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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from an application under section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code for execution of a decree passed by the Courts of the State of Cochin. The respondent (Krishna Pattar) was sued by the appellant (Rama Ayyar) to recover a sum of Rs. 2,300 alleged to be due. The respondent had repaid this amount to Kailasa Ayyar, son of Rama Ayyar, and was asked by Kailasa Ayyar to contest the suit to protect his interests. The respondent appeared and pleaded in the Cochin Courts under protest, contesting the suit on its merits, but objected to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court. The lower Courts decided against the respondent on the question of jurisdiction. The present appeal concerns whether the respondent's appearance in the foreign Court was voluntary, thereby conferring jurisdiction on that Court, or whether it was under duress, negating such jurisdiction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an objection to the jurisdiction of a foreign Court is upheld if the judgment-debtor had objected to jurisdiction when sued there.
  2. Whether a judgment-debtor who appears to contest the suit on the merits and takes the chance of a judgment in his favour is precluded from later objecting to jurisdiction, regardless of whether his appearance was voluntary.
  3. Whether the defendant is concluded only if his submission to the foreign Court's jurisdiction was voluntary.
  4. If submission must be voluntary, whether the defendant's appearance in the circumstances of this case amounts to voluntary submission.
  5. Whether the decision in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai was correctly decided.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The defendant's act of putting in a written statement objecting to jurisdiction and also pleading on the merits amounts to submission to the foreign Court's jurisdiction.
  • The recent English decision in Harris v. Taylor supports the position that a defendant submitting to jurisdiction, except under duress, is bound by the Court's decision.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent appeared under protest and only to protect his property and interests, thus his submission was not voluntary.
  • The principle in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai supports that a defendant's protest against jurisdiction prevents submission despite appearance and pleading on merits.
  • English authorities such as Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. and others are distinguishable or do not override the established Indian precedent.
  • The respondent's appearance was induced by the creditor's son refusing to refund the money unless the suit was contested, and by fear of arrest if a decree was passed against him.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Seit Clarified that a party pleading in a foreign Court does not necessarily submit to jurisdiction if done to protect property from attachment. Set the framework for considering whether appearance and pleading amounted to submission.
Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai Held that a defendant protesting jurisdiction but appearing and pleading on merits does not submit to jurisdiction if appearance is to avoid inconvenience such as property attachment. The Court considered whether to follow or overrule this precedent in light of more recent English decisions.
Pemberton v. Hughes Jurisdiction must be determined by international law principles, focusing on territorial competence over subject-matter and defendant. Supported the principle that competence of foreign Court is judged by international territorial competence, not local law.
Schibsby v. Westenholz Distinguished between enforcement of foreign judgments by comity and by international legal obligation; recognized that voluntary appearance creates a duty to obey judgment. Guided the Court's analysis on the effect of voluntary appearance and submission to jurisdiction.
Rousillon v. Rousillon Enumerated categories where foreign Courts have international competence, including voluntary appearance. Used to confirm that voluntary appearance is a recognized basis for jurisdiction.
Voinet v. Barrett Suggested that appearance under duress, such as to protect seized property, may be ineffectual to confer jurisdiction. Considered but ultimately distinguished; no property was seized in present case.
Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. Appearance and defense on merits bind the defendant to the foreign Court’s jurisdiction. Supported overruling Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai and adopting the English approach.
Harris v. Taylor Held that even a conditional appearance seeking protection of the Court constitutes submission to jurisdiction. Reinforced the principle that appearance, except under duress, binds the defendant.
Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkot Recognized that submission to foreign Court jurisdiction excludes judgments being nullities under international law. Affirmed that any submission, including voluntary appearance, confers jurisdiction.
Decosse Brissac v. Rathbone Appearance and taking chance of judgment in one’s favor binds the defendant. Supported the principle that voluntary submission creates obligation to obey foreign Court judgment.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by acknowledging the Full Bench decision in Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Seit which settled that the Court can inquire into the binding nature of a foreign decree sought to be executed. The core question was whether the respondent voluntarily submitted to the foreign Court’s jurisdiction by appearing and pleading there.

