (ordinary and extraordinary original civil jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction).	Referred to in confirming that the High Court sits in ordinary jurisdictions recognized by the Letters Patent and that appeal rights attach accordingly.
Birendra Kishore Manikya v. Secretary of State for India (in Council)	Addressed whether the High Court was exercising original or appellate jurisdiction in certain contexts; cited on the point that it was immaterial for purposes of appellate rights whether the Court sat in original or appellate jurisdiction.	Cited for the proposition that whether the High Court acted in original or appellate jurisdiction in such references is immaterial because in either case there is a right of appeal or power to give leave to appeal to the Privy Council.
Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. Chief Revenue Authority, Bombay	Direct authority on the point that statutory reference to the High Court carries appellate incidents enabling leave to appeal.	The Court stated it agreed with the decision in Tata Iron & Steel and treated it as direct authority supporting grant of leave to appeal.
Special Officer, Salsette Building Sites v. Dasabhai Bezanji	Referenced by Lord Macnaghten as adopting the view that certain statutes made the court function as arbitrators and no more.	Cited in the course of discussing the Rangoon line of authorities and the narrower view that where statutes create arbitral functions, no appeal exists unless expressly conferred.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded along these principal lines (based only on what is stated in the opinion):

The preliminary question was jurisdictional: whether the High Court's decision on a reference under the Income-Tax Act constitutes a "final judgment" permitting leave to appeal to the Privy Council under Clause 39 of the Letters Patent. The Court accepted there is no inherent right of appeal unless conferred by Letters Patent or statute.
The Income-Tax Act (in particular Section 57 and the reference mechanism under Section 51) confers on the Chief Revenue Authority the power to draw up a case and refer it to the High Court, which must decide the question and that judgment is to be acted upon. Absent this, Section 106 of the Government of India Act would bar High Court power to deal with revenue matters.
Citing National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster-General, the Court adopted the principle that when a statute extends the jurisdiction of a Court of Record to matters not ordinarily within its purview, that extension is accompanied by the ordinary incidents and machinery of Court jurisdiction (including those relating to appeals and procedure).
The Court considered Rangoon Botatoung Co. v. Collector of Rangoon and related Privy Council decisions which had held in their context that no appeal lay where proceedings were essentially arbitral (the decisions were described as "awards"). The Court distinguished those authorities on the ground that they dealt with proceedings that were, throughout, arbitration proceedings; accordingly, those decisions do not displace the general application of the National Telephone principle where the statute empowers the High Court to act as a Court.
The Court observed that it would require plain statutory language to show that the Legislature intended Judges to sit merely as arbitrators without any appeal. The Income-Tax Act contains nothing indicating such an intention.
It was further observed that whether the High Court was sitting in its original jurisdiction (ordinary or extraordinary) or in its appellate jurisdiction was immaterial for the purpose of the availability of leave to appeal: in either capacity the right or power to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council exists (citing Birendra Kishore Manikya and other authorities).
Applying these legal principles and the cited authorities (National Telephone, Navivaku, Chelikani, Tata Iron & Steel, etc.), the Court concluded that when the High Court's jurisdiction is extended by a special Act, the case becomes subject to the Civil Procedure Code and all incidents of ordinary jurisdiction, including the duty to grant leave to appeal in suitable cases.

A second opinion recorded (by Coutts Trotter, J.) restated the procedural posture and the same core question: the assessee's preliminary objection that the Court had no power to grant leave to appeal. That opinion treated the Rangoon decision as addressing arbitration-like proceedings and reiterated that authorities of weight required the Court to apply the principle that extension of jurisdiction carries the ordinary incidents of Court jurisdiction; the judge therefore held that leave must be granted.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

LEAVE TO APPEAL TO HIS MAJESTY IN COUNCIL IS GRANTED (a certificate for leave to appeal will be issued).

Consequences and implications (as stated in the opinion):

The Court certified that, although the monetary amount was only about Rs. 6,000, the question involved was of sufficient legal importance to merit appeal to the Privy Council, and the Court has the power to certify such leave.
The direct effect is that the Revenue Authority will be permitted to seek leave to appeal to the Privy Council; costs of the application were ordered "costs in the cause."
The opinion frames the decision as an application of existing legal authorities (National Telephone Co., Navivaku, Chelikani Rama Rao, Tata Iron & Steel, etc.). The Court treated the matter as governed by existing principles about statutory extension of Court jurisdiction and did not present this decision as the establishment of a novel principle beyond those authorities.

If any particular factual detail, party submission, or ancillary ruling is not discussed above, that information was not available in the provided opinion and therefore has not been included.

