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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • Order 21, Rule 57,
  • Section 64, C.P.C.,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Acts
  • Order 21, Rule 57,
  • Section 64, C.P.C.,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs (appellants) sought redemption of property based on two documents, Exhibits C and D. The 5th defendant (who later became owner by purchase at a Court sale and is represented in later proceedings by the 6th defendant) had previously obtained an attachment of the property in execution of a decree. There were multiple execution proceedings and related orders:

  • An earlier attachment (referred to in the text as the attachment under Exhibit I) had been effected by the decree-holder (5th defendant).
  • An execution-petition was dismissed on 22-4-1914 (the opinion records that prior to remand the Court decided that the 5th defendant's attachment subsisted notwithstanding that dismissal).
  • An application for attachment evidenced by Exhibit II was dismissed on 20-7-1914 because the decree-holder failed to produce schedules called for. Exhibit C was executed one day before that dismissal.
  • The lower Appellate Court held that the attachment under Exhibit I was not terminated by the subsequent dismissal (Exhibit II), but did not consider all consequences of the Exhibit II dismissal for Exhibit C. The matter was remanded for a revised finding on whether Exhibit C was void because of the order of dismissal included in Exhibit II.
  • On remand the District Judge of South Malabar submitted a finding concerning the voidness of Exhibit C, and the higher court subsequently reviewed the matter and delivered its reasons and final decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Exhibit C (and by extension Exhibits C and D) was executed during the pendency of an attachment and is therefore void as against claims enforceable under that attachment.
  2. Whether the dismissal contained in Exhibit II (dated 20-7-1914 for failure to produce schedules) terminated the earlier attachment under Exhibit I.
  3. Whether an order of dismissal for non-production of schedules was an order under Order 21, Rule 57 of the Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C.), thereby producing the implication that the attachment was terminated.
  4. Whether Section 64, C.P.C. (which treats transfers made pending attachment as void as against claims enforceable under the attachment) supports the contention that a transfer executed shortly before dismissal becomes valid once the attachment ceases.
  5. Whether the decree-holder's conduct (including reapplying for attachment) or failure to appeal the dismissal amounted to waiver or abandonment of the attachment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that Exhibit C was executed during the pendency of an attachment but that the attachment under Exhibit I was terminated by the dismissal recorded in Exhibit II on 20-7-1914; since Exhibit C had been executed a day before that dismissal, it would become effective when the attachment ended.
  • The appellants relied on the reference in Section 64, C.P.C., that a transfer made pending an attachment is void as against claims enforceable under the attachment; their argument was that once the attachment ceases and no claims remain enforceable under it, there is no reason the transfer should not be regarded as valid.

Respondents' / 5th Defendant's Arguments

  • The 5th defendant (decree-holder) argued that the order of dismissal was not passed under Order 21, Rule 57 because the failure to produce schedules was not a default in the sense contemplated by that rule.
  • It was contended that the schedules called for related to the framing of the sale proclamation and therefore the non-production did not amount to noncompliance with any order the executing Court was entitled or bound to make in the sense required for a Rule 57 dismissal.
  • Implicitly, the respondents maintained that the earlier attachment continued to subsist despite the subsequent dismissal and that Exhibits C and D never became effective as transfers of the property while the attachment remained.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court accepted the lower appellate court's ultimate conclusion that the first attachment was not terminated, but disagreed with the lower court's reasoning and set out its own analysis in several steps:

  1. Treatment of Order 21, Rule 57: The court clarified the nature of the default contemplated by Order 21, Rule 57, stating that such a default must be a failure to discharge some obligation laid on the decree-holder by the Code or the Rules. It observed that the lower appellate court's assumption — that the failure to produce schedules was solely for the purpose of framing the sale proclamation and thus not a failure to comply with an order the Court could make — was untenable on the record.
  2. Examination of the record: The court pointed to specific orders on the execution-petition (orders of 11-7-1914 and 14-7-1914) showing that the parties and the Court believed attachment had been thought necessary and that no prior attachment had been completed. There was no reference to return of the warrant of attachment. From this, the court inferred that the schedules were required for the making of an attachment (for affixture and for proclamation by beat of tom-tom under Rule 54(2)), not merely for framing a sale proclamation at a later stage.
  3. Adoption of a wider ground: Despite rejecting the lower court's factual assumption, the court resolved the case on a wider legal ground — that the order of dismissal could not be regarded as made under Rule 57 in the circumstances of this case. The court reasoned that Rule 57 is intended to apply where the Court and parties are conscious that the stage of attachment has been passed and that the next stage (for which non-production would be a relevant default) is intended. In an "abnormal case" where neither party nor Court was aware of the true facts (i.e., they mistakenly proceeded as if there had been no subsisting attachment), it would be contrary to principle to treat the dismissal as invoking the penal consequence envisaged by Rule 57 (namely, implication that attachment ceases).
  4. On appeal and waiver arguments: The court addressed two ancillary contentions. First, that absence of an appeal against the dismissal meant the dismissal should stand: the court replied that once it concluded the order was not passed under Rule 57, an appeal could have served no purpose because the order had no effect in displacing the previous attachment. Second, on waiver by reapplying for attachment, the court applied the general principle that there can be no waiver in ignorance of the existence of the rights alleged to have been waived.
  5. Conclusion of analysis: Taking those reasons together, the court accepted the finding (from remand) that the original attachment was never determined. Therefore, Exhibits C and D, being executed during an attachment that never ceased, never became effective as transfers binding on the property.
  6. Additional point on redemption claim under Exhibits D and O: The court dealt shortly with an alternate ground raised by the appellants — that Exhibit O (an order on a claim petition) sustained Exhibit D to the extent of Rs. 630 and so the plaintiffs were entitled to possession on payment of that sum. The court found that the right to obtain possession was conferred by the melkanom (Exhibit C), not by the panayam deed (Exhibit D). Further, Exhibit O did not sustain Exhibit D as a redeemable mortgage with possession; instead it directed that the property should be sold subject to a charge under Ex. D for Rs. 630. Consequently, the plaintiffs could not claim relief beyond what Exhibit O allowed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the first attachment was never terminated by the order of dismissal in Exhibit II and that therefore Exhibits C and D, which were executed during that attachment, never became effective.

Case dispositions (as stated in the opinion):

  • S.A. No. 2127 of 1920: DISMISSED — with costs to the 5th respondent (referred to as the 6th defendant in later representation).
  • S.A. No. 2128 of 1920: DISMISSED — with costs to the 1st respondent (plaintiff).

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The attachment effected by the decree-holder (5th defendant) remained subsisting; the transfers evidenced by Exhibits C and D did not become effective against that attachment.
  • The plaintiffs could not obtain possession on the basis of Exhibit D beyond the charge allowed by Exhibit O (Rs. 630) and could not claim redemption or possession under Ex. D in any greater degree than Ex. O permitted.

The opinion includes a judicial observation that the character and implications of an order under Rule 57 can be difficult to determine in practice and that it may be desirable for the rule to require the Court to express clearly any intended implication; the Court nevertheless decided the present case on the concrete facts and principles addressed above.

    Venkiteswarayyan And Anr. v. Aswatha Narayanan And Ors.

    1. Second and 3rd plaintiffs, appellants, are here to contend that the lower Appellate Court erred in holding that Exhibit C, was executed during the pendency of an attachment, effected by a decree-holder, now represented by the 6th defendant. The Lower Appellate Court no doubt was right in holding that the attachment under Exhibit I was not terminated by the dismissal, with which the proceedings closed. It is only necessary to say with regard to that conclusion that it might have been reached more shortly, because the default of the decree-holder referred to in Order 21, Rule 57, cannot, in our opinion, be constituted either by his absence from the sale or his failure to bid at the sale, but must be a default in the discharge of some obligation laid on him by the Code or the Rules framed under it.