The Court considered the respondent’s reasons for appearance: to protect his property and avoid arrest, and that the creditor’s son conditioned refund on contesting the suit. The Court examined principles from English and Indian authorities, particularly contrasting the Indian precedent in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai with more recent English decisions such as Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. and Harris v. Taylor.

It was noted that English law increasingly favors recognizing foreign judgments where the defendant has appeared and taken the chance of a favorable decision, binding him even if he protested jurisdiction. The Court also discussed the unsatisfactory distinctions made by Professor Westlake regarding voluntary submission in cases involving property seizure or business transactions, concluding that the trend is towards treating such appearances as voluntary submissions.

The Court found no evidence that the respondent’s appearance was under duress sufficient to negate jurisdiction, particularly as no property was seized by the foreign Court. The Court thus leaned towards overruling the Indian precedent in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai in favor of the English approach.

However, since one Judge favored adhering to Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai unless overruled by a Full Bench, the Court referred the key questions to a Full Bench for authoritative resolution.

Holding and Implications

The Court’s final decision was to overrule the precedent set by Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, aligning the law with recent English authorities that hold a defendant’s appearance and defense on merits in a foreign Court generally constitutes voluntary submission to jurisdiction.

The matter was referred to a Full Bench to settle the precise legal questions concerning submission to foreign jurisdiction, objections to jurisdiction, and the validity of the Parry decision.

The direct effect is that the respondent’s objection to jurisdiction based on involuntary appearance is doubtful under the emerging legal position. No new precedent was set by this Court alone; the Full Bench will provide the binding authoritative ruling.

    Rama Ayyar, (Died) And Another (Petitioner And His Legal Representative) v. Krishna Patter (Counter-Petitioner) .

    Oldfield, J.:— Since the hearing in the lower Appellate Court some of the questions between the parties have been set at rest by the Full Bench decision in Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Seit(1).

    In consequence of it there is now no suggestion that the Court cannot enquire into the binding nature of a foreign decree, of which execution is sought.

    The question is next whether the decree is binding and therefore executable in consequence of the respondent's submission to the foreign Court's jurisdiction. The decision referred to decided at least that a party, who pleads in a foreign Court (although after protest), does not submit to its jurisdiction, if he does so in order to protect his property in that jurisdiction from attachment and perhaps sale. The respondent contends that it further left open the question whether the presence of an intention to avoid any other or lesser inconvenience, such for instance as the possible attachment of property, which the party might bring within the jurisdiction in future would deprive his appearance or pleading of its character as a submission—vide Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai(2). Before dealing with this, we think it advisable to have the facts clearly before us. We therefore call on the lower Appellate Court to find on the issue,

    “What were the facts or reasons which led the respondent to appear and plead in the foreign Court?”

    Fresh evidence may be taken. The finding is due in six: weeks. Seven days will be allowed for filing objections.

    In compliance with the above order of this Court, the District-Judge of South Malabar submitted the following.

