Sir Murray Coutts Trotter, C.J:— In this case the appellant bought up at a Court-auction sale the rights of the judgment-debtor to receive dividends accrued in a limited company of which he was a share-holder. The question that we have to determine, now that the auction-purchaser is seeking to enforce his right against the company, is, what period of limitation is applicable to such a claim?
The Indian Limitation Act is one of those unfortunate pieces of India legislation which by trying to provide for everything conceivable very often ends by leaving out cases of the most glaring description. I might take this as a very good instance, for there is no article which provides simpliciter for a debt due, such a debt as would have been the subject of the old common law action in debt, although, oddly enough, provision is made by article 63
“for money payable for interest upon money due from the defendant to the plaintiffs”
so that a special article is enacted for the interest and nothing is said whatever about the principal debt. It was suggested that to such cases as this, article 62 might apply, which is,
“for money payable by the defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use.”
The fact is that the money out of which the dividend has to come is received by the company for its own use and put into its own coffers. Then at a later stage in accordance with the articles a dividend is declared by the company in a general meeting on the advice and recommendation of the directors. The very ingenious argument put forward was that as soon as the declaration was made there must be taken to be a notional second receipt by the company as it were from its right hand to its left, the second receipt to be deemed to be for the use of the share-holders who will be entitled to the dividend. It is sufficient to say that is a line of argument which seems quite in conflict with the enactment of the statute as to when the time begins to run and that is when the money is received, the clear implication being—and it is not inconsistent with the frame of the English cause of action for money bad and received—that the money must at the time it came into the hands of the defendant have been there and then put into his hands for the use of the plaintiff. It is quite true that in cases where the party aggrieved is ignorant of the facts the time will only begin to run, not when the money was in fact received by the defendant, but when the plaintiff first became aware of it; but that is a matter of procedure which really does not, except for a special purpose, fix the time when the money is to be deemed to be received. I think we are constrained to hold that the original receipt by the company is the only receipt upon which article 62 would operate and that as that receipt is not for the use of the plaintiff he cannot be brought within article 62.
I now pass to the next suggested alternative which is article 115, and that is worded as follows:—
“For compensation for the breach of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not herein specially provided for”
And if the defendant company can bring itself within the four walls of that article, that carries them home in this case and this action is statute-barred. Were the matter res integra, I should myself be strongly inclined to say that an action such as this was not an action for compensation for the breach of any contract. The English and the Irish Courts have quite clearly laid it down that upon the declaration of a dividend a debt immediately becomes payable by the company to each share-holder in respect of the amount of dividend represented by the amount of his holding to shares, and I should have thought therefore that it was not correct to describe the obligation to pay a debt as being compensation for the breach of a contract. But that matter is not res integra because it has been dealt with in a decision under the following article 110 of the Limitation Act, by the Privy Council. That is the case of Tricomdas Cooverji Bhoja v. Gopinath Jiu Thakur and the judgment of the Board was delivered by Lord Sumner. Now the words of article 116 are as follows:—
“For compensation for the breach of a contract in writing registered.”
In Tricomdas's case the sum of money in issue was arrears of rent due under a registered lease and the argument that was put forward and which the Board refused to accept was that article 110 of the Act specifically provided a period of limitation for arrears of rent, and, that being so, it was immaterial whether the rent was due under a registered or an unregistered lease. The Board rejected that argument on the ground that the words of article 116 were not incapable of covering a case of rent due and that a long cursus curiae of Indian decisions and the decisions of the Board had construed every possible section that they could with a view to giving favour to registered instruments and prolonging the period of limitation. That appears to us to be a method of approaching the case which is binding on us and I think we have to say in the case of a debt such as the debt created between company and share-holder on the declaration of a dividend that, if it is a contract at all, the remedy sought is aptly described as compensation for the breach of a contract, express or implied.
The matter does not rest there, however, because a very learned argument has been put forward before us the effect of which is to show that although the declaration of a dividend creates a debt, yet the relation between share-holder and company is not a relation which could be described as a contractual one. On that point there has been a very great conflict of opinion and divergent views in the English and Irish Courts. I am not a company lawyer and I do not propose to do more than refer very briefly to the main views that have been expressed. The whole matter is summed up in the judgment of Astbury, J., in the case of Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep Breeders' Association where he comes to the conclusion that although the articles cannot be held to constitute a contract between the company of the one part and an outsider in his capacity of outsider of the other part, yet as between share-holder and share-holder and the company a contract is in fact constituted. There were many weighty expressions of opinion to the contrary. We have come to the conclusion that the safest course to adopt here is to take the view that the declaration creates a debt. Byrne, J., in In re Artisan's Land and Mortgage Corporation after previewing the very weighty pronouncements in Irish cases which he refers to, holds that it not merely creates debt but by virtue of the share-certificates and the memorandum of articles it creates a specialty debt. Although the Irish Courts (not, I think, Byrne, J.) do use language which seems to imply that it is not merely a specialty debt but it is a debt arising out of a specialty contract, we are not really bound to go so far as that. We think that this debt created by the declaration, whether in certain circumstances and for certain purposes it might be regarded as a contract, is not a contract such as was contemplated and envisaged by article 115 of the Limitation Act. It is difficult enough to regard that form of words as applicable to a claim for rent. It seems to me clumsy beyond anything that is legitimate to allow the claim of a share-holder for his dividend to be regarded as aptly described by “compensation for breach of contract, express or implied.” In our opinion it is merely a claim for debt and as, unfortunately the Limitation Act does not contain an article applicable to debts, all we can do is to fall back on the omnibus article 120 and treat this case as one for which no article specifically applicable is prescribed under the schedule.
There is only one other matter that we have to deal with, which, in essence, was the start of this whole business. We were referred to a decision of this Court in Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty a decision of Wallis, C.J and Seshagiri Ayyar, J. That was a suit for a dividend and it was decided that the suit fell within article 116. Article 116 of course speaks of registered contracts and there is no doubt that the learned Judges held not merely that registration of a contract, in the ordinary sense, was covered by the article, but the deposit of the memorandum and articles of association of a limited company with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies under the direction of the Act. That seems to us to be putting an intolerable strain upon the word “registered” and one which the draftsman of this statute could not possibly be thought to have contemplated. Of course the decision amounts to this, and we find ourselves unfortunately in disagreement with it even on the minor point, that the relation constituted between the shareholder and the company is a contractual relation—we do not even go so far as that as we wish to limit ourselves carefully—if “contractual” is taken to mean, contractual in the sense contemplated by articles 115 and 16 of the Limitation Act. We therefore are of opinion that Ripon Press and Sugar Mill Co., Ltd. v. Nama Venkatarama Chetty is incorrectly decided and we think we ought to say so.
The reply to the question submitted to us is that in our opinion article 120 is the article that applies.
Krishnan, J.:— I agree.
Beasley, J.:— I agree.
N.R