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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • C.G Suri, J.
Acts
  • section sections 323, 324 and 325 read with section 4 of the Indian Penal Code
  • SECTION 4 PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT 1958
  • sub-section (1) of that section. Section 6
  • section 354, Indian Penal Code,
  • sub-section (2) of section 6
  • section 3 or section 4,
  • section 6(2)
  • section 4(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • C.G Suri, J.
Acts
  • section sections 323, 324 and 325 read with section 4 of the Indian Penal Code
  • SECTION 4 PROBATION OF OFFENDERS ACT 1958
  • sub-section (1) of that section. Section 6
  • section 354, Indian Penal Code,
  • sub-section (2) of section 6
  • section 3 or section 4,
  • section 6(2)
  • section 4(2)
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary: C.G. Suri, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Four persons were jointly tried for offences described in the opinion as "section sections 323, 324 and 325 read with section 4 of the Indian Penal Code" for having, in furtherance of their common intention, voluntarily caused simple and grievous injuries to three members of the complainant party. Two of the accused were admittedly under 21 years of age.

The trial Magistrate found all four guilty but, "having regard to the circumstances of the case," released them on probation of good conduct under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (the Act). The Magistrate did not appear to have called for or obtained a Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) of the Act.

The complainant was aggrieved and filed a revision petition. The Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala, recommended that the case be returned to the trial Magistrate and that the Magistrate be directed to pass a proper sentence, on the ground that the Magistrate ought to have called for and considered the Probation Officer's report under section 6(2), relying on the Supreme Court decision in Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State of Punjab (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 444).

In the High Court before C.G. Suri, J., the accused were not present and the State's representative (the Assistant Advocate General) had nothing to oppose the recommendation. The learned Judge, after considering the Act and the authorities, declined to accept the recommendation for interference and dismissed the revision petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a trial Court is obliged to call for and consider the Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 before granting the benefit of section 4 of the Act where some of the accused are under 21 years of age.
  2. Whether the Supreme Court's observation in Rattan Lal (supra) requires mandatory calling of the Probation Officer's report in all cases in which a youthful offender is involved when the Court either grants or denies probation.
  3. How the provisions of sections 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act should be interpreted — in particular, the meaning and scope of the words "shall" in section 4(2) and "if any" in section 4(2) — when applied to youthful offenders and adult offenders.

Arguments of the Parties

Complainant / Additional Sessions Judge's Position

  • The complainant challenged the Magistrate's lenient order releasing the accused on probation and filed a revision petition.
  • The Additional Sessions Judge recommended that the matter be sent back to the trial Magistrate with a direction to pass a proper sentence, on the basis that the Magistrate was "incumbent" to call for and take into consideration the Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) before giving the accused the benefit of section 4.
  • The Additional Sessions Judge relied on the Supreme Court's ruling in Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State of Punjab to support the view that the Probation Officer's report must be called for and considered in relation to youthful offenders.

State / Respondent

  • The Assistant Advocate General for the State of Punjab had nothing to say in opposition to the Additional Sessions Judge's recommendation (i.e., no substantive opposition was advanced in Court).

Accused

  • The accused did not appear in the High Court and no one appeared to oppose the recommendation to remit the matter back to the trial Magistrate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 444 Held that courts below are "incumbent" to send for and consider the Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) of the Probation of Offenders Act before denying a youthful offender the benefit of probation (context: one accused under 16, sentence of imprisonment passed without considering the Act). The High Court distinguished Rattan Lal on its facts. It observed that Rattan Lal involved a single accused below 16 who had been sentenced to imprisonment without consideration of the Act; here the Magistrate granted probation. The Court held that Rattan Lal does not mean that a report must be called in every case where probation is granted; rather, the obligation to call the report arises in the context of deciding to pass imprisonment on a youthful offender.
State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 647 Principle that a decision is authoritative for what it actually decides; the binding element is the ratio decidendi, not every observation in the judgment. The Court relied on this principle to emphasize that earlier judicial observations must be read for their ratio; stray observations are not automatically binding. This supported the Court's approach to distinguish and limit the scope of Rattan Lal.
B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of Pondicherry, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1480 Principle that a decision is binding in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down, not merely because of its conclusions or ancillary observations. The Court cited this to reinforce that precedents must be applied to the extent of their ratio, thereby justifying a narrower application of Rattan Lal to the specific factual matrix where it arose.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a textual and contextual interpretation of sections 4 and 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and analyzed the scope and interplay of those provisions with the authorities relied upon by the Additional Sessions Judge.