    Finding:— A finding is called for on the issue:—“What were the facts or reasons which led the respondent to appear and plead in the foreign Court?” Krishna Pattar, the respondent, states in evidence that the money which Rama Ayyar, the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 134 of 1084 in the District Court of Anjikaimal in the Cochin State, sued to recover was borrowed by him from Kailasa Ayyar, son of Rama Ayyar. He says that he had borrowed the money from Kailasa Ayyar for his trade in gold and repaid it at the request of the latter in Madras obtaining a receipt (Exhibit I) in acknowledgment of the amount paid and the letter (Exhibit II). When Ratna Ayyar brought the suit against him he was asked by Kailasa Ayyar to contest the suit and contend that the money had been paid back at his request. He states that Kailasa Ayyar said to him that unless he so contested the suit he would not refund the money to him in the event of his father obtaining a decree against the respondent. The respondent further explains that if a decree were obtained against him he might have been arrested when he went to Cochin State as he used to do to carry on his trade and to see his relations. The conversation about the suit between Rama Ayyar and the respondent is also mentioned by his second witness, Samu Pattar, a trader of Palghat, who also says that respondent paid back the money borrowed from Rama Ayyar in Madras as requested by Kailasa Ayyar. His brother-in-law the third witness Anantarama Patter speaks of the trade of the respondent in Cochin (vide Exhibits III to VIII) and states that the respondent contested the suit because he did not want to be arrested when he went there on business. The appellant who is the legal representative of the plaintiff in the suit did not examine any witness. He relied mainly on the proceedings in the Anjikaimal Court in that suit (Exhibits H, J, B, C, D, E, F and G) to show that the plea of the respondent is not true and that he merely contested the suit because he expected to win it. But it is clear that the plea of want of jurisdiction was expressly raised by the defendant and the fact that he contested the suit on its merits does not show that it was not with the object of avoiding inconvenience of having a decree against him in the Cochin State. I see no reason on the whole to reject the evidence of the respondent and his witnesses as to the reasons which led him to contest the suit and I find on the issue that the respondent appeared and pleaded in the District Court of Anjikaimal under the circumstances now stated by him.

    This appeal came on for final hearing after the return of the finding of the lower Appellate Court upon the issue referred by this Court for trial, before Tyabji and Phillips, JJ., who passed the following Orders of Reference to the Full Bench:—

    Tyabji, J.:— This appeal arises out of an application under section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code for execution of a decree passed in the Courts of the State of Cochin. It is admitted that there is such a notification with reference to the Courts in Cochin as is mentioned in that section.

    It has been recently held and was not questioned before us, that such an application may be resisted on the grounds mentioned in section 13 of the Civil Procedure Code: Veeraraghava Ayyar v. Muga Seit.

    The present application is resisted on the ground that the foreign Court was no of competent jurisdiction: section 13(a) of the Civil Procedure Code.

    It is admitted that the Courts in Cochin had jurisdiction in accordance with laws of Cochin. But whether a foreign Court is or is not a Court of competent jurisdiction within the meaning of section 13(a) has to be determined in accordance with the principles, of international law and not in accordance with the law of the country in which the foreign Court is situated. See Pemberton v. Hughes, where it is said: “The jurisdiction which alone is important in these matters is the competence of the Court in an international sense, i.e, its territorial competence over the subject-matter and over the defendant. Its competence or jurisdiction in any other sense is not regarded as material by the Court of this country.” See also Christian v. Delanney(3) and Saik Atham Sahib v. Davud Sahib(4). In Pemberton v. Hughes the question was (as it always is in England) whether a suit would lie in England on a foreign judgment. Section 44 however permits execution to be obtained on the foreign judgment itself.

    Whether section 44 does not proceed on the principle of “comity” as that expression is understood in Schibsby v. Westenholz(5) has not been argued before us, and I will assume that the principle of “comity” has no bearing on judgments falling within section 44. The difference between the two aspects is thus explained in Schibsby v. Westenholz, “and we think that if the principle on which foreign judgments were enforced was that which is loosely, called ‘comity’, we could hardly decline to enforce a foreign judgment given in Prance against a resident in Great Britain under circumstances hardly, if at all, distinguishable from those under which we, mutatis mutandis might give judgment against a resident in France: but it is quite different if the principle be that which we have just laid down” the latter principle being thus explained “we think that for the reasons there given, the true principle on which the judgments of foreign tribunals are enforced in England is that stated by Parke, B. in Russell v. Smyth, and again repeated by him in Williams v. Jones, that the judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on the defendant to pay the sum for which judgment is given which the Courts in this country are bound to enforce; and consequently that anything which negatives that duty or forms a legal excuse for not performing it, is a defence to the action.”