    2. Having reached that conclusion, however, the lower appellate Court did not go on to consider the result of the subsequent proceedings in Exhibit II. Exhibit II was another application for attachment, which was dismissed on 20-7-1914, because the decree-holder failed to produce the schedules called for. A day before that dismissal Exhibit C had been executed, it is urged, during the pendency of an attachment. The plaintiff's contention is that the attachment under Exhibit I was terminated by the order of dismissal of 20-7-1914 and that Ex. C executed the day before that dismissal would become effective, when the attachment came to an end. In this connection reliance has been placed on the reference in Section 64, C.P.C., to a transfer made pending an attachment, as void, as against all claims enforceable under the attachment, the argument being that, when the attachment ceases and there are no longer any claims enforceable under it, there is no reason why the transfer should not be regarded as valid. On the question raised in connection with the proceedings evidenced by Ex. II the lower appellate Court has expressed no opinion.

    3. We must accordingly call on it for a revised finding on the question whether Ex. C is void because of the order of dismissal included in Ex. II. The lower appellate Court's finding must be returned within six weeks; and seven days for objection. It will on the return of the finding be open to the respondents to argue the question raised by Issue 7 it the trial.

    4. S. A. No. 2128 of 1920 will stand adjourned pending returns of the finding in S.A. No. 2127 of 1920.

    [In compliance with the order contained in the above Judgment, the District Judge of South Malabar submitted the finding that Ex. C was void]

    5. The appellants, 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs, sued for redemption on two documents Exhibits C and D. The defence at present material was that Exhibits C and D were taken during the currency of an attachment of the property by the 5th defendant, contesting respondent here, who has since become the owner of that property by purchase from the purchaser at the Court sale, which subsequently took place. Before the remand we decided that the 5th defendant's attachment was subsisting notwithstanding the dismissal of the 5th defendant's execution-petition on the 22-4-1914. We have now to deal with the lower appellate Court's finding on remand, that the attachment was not terminated by the order of dismissal on a subsequent execution-petition, passed on 20-7-1914-The importance of that is that, if there was such a termination of the attachment, Exhibits C and D (it is not disputed) would, so soon as there was no attachment and no obstacle to their doing so, become binding on the property.

    6. We agree with the lower appellate Court's conclusion but not for the reasons it has given. For it held that there was no default by the decree-holder, 5th defendant, such as Order 21, Rule 57 contemplates, on the assumption that the failure to produce schedules on account of which the execution-petition was dismissed, was a failure to produce schedules for the purpose of framing the sale proclamation and that it therefore was not a failure to comply with any order, which the executing Court was entitled or bound to make. That assumption was untenable. For it is clear from the record that everyone, the decree-holder and the Court, mistakenly thought that the previous attachment had been raised and that the stage, at which schedules were necessary for framing the proclamation had not been reached. That is clear from the order on execution-petition, Ex. II. There is first the order after its receipt, being that of 11-7-1914. "Pay batta for attachment," and next that of 14-7-1914 "Batta paid, produce Schedules." There is no reference to any return of the warrant of attachment; and there is no doubt that attachment was thought necessary and so process had been filed and that no attachment had been completed. There was so far no question of the further stage of framing proclamation. Whether, if that stage had been reached, noncompliance with the Court's order to produce schedule would have been a default within the meaning of Rule 57 need not be decided. It is clear that the Lower Appellate Court has neglected the material evidence on this matter and that we must proceed on the footing that the schedules were required for the making of an attachment, such schedules being required for the affixture in various places and for the making of the proclamation by beat of tom-tom under Rule 54(2). An attempt has been made on bealf of the 5th defendant to contend that failure to produce them was not a default within the meaning of Rule 57 and the order of dismissal was therefore not passed under that rule. As we are deciding the case on another and wider ground, we need not pursue that. For we cannot accept the contention, because we think that either under the Code or in the exercise of its inherent power to make orders necessary for the prosecution of the petition before it the Court had power to require such schedules to be produced.