Key steps in the Court's reasoning:

  • The Court reproduced the pertinent portions of section 4 (power to release certain offenders on probation and the requirement in sub‑section (2) that the Court "take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer") and section 6 (restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty‑one and the obligation in section 6(2) to call for a probation officer's report where the offender is under twenty‑one).
  • The Court observed that section 6(2) expressly applies to offenders under twenty‑one years of age; therefore a Probation Officer's report can be called under section 6(2) only in respect of such youthful offenders. Section 6 deals specifically with offenders below 21 and requires the Court to call for a report where the Court is considering whether it should not be desirable to deal with the youthful offender under section 3 or section 4.
  • On the correct reading, the bar is to the imposition of imprisonment on a youthful offender under 21 unless the Court is satisfied, after considering the Probation Officer's report and other circumstances, that dealing under section 3 or section 4 would not be appropriate. Thus, the obligation to call for the report is tied to the situation where the Court proposes to pass imprisonment on a youthful offender and must therefore satisfy itself that probation is not appropriate.
  • The Court distinguished the facts of Rattan Lal: that case involved a single accused below 16 who had been sentenced to imprisonment before the Act was noticed, and the appellate and revisional courts had denied probation without obtaining the report. The Supreme Court in Rattan Lal observed that the subordinate courts should have called for and considered the Probation Officer's report in such circumstances.
  • The High Court concluded that Rattan Lal does not mandate that a Probation Officer's report must be called in every case involving youthful offenders; rather, it is mandatory where a court is passing imprisonment on a youthful offender and has to be satisfied that probation would not be suitable. If the Court is satisfied on the basis of material already on record that probation is appropriate, it may grant probation without calling for the Probation Officer's report.
  • The Court analyzed the language of section 4(2) — particularly the words "shall" and "if any" — and reasoned that the mandatory sense of "shall" in section 4(2) must be read in light of the limited reach of section 6(2) (which makes report-calling obligatory only in the youthful-offender context). For adult offenders (above 21) a report cannot legally be called under section 6(2) and hence section 4(2)'s "shall" cannot have the same mandatory implication as in the youthful-offender context.
  • The Court emphasized statutory interpretation and the liberal, reformative purpose of the Act: confining the Act's beneficial provisions by placing undue procedural fetters would be inconsistent with its rehabilitative aim. The Court found no material irregularity or illegality in the Magistrate's conduct to justify interference in revision.

Holding and Implications

Final Ruling: The High Court declined the recommendation of the Additional Sessions Judge and dismissed the complainant's revision petition. The trial Magistrate's order releasing the accused on probation under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act was not interfered with.

Implications and immediate effects:

  • The direct effect is that the Magistrate's order granting probation to the accused remains in force; the revision petition is dismissed and no further direction was issued to remand the matter for re‑sentencing.
  • The Court clarified the limited scope of the Rattan Lal authority: courts must call for and consider a Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) when they are in the position of deciding to impose imprisonment on a youthful offender and therefore must be satisfied that probation would not be appropriate. The obligation is not absolute in every case involving youthful offenders where probation is being granted based on material on record.
  • The opinion states that no material irregularity or illegality justifying interference in revision was shown; the Court did not purport to lay down a new broad precedent restricting the discretionary grant of probation beyond the interpretative points made regarding sections 4 and 6 and the proper reading of Rattan Lal's ratio.

Note: The summary above is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion. No facts or holdings have been added beyond those expressly stated in the opinion.

Show full summary ...

    Harbhajan Singh v. Tarlok Singh And Others

    C.G Suri, J.:— Four persons were jointly tried for offences made punishable under section sections 323, 324 and 325 read with section 4 of the Indian Penal Code for having, in furtherance of their common intention, voluntarily caused simple and grievous injuries to three members of the complainant party. Two of the accused persons were admittedly below 21 years of age. The trial Magistrate found them all guilty but having regard to the circumstances of the case, decided to release them on probation of good conduct under section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter briefly referred to as the Act). He had apparently not found it necessary to send for the Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) of the Act.

    2. The complainant felt aggrieved against the lenient view taken by the trial Magistrate and lied a revision petition. The Additional Session Judge, Patiala, has recommended that the case should be sent back to the trial Magistrate and that he (the Magistrate) should be directed to pass a proper sentence on the accused.

    3. In his view, it was Incumbent on the trial Magistrate to call for and take into consideration the Probation officer's report under sub-section (2) of section 6 before giving the accused the benefit of section 4 of the Act. Reliance has in this correction been placed by the learned Additional Session Judge on the Supreme Court ruling in Rattan Lal Alias Ram Rattan v. State Of Punjab . A.I.R 1965 S.C 444..

    4. The accused have not but in appearance in this Court. No one has, therefore, come forward to oppose this recommendation. Shri Prasher the learned Assistant Advocate General who appears for the State of Punjab, has also nothing to say against it. On a careful perusal of the provisions of the Act and the observations of the Hon'ble Judges in Rattan Lal's case (supra), I however feel that there was no real necessity for recommending interference in revision in this case.

    5. As observed by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra . AIR 1968 SC 647., a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides and what is of the essence of the decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein. Similarly, it was observed by the Hon'ble Judges in B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory Of Pondicherry . AIR 1967 SC 1480., that a decision is binding not because of its conclusions but in regard to its ratio and the principles laid down.