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The Secretary, Board Of Revenue (Income Tax), Madras Petitioner (Referring Officer). v. The Madras Export Company, Madras (Assesses).

1. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Council from a decision of this Court on a reference to it under Section 51 of the Income-Tax Act VII of 1918. The question involved in this reference is a difficult and important point of law of very great and general importance. I am, therefore, prepared to certify that, although the actual amount involved in this reference is only about Rs. 6,000, the case is a fit one for appeal to His Majesty in Council, provided that we have the power to certify, that is, provided that appeal lies. This depends on whether our decision in this case is a "final judgment" of the High Court either in its ordinary original civil jurisdiction or extraordinary original civil juris- diction; or in its appellate jurisdiction, because under Clause 39 of the Letters Patent it is only on these matters that an appeal lies. I agree that there is no inherent right of appeal and that unless such right is conferred by the Letters Patent or by Statute there can be none. I have no doubt that our decision is a "judgment" and also that it is 'final'. The power of determining income-tax question is conferred by the Income-Tax Act VII of 1918. By Section 57 the Chief Revenue Authority may, and in certain circumstances on the application of the assessee himself must, draw up a statement of the case and refer it with his own opinion to the High Court and the High Court has to decide the question raised arid deliver judgment, and that judgment is to be acted upon. Apart from this provision, the High Court by reason of Section 106 of the Government of India Act has no power to deal with revenue matters. The section confers this jurisdiction on the Court and, in my view, these Income-Tax cases are referred to the Court as a "Court" and it must follow that the ordinary rights of appeal from that Court are available. This principle is clearly enunciated in National Telephone Co. v. Postmaster-General (1913) A.C. 546 : 82 L.J.K.B. 1197 : 109 L.T. 562 : 57 S.J. 661 : 29 T.L.R. 637. The Government in that case had taken over the assets of the National Telephone Co. and by the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909, (Edw. VII, C. 20) Section 1, it was provided that any difference as to price and other matters, if the parties agreed, be referred to the Railway and Canal Commission and that that Commission should determine the same. The Railway Canal Commission is a statutory body and there are certain rights of appeal from its decision. The matters in dispute between the National Telephone Co., and the Government were by agreement referred to that Commission and a decision was given. Upon appeal it was argued that no appeal lay, no right to appeal having been conferred by the Statute; but it was held that jurisdiction having been conferred on that tribunal, it followed that the usual rights of appeal from that tribunal were also conferred. The point was shortly stated by Lord Parker at page 562: "Where by Statute matters are referred to the determination of a Court of Record with no further provision, the necessary implication is, I think, that the Court will determine the matters as a Court. Its jurisdiction is enlarged, but all the incidents of such jurisdiction, including the right of appeal from its decision, remain the same." The same principle has been applied here in cases under the Madras Forest Act, V of 1882, which gives a right of appeal from a Forest Officer to the District Judge without providing for any appeal from the District Judge to the High Court. It was held by the Privy Council that when the District Court was reached, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees, the rules of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable and that, therefore, an appeal lay to the High Court: Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao 35 Ind. Cas. 902 : 39 M. 617 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311 : (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 : 43 I.A. 192 (P.C.).

