G.D Khosla, C.J:— This revision petition arise out of an application by the landlord for the fixation of standard rent under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The trail court fixed the Standard rent taking into consideration the probable cost of construction of the building, but on appeal by the tenant the application was dismissed on the ground that the Rent Control Act did not apply to these promises which were to be treated as the property of Central Government. The landlord has moved this court on the revision side.
2. The facts briefly are that the property in dispute was built by a Muslim in 1947 and was later allotted to a number of persons who are the tenants respondents before me. The property was, in due course, put up to sale and the petitioner made the highest bid for it. On 29th March, 1956 he informed that his bid was accepted and that he would be treated as the owner of the property and a sale certificate would, in due course, issue in his favour. A few days later on 10th April, 1956 the occupiers were informed by the Custodian's Department that rent for the premises should henceforth be paid to the petitioner. Rent was, in fact, from the date paid to the petitioner and it was then that the petitioner made the present application for the fixation of standard rent. The application was decided by the trial court on 17th August, 1957 and the appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi, on 23rd May, 1958. Till then no sale certificate had been issued in favour of the petitioner, but a sale Certificate was issued on 4th June, 1959, i.e after the present petition was filed in this court.
3. The view taken by the learned Additional District Judge was that as no sale certificate had been issued in favour of the action purchaser, title in the property had not passed to him and had remained with the Central Government and that being so, the property could not come within the purview of the Act. He also come to the conclusion that since a joint application had been made against all the occupiers, the application was bad for misjoinder of parties. On these two grounds he allowed the appeal and dismissed the application.
4. With regard to the second ground the learned Additional District Judge was clearly in error. The building in respect of which the application was made is one consolidated building. It was constructed at the same time and different portions of it are in occupation of a number of persons. While computing standard rent on the basis of the cost of construction, it is much more advantageous to the tenants that the building should be evaluated as a whole rather than that each portion of it should be considered in insolation, because it is clear that the cost of constructing a room or a portion of a building by itself would be far in excess of its cost if it were to form part of a larger building, and apart from this consideration, in view of the fact that the building is one, although different portions of it are in occupation of different individuals, the best way to fix standard rent is to evaluate the property as a whole and then to apportion the cost with regard to the various portions in occupation of the different individuals and on the basis of this apportionment to fix standard rent. It cannot, therefore, be said that the application was bad for misjoinder of parties.
5. With regard to the first point, the learned Additional District Judge relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported as Bombay Salt & Chemical Industries v. L.J Johnson . A.I.R 1958 S.C 289.. In this case what had happened was that evacuee property was put up to sale and bought by a firm Before the sale certificate was issued, the Managing officer ejected the occupiers and handed over vacant possession to the auction purchaser. The persons so ejected objected on the ground that the Managing Officers had no right to eject them because title had passed to the auction purchaser. The Supreme Court, however declined to interfere on the ground that although the auction purchaser had acquired a right by making the highest bid at the auction, the title had still remained in the Central Government and, therefore, the auction for ejectment taken by the Managing Officers was lawful. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that the dictum that the parsing of title dates back from the date of the confirmation of the sale was open to some doubt. This doubt could, however, only arise until the Sale Certificate is granted and there is doubt that once the Sale Certificate is granted, the title of the auction-purchaser dates back to the date of the confirmation of the sale. The confirmation of sale in this case took place not later than 29th March, 1956 upon which date intimation was sent to the auction-purchaser. The proceedings are still pending and no final decision having been arrived at, it cannot be said that the issue of the Sale Certificate can have no bearing whatsoever upon the rights of the parties. The sale Certificate has now been issued and so the title of the auction-purchaser, who is the petitioner before me, dates back to a period before he brought the present application.
6. On another ground, too, the petitioner has a right to maintain these proceedings. Under the Rent Control Act, a ‘londlord’ is defined as a person who is in receipt of the rent of the premises in dispute. It is conceded that the petitioner has been receiving the rent of these premises from the various occupiers and as such he is the landlord, and a landlord can maintain an application for the fixation of standard rent. That being so, the fact that the premises are no longer Government property and, therefore, governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act, gives the landlord a legal right to ask for the fixation of standard rent. The order of the learned Additional District Judge, therefore, must be set aside.
7. The result is that this petition will be allowed and the matter is remitted to the Appellate Authority for the hearing of the appeal against the order fixing standard rent. The legal objections having been disposed of, the only matter which will remain alive will be the fixation of standard rent and whether the amount determined by the trial court was just and proper in the circumstances.
8. Parties are directed to appear before the District Judge for fixing a date of hearing on the 17th of November, 1961. Costs in this petition will form costs in the proceedings.
Petition allowed.