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  • sec. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935,
  • Rules of Indian Railway Establishment Code,
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citation codes
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  • sec. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935,
  • Rules of Indian Railway Establishment Code,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution by eight petitioners seeking a writ to restrain respondents from giving effect to an order dated 3 April 1952. That order cancelled the petitioners' confirmations to certain posts in the East Indian Railway and reverted them to lower posts with effect from 1 April 1952.

The factual sequence, as recited in the opinion, is:

  • In April 1945 the petitioners were recruited by the Bengal and Assam Railway as "Special Clerks" on a stated pay scale and underwent two years' probationary training in Commercial and Transportation branches.
  • They were confirmed in that post with effect from 1 May 1947. A circular of 5 May 1947 stated these officers would be used for inspectorial and control work and that "regarding their absorption and promotion, they will take their places with other staff in the categories of Inspectors and Controllers and in the normal course they will come below those who were selected and placed in the approved panel before them."
  • After partition, in August 1947, the petitioners were transferred to the East Indian Railway on the same terms. The East Indian Railway formed panels for Inspectors and Controllers; the petitioners were not included and pursued internal appeals which were turned down at various stages.
  • Following review, the Chief Commercial Manager concluded the "special clerks" should be treated like East Indian Railway Commercial Apprentices and on 6 January 1951 the Administration provisionally permanently promoted the petitioners as Claims Inspectors (grade Rs. 200-10-300), placed them on seniority lists above Commercial Apprentices, and confirmed them in preference to officiating Claims Inspectors by inter-departmental correspondence dated 31 March and 24 April 1951.
  • On 3 April 1952, after an appeal by officiating E.I. Railway Claims Inspectors, the General Manager reinterpreted the 5 May 1947 circular to mean that the petitioners must take places below those placed in approved panels before the petitioners completed training. The petitioners were reverted to Assistant Claims Inspectors (grade Rs. 150-225) effective 1 April 1952, and eight E.I. Railway officiating Claims Inspectors were provisionally confirmed in the higher posts.
  • The petitioners challenged the reversion order as arbitrary and as violating Article 311(2) of the Constitution (reduction in rank without an opportunity to show cause).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 3 April 1952 reverting the petitioners to lower posts was arbitrary or unreasonable and therefore susceptible to writ interference under Article 226.
  2. Whether the reversion order violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution because the petitioners were reduced in rank without being given an opportunity to show cause.
  3. Whether the petitioners' entitlement (if any) to the posts of Claims Inspectors depended on contracts executed in the form required by section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Regulation 143 / Appendix XXIV of the Railway Code, and whether absence of such fresh agreements defeats their claim.
  4. Whether Rule 1714 (Railway Code) or any other rule precluded the Railway Authorities from assigning the petitioners to lower posts.
  5. Whether the petitioners satisfied the procedural prerequisite of a proper "demand of justice" before instituting the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Niren De)

  • The order of 3 April 1952 is arbitrary and was passed in contravention of Article 311(2) because it reduced the petitioners in rank without giving them an opportunity to show cause.
  • Impliedly, the petitioners relied on prior confirmations and administrative assurances (including earlier office orders placing them on seniority lists and confirming them as Claims Inspectors) to assert a substantive right to the higher posts.
  • There was a demand of justice (pleaded paragraph 28 and a telegram dated 24 March 1952 was produced) addressing the grievance prior to litigation.

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. A. K. Sen and in the affidavit)