    7. The wider ground, on which we decide the petition, is that even so the order cannot in the circumstances be regarded as having been made under Rule 57. It is true that the conditions specified in Rule 57 are at first sight satisfied. The Court was unable to proceed further with the application for execution. There was default by the decree-holder. The property had been attached in execution of a decree. But that does not entail that the section has in substance been complied with. No doubt the first six words of the section "Where any property has been attached" are literally satisfied in the present case. But, we are not prepared to hold that such literal satisfaction is sufficient. It seems to us that the section as a whole is applicable only to cases, in which the stage of attachment has been passed and in which the Court is conscious that the next stage is intended and is not applicable to an abnormal case, such as that before us, where no one concerned, neither the party nor the Court was conscious of the true facts and where, if there was in fact an attachment, the party and the Court were not aware of it and were proceeding as though there were none. That is clear from the nature of the procedure enjoined on the Court. Two courses are open to it, either to dismiss the application with the implication that the attachment ceased to exist, in which case what may be described as a quasi penal consequence shall be assumed or for any sufficient reason to adjourn the proceedings to a future date. It would be contrary to all principle that the Court should be supposed to be making its choice between the two alternatives, one of which results in the imposition of a penalty when it is not aware of the true facts. The order in respect of which default is contemplated, must clearly be one, which could be made after attachment, not one, as here, appropriate only before it. Taking this view, we hold that Order 21, Rule 57 was not applicable to the present case or to the order of dismissal now under consideration at all.

    8. Reliance is then placed on behalf of the plaintiffs on the fact that the order of dismissal was never set aside on appeal or in the alternative that the decree-holder by applying again for attachment must be taken to have abandoned or waived the attachment already made and still subsisting. As regards the absence of appeal we observe that the question whether an order was really passed under Rule 57 and whether it has the implication referred to in the last sentence of that rule is in our experience always a difficult one, and it is perhaps to be desired that the rule should impose an obligation on the Court to express that implication clearly, so as to include in its disposal a clear expression of that implication, when it intends it. The difficulty is that the character of the order, which is made in many cases in the absence of the judgment-debtor, is not in controversy until after time has elapsed and it is necessary in some future proceedings to determine its effect. The argument before us however can be dealt with shortly. For after our conclusion that the order of dismissal was not passed under Rule 57 at all, it is immaterial that there was no appeal; for an appeal could have secured no purpose, when the order in question had not any effect on the previous attachment, which it was necessary to displace. As regards waiver, the answer is equally simple. For it is a general principle that there can he no waiver in ignorance of the existence of the rights alleged to have been waived.

    9. Taking this view, we accept the finding and hold that the first attachment was never determined and that therefore Exhibits C and D, made during the attachment which never ceased have never become effective.

    10. This failing the appeal has been argued on another ground that Exhibit O, the order on a claim petition by these plaintiffs sustained Exhibit D to the extent of Rs. 630 actually secured by it and that therefore the plaintiffs should have had a decree to obtain possession on payment of Rs. 630. This argument was taken very obscurely, if at all, in the grounds of appeal in this Court. It can be dealt with very shortly. First The right to obtain possession was conferred by the melkanom. Exhibit C and not by the panayam deed, Ex. D, which entitled the plaintiffs only to retain possession of the property as security for their money, after possession had been obtained under Ex. C. Next Ex. O did not sustain Ex. D, as a mortgage with possession, which could be redeemed, but only directed the plaintiffs that the property should be sold subject to a charge under that document for Rs. 630. The plaintiffs cannot claim any different or further relief on Ex. D, than Ex. O allowed them.

    11. The result is that S.A. No. 2127 of 1920 fails and is dismissed with costs of 5th respondent (6th defendant). S.A. No. 2128 of 1920 must be decided on the same grounds and it is also dismissed with costs of 1st respondent, plaintiff.

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    Venkiteswarayyan And Anr. v. Aswatha Narayanan And Ors.
    (Mar 23, 1923)