    The cases in which foreign Courts are in England recognized to be internationally of competent jurisdiction in regard to suits of a personal nature have been stated by Fry, J., in Rousillon v. Rousillon, to include the following five:—

    (1) “where he is the subject of the foreign country in which the judgment has been obtained;

    (2) where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;

    (3) where the defendant, in the character of plaintiff, has selected the forum in which he is afterwards sued;

    (4) where be has voluntarily appeared;

    (5) where he has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the judgment was obtained.”

    In the present case only the fourth head need be considered. It is impliedly recognized as a source of international competence in Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkot as a decree of a foreign Court to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has in any way submitted himself is in their Lordships' judgment excepted from those decrees which are described as being by international law a nullity.

    What we have to decide therefore is whether or not the respondent had voluntarily appeared in the Cochin Court, or to use Lord Selborne's words in Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkoti: “whether or not he had in any way submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Cochin Courts.”

    Both the lower Courts have answered this question in the negative, and the question before us narrows itself down into whether there is any evidence on which they could have held that the defendant's appearance was caused by duress so as to prevent his appearance having the effect of clothing the Courts of Cochin with jurisdiction under the fourth bead.

    The facts are as follows:—

    A sum of Rs. 2,300 was due from the respondent (Krishna-Patter) to the appellant (Rama Ayyar). The respondent paid this sum to Kailasa Ayyar, the son of Rama Ayyar. Rama Ayyar repudiated the payment to his son as a proper payment to himself, and brought the suit in the Cochin Courts. The respondent appeared to the Cochin Courts under protest, but pleaded on the merits. His defence on the merits was upheld in the Court of first instance in Cochin, but that decision was reversed by the Appellate Court. Both Courts decided against the respondent on the question of jurisdiction. The respondent says that his appearance was not voluntary having been actuated by the following circumstances:—

    (1) “He states” (in the words of the District Judge) “that Kailasa Ayyar said to him that unless he so contested the suit he would not refund the money to him in the event of his father obtaining a decree against the respondent.” In other words, a third party, Kailasa, Ayyar, required the respondent to contest the suit and said to him that unless the suit was contested he (Kailasa Ayyar) would not refund the money which had been paid to him by the respondent on behalf of his father.

    (2) “The respondent further explains that if a decree were obtained against him he might have been arrested when, he went to Cochin State as he used to do to carry on his trade and to see his relations.”

    Do these two circumstances furnish any evidence that the appearance of the respondent in the Cochin Courts was under duress?

    Great reliance was placed by the respondent upon Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, the principle of which decision appears in the following sentences: “The grounds on which those decisions proceeded were that the defendant, by appearing in the foreign Court and taking no objection to its jurisdiction, had for the time put himself under the jurisdiction of the Court and had led the plaintiff to believe that the proceedings were allowed by him to be effectual, and encouraged the plaintiff to proceed on them instead of withdrawing from them and instituting proceedings elsewhere.” Mr. Justice Mottuswami Ayyar whose decision was upheld had said in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai: “The true test seems to be something in the conduct of the defendant which amounts to a voluntary submission to jurisdiction an which might amount to a breach of faith if the defendants were allowed to question the jurisdiction of the foreign Court.”

    The true principle however seems to be, not that good faith estops the defendant from questioning the jurisdiction of a Court which in fact has no jurisdiction; but that the fact of the defendant; appearing and pleading on the merits, and thus taking a chance of a decision being given in his favour (and inviting the Court to pronounce on the merits) makes that Court internationally competent to adjudicate on the merits, in the same manner as is done by residence (even temporary) of the defendant in the foreign country, or by a contract made prior to the suit by the defendant with the plaintiff to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Court. Applying the test approved of in Schibsby v. Westenholz, it may be said that when a person appears before a foreign Court and takes the chance of a judgment in his favour, there is a duty cast upon him to obey that judgment even if it goes against him.