  • The petitioners were only "provisionally permanently confirmed" and, even if so described, were effectively holding Claims Inspector posts in an officiating capacity; their substantive posts were those of Special Clerks, so the order did not amount to a reduction in rank within Article 311(2).
  • The recruitment terms for Special Clerks promised appointment as clerks, junior inspectors or other suitable posts upon completion of training, but did not go further; in contrast, E.I. Railway Commercial Apprentices had distinct assurances of appointment as Claims Inspector or junior research inspector on completion of training.
  • The earlier favourable orders were based on a mistaken view that the terms and conditions of B.A. Railway special clerks were identical to those of E.I. Railway Commercial Apprentices; on review the General Manager found the terms were not identical and rescission of confirmations followed from that construction.
  • No proper "demand of justice" was made on the relevant respondents prior to filing the petition (the telegram was sent to the Railway Board before the order and no demand was made on respondents Nos. 1 and 2).
  • When required forms of contract for Claims Inspectors were sought, respondents could produce only a form applicable to Transportation Commercial Apprentices and not a fresh agreement for the substantive appointment as Claims Inspectors.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M.V. Vichoray v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1952) 7 Dominion Law Report (Nagpur) 58 Cited for the proposition that Article 311(2) is attracted if a reversion is effected by way of penalty (i.e., when reduction is punitive). The Court noted the case as authority for the distinction that Art. 311(2) protects against punitive reductions; it used this to analyse whether the present reversion was punitive (it concluded it was not).
Jayanti Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (A.I.R. 1951 All. 793) Used among authorities establishing that "dismissal, removal and reduction in rank" in Art. 311(2) have a technical meaning and that Art. 311(2) is engaged only when action is for misconduct or fault. Counted with other decisions to support the proposition that Art. 311(2) does not apply to non-punitive administrative reassignments.
Kewalmal Singhi v. State of Rajasthan (A.I.R. 1952 Rajasthan 17) Same general proposition as above about the technical scope of "dismissal, removal and reduction in rank" under Art. 311(2). Relied on to frame the legal test for applicability of Art. 311(2) to the facts of the present case.
Des Raj v. Dominion of India (A.I.R. 1952 Punjab 205) Also cited for the technical interpretation of Art. 311(2) and its application only when disciplinary or fault-based action is taken. Used alongside other cases to conclude Art. 311(2) was not triggered here.
Kamal Kanti Ghose v. J. H. Patridge (Original Side Matter No. 187 of 1951) Cited as additional authority on the technical meaning of the terms in Art. 311(2). Referenced as part of the legal background informing the Court's conclusion on Art. 311(2).
Sriram Arjundas v. Governor General in Council (86 C.L.J. 308) Cited for the proposition that section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 applies to contracts entered into by Railway Administrations and that Railway service contracts must conform with Reg. 143 and Appendix XXIV forms. The opinion noted this authority but declined to decide whether non-compliance with those requirements was decisive in the present case; the Court observed petitioners said they had entered into Form I Appendix XXIV agreements and that this was not disputed.
Union of India v. Elbridge Watson (56 C.W.N. 232) Cited for the law on the "demand of justice" prerequisite — that demand must be specific and directed to the persons against whom relief is sought. The Court applied this authority to find that the petitioners had not made the required specific demand on the relevant respondents and that the telegram to the Railway Board was insufficient; this deficiency weighed against the petitioners.
Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Ed.), Vol. 9, para 1307 (pg. 771) Referenced for exceptions to the demand-of-justice requirement. The Court observed that although there was not a strict demand as required, the petitioners' case might arguably fall within exceptions discussed in Halsbury; nevertheless, on other grounds the petition failed.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, following the materials and arguments presented in the record:

  1. Construction of the 5 May 1947 circular: The court examined the clause stating that upon completion of training the special clerks "will take their places with other staff ... and in the normal course they will come below those who were selected and placed in the approved panel before them." The court acknowledged that the authorities may have misconstrued that circular and come to a wrong estimate of the petitioners' claims, but found insufficient evidence to conclude the respondents' conduct in making the 3 April 1952 order was arbitrary.
  2. Assessment of administrative process and history: The court reviewed the administrative history (appeals, inter-departmental notes, the Chief Commercial Manager's scrutiny and recommendation) and observed that high officials had at times expressed differing views, producing confusion and hardship for the employees. The judge criticized administrative inconsistency but treated it as insufficient to render the reversion arbitrary.
  3. Article 311(2) analysis: Counsel for petitioners argued the reversion violated Art. 311(2) because there was no opportunity to show cause. The respondents argued the petitioners were holding the higher posts only officiatingly and thus there was no reduction in rank. The court concluded:
    • The record (letters of 24 April 1951 and 31 March 1951) showed the authorities treated the petitioners as having been confirmed as Claims Inspectors; the words "provisionally permanently promoted" were ambiguous but the documentary context indicated confirmation.
    • Even assuming an officiating status, the court accepted the legal principle from authorities that Art. 311(2) applies where the reduction is inflicted as a penalty for misconduct. The court found the present reversion was not punitive but was made on the footing that the petitioners had been assigned posts under a misapprehension of entitlement.
    • Consequently, Art. 311(2) did not apply to invalidate the order under the facts of this case.
  4. Contract-formation and statutory form requirements: Respondents stressed that sec. 175(3) (Government of India Act) and Reg. 143/Appendix XXIV prescribe forms for railway service contracts. The petitioners asserted they had entered into Form I Appendix XXIV agreements when recruited as special clerks. The court noted the point, observed that Form No.1 contains a clause that a non-gazetted railway servant remains subject to the agreement irrespective of capacity later held, but ultimately declined to decide the broader legal question whether fresh agreements were required when promoted. The court said it was unnecessary to resolve that issue for disposal of the petition.
  5. Rule 1714 argument: Petitioners argued that aside from Rule 1714 the Railway Authorities had no power to reduce a servant to a lower post. The court rejected the contention because the reversion was not a disciplinary reduction; Rule 1714 itself suggested there could be reductions for reasons other than penalty and the impugned reversion was founded on a view that posts had been allotted under a misapprehension.
  6. Demand of justice (procedural prerequisite): The court examined whether the petitioners complied with the prerequisite of making a demand of justice before seeking writ relief. The petitioners relied on a telegram to the Railway Board (24 March 1952) and the pleadings. The court held that the telegram was sent before the 3 April order and that no demand was made on respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Citing Union of India v. Elbridge Watson, the judge stated that the demand must be specific and directed to the parties sought to be restrained. The absence of a proper demand weighed against the petitioners, though the court noted exceptions might apply in some situations (citing Halsbury) — but concluded the petition failed on other grounds anyway.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE PETITION IS DISMISSED. The rule is discharged.

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The impugned order dated 3 April 1952 (reverting the petitioners to lower posts with effect from 1 April 1952) was not set aside by the Court on the grounds urged in the petition.
  • The Court held that Article 311(2) did not apply because the reversion was not a punitive reduction in rank but an administrative reallocation based on a concluded view that prior confirmations had resulted from a misapprehension of entitlement.
  • The absence of a proper "demand of justice" on the relevant respondents prior to filing the writ weighed against the petitioners; the Court noted that although exceptions exist, the petition failed for other reasons as well.
  • The Court made no order as to costs.
  • The opinion did not purport to lay down a broad new precedent; it resolved the dispute on the particular factual and legal matrix before it and expressly declined to decide some broader legal questions (for example, whether fresh written agreements were necessary on promotion under sec. 175(3) and Regulation 143).

This summary is strictly limited to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer factual or legal material beyond that text.

    Amalendu Roy Choudhury v. Kailash Behari Mathur And Ors.

    1. This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution for an appropriate writ directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to an order, dated the 3rd of April, 1952, which cancelled the confirmation of the petitioners to certain posts in the East Indian Railway and reverted them to certain lower posts with effect from 1st of April, 1952.