    6. The facts in Rattan Lal's case (supra) were quite different. There was only one accused and he was below 16 years of age. He had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for six months by a Magistrate under section 354, Indian Penal Code, before the coming into force of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The provisions of the Act were not noticed even by the Additional Sessions Judge while dismissing the offender's appeal after a few days of the Act having been extended to the territories in which the offence had been committed. The High Court had also declined to give the accused the benefit of the provisions of the Act. It was on these facts that the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court were pleased to observe that it was incumbent on the Courts below to send for and consider the Probation Officer's report under section 6(2) of the Act before denying the accused the benefit of probation. This ruling would not imply that where the Courts feel on the basis of material already brought on record that the accused can be given the benefit of Section 4 of the Act without calling for that report they cannot do so. A Probation Officer's report can be called under section 6(2) only in cases where the accused is below 21 years of age. Where the accused is above that age, section 6(2) will not apply. The language of section 4 of the Act, however, makes it clear that the benefit of this section can also be given under certain circumstances, to accused persons who are above the age of 21 years. If adults can be given the benefit of probation without calling for the Probation Officer's report. I do not see why the same leniency cannot be shown to persons when their tender age would be an additional circumstance going in their favour. It would be helpful at this stage to reproduce below the pertinent portions of sections 4 and 6 of the Act:—

    “4. Power of Court to release certain offenders on Probation of good conduct:—

    (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable With death or imprisonment for life and the Court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the Court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment, direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the Court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour:

    Provided that the Court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the Court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.

    (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the Court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case.

    (3), (4) and (5) … … …”.

    (6) Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-one years of age:—

    (1) When any person under twenty-one years of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the Court by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character of the offender, it should not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the Court passes any sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons for doing so.

    (2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender referred to in sub-section (1), the Court shall call for a report from the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other information available to it relating to the character and physical and mental condition of the offender.”

    7. On a careful reading of the provisions of the Sections, it appears obvious that the bar is to the passing of a sentence of imprisonment on a youthful offender under the age of 21 years unless the Court has satisfied itself after considering the Probation Officer's report and other circumstances that an order under section 3 or section 4 of the Act would not be the appropriate step to be taken in the case. There is nu such bar or prohibition to the granting of probation to an offender, whether he be young or old, where the Court is satisfied, independently of the Probation Officer's report, but otherwise on a consideration of the circumstances already appearing on record, that the grant of such probation would be the just order. It is only in cases where the Court has decided to pass a sentence of imprisonment on a youthful offender that it has to look into the circumstances for the purposes of satisfying itself about the desirability of granting probation. It is for this satisfaction that the Court is called upon to send for the Probation Officer's report and that also in the case of youthful offenders only. The benefit of section 4 can also be granted to persons who are above 21 years of age in cases where the offence committed is not punishable with imprisonment for life or with death. Where the offence is punishable with shorter terms of imprisonment, the offender can be granted the benefit of section 4 even if he is above the age of 21 years. In his case, no report can possibly be called under section 6(2). The words “if any” in section 4(2) would call for a different interpretation than had been put on these words by the Hon'ble Judges in Rattan Lal's case (supra) and that is so because the only accused. In that case was an offender below 21 years of age and the Courts had passed a sentence of imprisonment without satisfying themselves, in the manner laid down, that it would not be desirable to deal with him under section 3 or section 4. In the changed context, the words “if any” in section 4(2) may seem to assume an altogether different significance than the one construed in Rattan Lal's case (supra). The word “shall” in section 4(2) would naturally cease to have any mandatory connotation in the case of offenders above 21 years of age because no report can legally be called in respect of such offenders under sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Act. The language of this sub-section makes it char that the Probation Officer's report can be called only in respect of offenders referred to in sub-section (1) of that section. Section 6 deals only with offenders below 21 years of age and no report can be called under sub-section (2) thereof in respect of adult offenders above 21 years of age. The word “shall” in section 4(2) cannot have the same meaning in respect of adult offenders as it may have in case of offenders below 21 years of age and to whom the Court may have decided to deny the benefit of probation. Where the Court decides to grant probation, the calling of a report under section 6(2) is not obligatory. It is only if the Court decides to award imprisonment to a youthful offender, as in Rattan Lal's case (supra), that the calling of a report under section 6(2) and its consideration for the satisfaction of the Court have been made obligatory. As observed by the Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal's case (supra), the Act is a milestone in the progress of the modern liberal trend of reform in the filed of penology. To render a beneficial provision of this universal type in a restricted sense so as to confine the powers of the Courts would not be in accord with sound principles of statutory interpretation. No material irregularity or illegality which could be described to have caused any miscarriage of justice, has been committed by the Magistrate and the case does not call for any interference in revision.

    8. I accordingly decline the recommendations made by the Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala and dismiss the revision petition filed by the complainant against the trial Magistrate's order.

    9. Petition dismissed.

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    Comments

    Harbhajan Singh v. Tarlok Singh And Others
    (Sep 19, 1973)