    On the other hand, of course, where the defendant's appearance is not voluntary, but brought about under duress, the Courts cannot give to such an act any legal consequence: and “the case will be treated as though be had not appeared”: Voinet v. Barrett, (per Lord Esher). It has been assumed that one example of such duress is where property having been “seized by the foreign tribunal in order to compel appearance” (Ibid per Cotton, L.J), the defendant appears under protest in order to protect such property. On the other hand it has been said by Lord Esher, M.R, in the same, case that the mere fear that things which may be afterwards carried into the foreign country will be seized is not such pressure as will prevent appearance from being voluntary under head 4 above: and Lord Justice Bowen said: A man cannot be said to be compelled to appear, because if be does not do so, he may be inconvenienced in the long run” (page 42). This case would therefore appear to be directly against the contention of the respondent and it is only to be considerad whether we are bound to follow the decision in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pilla, in preference to Voinet v. Barrett.

    Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai has, no doubt, stood in the Indian Law Reports for a long time, and there is much substance in the contention that we ought not to depart from it lightly as many parties may have proceeded on the basis of its correctness. But international law develops rapidly. The attitude of the Courts towards foreign judgments has certainly greatly changed since Lord Ellenbobough said, “I will look to these foreign judgments with great jealousy Molony v. Gibbons. Now the legislature of British India requires some of them to be executed as if they had been passed by the Courts of British India. Moreover the decision in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai has recently been greatly canvassed and its soundness doubted in Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Sait. It was not followed in Parameswaran Nambudri v. Subramania Paitar where the English decision in Boissiere & Co. v. Brookner & Co.(6), was followed without reference to Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai. The decision in Narayana Moothad v. The Cochin Sircar(7), however, proceeded mainly on the ground that the defendant had filed an appeal from a decision against the foreign Court and in the appeal he had taken no objection to jurisdiction. On the other hand Sadasiva Ayyar, J., one of the learned Judges who decided Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Sett, and Narayana Moothad v. The Cochin Sircar, was prepared to follow Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai.

    We have therefore the fact that there is a decision of this Court; of long standing which has not been expressly overruled by a Full Bench and which Sadasiva Ayyar, J., is prepared to follow in favour of the respondent. It is argued by the respondent that this consideration is strengthened by the fact that the only alternative to following Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai is that we should follow the English decisions; and that the latter alternative ought not to be adopted for this additional reason that the present state of authorities in England leaves the law in an unsatisfactory condition. (See Westlake's Private International Law, fifth edition, 406.)

    The facts with reference to voluntary or involuntary submission to jurisdiction under protest must (according to Professor Westlake's view of the present English authorities) be arranged under one of three heads:—

    (1) When the property of the defendant is at the date of appearance actually in the hands of the foreign Court;

    (2) When the defendant possesses property which at the same date is within the grasp of the foreign Court, but not actually seized by it;

    (3) When the defendant has business transactions in the foreign country and is frequently in such position that a judgment in a Court of that country could be executed against him there.

    When the facts fall under the first head the submission to jurisdiction has been considered (without ever having been so decided) to be involuntary; under the other two heads it has been held to be voluntary.

    Professor Westlake points out that there cannot be any real distinction between the amount of pressure in cases (1) and (2). This was the view of Wills, J., in Voinet v. Barrett reversed on appeal—Voinet v. Barrett. Nor is there any solid distinction between cases (2) and (3). It would follow therefore that logically all three cases must result in the same manner, i.e, either in each of these cases it ought to be considered that the submission has been voluntary, or the reverse.

    We have therefore three alternative courses open to us—

    I. To hold [as held in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai] that in all three cases the submission is involuntary; in which case “the principle that jurisdiction is given by voluntary appearance would be practically abandoned.” This principle has, however, as Professor Westlake points out, not been abandoned in Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. nor in Carrick v. Hancoak, still less, it may be added, in Guiara v. De Clermont and Donner.