    2. In April, 1945, the petitioners who are eight in number were recruited by the Bengal and Assam Railway Administration and were designated as “Special Clerks” on scale of pay of Rs. 100-10|2-120|-. After the said recruitment the petitioners were given training as Probationers in the Commercial and Transportation Branches of the said Raliway for a full period of 2 years. Thereafter the petitioners were confirmed in that post with effect from 1st May, 1947. On the 5th May, 1947, a circular letter was issued under the signature of Chief Commercial Manager of the Bengal Assam Railway in Which it was stated that these officers would on the completion of their training be utilised in Inspectorial and control work generally and regarding their absorption and promotion they would take their places with other staff in the categories of Inspectors and Controllers and in the normal course they would come below those who are selected and placed in the approved panel before them. By this letter all the “special clerks” except those who had not completed their training were confirmed in that post with effect from 13th May, 1947. In August, 1947, after the partition of India the petitioners were transferred to the East Indian Railway, after there was disintegration of the— Bengal Assam Railway, on identical terms and conditions of service which governed them when they were in the B.A Railway. Thereafter the East Indian Railway Administration commenced forming panels of Inspectors and Controllers but the petitioners were not included in such panels in November, 1947, the petitioners preferred an appeal to the Deputy General Manager (Personnel) through Divisional Superintendent, Sealdah, but the Superintendent without forwarding the said appeal turned it down on 20th November, 1947. But on being requested by the petitioners on the 29th November, 1947, to forward that appeal the appeal was forwarded on 15th December, 1947, but the Deputy General Manager on the 10th January, 1948, upheld the decision of the Divisional Superintendent. Subsequently, through the intervention of the Regional Labour Commissioner, the petitioners asked for a review of their Cases. Thereafter further appeals were preferred and the Chief Commercial Manager considered the service conditions and the status of the “special clerks” and was of the view that the “special clerks” should be treated in the same way as the Traffic Apprentices on the East Indian Railway. It was pointed out in the Note of the C.C.M that the “special clerks” were not intended for clerical jobs. On 6th January, 1951, the Railway Administration appears to have passed an order by which the petitioners were provisionally permanently promoted as Claims Inspectors in Grade of Rs. 200-10-300 (P.C), with effect from 10th January, 1951, and certain temporary posts of Claims Inspectors were assigned to them. It is stated in this order that as the petitioners had completed their training much earlier than the East Indian Railway Commercial Apprentices the Chief Commercial Manager had decided that the former should be placed on the seniority list above the latter. It further appears from an inter-departmental letter of the Railway, dated the 31st March, 1951, that the “special clerks” had been confirmed as Claims Inspectors in preference to all officiating Claims Inspectors in accordance with their terms and conditions under which they were directly recruited. On the 9th of April, 1951, there appears to have been another Office order under which the petitioners were placed on the seniority list above the Commercial Apprentices irrespective of the fact that the former had been confirmed from later dates. It further appears from a letter, dated the 24th of April, 1951, written by Mr. Rangachari to the Superintendent (C. & R.), Benares D Cantt., that in accordance with the order of the Chief Commercial Manager, out of the total permanent posts of Claims Inspectors, 13 permanent posts had been made use of for the absorption of 5 East Indian Railway Commercial Apprentices and 8 ex-B.A Railway “special clerks” by virtue of their Service conditions. On the 3rd of April, 1952, upon an appeal preferred by the East Indian Railway officiating Claims Inspectors the then General Manager decided upon an interpretation of the circular letter, dated the 5th May, 1947, that for the purpose of absorption and promotion the petitioners on completion of their training had to take their places with other staff below those who had been selected and placed in the approved panels before they completed their training. Consequently, as the petitioners had completed their training in May, 1947, and the last panel for the post of Commercial Inspectors was formed in February, 1947, the petitioners must be placed after N.K Roy, the last man of the February, 1947, panel formed on the ex-B.A Railway. An order was therefore made reverting the petitioners to the posts of Assistant Claims Inspectors in Grade of Rs. 150-225 (P.C), with effect from 1st April, 1952, and eight officiating Claims Inspectors who were E.I Railway men were provisionally confirmed in the posts of Claims Inspectors in Grade of Rs. 200-10-300 (P.C). The petitioners have challenged this order of reversion, dated the 3rd April, 1952, as arbitrary and as being made in contravention of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India.

    3. The Head Quarter Personnel Officer has affirmed the affidavit in opposition. It is stated in this affidavit with reference to the advertisement which was issued for recruitment of special clerks, that these special clerks were assured that on completion of their training they (would be appointed as clerks, Junior Inspectors or to any other suitable post and it is suggested that the assurance extended no further. But the Commercial Apprentices recruited by the East Indian Railway in 1946, were assured that they would be offered employment as Claims Inspector or as junior research Inspector on completion of their training.