2. It was argued that the decision of the Privy Council in Rangoon Botaloung Co., Limited v. Collector of Rangoon 16 Ind. Cas. 188 : 40 C. 21 : 16 C.W.N. 961 : 12 M.T. 195 : (1912) M.W.N. 781 : 16 C.L.J. 245 : 33 M.L.J. 276 : 14 Bom. L.R. 833 : 10 A.L.J. 271 : 5. Bur. L.T. 205 : 6 L.B.R. 150 : 39 I.A. 197 (P.C.) was against this view. Under the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894, when lands are taken over for public purposes, the Collector is appointed arbitrator as between the Government and the parties. Under Section 18 he may be required to refer the matter for the determination of the Court, the Court for this purpose being a principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. By Section 54 an appeal is given from what is termed an award of that Court to the High Court. Two Judges of the Chief Court of Burma sat to hear the reference and it was held by the Privy Council that no appeal lay from their decision applying the principle stated by Bramwell, L.J., in Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Stafford shire Railway Company (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 1 : 47 L.J.Q.B. 10 : 37 L.T. 391 : 26 W.R. 229. An appeal does not exist in the nature of things. A right to appeal from any decision of a tribunal must be given by express enactment. So far as the actual decision is concerned, I think that the fact that the two Judges sat as arbitrators, and not as a Court in the ordinary sense is established by the words of the Act itself, which call their decision an award and not a judgment. It was, however, suggested that these Judges were sitting not only on the reference to them by the Collector but also as an appellate, tribunal under Section 54. It is difficult to understand how this could be so, because it seems impossible that the two Judges could be hearing a case as arbitrators and at the same time be hearing an appeal from their own decision which had not. yet been given. Lord Shaw in Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao 35 Ind. Cas. 902 : 39 M. 617 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311 : (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 : 43 I.A. 192 (P.C.) explains this judgment by saying that the proceedings were from beginning to end ostensibly and actually arbitration proceedings, and in Ramachandra Rao v. Ramachandra Rao 67 Ind. Cas. 408 : 45 M. 320 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 26 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 545 : 16 L.W. 1 : (1922) M.W.N. 359 : (1922) A.I.R. (P.C.) 80 : 20 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.) their lordships of the Privy Council explain the decision in Rangoon Botatoung Co., Limited v. Collector of Rangoon 16 Ind. Cas. 188 : 40 C. 21 : 16 C.W.N. 961 : 12 M.T. 195 : (1912) M.W.N. 781 : 16 C.L.J. 245 : 33 M.L.J. 276 : 14 Bom. L.R. 833 : 10 A.L.J. 271 : 5. Bur. L.T. 205 : 6 L.B.R. 150 : 39 I.A. 197 (P.C.) in the same way--see page 329. Page of 45 M.--[Ed.] I think, it is clear on these authorities that the principles enunciated in the National Telephone Co., case are considered, as being of general application in this country and are in no way affected by the decision in Rangoon Botatoung Co., Limited v. Collector of Rangoon 16 Ind. Cas. 188 : 40 C. 21 : 16 C.W.N. 961 : 12 M.T. 195 : (1912) M.W.N. 781 : 16 C.L.J. 245 : 33 M.L.J. 276 : 14 Bom. L.R. 833 : 10 A.L.J. 271 : 5. Bur. L.T. 205 : 6 L.B.R. 150 : 39 I.A. 197 (P.C.). This Court does not sit in my other capacity than in the exercise of its ordinary and extraordinary, original civil jurisdiction and its appellate jurisdiction. See Chappan v. Moidin Kutti 22 M. 68 : 8 M.L.J. 231 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 49 and Navivaku v. Turner 16 I.A. 156 : 13 B. 520 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 400 : 13 Ind. Jur. 251 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 345 (P.C.). It does not sit in a further capacity, namely, to try matters referred to it by Statute. It would he possible for the Legislature to empower the Judges to sit as arbitrators and without appeal, but it would require plain language to impose such duties and there is nothing in the Income Tax Act to indicate any such intention. Whether in this case we are sitting in our original jurisdiction, or in our appellate jurisdiction as was held in Birendra Kishore Manikya v. Secretary of State for India in Council 61 Ind. Cas. 112 : 48 C. 766 : 32 C.L.J. 433 : 25 C.W.N. 80, is immaterial, for in either case there is a right of appeal or power to give leave to appeal to the Privy Council. There is direct authority on the point in Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. Chief Revenue Authorial, Bombay 64 Ind. Cas. 931 : 33 Bom. L.R. 1102, with which, for the reasons stated above, I agree.

3. Accordingly, a certificate for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council will he granted. Costs of this application costs in the cause.

Coutts Trotter, J.

4. This was a case referred to the High Court by the Chief Revenue Authority under the powers conferred upon it to that end, by Section 51(1)(9) of the Income Tax Act, VII of 1918. The Revenue Authority being dissatisfied with the determination of the High Court is desirous of obtaining leave to appeal to the Privy Council.