    II. To follow the English authorities as they stand, notwithstanding that they are anomalous.

    III. To hold that in all three cases the submission is voluntary, which would be opposed to the dicta that when a person appears to protect his property, his submission may be considered to be brought about by duress and have no effect in conferring jurisdiction.

    The trend of the most recent decisions in England is, however, in favour of this last course, namely, to recognize a foreign judgment whenever the defendant has appeared: Cf. Guiara v. De Clermont and Donner and the remarks on it in Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Seit. In favour of the same view must be mentioned the principle that if the defendant takes the chance of a decision in his favour then he is bound: whenever he appears and defends the action on the merits, he takes such a chance. The fact that the defendant is even temporarily resident in the foreign country itself gives jurisdiction to the Court, the question of the time during which he has actually been in the country is wholly immaterial— Garrick v. Hancock. Jurisdiction may be given by agreement between the parties and where the suit is on a contract it has sometimes been held by the Courts that by implication there was a contract that the foreign Court should have jurisdiction. It is important to note also that possession by the defendant of property in the foreign country is by itself considered by some countries, including Scotland, to be sufficient to give jurisdiction to the foreign country. See Dicay's Conflict of Laws, second edition, pages 56 and 57. Story's Conflict of Laws, eighth edition, section 549, where it is recognized that the property in the foreign country may be seized and attached and the decree is held not to be binding personally only if the defendant “has never appeared and contested the suit.” See also Douglas v. Forrest which was however doubted in Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co., and in Gurdyal Singh v. Raja of Faridkot the possession of property was held to be no ground for jurisdiction. But it may be added that when the property is of sufficient value to induce the defendant to appear and defend the suit, the test of effectiveness, on which Professor Dicey bases the whole theory of the international competence of Courts, is satisfied.

    On the other side and in support of the view that when property has been seized by the foreign Court appearance should be considered involuntary and be deemed insufficient to clothe that Court with jurisdiction we have in the first place the remarks in Voinet v. Barrett, though the actual decision was that the appearance was under such circumstances as to give jurisdiction to the Court. Professor Dicey says on this point. “The distinction suggested rests on good authority” (the authority is not cited) “but is not entirely satisfactory”. (Conflict of Laws, page 371, footnote 2.) Professor Westlake on the other hand is in favour of the view that appearance in such circumstances does not bind the defendant, saying that otherwise “the defendant would be bound to abandon his property abroad as the price of saving his English property from the grasp of a Court having ex hypothesi no international jurisdiction in the case” (page 406). He is also of opinion that the obvious leaning of Lord Blackburn and his colleagues in Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. was in the same direction. The passage cited immediately before this remark is: “We think it better to leave this question open and to express no opinion as to the effect of the appearence of a defendant where it is so far not voluntary that be only comes in to try to save some property in the hands of the foreign tribunal. But we must observe that the decision in Decosse Brissac v. Rathbone is an authority that where the defendant voluntarily appears and takes the chance of a judgment in his favour he is bound” (Westlake, page 406).

    There seems, however, to be no decision of the English Courts that when property has been seized by the foreign Court, the defendant's subsequent appearence must be considered to be ineffectual in the sense that the Court is not then competent to pronounce an internationally effective judgment. The obiter dicta in Voinet v. Barrett and Professor Westlake's opinion that such ought to be the law are of course of the greatest weight. But it seems to me as I have already said that the trend of the most recent authorities, the view taken by the Courts of Scotland and other countries and the test of effectiveness mentioned by Professor Dicey all indicate that the law will develop in another direction. As to Professor Westlake's remarks cited above, the defendant virtually abandons his foreign property as soon as he fails to defend the suit successfully; for such property being within the jurisdiction of the foreign Court can be seized in execution of the foreign judgment. See Story's Conflict of Laws, section 549. In the present case the defendant appeared and took the chance of a judgment in his favour. The authorities are quite clear that in such a case the foreign Court has jurisdiction: Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. and Harchand Panaji v. Gulabchand Kanji. No expression of opinion is necessary on the question whether if his property had been seized the Court would or would not have been deprived of its international competence, as no property had been seized. All I need say is that in my opinion in the present case there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that the defendant appeared in the Cochin Courts through such duress as to render his appearance devoid of the effect which it would ordinarily have under the fourth head mentioned by Fry, J.