    4. It is further stated in paragraph 17 of this affidavit that the orders and memoranda which were made in favour of the petitioners were made on the interpretation that the terms and conditions of B.A Railway special clerks were the same as those of E.I Railway Commercial apprentices but it was subsequently held by the General Manager of the Railway on perusal of the terms and conditions of both the categories that they were not identical and this fact was overlooked in the beginning. The memorandum which was made by the Chief Commercial Manager on 24th July, 1951, sums up in paragraph 20 thereof the position of the special clerks. It may be that the summary is not accurate in all its particulars but it is clear that the Chief Commercial Manager had gone into the matter fully and after scrutinising the papers of the relevant files he came to the conclusion that the orders regarding the confirmation of the petitioners as Claims Inspectors should be rescinded. But in view of the fact that the petitioners had been confirmed as Special clerks in May, 1947 and since then had been in Service for four years, and as they must have acquired some experience during the period they should be made to appear before a Selection Board and those found suitable for promotion should be designated as A.C.T.I's in Grade 200-300 but those not found suitable for promotion might be posted as Assistant Claims Inspectors or as Junior Research Inspectors or in any other similar category in Grade 150-225.

    5. Upon this recommendation the Deputy General Manager made an endorsement suggesting that eight supernumerary posts of Claims Inspectors might be created but the Financial Adviser by his letter, dated 8th January, 1952, turned down the proposal on the ground that this would involve an infructuous expenditure of approximately Rs. 30,000 per year for an indefinite period.

    6. It is upon these facts and after construing the Circular letter, No. 85E152(T), dated 5th May, 1947, and particularly the following clause:

    “Regarding their absorption and promotion, they will take their places with other staff in the categories of Inspectors and Controllers and in the normal course they will come below those who were selected and placed in the approved panel before them,”

    the Deputy General Manager made the Order of reversion. It may be that the Authorities have misconstrued the Circular letter, dated the 5th May, 1947, and have made a wrong estimate of the reasonableness of the claims of the petitioners but I am unable to come to a definite conclusion that the conduct or act of the respondents in making or approving the order, dated the 3rd April, 1952, was arbitrary. There have been appeals and representations to the Authorities from time to time by one group of employees or the other and the different officials have from time to time expressed different views about the status and position and about the conditions of Service of these employees with the result that the poor employees have been made the victims of hardship and disappointment and have suffered degradation in course of their employments.

    7. If anybody is to be blamed for the feelings of discontent and unrest amongst the employees of this Railway it is undoubtedly the high officials who are at the helm of affairs.

    8. It is either the error of their judgment in taking a particular course of action or it is their desire to favour one group of employees at the expense of another group which is responsible for bringing about this unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Railway Administration.

    9. Mr. Niren De further contended that the order of the 3rd April, 1952, is in contravention of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution as it reduced the petitioners in rank without giving them any opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against them. Mr. A.K Sen, the learned Counsel for the respondents, has argued that as the petitioners were only “provisionally permanently confirmed as Claims Inspectors”, they were holding the said posts as only in an officiating capacity and their substantive posts being those of special clerks, there was no reduction in rank by the order of 3rd April, 1952.

    10. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sen. Although the words “provisionally permanently promoted” are ambiguous in their nature, the letter of Mr. Rangachari of the. 24th April, 1051, and his earlier letter of the 31st March, 1951, make it clear that it was understood by the railway authorities that the petitioners were confirmed in the posts of Claims Inspectors. Even assuming that the petitioners Were merely holding the posts of Claims Inspectors in an officiating capacity, I would have held that the petitioners had been reduced in rank within the meaning of Art. 311(2) if they had been reverted by way of penalty. [See M.V Vichoray v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1), (1952) 7 Dominion Law Report (Nagpur) 58], judgment of Mangalmurti, J., and Madholkar, J.]. It has been held by this Court as also by other High Courts that the words “dismissal, removal and reduction in rank” in Art. 311(2) have a technical meaning and it is only when an employee is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank for misconduct or some fault on the part of the employee that this Article is attracted. See Jayanti Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2), (A.I.R 1951 All. 793); Kewalmal Singhi v. State Of Rajasthan (3), (A.I.R 1952 Rajasthan 17; Des Raj v. Dominion of India (4), (A.I.R 1952 Punjab 205), and Original Side Matter No. 187 of 1951, Kamal Kanti Ghose v. J.H Patridge (5).