5. With the merits of the question we are not concerned. The only point we have to determine is that raised by way of preliminary objection by the assessee, viz., that we have no power to grant leave to appeal, in any event. There can be no question as to the fulfilment of the conditions requisite for an appeal being allowed, for though the value is only Rs. 6,000, the legal importance of questions raised by the reference is obviously great. But Mr. Grant has argued that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply, that there is a special machinery provided by the Income Tax Act beyond which you must not look and that unless there is an express provision in the Act for an appeal to the Privy Council, there is no jurisdiction in this Court to grant leave. The chief authority which he cites for that position is Rangoon Botatoung Co., Limited v. Collector of Rangoon 16 Ind. Cas. 188 : 40 C. 21 : 16 C.W.N. 961 : 12 M.T. 195 : (1912) M.W.N. 781 : 16 C.L.J. 245 : 33 M.L.J. 276 : 14 Bom. L.R. 833 : 10 A.L.J. 271 : 5. Bur. L.T. 205 : 6 L.B.R. 150 : 39 I.A. 197 (P.C.), a decision of the Privy Council on appeal from the Chief Court of Lower Burma, under the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894; and it was there held that, as the Land Acquisition Act conferred no express right of appeal, none existed, following the observation of Lord Bramwell in Sandback Charity Trustees v. North Staffordshire Railway Company (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 1 : 47 L.J.Q.B. 10 : 37 L.T. 391 : 26 W.R. 229. "An appeal does not exist in the nature of things. A right to appeal from any decision of any tribunal must be given by an express enactment." In that case an award of a Collector as to valuation was referred to the Chief Court of Lower Burma under the provisions of the Act; and it was quite possible to take the view that, in effect, the Judges forming the Court were to be regarded as arbitrators making an award, from which award no appeal would lie unless expressly conferred. But at page 26 Page of 40 C.--[Ed.] of the report Lord Macnaghten, who delivered the judgment of the Board, makes the following observation: "They (i.e., the representatives of the Chief Court) sat as 'the Court' and also as the High Court". This would seem to indicate that, in the opinion of the Board, the Chief Court of Lower Burma was in that case invested with the functions of a Court of law, as well as those of arbitrators. I do not profess to understand how any Court can he supposed to be combining, at One and the same sitting, the functions of arbitrators with those of an appellate tribunal apparently a tribunal sitting in appeal from itself in its other contemporaneous exercise of its functions as arbitrators. But I think, it is not going too far to say that that decision has been treated as being based on the view that the Land Acquisition Act made the Chief Court arbitrators and no more. That view appears to have been adopted by Lord Macnaghten himself in Special Officer, Salsette Building Sites v. Dasabhai Bezanji 20 Ind. Cas. 763 : 17 C.W.N. 421 (P.C.). See also the observations of Lord Shaw in Secretary of State for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao 35 Ind. Cas. 902 : 39 M. 617 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311 : (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 : 43 I.A. 192 (P.C.).

6. Mr. Grant's argument is as follows: By Section 106 of the Government of India Act, the ordinary Courts of this country are debarred from inquiring into matters concerning the revenue. The Income Tax Act of 1918 gives power to the Board of Revenue and in a sense creates a right in the assessee to refer a formal special case for the opinion of the High Court. His contention is, that the Act of 1918 is exhaustive as to this subject, and that when the High Court has given its opinion, the matter is ended, as the Statute makes no provision for a further appeal to the Privy Council. If the matter were res integra, the inclination of my mind would be in accordance with this argument, but I think, I am precluded by authorities of great weight from acceding to it. The principle that I conceive to be established by those authorities is this, that where yon find the jurisdiction of a Court extended by a Statute to matters which would not ordinarily come within its purview, that extension of jurisdiction makes the new matters subject to all the machinery provided by law, for the regulating of its ordinary jurisdiction as a Court of Record--the machinery in this instance being the Civil Procedure Code. That seems to me to be emphatically laid down by the House of Lords in National Telephone Co. v Postmaster-General (1913) A.C. 546 : 82 L.J.K.B. 1197 : 109 L.T. 562 : 57 S.J. 661 : 29 T.L.R. 637. There, by a Special Statute, it was enacted that on the taking over of the Company by Government, all matters in dispute should be determined by the Railway and Canal Commission. The decision of the House of Lords was to the effect that the referring of the matter to the arbitrament of the Railway and Canal Commission brought into operation all the machinery of appeal provided by the Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1888, and allowed an appeal from it, notwithstanding the absence of any express provision in the Special Act. I think, that the position had been previously established for India in Navivahu v. Turner 16 I.A. 156 : 13 B. 520 : 5 Sar. P.C.J. 400 : 13 Ind. Jur. 251 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 345 (P.C.), by the Judicial Committee. This has been the consistent view of this Court and it has been endorsed by the Privy Council in Secretary of Stale for India v. Chelikani Rama Rao 35 Ind. Cas. 902 : 39 M. 617 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311 : (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 : 43 I.A. 192 (P.C.). I am, therefore, constrained to hold that, when once the High Court his its jurisdiction extended by a Special Act, the case which is thus put under its jurisdiction becomes subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, with all its incidents including the duty to grant leave to appeal to the Privy Council in cases which satisfy the conditions of the Code. As I have said, there is no question but that this case satisfied those conditions and I, therefore, am of opinion that leave to appeal must be granted.

The Secretary, Board... v. The Madras Export Co...