    My reference to some of the more general aspects of the question was neceesary only in order to determine whether we ought to follow Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai and hold, contrary to the English authorities, that though the defendant appears and pleads on the merits, his denial that the Court has jurisdiction is sufficient to prevent the Court from becoming internationally competent.

    The distinction between voluntary and involuntary appearance in the three cases mentioned by Professor Westlake may be admitted to be unsatisfactory. But if in all the three cases the same decision comes to be given in England, it seems to me that decision will be that in each case the Court becomes competent by the defendant's appearence. Hence in any case, Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai should not to my opinion be followed, when (as in the present case) it is opposed to English decisions, as far as they have already proceeded. If I had thought that the trend of the English decisions was in favour of the view in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, it would have been proper to follow it, but as I have already said it seems to me to be emphatically in the reverse direction.

    I should myself be inclined therefore to allow the appeal but; as my learned brother thinks that we ought not to disregard Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, unless it is overruled by a Full Bench, I agree to refer the following questions to a full bench of this Court:—

    (1) Where there is an application under section 44 of the Civil Procedure Code for execution of a foreign judgment and the judgment-debtor objects on the ground that the judgment was given by a foreign Court that had no personal jurisdiction over him inasmuch as he was not resident within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court,

    (a) Is such objection to be upheld where it appears that the judgment-debtor had objected to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court when sued there, or

    (b) Will the fact that the judgment-debtor has appeared to contest the suit on the merits and taken the chance of a judgment in his own favour conclude him from taking any objection to the jurisdiction of the Court, irrespective of the question whether his appearance has been voluntary? or

    (c) Will the defendant be concluded only if his submission to the jurisdiction was voluntary?

    (d) If the third alternative is answered in the affirmative is the submission voluntary where the defendant appears in the circumstances of the present case?

    (2) Was Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai rightly decided?

    Phillips, J.:— The facts of the case are set out in my learned brother's judgment. The only question for consideration is whether the respondent voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Cochin Court, which passed the decree which it is now sought to execute. The respondent appeared and defended the suit against him in the Cochin Court, but he protested against the jurisdiction of the Court. He renewed his protest in the Appellate Court, and has now taken the same objection in execution of the decree. His reasons for appearing and defending the suit were, as found by the learned District Judge: (1) that his creditor's son to whom he had repaid the suit debt refused to refund him the money unless he defended the suit brought by the father and (2) that if a decree were passed against him he might be arrested when he went to Cochin on business or to see his relations. In Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, the reason for the defendants' submission to a foreign tribunal as given in the judgment (page 412) is “to escape the inconveniences which would attend a judgment against them, if at any time they or their property might be found in French territory.” That case is therefore on all fours with the present case and if that ruling is to be followed this appeal would have to be dismissed. The authority of the ruling has, however, been recently doubted by the learned Chief Justice and Seshagiri Ayyar, J., in Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Sait in consequence of the decision in Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co.. There are also other English decisions which are opposed to the ruling in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co., Voinet v. Barrett, Rousillon v. Rousillon and Decosse Brissac v. Rathbone. In a very recent case Harris v. Taylor, where a defendant put in an appearance conditionally and applied to the Court to set aside the order for service out of the jurisdiction but did not even defend the action, it was held that the defendant had voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction because be had sought the protection of the Court. The principle that is apparently applied in these English cases is that when a defendant submits to jurisdiction, except under duress, he is bound by the decision of the Court, because he has elected to take the chance of a decision in his favour and cannot be allowed to demur to a decision against him. A mere protest against jurisdiction does not make his submission involuntary. The ruling in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, is the concurrent decision of three Judges and proceeds on the grounds that a defendant having, protested against jurisdiction puts the plaintiff on his guard and does not lead him to believe that the proceedings will be allowed to be everywhere effectual. This point of view is quite different from that adopted by the English Courts, and in a question like this, which is one of international law, Indian Courts must be guided by the decisions of English Courts. The law however as laid down in Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai has been the law in this Presidency, where the circumstances are not the same as in England, for over thirty-five years and has not been altered notwithstanding the decision in Voinet v. Barrett. On the principle of stare decisis I am not prepared to dissent, unless and until that decision is overruled by a considered decision of a Full Bench. I therefore agree to refer to a Full Bench the questions proposed.