    11. It was argued by Mr. Niren De, that St is clear from the affidavit in opposition, paragraph 3(e), and the summary in paragraph 20 of the Memorandum dated the 24th July, 1951, that the petitioners were reduced for inefficiency. It appears to me however that this is not the correct position. The reason why the order of reversion was made appears from the body of the order itself, dated the 3rd April, 1952. In my view the petitioners cannot invoke the operation of Art. 311(2) in the facts and circumstances of this case.

    12. It was argued by Mr. A.K Sen, that as there are no contracts of service in the form required by sec. 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the petitioners cannot rely on the conditions of service which are alleged to govern their employment in the service of the Union., It is true that section 175(3) applies to contracts entered into by Railway Administration. (See Sriram Arjundas…Plaintiff; v. Governor General In Council…Defendant. in Council (6), (86 C.L.J 308), and in case of contracts of service of railway employees the Agreements have to be in accordance with Reg. 143 of the Rules of Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I, and in forms in Appendix XXIV, but it is stated by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that when the petitioners were recruited as special clerks they had entered into Agreements in Form I of Appendix XXIV. This statement is not disputed by Mr. A.K Ben, but it is urged by him that when the petitioners were promoted as Claims Inspectors, no fresh Agreement was executed. I asked Mr. Sen to produce a Form of the Agreement of employment of Claims Inspectors but he has not been able to produce any. He produced only a Form of Agreement for Transportation Commercial Apprentices. The Form produced is an old one. It appears from Form No. 1 in Appendix XXIV of the Railway Code that a Railway servant SO long as he is of non-gazetted status continues to be subject to this Agreement in whatever capacity he may be employed later on (Clause 14), Page 346. However, as it is not necessary to decide for the purpose of this case the question whether apart from Keg. 143 of the Railway Code it was necessary for every railway employee to enter into a contract of employment in the form required by sec. 175(3), and it is necessary to do so now under Art. 299 of the Constitution, I do not express any opinion on this point. This application, as I have indicated before, fails on other points.

    13. Mr. Niren De also submitted that apart from Rule, 1714 of the Railway Code there is no power in the Railway Authorities to reduce a railway servant to a lower post and so the order is bad. But as I have pointed out before, the order of the 3rd of April, 1952, is not really an order of reduction in rank be cause reduction in this sense implies that it is inflicted by way of penalty. The order impugned is made on the footing that certain posts were allotted to the petitioners under a misapprehension. The petitioners have no right to remain in those posts and so they are assigned certain other posts which are no doubt posts of a lower grade. Rule, 1714 itself suggests that there can be reduction to a lower post for reasons other than those mentioned in the Rule. It appears to me that there is no substance in this contention of Mr. De.

    14. It was contended by Mr. A.K Sen that there has been no demand of justice in this case preceding the application under Art. 226 and so this petition must fail.

    15. The demand of justice and refusal is pleaded in paragraph 28 of the petition and Mr. De has produced a telegram, dated the 24th March, 1952, addressed to the Railway Board. It has been held in the case of Union of India v. Elbridge Watson (7), (56 C.W.N 232), that this demand of justice is not merely a matter of form but is a matter of substance, and the persons against whom relief is sought must be specifically required to do the very act in respect of which relief is sought against such persons. This course does not appear to have been strictly followed in this case and there has not been a proper demand of justice as required by law. The telegram was sent to Railway Board before the Order of 3rd April, 1952, was made. No demand was made from respondents Nos. 1 and 2, at all and this application was moved on 10th April, 1952. The petitioners, it appears, were pressed by considerations of urgency as Railway Regrouping scheme was imminent and so they did not make any further demands. If the petitioners had made out grounds for interference this absence of proper demands would not have stood in the way of the petitioners getting reliefs in this application, as it appears to me that the case of the petitioners might be said to fall within the exceptions contemplated in the concluding portions of the passage dealing with this question of demand of justice and refusal in Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Ed.) Vol. 9. page 771 paragraph 1307.

    16. In my view this petition must fail. Rule is discharged. I make no order as to costs.

    A.K.D.G

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    Amalendu Roy Choudhury v. Kailash Behari Mathur And Ors.
    (Jul 2, 1952)