    T.R Krishnasivami Ayyar for the appellant.—The defendant put in a written statement objecting to jurisdiction and also pleaded on the merits. This amounts to submission. The recent decision in Harris v. Taylor is in my favour.

    [Wallis, C.J:— We will hear the other side.]

    The Honourable Mr. L.A Govindaraghava Ayyar and T.K Govinda Ayyar for the respondents.

    The case against me is Boissiere & Co. v. Brookner & Co..

    [Wallis, C.J:— But it is approved in Harris v. Taylor.]

    Harris v. Taylor can be distinguished. There is a distinction between a case in which a person says that he is not going to submit to the Court's jurisdiction whether the Court has jurisdiction over him or not and whatever be the law applicable and a case in which a person says that by the Municipal law the Court has no jurisdiction and yet he will submit to it. (See page 585.) The decision in Harris v. Taylor must be taken with reference to the facts. No other English case goes 80 far as Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co..

    A person has two courses open: (1) to plead altogether against the jurisdiction; (2) to submit and say that the Municipal law has no jurisdiction. Guiard v. De Clermont and Donner can be distinguished. In The Vivar there was appearance under protest;. In Voinet v. Barrett, there was no protest but there was appearance. The decision in Boissiere & Co. v. Brockner & Co. is questioned by Mr. Dicey in his Conflict of Laws.

    [Wallis, C.J:— Mr. Dicey's view was brought to the notice of their Lordships in Harris v. Taylor.]

    Your Lordships will have to go to this extent, viz., whether there was protest or no protest, the moment a person appears he submits himself to the jurisdiction.

    [Wallis, C.J:— Protest does not matter, appearance is what is material.]

    Further the circumstances ought also to be taken notice of. There are many states in this country. Refers to Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Sait, Narayana Moothad v. The Cochin-Circar and Schibsby v. Westenholz(8).

    T.R Krishnaswami Ayyar for the appellant was not called upon in reply.

    This Appeal against Appellate Order coining on for hearing in pursuance of the above Order of Reference, the following Opinion of the Court was delivered by

    Wallis, C.J:— We think that Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai(9) must be overruled. No authorities are cited in the judgment of the Appellate Court, but the learned Judge who decided the case on the original side referred on the point to The General Steam Navigation Company v. Guillou and to Schibsby v. Westenholz. The dicta in The General Steam:— Navigation Company v. Guillou, on which the learned Judge relied, were questioned in Schibsby v. Westenholz which is rather against the view taken by him as in that case the question on which the Court of Queen's Bench decided to express no opinion was “as to the effect of the appearance of the defendant, where it is so far not voluntary that he only comes in to try and save some property in the hands of the foreign tribunal” rather implying that at any rate where there was no property in the hands of the foreign tribunal appearance there would amount to submission. The later English Cases referred to in the Order of Reference and in Veeraraghava Aiyar v. Muga Seit, including the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Harris v. Taylor, as also Harchand Panaji v. Gulabchand Kanji, are clearly opposed to Parry & Co. v. Appasami Pillai, which must be overruled. That is sufficient to dispose of the reference, as the facts of the present case are identical.

    C.M.N

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